Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The case involved a defendant who was charged in December 2017 with one count of lewd or lascivious conduct with a child, based on allegations that she had inappropriately touched a six-year-old girl, A.G., who was the daughter of her then-boyfriend. Before trial, the court allowed both the admission of the child’s statements from a 2017 police interview and permitted A.G. to testify. In 2019, the State requested that A.G. testify outside the defendant’s presence via video, citing potential trauma. After a hearing in 2020, the trial court granted this request, finding that testifying in front of the defendant would traumatize and impair A.G.’s ability to testify. In 2023, as A.G. had aged, the defense sought a new hearing on this issue. At the new hearing, a school counselor testified about A.G.’s general emotional state and possible trauma but did not specifically link trauma to testifying in the defendant’s presence.The Superior Court, Orleans Unit, Criminal Division, relying on the counselor’s testimony, again permitted A.G. to testify outside the defendant’s presence. A jury trial followed in October 2023, during which A.G. testified by video and the jury found the defendant guilty. The court denied the defendant’s motion for a new trial, concluding that although the prosecutor improperly commented on the defendant’s post-arrest silence, this was harmless error.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed whether the requirements of Vermont Rule of Evidence 807 and the Confrontation Clause were met. The Court held that the trial court’s finding—that requiring A.G. to testify in the defendant’s presence would cause trauma substantially impairing her ability to testify—was clearly erroneous because the evidence did not specifically support such trauma would result from the defendant’s presence. As a result, the Court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial, concluding that the defendant’s right to confrontation was violated. View "State v. Sylvester" on Justia Law

In the spring of 2020, three veterans residing at the Soldiers’ Home in Chelsea, Massachusetts, died after contracting COVID-19. The personal representatives of the veterans’ estates filed suit against several Massachusetts state officials responsible for the facility, alleging violations of the veterans’ substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The complaint asserted that the officials failed to protect residents from COVID-19 by not implementing adequate safety protocols and maintaining inhumane living conditions, including lack of sanitation, improper restraint of residents, and exposure to illegal drugs.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts reviewed the complaint after the defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for a substantive due process violation and that the officials were entitled to qualified immunity. The District Court granted the motion to dismiss. It held that the plaintiffs had not sufficiently alleged individual involvement by any defendant in the purported misconduct regarding COVID-19, and failed to provide details showing how the named veterans were specifically harmed by the living conditions. The court also found no clearly established legal authority placing the officials on notice that their conduct would violate the veterans’ rights, thus concluding qualified immunity applied.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The First Circuit held that the complaint did not plausibly allege that the defendants directly caused the harm suffered by the veterans, nor did it sufficiently invoke exceptions to that requirement. The Court also found that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated a violation of clearly established law and thus, the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. Consequently, the dismissal of the complaint was affirmed. View "Terenzio v. Urena" on Justia Law

After pleading guilty to felony child neglect, the defendant was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment with three years suspended, credit for 375 days already served, supervised probation, and restitution. Following his release, the State alleged that the defendant violated multiple conditions of his probation. At a probation revocation hearing, the defendant waived his right to counsel and admitted the violations, leading the district court to revoke his probation. The court orally stated the defendant would receive credit for two years plus the time he spent in custody after being arrested on the probation violation warrant, which amounted to twenty-four days.The written order issued after the revocation hearing, however, erroneously recorded the credit for time served as “3 years and 34 days” instead of the correct “2 years and 24 days.” The State moved to correct this mistake under North Dakota Rule of Criminal Procedure 36, arguing it was a clerical error that conflicted with the court’s oral pronouncement. The District Court of McHenry County granted the State’s motion, found the original written order contained a clerical error, and issued an amended order reflecting the proper credit. The defendant appealed, arguing that the correction improperly reduced his credit for time served and conflicted with the court’s oral pronouncement. He also asserted his constitutional right to counsel was violated when the court did not appoint an attorney to represent him in the Rule 36 proceedings.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court’s orders. It held that the correction was a permissible exercise of the court’s discretion under Rule 36 to remedy a clerical error in the judgment so that it accurately reflected the oral pronouncement at the revocation hearing. The court also concluded that the defendant’s constitutional right to counsel was not violated because the correction of a clerical error under Rule 36 is not a critical stage of the prosecution. View "State v. Jaeger" on Justia Law

A non-profit religious organization sought to build an outdoor grotto, including a shrine, plaza, and walking path, on land adjacent to its existing church property. The new grotto was planned for a parcel subject to a lease and eventual transfer to the organization. The property was zoned for residential use, and while the church itself predated the zoning ordinance, the construction of accessory religious structures was not directly permitted under the current ordinance unless the church was located adjacent to an arterial street. The organization’s application acknowledged this restriction but requested approval for the project and setback variances.The Park Hills Board of Adjustment held a public hearing, received input both for and against the project, and ultimately approved the conditional use permit and variances, conditioned on the property transfer. Neighbors opposed to the project, specifically the Frederics, challenged the Board’s decision in the Kenton Circuit Court, arguing that the Board exceeded its authority under local ordinances and state law. The circuit court ruled in favor of the defendants, finding that the church was “grandfathered” due to its pre-zoning existence and that the Board did not act arbitrarily. The court did not address the federal Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) claim raised during summary judgment.On appeal, the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed, holding the Board acted arbitrarily and exceeded its authority, as the expansion constituted an impermissible enlargement of a nonconforming use under both the zoning code and state law. The court also found no RLUIPA violation, reasoning that the ordinance did not impose a substantial burden on religious exercise.The Supreme Court of Kentucky granted discretionary review. The Court held that the RLUIPA defense was properly before it, as it had been tried by implied consent of the parties. On the merits, the Court concluded that denial of the permit did not impose a substantial burden under RLUIPA, applying the Sixth Circuit’s standard. The Court also found that the zoning ordinance did not violate RLUIPA’s equal-terms provision. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ ruling, vacating the Board’s grant of the permit and variances. View "MISSIONARIES OF SAINT JOHN THE BAPTIST, INC. V. FREDERIC" on Justia Law

A recently enacted statute in Kentucky, Senate Bill 1 (SB 1), altered the governance structure of only the Jefferson County public school district by granting its superintendent increased authority and reducing the powers of its school board. The law also imposed unique restrictions on the Jefferson County Board of Education, such as limiting meeting frequency and permitting unilateral actions by the superintendent not available in other districts. No other public school district in Kentucky was subject to these new terms, and the law did not provide an explanation for this differential treatment or why such governance changes would be unsuitable for other districts.The Jefferson County Board of Education challenged SB 1, alleging that it violated Section 59 of the Kentucky Constitution, which prohibits special or local legislation regarding the management of public schools unless justified by a reasonable basis. The Jefferson Circuit Court reviewed the challenge and found that SB 1 was unconstitutional because it conferred disparate treatment on Jefferson County without a rational or natural distinction justifying the law’s limitation to that district. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, agreeing that the law amounted to impermissible special legislation.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the appeal and affirmed the lower courts’ rulings. The court held that SB 1 violates Section 59 of the Kentucky Constitution because it treats Jefferson County’s school district and its superintendent differently from all others without any reasonably articulable natural and distinctive reason. The court clarified that while the legislature may address specific local needs through classification, such distinctions must be reasonable and related to legislative objectives. The court’s disposition was to affirm the judgments that found SB 1 unconstitutional. View "COLEMAN V. JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who pleaded guilty in 2012 to multiple sex offenses involving his minor children. He was sentenced to ten years in state prison followed by ten years of probation, with mandatory global positioning system (GPS) monitoring as a condition of probation under Massachusetts law. The statute required GPS monitoring for the entirety of his probation, but at the time of sentencing, no specific exclusion zones were established. After serving his prison sentence and two years of probation with GPS monitoring, the defendant sought relief from the GPS monitoring condition, arguing that it was unreasonable and unconstitutional, particularly due to its ten-year duration.After the Supreme Judicial Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Feliz, which required individualized judicial findings regarding the reasonableness of GPS monitoring as a probation condition, the defendant filed a motion in the Superior Court for such an individualized assessment. The Superior Court judge denied the motion, finding that the Commonwealth had shown continued GPS monitoring was reasonable, based in part on the defendant’s classification as a level three sex offender and the victims’ statements about ongoing harm. However, the judge did not make findings regarding the reasonableness of the specific ten-year duration of GPS monitoring.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case on direct appellate review. The Court held that a judge must consider the duration of GPS monitoring in evaluating its reasonableness under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. The holding clarified that a judge may only impose GPS monitoring for a duration found to be reasonable, even if that period is less than the statutory term of probation. Because the Superior Court judge did not evaluate the ten-year duration, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order denying the defendant’s motion and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Commonwealth v. Arnold" on Justia Law

The essential facts of this case involve an individual who was convicted in Mississippi state court for failing to pay child support, an offense punishable by up to five years in prison but for which he ultimately received only probation. After repaying the owed child support and completing probation, the individual was later indicted under federal law, specifically 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits firearm possession by anyone previously convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year. The predicate offense for the federal charge was the non-payment of child support.In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, the defendant twice moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional as applied to him, among other constitutional challenges. The district court denied both motions. The defendant subsequently pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement that preserved his right to appeal the Second Amendment issue, leading to this appeal before the Fifth Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that, under the historical inquiry required by the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, there is no historical tradition supporting the permanent disarmament of a person convicted solely of non-payment of child support, particularly where the debt had been repaid and probation completed. The court rejected the government’s analogy between debtors and thieves, noting that founding-era practices treated debtors differently, allowing for temporary disarmament only until the debt was paid. The Fifth Circuit therefore held that the application of § 922(g)(1) to the defendant violated the Second Amendment and reversed the conviction, remanding for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "United States v. Cockerham" on Justia Law

A man living in Muncie, Indiana, was charged with supplying another individual with counterfeit oxycodone pills (M30s) containing fentanyl, which were then sold to a seventeen-year-old who died from a fentanyl and cocaine overdose. The accused regularly sold M30s to the intermediary, who also obtained such pills from other sources. After the fatal incident, police recovered part of an M30 pill from the victim’s nightstand. During the investigation, the intermediary initially told police that the accused was the supplier of the fatal pills but later recanted, identifying another supplier. The State, planning to use the intermediary’s testimony, withdrew its immunity offer when the intermediary changed his account and decided not to call him as a witness, knowing he would invoke his right against self-incrimination.At the bench trial in Delaware Circuit Court, the prosecution introduced, over objection, the intermediary’s prior statement to police implicating the accused, but the defense was not given an opportunity to cross-examine the intermediary. The court found the accused guilty of multiple charges, including a Level 1 felony for aiding in dealing a controlled substance resulting in death. On appeal, the accused challenged the Level 1 felony conviction, arguing a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witness. The State conceded this violation but argued that the error was harmless. The Indiana Court of Appeals agreed with the State and affirmed the conviction.The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer and reviewed whether the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court concluded that the admission of the statement was not harmless, as it was the only direct, non-cumulative, and uncorroborated evidence linking the accused to the fatal pills, and the defense was denied cross-examination. The court vacated the Level 1 felony conviction and remanded for a new trial on that charge. View "Taylor v. State of Indiana" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs in this case are mental health counselors who provide “talk therapy” services, including counseling to minors, guided by their Catholic faith. Their services consist exclusively of spoken words, and they do not use physical or aversive techniques. Some of their clients, including minors with parental consent, seek counseling to address issues related to gender identity or sexual orientation, such as wanting to align their gender identity with their biological sex or to reduce same-sex attraction in accordance with their religious beliefs. The plaintiffs assert an ethical and religious duty to help clients pursue such goals if requested.In 2023, Michigan enacted laws forbidding licensed therapists from engaging in “conversion therapy” with minors, defined as efforts to change an individual’s sexual orientation or gender identity, but specifically permitting counseling that assists with gender transition. The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, seeking a preliminary injunction to block enforcement of these laws, arguing that the prohibition restricts their speech based on its content and viewpoint in violation of the First Amendment. The district court denied the motion, reasoning that the counseling in question was conduct, not speech, for constitutional purposes.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found that the plaintiffs had standing and disagreed with the district court’s characterization of the therapy as conduct rather than speech. The court held that the Michigan law is a content- and viewpoint-based restriction on speech and is therefore subject to strict scrutiny under the First Amendment. The court determined that the State did not demonstrate a sufficient justification for the restriction, and that the plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of the preliminary injunction and remanded for prompt entry of an injunction preventing enforcement of the law during the case. View "Catholic Charities of Jackson v. Whitmer" on Justia Law

Luther Poynter was incarcerated at the Barren County Detention Center in Kentucky for contempt of court related to unpaid child support. After a brief period in COVID-19 observation, he was moved to a general-population cell with two other detainees, Scotty Wix and Timothy Guess. Both Wix and Guess had extensive histories of violent behavior and multiple documented assaults against other detainees while in the facility. Shortly after Poynter entered the cell, Guess and Wix attacked him without apparent provocation, causing a traumatic brain injury and lasting physical impairment.The United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky reviewed the case after Poynter, through his guardian, sued the jailer and Barren County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to his safety in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment to the county, concluding there was insufficient evidence of a constitutional violation or municipal liability, and held that Poynter had not shown he was placed at a substantial risk of harm or that reasonable steps were not taken to abate that risk.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that Poynter had presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Barren County had a custom of failing to properly classify detainees with violent histories, recklessly disregarded a known risk, and that this failure caused Poynter’s injuries. The Sixth Circuit clarified that municipal liability can attach even without identifying a specific individual as the violator, so long as the unconstitutional harm resulted from a municipal policy or custom. The Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Poynter v. Bennett" on Justia Law