Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

An elderly couple in Greenville, North Carolina, reported a breaking-and-entering at their residence around 4:00 a.m., hearing glass break and a male voice yelling. Officer David Johnson, who was nearby, responded to the call. Upon arrival, Johnson heard loud yelling and saw Sean Rambert running towards him while yelling. Johnson commanded Rambert to get on the ground eight times, but Rambert did not comply and continued to charge at Johnson. Johnson fired multiple shots at Rambert, who continued to advance even after being shot. Rambert eventually fell and later died from his injuries.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina denied Johnson’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The court found genuine disputes of material fact regarding the reasonableness of Johnson’s conduct and concluded that a jury could determine that Johnson violated Rambert’s Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force. The court also denied summary judgment on the remaining federal and state law claims against Johnson and the City of Greenville.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Johnson was entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claim. The court found that Johnson’s use of deadly force was not objectively unreasonable given the circumstances, including Rambert’s aggressive behavior and failure to comply with commands. The court also determined that the law did not clearly establish that Johnson’s conduct was unconstitutional at the time of the incident. Consequently, the court reversed the district court’s denial of summary judgment on the § 1983 claim against Johnson. However, the court dismissed the appeal regarding the related state and federal claims and claims against the City of Greenville, remanding those issues for further proceedings. View "Rambert v. City of Greenville" on Justia Law

Emilee Carpenter, a wedding photographer, filed a preenforcement challenge against New York’s public accommodations laws, which prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation. Carpenter argued that these laws violated her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by compelling her to provide photography services for same-sex weddings, which she claimed conflicted with her religious beliefs. She sought declaratory and injunctive relief, including a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of the laws against her.The United States District Court for the Western District of New York dismissed all of Carpenter’s claims. The court found that Carpenter had not sufficiently pled that the public accommodations laws violated her rights to free speech, free association, free exercise of religion, or the Establishment Clause. The court also rejected her claims that the laws were unconstitutionally overbroad or vague. Consequently, the court denied her request for a preliminary injunction as moot.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, the appellate court agreed that Carpenter had plausibly stated a free speech claim. However, the court denied her request for a preliminary injunction at this stage, remanding the case to the district court for further proceedings to develop a factual record. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Carpenter’s other claims, including those related to free association, free exercise of religion, the Establishment Clause, and vagueness. The court concluded that the public accommodations laws were neutral, generally applicable, and did not provide for individualized exemptions that would undermine their general applicability. The court also found that Carpenter had waived her overbreadth claim due to inadequate pleading and briefing.The Second Circuit thus affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Carpenter v. James" on Justia Law

The case involves Gretchen Buselli, who was convicted of a murder-for-hire plot targeting her estranged husband, Bradley Buselli, and for making false statements to a federal agent. The evidence presented at trial included recorded phone calls where Buselli discussed hiring someone to kill Bradley, and surveillance footage showing her leaving $5,000 in a lunch box as payment. Buselli had reported Bradley for abusing their daughter, but investigations found no evidence supporting her claims. She was arrested after an undercover FBI agent, posing as a hitman, confirmed the murder-for-hire plot.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida handled the initial trial. Buselli was indicted on two counts: use of interstate commerce with intent to commit murder-for-hire and making materially false statements. She contested the jury instructions related to the murder-for-hire charge, arguing that the jury should be instructed on Florida’s defenses to murder, such as justifiable and excusable homicide. The district court declined to include these instructions, finding no evidence to support them.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the statutory language in 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a) does not require incorporating state law defenses into federal murder-for-hire prosecutions. The court also found that any error in the jury instructions was harmless, as no reasonable jury would have found Buselli’s actions justified under Florida law. Additionally, the court rejected Buselli’s constitutional challenge to her false-statements conviction and found no error in the jury instructions related to this charge. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed both of Buselli’s convictions. View "United States v. Buselli" on Justia Law

Three sets of parents refused to allow their newborns to receive Vitamin K shots at private hospitals in Illinois, citing concerns about risks and religious reasons. Hospital staff reported the refusals to the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), which investigated the parents for medical neglect. In one case, hospital staff took temporary protective custody of the child. The parents sued the hospitals and certain medical professionals under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the cases, ruling that the private entities could only be liable under § 1983 if they were engaged in state action. The court found that the hospitals and their staff were not acting under color of state law when they reported the parents to DCFS or took temporary custody of the children. The parents appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court held that the hospitals and their staff did not act under color of state law. The court found no evidence of a conspiracy or joint action between the hospitals and DCFS to infringe on the parents' constitutional rights. The court also determined that the hospitals were not performing a public function traditionally reserved to the state, as the mere threat of taking protective custody did not constitute state action. Additionally, the court found no entwinement or symbiotic relationship between the hospitals and the state that would make the hospitals state actors. Therefore, the parents' § 1983 claims could not proceed. View "Scott v. University of Chicago" on Justia Law

Three sets of parents refused to allow their newborns to receive Vitamin K shots at private hospitals in Illinois due to concerns about risks and religious reasons. Hospital staff reported the refusals to the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), which investigated the parents for medical neglect. In one case, hospital staff took temporary protective custody of the child. The parents sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by the hospitals and medical professionals.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the cases, ruling that the private entities were not engaged in state action and thus not liable under § 1983. The parents appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the private hospitals and their staff did not act under color of state law. The court found no evidence of a conspiracy or joint action between the hospitals and DCFS to infringe on the parents' constitutional rights. The court also determined that the hospitals were not performing a public function traditionally reserved to the state, as the mere threat of taking protective custody did not constitute state action. Additionally, the court found no symbiotic relationship or entwinement between the hospitals and the state to the point of largely overlapping identity.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the parents' claims, concluding that without state action, there could be no § 1983 liability. View "Bougher v. Silver Cross Hospital and Medical Centers" on Justia Law

In 1999, Allen Ward Cox, an inmate at Lake Correctional Institute, was indicted for the premeditated murder of fellow inmate Thomas Baker. Cox discovered that $500 had been stolen from his footlocker and offered $50 to anyone who could identify the thief, threatening to kill the person responsible. The next day, Cox attacked Baker, beating and stabbing him with a shank, resulting in Baker's death. Cox was found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to death.The Florida Supreme Court affirmed Cox's conviction and death sentence in 2002. After exhausting initial state and federal postconviction proceedings, Cox filed a motion for postconviction relief based on Hurst v. Florida, which was granted in 2017. A new penalty phase trial was ordered, and the jury unanimously recommended the death penalty, finding two aggravating factors: imprisonment and a prior violent felony. The trial court sentenced Cox to death, considering both aggravating and mitigating factors.The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed Cox's appeal, which raised seven issues, including the rejection of certain nonstatutory mitigating factors, the cumulative effect of the prosecutor's comments during closing arguments, and the constitutionality of Florida's death penalty scheme. The court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's rejection of the mitigating factors, determining that the evidence supported the trial court's findings. The court also concluded that the prosecutor's comments did not constitute fundamental error and upheld the constitutionality of Florida's death penalty scheme based on established precedent.The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed Cox's death sentence, finding no reversible error in the trial court's proceedings. The court did not address the issue raised by the State on cross-appeal, as Cox's convictions and sentences were affirmed. View "Cox v. State" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the Utah Legislature's repeal and replacement of a citizen initiative known as "Proposition 4," which aimed to reform the state's redistricting process to prevent partisan gerrymandering. Proposition 4, passed by Utah voters in 2018, established an Independent Redistricting Commission and set forth neutral redistricting standards, including a prohibition on partisan gerrymandering. However, before the next redistricting cycle, the Utah Legislature enacted Senate Bill 200 (S.B. 200), which repealed Proposition 4 and replaced it with a new law that did not include the same anti-gerrymandering provisions and weakened the role of the Independent Commission.In the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, the plaintiffs argued that the Legislature's actions violated the Utah Constitution by nullifying the reforms enacted by the people through Proposition 4. The district court dismissed this claim, holding that the Legislature has the authority to amend or repeal any statute, including those enacted by citizen initiative, without limitation. The plaintiffs appealed this decision.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case and focused on two constitutional provisions: the Initiative Provision in article VI, section 1, which grants the people the power to initiate legislation, and the Alter or Reform Clause in article I, section 2, which states that the people have the right to alter or reform their government. The court concluded that these provisions, when read together, limit the Legislature's power to amend or repeal a citizen initiative that reforms the government. The court held that the people’s right to reform the government through an initiative is constitutionally protected from legislative actions that would impair the reform enacted by the people.The Utah Supreme Court reversed the district court's dismissal of Count V, which challenged the Legislature's repeal and replacement of Proposition 4, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court emphasized that legislative changes to a government-reform initiative must not impair the reform and must be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling government interest if they do. View "League of Women Voters v. Utah State Legislature" on Justia Law

A juvenile male, B.N.M., was accused of participating in the murder of his girlfriend’s parents when he was fifteen years old. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma transferred him to adult status, allowing him to be prosecuted as an adult. B.N.M. challenged this decision, arguing that the district court made errors in its analysis and that transferring him for adult prosecution was unconstitutional due to the severe penalties for first-degree murder.The district court's decision was based on the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, which outlines factors to consider when deciding whether to transfer a juvenile for adult prosecution. The magistrate judge found that the nature of the offense and the availability of programs to treat the juvenile’s behavioral problems weighed in favor of transfer. The magistrate judge noted that if B.N.M. were adjudicated as a juvenile, he would be released at twenty-one, and there was a low likelihood of sufficient rehabilitation by that age. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation, despite B.N.M.'s objections.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. B.N.M. argued that the district court erred by misattributing testimony from the government’s expert to his expert and by not properly considering his role as a follower in the crimes. He also argued that the district court improperly shifted the burden of proof regarding the availability of community programs for his rehabilitation. The Tenth Circuit found that the misattribution of testimony did not affect the outcome and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the factors. The court also held that B.N.M.'s constitutional argument was not ripe for review. Consequently, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to transfer B.N.M. for adult prosecution. View "United States v. B.N.M." on Justia Law

The case involves a property owned by Indiana Land Trust #3082, located in Hammond, Indiana, which houses a lucrative fireworks and tobacco business operated by Omar and Haitham Abuzir. The City of Hammond seeks to use its eminent domain power to take this property to build a road connecting Indianapolis Boulevard and the Water Gardens neighborhood. The Abuzirs allege that the City’s actions are part of a conspiracy involving political motives and favoritism towards competitors who support the mayor.The Hammond Redevelopment Commission initially offered to purchase the property in 2018, but the Abuzirs declined. Consequently, the Commission initiated a condemnation action in Indiana state court under the state’s eminent domain statute. The Abuzirs objected, arguing that the taking was for a private purpose and motivated by ill will. Unable to assert counterclaims in state court, they filed a federal lawsuit alleging constitutional and federal law violations, including claims under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana dismissed the Abuzirs' third amended complaint with prejudice, finding that the City had a legitimate government interest in building a road and that the Abuzirs failed to state a claim for equal protection, substantive due process, or civil conspiracy. The court noted that the Abuzirs' complaint itself provided a rational basis for the City’s actions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that the Abuzirs failed to state a class-of-one equal protection claim because the City’s actions had a rational basis. The court also found that the proposed substantive due process claim was futile as the Abuzirs did not allege a deprivation of a protected interest. Lastly, the court upheld the denial of leave to add a § 1983 conspiracy claim, as the Abuzirs failed to establish any underlying constitutional violation. View "Indiana Land Trust #3082 v. Hammond Redevelopment Commission" on Justia Law

Carlton Loeber, the trustor of an irrevocable trust owning two undeveloped properties within the Lakeside Joint School District, sought to place an initiative on the ballot to exempt taxpayers over 65 from any district parcel tax on undeveloped parcels. The district declined to call the election, citing cost concerns and legal objections. Loeber filed a petition for a writ of mandate to compel the district to place the initiative on the ballot. The trial court dismissed the petition, ruling that Loeber lacked standing.The trial court found that Loeber did not have a direct and substantial interest in the initiative because he did not personally own property in the district and failed to show that the trust could qualify for the exemption. The court also rejected Loeber’s public interest standing argument, noting the lack of public engagement and the significant cost to the district. The court concluded that the public need was not weighty enough to warrant the application of the public interest exception.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case and determined that Loeber had standing under the public interest exception, given the significant public right at issue concerning the initiative power. However, the court concluded that the proposed initiative did not fall within the scope of Article XIII C, Section 3 of the California Constitution, which allows initiatives to reduce or repeal local taxes. The court held that the initiative, which sought to create a new exemption for certain taxpayers, did not constitute "reducing" a tax within the meaning of the constitutional provision. Consequently, the district was not obligated to call an election on the initiative. The judgment was modified to deny the writ petition and affirmed as modified. View "Loeber v. Lakeside Joint School District" on Justia Law