Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries
P. v. Holliday
In this case, two defendants were tried for multiple assaultive incidents that occurred in 2017. The first incident involved the defendants accosting a man in Pacific Beach, where one defendant punched the victim and the other stole his bike. The second incident took place in Chula Vista, where the defendants attempted to rob a man carrying a shopping bag. The third incident occurred in the Gaslamp Quarter, where one defendant punched an inebriated man, leading to a brawl during which the other defendant fatally stabbed one man and seriously injured another.The Superior Court of San Diego County found both defendants guilty of conspiracy to commit robbery and robbery for the Pacific Beach and Chula Vista incidents. One defendant was also found guilty of premeditated murder, attempted murder, and assault by force likely to produce great bodily injury for the Gaslamp Quarter incident. The other defendant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter and assault by force likely to produce great bodily injury for the same incident.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the trial court erred by giving a modified version of CALCRIM No. 375, which used a preponderance of the evidence standard for the jury’s consideration of evidence of the charged Pacific Beach and Chula Vista crimes. This instruction effectively lowered the prosecution’s burden of proving those crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, resulting in a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Such a structural error is reversible per se.The Court of Appeal reversed both defendants’ convictions for the Pacific Beach and Chula Vista crimes (counts 5–7) and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed the remaining convictions related to the Gaslamp Quarter incident, finding no prejudicial error in those respects. View "P. v. Holliday" on Justia Law
Strom Trust v. SCS Carbon Transport, LLC
SCS Carbon Transport, LLC (SCS) plans to develop a pipeline network to transport carbon dioxide (CO2) through South Dakota. Several landowners (Landowners) along the proposed route refused to allow SCS pre-condemnation survey access, which SCS claims is authorized by SDCL 21-35-31. Landowners sued in both the Third and Fifth Judicial Circuits, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the surveys. These proceedings resulted in a consolidated appeal from six lawsuits filed by Landowners and one by SCS.The Third Circuit granted SCS summary judgment, determining that SCS was a common carrier and that SDCL 21-35-31 was constitutional. The Fifth Circuit also granted SCS summary judgment, adopting the Third Circuit’s reasoning. Landowners appealed, arguing that SCS is not a common carrier, CO2 is not a commodity, and that SDCL 21-35-31 violates the takings and due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reversed the circuit courts’ grants of summary judgment on the common carrier issues. The court held that SCS’s ability to conduct pre-condemnation surveys depends on whether it is a common carrier vested with the power of eminent domain. The record did not demonstrate that SCS is holding itself out to the general public as transporting a commodity for hire. The court also found that the circuit courts abused their discretion in denying Landowners’ request for further discovery.The court further held that SDCL 21-35-31 only authorizes limited pre-condemnation standard surveys, which are minimally invasive superficial inspections. The statute, as strictly interpreted, does not violate the federal or state constitutions. The court concluded that any actual damage caused by the surveys must be justly compensated, with the amount determined by a jury. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Strom Trust v. SCS Carbon Transport, LLC" on Justia Law
SIMS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Dennis Keith Sims was convicted by a Casey County jury of two counts of first-degree sexual abuse involving his granddaughters, nine-year-old D.C. and seven-year-old Z.C. The incidents occurred while the girls stayed with Sims during their mother’s illness. Upon their return, D.C. exhibited behavioral changes and later disclosed inappropriate touching by Sims. Both girls provided testimony, with D.C. detailing multiple instances of abuse and Z.C. confirming inappropriate touching.The Casey Circuit Court sentenced Sims to twenty years in prison, following the jury's recommendation. Sims appealed, raising several issues. He argued that the trial court erred by not administering an oath to the prospective jurors before voir dire, violating his Sixth Amendment rights by allowing the girls to testify outside his presence, and admitting late-disclosed evidence. He also contended that the court improperly excluded certain testimony and that there was insufficient evidence to convict him regarding Z.C.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decisions. The court found no error in the trial court's failure to administer an oath to the venire, as no rule required it. The court also upheld the decision to allow the girls to testify outside Sims’s presence, citing sufficient evidence of their emotional distress. The court ruled that Sims was not deprived of effective counsel despite being separated from his attorney during the girls' testimony, as he had opportunities to consult with his lawyer. The court found no abuse of discretion in admitting the late-disclosed evidence and excluding hearsay testimony. Finally, the court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction related to Z.C., given the testimonies and Sims’s own statements. View "SIMS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law
RAZ, INC. V. MERCER COUNTY FISCAL COURT
In 2002, a 208-acre estate in Jessamine County was divided into four parcels. In 2004, the owner of Parcel 2 planned residential development, including a bridge and road extension, which was approved by the Nicholasville Planning Commission (NPC). By 2017, LPW Redevelopment, LLC owned Parcels 2 and 3, sought a zone change, and submitted a development plan, which was approved. Boone Development, LLC purchased Parcel 3 in 2018 and began construction. The NPC required Boone to include the bridge and road extension in a letter of credit, which Boone disputed, leading to this litigation.The Jessamine Circuit Court ruled in favor of Boone, stating the NPC had not made a decision, necessitating a declaratory action. The NPC then issued a Notice of Decision affirming its requirements, which the Board of Adjustment upheld. Boone appealed, and the Jessamine Circuit Court affirmed the Board’s decision, finding the Board’s actions were within its legislative powers, provided due process, and were supported by substantial evidence.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case, focusing on the constitutionality of the appeal bond requirement in KRS 100.3471. The Court found the statute unconstitutional, referencing its decision in Bluegrass Trust v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government. The Court also addressed the merits of the case, affirming the Jessamine Circuit Court’s decision that Boone was responsible for the bridge and road extension as per the development plan. The Court found no procedural due process violations and determined the Board’s decision was not arbitrary or unreasonable. The Court of Appeals’ dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was reversed, and the Jessamine Circuit Court’s judgment was affirmed. View "RAZ, INC. V. MERCER COUNTY FISCAL COURT" on Justia Law
BOONE DEVELOPMENT, LLC V. NICHOLASVILLE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT
In 2002, a 208-acre estate in Jessamine County was divided into four parcels. In 2004, the owner of Parcel 2 planned residential development, including a bridge and road extension, which was approved by the Nicholasville Planning Commission (NPC). However, these were not built. LPW Redevelopment, LLC later acquired Parcels 2 and 3, sought a zone change, and submitted a development plan, which included the bridge and road extension. Boone Development, LLC purchased Parcel 3 in 2018 and began construction. The City of Nicholasville then informed Boone it was responsible for the bridge and road extension, which Boone disputed.Boone filed a declaratory action in Jessamine Circuit Court, which ruled in Boone's favor, instructing the NPC to make a decision. The NPC affirmed its letter of credit requirements, including the bridge and road extension. The Board of Adjustment upheld the NPC's decision. Boone appealed, and the Jessamine Circuit Court affirmed the Board's decision, finding the Board's actions were within its legislative powers, provided procedural due process, and were supported by substantial evidence.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case, focusing on the constitutionality of the appeal bond requirement in KRS 100.3471. The Court held that the statute imposed an unconstitutional burden on the right to appeal, referencing its contemporaneous decision in Bluegrass Trust v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals' dismissal of Boone's appeal for lack of jurisdiction due to the bond issue. On the merits, the Supreme Court affirmed the Jessamine Circuit Court's decision, finding the NPC's requirements for the bridge and road extension were not clearly unreasonable. View "BOONE DEVELOPMENT, LLC V. NICHOLASVILLE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT" on Justia Law
BLUEGRASS TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION V. LEXINGTON FAYETTE URBAN COUNTY GOVERNMENT PLANNING COMMISSION
The case involves the Commonwealth Building, located in the South Hill Historic District in Lexington, Kentucky. Built in the late 1950s, the building was purchased by The Residences at South Hill, LLC in 2017. The Residences sought approval from the Board of Architectural Review (BOAR) to demolish the building and construct a five-story apartment complex. The BOAR approved the demolition, leading to several appeals. The Historic South Hill Neighborhood Association (HSHNA) and Bluegrass Trust for Historic Preservation (Bluegrass Trust) were among the appellants, with Bluegrass Trust arguing that the building contributed to the historic character of the district and could provide economic return if renovated.The Fayette Circuit Court reviewed the case and concluded that the Planning Commission's decision to uphold the BOAR's approval was supported by substantial evidence. The court noted that the Planning Commission had considered various testimonies and evidence, including expert opinions, and found that the Commonwealth Building did not contribute to the historic character of the district. Bluegrass Trust appealed to the Kentucky Court of Appeals but did not post the required appeal bond, arguing financial incapacity. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction due to the failure to post the bond and stated in dictum that it would have affirmed the trial court's decision.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and held that Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 100.3471, which mandates an appeal bond in zoning and land use disputes, is unconstitutional. The court found that the statute infringes on the constitutional right of Kentuckians to at least one appeal to the next highest court, as guaranteed by Section 115 of the Kentucky Constitution. Consequently, the court reversed the Court of Appeals' dismissal of the appeal but affirmed the circuit court's decision on the merits, upholding the Planning Commission's approval of the demolition. View "BLUEGRASS TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION V. LEXINGTON FAYETTE URBAN COUNTY GOVERNMENT PLANNING COMMISSION" on Justia Law
Commonwealth v. Lacrosse
The defendant was convicted of first-degree murder for the stabbing death of his ex-girlfriend, Kathryn Mauke. The defendant and the victim had dated on and off for several years, but the victim ended the relationship in December 2014. On February 11, 2015, the defendant left work early, walked to the victim's home, and stabbed her thirty-two times. The defendant's primary defense at trial was that he was not criminally responsible due to mental illness, which the jury rejected.The case was initially tried in the Superior Court, where the defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. The defendant filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the testimony of two incarcerated informants was unreliable and that his trial counsel was ineffective. The motion was denied by the same judge who presided over the trial. The defendant then appealed both his conviction and the denial of his motion for a new trial.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. The court held that the testimony of the two incarcerated informants was permissible and declined to create a new rule requiring reliability hearings for such testimony. However, the court mandated supplemental jury instructions for future cases involving incarcerated informants. The court also found that the defendant's trial counsel provided effective assistance and that the prosecutor's statements during closing arguments were proper. The court concluded that the defendant's sentence of life without parole was unconstitutional based on a recent decision, Commonwealth v. Mattis, and modified the sentence to allow for parole eligibility after thirty years. The court affirmed the conviction and the denial of the motion for a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Lacrosse" on Justia Law
Porretto v. City of Galveston
Plaintiff-Appellant Sonya Porretto owns Porretto Beach in Galveston, Texas. After filing for bankruptcy in 2009, her case was converted to a Chapter 7 proceeding. In 2020, the bankruptcy trustee abandoned the Porretto Beach property back to her. In 2021, Porretto filed a lawsuit against the City of Galveston Park Board of Trustees, the City of Galveston, the Texas General Land Office (GLO), and its Commissioner, alleging that their actions constituted takings without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment.The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed Porretto’s lawsuit. The court concluded that Porretto lacked standing to sue the GLO and its Commissioner because her complaint did not establish a causal link between their actions and her alleged injuries. The court also found that it lacked bankruptcy jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334 and federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as Porretto did not invoke 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for her constitutional claims. Additionally, the court denied Porretto leave to amend her complaint and her motion for recusal of the presiding judge.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Porretto’s claims against the GLO and its Commissioner without prejudice, agreeing that Porretto lacked standing. However, the appellate court vacated the district court’s dismissal of Porretto’s claims against the Park Board and the City of Galveston, finding that the district court does have federal question jurisdiction over her constitutional claims despite her failure to cite § 1983. The case was remanded for the district court to consider alternative arguments for dismissal and the issue of supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims. The appellate court also affirmed the district court’s denial of Porretto’s motion for recusal and her request for reassignment to a different judge. View "Porretto v. City of Galveston" on Justia Law
Kalu v. Spaulding
In 2016, John O. Kalu, an inmate at FCI Allenwood, alleged that he was sexually assaulted on three separate occasions by Lieutenant K. Middernatch. Kalu reported the first two incidents to Warden Spaulding, who responded that he would investigate but took no further action. Following his report, Kalu was placed in the Special Housing Unit (SHU) and later returned to the general population, where he was assaulted a third time. Kalu also claimed that he was subjected to inhumane conditions of confinement, including being forced to sleep on a cold metal bunk in freezing temperatures without adequate clothing.Kalu filed a pro se complaint in the Middle District of Pennsylvania against Warden Spaulding and Lt. Middernatch, seeking damages under Bivens for violations of his Eighth Amendment rights. The District Court dismissed Kalu’s claims against Warden Spaulding for lack of personal involvement but allowed the sexual assault claim against Lt. Middernatch to proceed. Kalu later amended his complaint, but the District Court ultimately dismissed all claims, determining that they presented new Bivens contexts and that special factors counseled against extending Bivens remedies.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court’s dismissal. The court held that Kalu’s Eighth Amendment sexual assault and conditions-of-confinement claims presented new Bivens contexts. It found that special factors, including the availability of alternative remedies through the Bureau of Prisons’ Administrative Remedy Program, Congress’s omission of a standalone damages remedy in the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) and the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA), and separation of powers principles, counseled against extending Bivens liability. The court also agreed that Kalu’s complaint failed to allege sufficient facts to establish a plausible claim against Warden Spaulding for deliberate indifference or failure to protect. View "Kalu v. Spaulding" on Justia Law
Bost v. Illinois State Board of Elections
In Illinois, voters can cast their ballots by mail, and election officials can receive and count these ballots for up to two weeks after Election Day, provided they are postmarked or certified by Election Day. Plaintiffs, including Illinois voters and political candidates, challenged this procedure, arguing it unlawfully extends the voting period and dilutes their votes. They also claimed it forced them to spend additional resources on their campaigns beyond Election Day. The district court dismissed their claims, ruling that Plaintiffs lacked standing to sue and also rejected the claims on the merits.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the case, concluding that Plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the Illinois ballot receipt procedure. The court found that Plaintiffs did not allege a sufficient injury in fact, as their claims of vote dilution and additional campaign expenditures were deemed too speculative and generalized. Plaintiffs appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court held that Plaintiffs lacked standing because they did not allege a concrete and particularized injury. The court found that any potential vote dilution would affect all Illinois voters equally, making it a generalized grievance. Additionally, the court determined that the claimed campaign expenditures were speculative and not directly traceable to the Illinois ballot receipt procedure. Therefore, the court concluded that Plaintiffs did not meet the requirements for Article III standing and affirmed the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction. View "Bost v. Illinois State Board of Elections" on Justia Law