Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Robert William Doelz was convicted of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. In 2019, the Kansas Supreme Court reversed his conviction, finding that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated due to a warrantless search, and the evidence obtained should have been suppressed. On remand, the State dropped the charge and did not pursue a retrial. Subsequently, Doelz sought compensation for his wrongful conviction under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-5004, which requires proving actual innocence among other criteria.The Shawnee District Court denied both parties' motions for summary judgment, interpreting K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-5004(c)(1)(C) to require a claimant to prove that their innocence resulted in the reversal of their conviction, dismissal of charges, or a not guilty verdict upon retrial. The court found that Doelz's conviction was reversed due to a Fourth Amendment violation, not because he did not commit the crime. Since there was no evidence explaining why the charges were dismissed, a material fact remained unresolved. At a bench trial, Doelz testified to his innocence, but the court granted the State's motion for judgment as a matter of law, finding that Doelz failed to prove the charges were dismissed due to his innocence.The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-5004(c)(1)(C) requires a claimant to prove actual innocence and that this innocence led to the reversal, dismissal, or acquittal. The court found that the legislative intent behind the statute was to compensate only those who are factually innocent. Since Doelz did not provide evidence that the charges were dismissed because of his innocence, he did not meet the statutory requirements for compensation. View "In the Matter of the Wrongful Conviction of Doelz" on Justia Law

The case involves William Zitterkopf, who was charged with unlawful distribution of an intimate image under Nebraska law. The charges stemmed from allegations that Zitterkopf recorded a sexual encounter with the victim, L.E., without her consent and later distributed a screenshot from the video to his ex-wife and L.E. The image showed L.E. nude from the waist down. Zitterkopf sent the image to L.E. with a message suggesting she confess to lying in an affidavit related to his divorce proceedings.The Scotts Bluff County District Court overruled Zitterkopf’s motion to quash the charge, in which he argued that the statute under which he was charged was unconstitutional. The court found that the statute was not overbroad and did not violate free speech protections because it targeted the nonconsensual nature of the disclosure rather than the content of the image. The court applied an intermediate level of scrutiny and concluded that the statute served an important governmental interest without burdening more speech than necessary.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and assumed for the sake of argument that the statute was content-based and subject to strict scrutiny. The court found that the statute served a compelling interest in protecting individual privacy and was narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. The statute required a lack of consent both when the image was created and when it was distributed, and it required that the distribution be done knowingly and intentionally. The court concluded that the statute was not substantially overbroad and did not violate the First Amendment.The court also addressed Zitterkopf’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. It found that the record on direct appeal was sufficient to determine that Zitterkopf could not show prejudice from his counsel’s failure to object to certain testimony. However, the court found the record insufficient to review Zitterkopf’s claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to present certain testimony. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed Zitterkopf’s conviction. View "State v. Zitterkopf" on Justia Law

In October 1, 2021, Sean J. Trahan pleaded guilty to possession and knowing access with intent to view child pornography, violating 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). The district court sentenced him to 126 months' imprisonment, applying a sentencing enhancement based on Trahan's prior state conviction for possession of "visual material of child depicted in sexual conduct," which the court determined required a ten-year mandatory minimum under § 2252A(b)(2).The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts initially reviewed the case. Trahan objected to the imposition of the mandatory minimum, arguing that his prior state conviction did not qualify under § 2252A(b)(2) because the state statute criminalized more conduct than the federal statute. He also challenged the imposition of a consecutive six-month sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3147 for an offense committed while on pretrial release, arguing it violated the Sixth Amendment. The district court rejected these arguments and sentenced Trahan to 126 months' imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the phrase "relating to" in § 2252A(b)(2) has a broadening effect, meaning that a state conviction need not be an exact match with the federal definition of child pornography to trigger the mandatory minimum. The court found that Trahan's prior state conviction was sufficiently related to the federal definition to warrant the enhancement. Additionally, the court rejected Trahan's Alleyne challenge, concluding that any error in imposing the consecutive sentence under § 3147 was harmless because there was overwhelming evidence that Trahan committed the offense while on pretrial release. The First Circuit affirmed the district court's 126-month sentence. View "United States v. Trahan" on Justia Law

In 2021, Ellva Slaughter was charged with illegally possessing a firearm while knowing he had previously been convicted of a felony, violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Slaughter moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the jury selection plan of the Southern District of New York (SDNY) systematically underrepresented Black and Hispanic or Latino people, violating his Sixth Amendment right and the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 (JSSA). The district court assumed the underrepresentation was significant but denied the motion, finding Slaughter failed to prove systematic exclusion in the jury selection process.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied Slaughter's motion to dismiss the indictment. The court assumed without deciding that there was significant underrepresentation of Black and Hispanic or Latino people but concluded that Slaughter did not establish that this underrepresentation was due to systematic exclusion. The court found that Slaughter's expert did not provide evidence that the identified practices caused the disparities and noted that many of the challenged practices were authorized by the Second Circuit. The court also found that any disparities were due to external factors outside the SDNY's control.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court applied the framework from Duren v. Missouri, assuming without deciding that the underrepresentation was significant. However, it concluded that Slaughter did not meet his burden of proving systematic exclusion. The court found that Slaughter's expert did not provide sufficient evidence that the SDNY's practices caused the underrepresentation. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that Slaughter failed to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement under the Sixth Amendment and the JSSA. View "United States v. Slaughter" on Justia Law

Esteban Luna Caudillo pleaded guilty to one count of receipt of child pornography, violating 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(B) and (b)(1). As part of his plea agreement, he agreed to pay full restitution to the victims, with the court determining the amount. The government provided a factual basis for the plea, detailing that Luna Caudillo received child pornography via an online cloud storage account linked to his email. A search of his cell phone revealed numerous files of child pornography. The presentence investigation report (PSR) calculated a guidelines range of 210 to 262 months of imprisonment and recommended restitution awards to eleven victims.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas considered Luna Caudillo’s objections to the PSR, including challenges to the restitution calculations. The court adjusted the guidelines range to 121 to 151 months based on an amended offense level and criminal history category. Luna Caudillo reiterated his objections to the restitution recommendations, arguing that the estimates for future medical costs were not verifiable and that the Paroline factors required a determination of proximate cause for each victim’s losses. The district court sentenced him to 135 months of imprisonment, ten years of supervised release, and ordered restitution totaling $73,000 to the eleven victims, including a $3,000 mandatory minimum to one victim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. Luna Caudillo argued that the restitution awards violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. The court found this argument foreclosed by circuit precedent, which holds that the Sixth Amendment does not apply to restitution awards. He also contended that the mandatory minimum restitution award violated his Sixth Amendment rights under Alleyne v. United States. The court noted that this argument was not foreclosed by precedent but found it moot due to Luna Caudillo’s explicit waiver of any Sixth Amendment challenge in his plea agreement. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Caudillo" on Justia Law

Three plaintiffs, planning to participate in protests during the Democratic National Convention in Chicago, challenged the constitutionality of a city ordinance listing prohibited items within security perimeters. The list includes items such as laptops, large bags, drones, bicycles, and pointed objects, among others. Plaintiffs argued that the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague, particularly concerning the prohibition of "pointed object(s)," which they feared could include everyday items like ballpoint pens and buttons.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction, finding that the ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague. The plaintiffs then appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the ordinance has a core of ascertainable meaning, covering items that pose clear safety risks, such as weapons and explosives. The court noted that while the plaintiffs raised concerns about potential overreach, they had not demonstrated that a substantial number of the ordinance's applications were unconstitutional. The court concluded that the plaintiffs' facial challenge to the ordinance lacked merit, as the potentially problematic applications were not substantial in relation to the valid ones. The court also found that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the ordinance but ultimately ruled against them on the merits. View "Thayer v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Antonio Webb, a former state inmate in Missouri, filed a lawsuit against several prison officials, alleging violations of his Eighth Amendment rights. Webb claimed he was subjected to sexual harassment and abuse, that officials failed to protect him from this abuse, and that he faced retaliation for reporting the misconduct. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officials, leading to Webb's appeal.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri initially handled the case. The officials asserted qualified immunity as a defense in their answer to Webb's complaint but did not file a motion to address it. The case moved forward through discovery, and at a pretrial conference, the officials indicated they had not moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity due to a lack of grounds. However, four days before the trial, the court ordered the officials to file a motion discussing qualified immunity, extended the deadline for dispositive motions, and continued the trial. The officials complied, and the court granted summary judgment, concluding Webb failed to present sufficient evidence of any constitutional violation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court's decision to address qualified immunity before trial was a reasonable exercise of case management, aimed at conserving judicial resources and ensuring fairness. Webb had adequate notice and an opportunity to respond to the motion. On the retaliation claim, the court determined Webb did not provide competent evidence to support his allegations. His declaration was inadmissible as it was not signed under penalty of perjury, and his grievance records did not meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Consequently, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Webb v. Lakey" on Justia Law

In September 2020, the CDC issued a nationwide order temporarily halting residential evictions in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. This eviction moratorium remained effective for nearly a year. Owners of residential rental properties sued the government, claiming that the CDC’s order constituted a physical taking of their property for public use, requiring just compensation under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.The U.S. Court of Federal Claims dismissed the property owners' complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court agreed with the government’s argument that a takings claim cannot be premised on government action that was unauthorized, and it concluded that the CDC’s order was unauthorized because it exceeded the CDC’s statutory authority under the Public Health Service Act (PHSA).The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the lower court’s decision. The Federal Circuit concluded that the CDC’s order was “authorized” for takings-claim purposes because it was issued within the normal scope of the CDC’s duties and pursuant to a good faith implementation of the PHSA. The court also determined that the order did not contravene any explicit prohibition or positively expressed congressional intent. Furthermore, the court held that the property owners’ complaint stated a claim for a physical taking, as the CDC’s order prevented them from evicting non-rent-paying tenants, thus infringing on their fundamental right to exclude others from their property. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "DARBY DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC. v. US " on Justia Law

In May 2020, following the death of George Floyd, several individuals participated in or were near protests in downtown Houston. They allege that they were falsely arrested by City of Houston police officers who used "kettle maneuvers" to confine and arrest protesters. The plaintiffs claim that then-Chief of Police Art Acevedo implemented a policy of "kettling" and arresting protesters. They sued the City and Acevedo under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, based on the assertion that there was no probable cause for their arrests under section 42.03 of the Texas Penal Code, which prohibits obstructing passageways.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas found that there was probable cause to arrest the plaintiffs under section 42.03 and dismissed the claims against both the City and Acevedo. The plaintiffs appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted that two previous panels had addressed similar issues with conflicting outcomes. In Utley v. City of Houston, the panel found probable cause for arrest and affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff’s § 1983 lawsuit. Conversely, in Herrera v. Acevedo, the panel found that the plaintiffs had plausibly alleged false arrest and denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. The current panel agreed with the Utley decision, holding that there was probable cause to arrest the plaintiffs for obstructing a passageway under section 42.03. The court found that the size and location of the protests provided sufficient probable cause for the arrests, thus negating any First, Fourth, or Fourteenth Amendment violations. Consequently, the claims against the City and Acevedo were dismissed due to the lack of an underlying constitutional violation. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Wade v. City of Houston" on Justia Law

In August 2022, Cole Levine moved from New Mexico to Missoula, Montana, to attend law school. On August 18, 2022, a woman identified as M.H. was sexually assaulted in an alley. During the incident, the assailant took M.H.'s phone but dropped another phone, which was later identified as belonging to Levine. Following an investigation, Levine was charged with several offenses, including attempted sexual intercourse without consent and aggravated assault. On October 3, 2022, the District Court issued a search warrant to Verizon Wireless for data related to Levine's phone, which was stored on servers outside Montana.Levine filed a motion to suppress the data obtained from the warrant, arguing it was an illegal extraterritorial warrant. The Fourth Judicial District Court agreed, ruling that Montana courts did not have jurisdiction to issue such a warrant to an out-of-state entity. The court relied on the reasoning from United States v. Webb and found that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply, declaring the warrant void ab initio. Consequently, the court granted Levine's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the warrant.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and reversed the District Court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the Secure Communications Act (SCA) grants Montana district courts jurisdiction to issue search warrants for electronic communications stored by out-of-state third parties. Additionally, Montana law under § 46-5-605(3)(a), MCA, provides an independent basis for such jurisdiction. The Supreme Court concluded that the District Court had jurisdiction to issue the search warrant and erred in granting Levine's motion to suppress. The case was remanded for continuation of proceedings. View "State v. Levine" on Justia Law