Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Police officers responded to a 911 call about a suspicious individual in a residential neighborhood. Officer Sanchez encountered Victor Grandia Gonzalez, who matched the description given by the complainant. Gonzalez was walking in the street, wearing dark clothing, and carrying a backpack. He appeared nervous and sweaty. Officer Exantus, after speaking with the complainant, learned that Gonzalez had been seen looking into mailboxes and concealing himself between cars. Upon arrival, Exantus patted down Gonzalez and found scissors. Gonzalez admitted to living out of his car and showed a photo of his ID listing a home county 30 minutes away. Based on these observations and the complainant’s report, Gonzalez was arrested for loitering and prowling. A search of his backpack revealed stolen mail.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied Gonzalez’s motion to suppress the mail evidence and statements, finding that the officers had probable cause for the arrest. Gonzalez pleaded guilty to one count of possessing stolen mail but reserved the right to appeal the suppression ruling. He was sentenced to time served and two years of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Fourth Amendment does not require a misdemeanor to occur in an officer’s presence for a warrantless arrest. The court found that the officers had probable cause to arrest Gonzalez for loitering and prowling under the totality of the circumstances, including the complainant’s report and the officers’ observations. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Friends of George’s, Inc. (FOG), a theater organization that performs drag shows, challenged Tennessee’s Adult Entertainment Act (AEA), which criminalizes adult cabaret entertainment in public or where minors could view it. FOG argued that the AEA was facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment. The district court agreed, declaring the AEA unconstitutional and permanently enjoining District Attorney General Steven Mulroy from enforcing it within Shelby County, Tennessee. Mulroy appealed, questioning FOG’s standing and the merits of the injunction.The United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee initially granted FOG a temporary restraining order against the AEA. The court later ruled in favor of FOG, finding that the AEA violated the First Amendment and was unconstitutionally vague. The court permanently enjoined Mulroy from enforcing the statute within his jurisdiction. Mulroy appealed this decision, arguing that FOG lacked Article III standing and that the AEA was constitutional.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and found that FOG did not meet its burden to show standing. The court held that FOG failed to demonstrate an intention to engage in conduct arguably proscribed by the AEA, as FOG’s performances were described as having artistic value suitable for minors. The court also found that FOG did not face a certainly impending threat of prosecution under the AEA. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of standing. View "Friends of George's, Inc. v. Mulroy" on Justia Law

The case involves Robert Paul Rundo and Robert Boman, who were charged with conspiracy to violate the Anti-Riot Act and with substantively violating the Act. The indictment alleges that Rundo is a founding member of the "Rise Above Movement" (RAM), a militant white supremacist group. Rundo and Boman, along with other RAM members, attended several political rallies where they violently attacked counter-protesters. The indictment details their involvement in rallies in Huntington Beach, Berkeley, San Bernardino, and Charlottesville, where they engaged in organized violence and later boasted about their actions online.The United States District Court for the Central District of California initially dismissed the indictment, finding the Anti-Riot Act unconstitutional due to facial overbreadth under the First Amendment. The Ninth Circuit reversed this decision, holding that the Act was not facially overbroad except for certain severable portions. On remand, the district court dismissed the indictment again, this time based on a claim of selective prosecution. The district court concluded that the government selectively prosecuted RAM members while ignoring the violence of Antifa and related far-left groups, suggesting that the prosecution was based on the offensive nature of RAM's speech.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that Rundo did not meet his burden to demonstrate that similarly situated individuals were not prosecuted and that his prosecution was based on an impermissible motive. The court found that the district court erred by comparing collective conduct to individual conduct and by holding that individual Antifa members were similarly situated to Rundo. The Ninth Circuit also held that Rundo failed to show that his prosecution was based on an impermissible motive, noting that timing and other factors cited by the district court were insufficient. The court reinstated the indictment and remanded the case for trial. View "USA V. RUNDO" on Justia Law

Phillip Robbin was removing a tree from a residential lot in the City of Berwyn when he was confronted by Sarah Lopez, a city inspector. Lopez berated Robbin using racial slurs, which led Robbin to demand disciplinary action against her. The Mayor of Berwyn denied Robbin's request for Lopez's termination, leading Robbin to sue the City, the Mayor, and Lopez for violations of his substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and state law.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed Robbin’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), finding that he failed to state a federal claim. The court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, leading to Robbin's appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Robbin failed to allege a violation of a fundamental right and that the conduct described did not "shock the conscience," which are necessary elements for a substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court noted that while Lopez's use of racial slurs was deplorable, it did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Robbin's complaint. View "Robbin v. City of Berwyn" on Justia Law

Renae Gerszewski filed a petition for a disorderly conduct restraining order (DCRO) against Conrad Rostvet, leading to a temporary DCRO and a scheduled hearing. Rostvet responded by filing his own petitions for DCROs against Renae and Wayne Gerszewski. The cases were consolidated, and the hearing was delayed for nearly six months due to continuances. The dispute centered around the use of a road running from the highway past Rostvet’s property to the Gerszewskis’ property.The District Court of Walsh County, Northeast Judicial District, heard testimony about the ongoing conflict and issued an order granting Renae Gerszewski’s petition for a DCRO while denying Rostvet’s petitions. The court found that Rostvet’s actions, including stopping his vehicle to point at Renae, cultivating land near her, blocking the road, and pushing snow into the roadway, constituted disorderly conduct. Rostvet appealed, arguing that the court abused its discretion and that his actions were constitutionally protected.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the DCRO to Renae Gerszewski, as there were reasonable grounds to believe that Rostvet engaged in disorderly conduct. The court also found no error in the district court’s denial of Rostvet’s petitions, as he failed to show that the Gerszewskis engaged in disorderly conduct. Additionally, the Supreme Court rejected Rostvet’s arguments regarding judicial notice of documents and the delay in the hearing, noting that these issues were not properly raised in the lower court. View "Rostvet v. Gerszewski" on Justia Law

The case involves two nonprofit organizations, the National Federation of the Blind of Texas and Arms of Hope, which use donation boxes to collect items for fundraising. The City of Arlington, Texas, enacted an ordinance regulating the placement and maintenance of these donation boxes, including zoning restrictions and setback requirements. The nonprofits challenged the ordinance, claiming it violated the First Amendment by restricting their ability to place donation boxes in certain areas of the city.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas reviewed the case. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Arlington on several counts, including the constitutionality of the setback requirement and the ordinance not being overbroad or a prior restraint. However, the court ruled in favor of the nonprofits on the zoning provision, finding it was not narrowly tailored and thus violated the First Amendment. The court enjoined Arlington from enforcing the zoning provision against the nonprofits.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the ordinance was content-neutral and subject to intermediate scrutiny. It found that the zoning provision, which limited donation boxes to three of the city's 28 zoning districts, was narrowly tailored to serve Arlington's significant interests in public health, safety, welfare, and community aesthetics. The court also upheld the setback requirement, finding it did not burden more speech than necessary and left ample alternative channels of communication. The court concluded that the ordinance's permitting provisions did not constitute an unconstitutional prior restraint.The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment regarding the zoning provision and rendered judgment in favor of Arlington on that part. The rest of the district court's judgment was affirmed. View "National Federation of the Blind of Texas, Incorporated v. City of Arlington" on Justia Law

Alexander Behrend, a Work Practice Apprentice (WPA) at the San Francisco Zen Center, filed an employment discrimination lawsuit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Behrend, who lived and worked at the Center, performed various tasks including meditation, cleaning, cooking, and maintenance. He argued that his role was not ministerial because it involved mostly menial work and did not include teaching or leading the faith.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted summary judgment in favor of the San Francisco Zen Center. The court found that Behrend's role fell within the First Amendment’s ministerial exception, which exempts religious organizations from certain employment laws in relation to their ministers. The court determined that Behrend’s duties, although menial, were integral to the Center’s religious mission and practice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the ministerial exception applied to Behrend’s role as a WPA. The court emphasized that the exception is broad and includes roles that are essential to carrying out a religious organization’s mission, even if they do not involve teaching or leadership. The court concluded that Behrend’s work was a vital part of Zen training and practice, thus fitting within the ministerial exception. The court rejected Behrend’s argument that only those with key roles in preaching and transmitting the faith qualify for the exception, noting that precedent supports a broader application. The court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment, upholding the application of the ministerial exception. View "BEHREND V. SAN FRANCISCO ZEN CENTER, INC." on Justia Law

David Lesh, a social media content creator and owner of an outdoor apparel brand, posted photos on Instagram of himself snowmobiling at Keystone Resort, Colorado, during its closure due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The United States charged him with using an over-snow vehicle on National Forest Service (NFS) land off a designated route and conducting unauthorized work activity on NFS land. A magistrate judge convicted him of both counts after a bench trial.The magistrate judge found Lesh guilty of using an over-snow vehicle on NFS land off a designated route, taking judicial notice of a publicly available map indicating that Keystone Resort was not designated for snowmobile use. Lesh's argument that the map's undated nature failed to provide sufficient notice was not preserved for appeal. The district court affirmed the magistrate judge's decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed Lesh's conviction for using an over-snow vehicle on NFS land off a designated route, finding that Lesh had waived his challenge to the judicial notice of the map. However, the court reversed his conviction for unauthorized work activity under 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(c). The court held that the regulation was impermissibly vague as applied to Lesh's conduct, as it did not provide fair warning that posting images on social media could constitute a federal crime. The court also found insufficient evidence to prove that Lesh's primary purpose in posting the photos was to sell goods or services, as required by the regulation. The court concluded that Lesh was not deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, as the maximum penalty he faced did not exceed six months of imprisonment. View "United States v. Lesh" on Justia Law

Three gun rights organizations and their members challenged Minnesota’s permit-to-carry statute, which requires applicants to be at least 21 years old, arguing it violates the Second and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, finding that the Second Amendment’s plain text covered their conduct and that the government failed to show that restricting 18 to 20-year-olds’ right to bear handguns in public was consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Minnesota appealed the decision.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, declaring the age restriction facially unconstitutional for otherwise qualified 18 to 20-year-olds and enjoining its enforcement. The district court applied the two-part test from New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, focusing on the Second Amendment’s text and historical tradition. The court found that the plain text covered the plaintiffs’ conduct and that the government did not meet its burden to demonstrate a historical tradition of similar firearm regulations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that ordinary, law-abiding 18 to 20-year-olds are part of “the people” protected by the Second Amendment. The court found that Minnesota failed to provide sufficient historical analogues to justify the age restriction, noting that the state’s proffered evidence did not meet the burden of demonstrating a historical tradition of similar firearm regulations. Consequently, the court ruled that the age restriction in Minnesota’s permit-to-carry statute is unconstitutional. View "Worth v. Jacobson" on Justia Law

Three foreign nationals, crewmembers aboard the vessel MARGUERITA, were detained in the United States after the vessel was held in port in Maine due to alleged improper disposal of bilge water and inaccurate record-keeping. The plaintiffs were ordered to remain in the U.S. as potential material witnesses. They were later allowed to leave but returned for trial and were awarded for their contributions to the conviction of the vessel's operator.The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics and the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) against various U.S. government entities and officials, alleging violations of their constitutional rights and various tort claims. The U.S. District Court for the District of Maine dismissed the Bivens claim and granted summary judgment for the defendants on the FTCA claims. The court found that the plaintiffs' detention and the revocation of their landing permits were authorized and that the plaintiffs did not show that the actions taken by the government officials were unlawful or unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the requirement for ships to maintain an Oil Record Book under 33 C.F.R. § 151.25 is valid and that the plaintiffs' detention was justified under the circumstances. The court also found that the plaintiffs failed to establish their claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, abuse of process, and intentional infliction of emotional distress under the FTCA. Additionally, the court concluded that the Bivens claim presented a new context and that special factors counseled hesitation in extending a Bivens remedy, particularly given the availability of alternative remedies and the implications for government policy and international relations. View "Hornof v. United States" on Justia Law