Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

A landowner in Hardin County, Iowa, refused to allow a surveyor for a pipeline developer to enter his private property. The developer, Summit Carbon Solutions, LLC, sought access under Iowa Code section 479B.15, which governs hazardous liquid pipelines. The district court ordered the landowner to allow the surveyor temporary access, rejecting the landowner’s claims that the statute was unconstitutional under the “takings” clauses of the U.S. and Iowa Constitutions and that carbon dioxide in a supercritical state is not a “hazardous liquid.”The Iowa District Court for Hardin County ruled that the statute was facially constitutional and that Summit was a “pipeline company” with access rights under section 479B.15. The court found that Summit had provided proper statutory notice to the landowner and that the landowner’s claim of having a tenant who did not receive notice was not credible. The court granted Summit’s request for injunctive relief to compel access for surveying.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that section 479B.15 is a lawful pre-existing limitation on the landowner’s title, consistent with longstanding background restrictions on property rights, and does not constitute a taking under the Federal or Iowa Constitutions. The court also held that supercritical carbon dioxide is a “hazardous liquid” within the meaning of section 479B.2, making Summit a pipeline company with access rights under the statute. The court found that Summit had complied with the statutory notice requirements and that no additional showing of irreparable harm was required for the injunction. The judgment and injunctive relief granted by the district court were affirmed. View "Summit Carbon Solutions, LLC v. Kasischke" on Justia Law

Alpine Securities Corporation, a securities broker-dealer and member of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), faced sanctions from FINRA in 2022 for violating its rules. FINRA imposed a cease-and-desist order and sought to expel Alpine from membership. Alpine challenged the constitutionality of FINRA in federal court, arguing that FINRA's expedited expulsion process violated the private nondelegation doctrine and the Appointments Clause.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied Alpine's request for a preliminary injunction to halt FINRA's expedited proceeding. The court held that FINRA is a private entity, not subject to the Appointments Clause, and that the SEC's ability to review FINRA's decisions satisfied the private nondelegation doctrine.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Alpine demonstrated a likelihood of success on its private nondelegation claim, as FINRA's expulsion orders take effect immediately without prior SEC review, effectively barring Alpine from the securities industry. The court held that this lack of governmental oversight likely violates the private nondelegation doctrine. The court also found that Alpine faced irreparable harm if expelled before SEC review, as it would be forced out of business.The court reversed the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction, instructing it to enjoin FINRA from expelling Alpine until the SEC reviews any expulsion order or the time for Alpine to seek SEC review lapses. However, the court did not grant a preliminary injunction on Alpine's Appointments Clause claims, as Alpine did not demonstrate irreparable harm from participating in FINRA's expedited proceeding itself. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's findings. View "Alpine Securities Corporation v. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc." on Justia Law

Mark Johnson sued the Clarksdale Public Utilities Authority (CPU) and its members in federal district court, alleging he was fired for reporting inefficiency and incompetence to the state auditor. His initial complaint asserted retaliation under the Mississippi Whistleblower Protection Act (MWPA), later amended to include First Amendment retaliation and breach of contract. The defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, which the district court granted, holding that Johnson failed to comply with the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA) notice requirements and that the MWPA claim was barred by the MTCA’s one-year statute of limitations. The court also found Johnson’s First Amendment and breach-of-contract claims time-barred.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case, focusing on whether the MTCA’s procedural requirements apply to MWPA claims. The defendants argued that the MTCA’s broad application and limited immunity waiver necessitate compliance with its procedural requirements for MWPA claims. Johnson countered that the MWPA provides a separate right to monetary relief and should not be subject to the MTCA’s requirements.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the certified question from the Fifth Circuit. The court concluded that the MWPA is a remedial statute separate from the MTCA. The MWPA does not prescribe a statute of limitations or notice requirement, and the reference to the MTCA’s damages cap does not incorporate its procedural requirements. Therefore, the court held that MWPA claims are not subject to the MTCA’s statute of limitations and notice requirements. The certified question was answered accordingly. View "Johnson v. Miller" on Justia Law

Yamhill County filed an in rem civil forfeiture action against a property in Yamhill, Oregon, alleging it was used to facilitate prohibited conduct. Sheryl Lynn Sublet, who claimed an interest in the property, opposed the forfeiture, arguing it violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment because she had already been prosecuted for the same conduct. The trial court rejected her argument, and a jury found in favor of the county, leading to a judgment forfeiting the property.The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, agreeing with Sublet that the forfeiture was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. The court held that civil forfeiture in Oregon is effectively a criminal penalty, thus implicating double jeopardy protections.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine whether civil forfeiture under Oregon law constitutes criminal punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The court concluded that the civil forfeiture scheme under ORS chapter 131A is intended to be remedial and not punitive. The court emphasized that the forfeiture proceeds through an in rem action, targeting the property itself rather than the owner, and incorporates distinctly civil procedures. The court found no clear proof that the forfeiture's purpose and effect are punitive, thus it does not trigger double jeopardy protections.The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that civil forfeiture under current Oregon law does not constitute criminal punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. View "Yamhill County v. Real Property" on Justia Law

Joseph Rothe was convicted of armed robbery with a dangerous weapon other than a firearm and sentenced to life imprisonment. He filed a pro se petition for relief from judgment, arguing that his conviction violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution because the elements of armed robbery with a weapon other than a firearm and armed violence with a Category III weapon are identical, but the penalties are different. The Madison County circuit court dismissed his petition as untimely.The appellate court affirmed the dismissal but on different grounds. It held that the petition was timely because constitutional challenges can be raised at any time. However, it rejected Rothe’s claim on the merits, ruling that the offenses do not have identical elements because they define "dangerous weapon" differently. The appellate court concluded that the armed robbery statute's broad definition of dangerous weapons is distinct from the specific list of Category III weapons in the armed violence statute.The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case and affirmed the appellate court's judgment. The court held that the definition of "dangerous weapon" under the armed robbery statute is broader than the defined list of Category III weapons in the armed violence statute. Therefore, the two statutes do not contain identical elements, and Rothe's claim that his conviction violated the proportionate penalties clause was without merit. The court concluded that the armed robbery and armed violence statutes are not identical offenses, and there was no violation of the proportionate penalties clause. The dismissal of Rothe’s petition was affirmed. View "People v. Rothe" on Justia Law

Robert Mann, a taxpayer, filed a lawsuit against the State of California and the California Highway Patrol (CHP), challenging CHP’s vehicle impound policies. Mann argued that the impoundment of vehicles without a warrant and inadequate notice procedures constituted illegal expenditures of public funds. He sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent what he characterized as wasteful, unlawful, and unconstitutional law enforcement policies. The trial court granted a permanent injunction requiring CHP to consider vehicle owners’ ability to pay towing and storage fees during impound hearings and vehicle release procedures, and to revise its notice form to advise owners of procedures for retrieving impounded vehicles.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County initially reviewed the case. At the close of the plaintiffs’ case, the trial court granted a motion for judgment against Youth Justice Coalition and entered judgment in favor of defendant Warren A. Stanley, who had retired before the trial. The court found that Stanley, as a former public officer, was no longer a proper defendant. The trial court issued a permanent injunction requiring CHP to revise its vehicle impound procedures, including considering the ability to pay and revising notice forms.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court reversed the trial court’s judgment, holding that the injunction improperly required CHP to contravene valid statutes, relied on inapplicable case law, conflicted with the existing statutory scheme, and mandated unnecessary revisions to its notice procedures. The appellate court concluded that the trial court erred in requiring CHP to conduct ability-to-pay hearings and revise its notice forms, as these requirements were not mandated by due process and conflicted with statutory provisions. The judgment was reversed, and costs on appeal were awarded to the appellant. View "Mann v. State" on Justia Law

On November 18, 2020, Officer Matthew Ibbotson and his partner stopped a silver Honda with heavily tinted windows in a high-crime area of Philadelphia for traffic violations. The driver, Omar Saunders, made suspicious movements, and Officer Ibbotson saw the handle of a gun under the driver’s seat. Saunders admitted he did not have a permit for the gun, which was later found to be stolen. Saunders was arrested, and the gun was seized.The Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County denied Saunders’s motion to suppress the gun, ruling that the seizure was justified under the plain view doctrine and the automobile exception, which requires both probable cause and exigent circumstances. Saunders was convicted of firearms offenses and sentenced to three and a half to seven years in prison. The Superior Court affirmed the judgment, holding that the seizure was lawful under the plain view doctrine.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case to determine the legality of the warrantless seizure. The court held that the seizure was constitutional under the plain view doctrine. It found that the police had a lawful vantage point, the incriminating nature of the gun was immediately apparent, and the police had a lawful right of access to the gun. The court emphasized that the unexpected development of probable cause during a lawful traffic stop justified the seizure without a warrant. Consequently, the court affirmed the Superior Court’s order upholding the denial of suppression of the firearm. View "Commonwealth v. Saunders" on Justia Law

The case involves a group of appellants, including individual citizens, CeaseFirePA, and the City of Philadelphia, who challenged two Pennsylvania statutes that prevent local governments from enacting their own firearms regulations. The appellants argue that these statutes, Section 6120 of the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act and Section 2962(g) of the Home Rule Charter and Optional Plans Law, hinder their ability to address gun violence effectively at the local level.The Commonwealth Court previously reviewed the case and dismissed the appellants' petition, sustaining preliminary objections for failure to state a claim. The court found that the appellants did not sufficiently allege violations of substantive due process under Article I, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, the state-created danger doctrine, or improper interference with Philadelphia's delegated duties under the Local Health Administration Law and the Disease Prevention and Control Law of 1955.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and affirmed the Commonwealth Court's decision. The court held that the appellants failed to identify a constitutionally protected right that the statutes infringed upon, thus failing to establish a substantive due process claim. The court also concluded that the appellants did not meet the elements required to establish a state-created danger claim, particularly the requirement that the harm caused was foreseeable and fairly direct. Lastly, the court determined that the statutes did not interfere with Philadelphia's delegated public health responsibilities, as the relevant laws did not implicitly or explicitly authorize local firearm regulation.In summary, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the dismissal of the appellants' petition, upholding the statutes that preempt local firearm regulations. View "Crawford v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Alcatel-Lucent USA Inc. (Alcatel) challenged the constitutionality of Pennsylvania's 2014 cap on net-loss carryover (NLC) deductions for corporate net income (CNI) tax. The cap allowed corporations to carry forward net operating losses up to the greater of $4 million or 25% of the company's 2014 net income. Alcatel, with a net income of $27,332,333 and accumulated losses exceeding that amount, could only carry over $6,833,083 due to the cap, resulting in a taxable income of around $20 million and a tax liability of approximately $2 million. Alcatel paid the tax and sought a refund, arguing the cap violated the Uniformity Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution.The Department of Revenue's Board of Appeals and the Board of Finance and Revenue denied Alcatel's refund request, citing lack of authority to decide constitutional issues. Alcatel then appealed to the Commonwealth Court, which initially affirmed the Board's decision, applying the Chevron test and concluding that the Nextel decision should not apply retroactively. However, after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in General Motors Corp. v. Commonwealth, which held that Nextel applies retroactively, an en banc panel of the Commonwealth Court reversed the earlier decision, sustaining Alcatel's exceptions and ordering a refund.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and concluded that the General Motors decision was erroneous. The Court held that Nextel should apply only prospectively, not retroactively, as it established a new principle of law. The Court applied the Chevron test, determining that retroactive application would not further the operation of the rule and would cause significant financial harm to the Commonwealth. Consequently, the Court reversed the Commonwealth Court's decision, ruling that due process does not require the Commonwealth to refund the taxes paid by Alcatel in 2014. View "Alcatel-Lucent USA Inc. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In 2016, the Mississippi legislature passed S.B. 2162, which abolished the Jackson Municipal Airport Authority (JMAA) and created the Jackson Metropolitan Area Airport Authority (Authority). The new Authority would be governed by nine commissioners, with only two selected by the Jackson city government. The JMAA commissioners, along with Jackson’s Mayor and City Council, intervened in a suit to enjoin enforcement of the law, alleging violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Mississippi Constitution. They claimed S.B. 2162 diluted the voting rights of Jackson citizens and altered the airport’s management for race-based reasons.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi initially upheld the plaintiffs' standing and ordered discovery, which the legislators resisted, citing legislative privilege. On the first appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiffs lacked standing, as they failed to demonstrate injury to a legally protected interest. The case was remanded with instructions to dismiss without prejudice. Plaintiffs amended their complaint to address the standing issue, and the district court again ordered discovery. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s privilege ruling but later dismissed the appeal as moot when none of the plaintiff-commissioners held their positions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to sue. The court held that the plaintiffs' alleged injuries were institutional rather than personal, as the injury affected the JMAA as an entity. The court also found that the plaintiffs did not have a protected property interest in their positions or the associated per diem and travel reimbursements. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's order and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss. View "Jones v. Reeves" on Justia Law