Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves the American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA), which allocated nearly $200 billion to states and the District of Columbia to assist with economic recovery following the COVID-19 pandemic. However, to accept the funds, states had to agree not to use them to "directly or indirectly offset" reductions in state tax revenue. The states of Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi filed a lawsuit seeking to enjoin the enforcement of this provision, arguing that it was unconstitutionally ambiguous and violated the Spending Clause and the anticommandeering doctrine.The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the states, finding that the provision was unduly coercive and commandeered the states. It held that the amount of money at stake was too great to present the states with a real choice and that the provision unlawfully forced the states to adopt certain tax policies. The court permanently enjoined the enforcement of the provision, and the federal defendants appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the provision was impermissibly ambiguous and fell short of Congress's constitutional obligation to clearly outline the conditions for states accepting federal funding. The court held that the provision violated the Spending Clause's requirement for clarity, as it left states unable to determine the terms of the deal they were agreeing to. The court also affirmed the district court's grant of a permanent injunction against the enforcement of the provision. View "State of Texas v. Yellen" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Joseph Brian McElroy, who was charged with criminal possession of dangerous drugs with intent to distribute, a felony. The charge stemmed from a traffic stop initiated by Trooper Adams for speeding. During the stop, Trooper Adams noticed the smell of marijuana from the vehicle and observed signs of "hard travel." After verifying the driver's information and concluding that the driver was not under the influence, Trooper Adams questioned the occupants about the smell of marijuana. When they denied consent to search the vehicle, Trooper Adams deployed a canine for a sniff test, which led to the discovery of drugs and other items. McElroy filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that the traffic stop was unlawfully extended without sufficient particularized suspicion.The District Court denied McElroy's motion to suppress the evidence. The court found that Trooper Adams had sufficient particularized suspicion to conduct the canine sniff based on the smell of marijuana, signs of hard travel, the occupants' nervousness, and their somewhat differing backstories. McElroy then entered a plea agreement, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed the District Court's decision. The court found that Trooper Adams did not have sufficient particularized suspicion to expand the traffic stop into a drug possession investigation. The court held that factors such as signs of hard travel, traveling from a known drug center in a third-party vehicle, and nervous demeanor, even when considered together, do not constitute particularized suspicion. The court also noted that the smell of marijuana itself does not constitute particularized suspicion sufficient to conclude there could be drugs in the vehicle. Therefore, the court concluded that Trooper Adams's further questioning about the marijuana smell and subsequent use of the canine sniff were unlawful. The court reversed the District Court's order denying McElroy's motion to suppress evidence and the resulting judgment of conviction and sentence. View "State v. McElroy" on Justia Law

The case involves a group of appellants, collectively referred to as "Challengers", who appealed judgments declaring section 67.1175.1 of the Missouri Statutes constitutionally invalid. This provision, in conjunction with section 67.1177, required a political subdivision to grant public money to a private entity, which was deemed to violate article VI, section 23 of the Missouri Constitution. The circuit court attempted to rectify the constitutional invalidity by modifying section 67.1175.1. The Challengers, however, argued that despite the modification, the sections still required a political subdivision to grant public money to a private entity in violation of the constitution. They further argued that the entire statutory scheme must be struck down because the sections were not severable.The circuit court had declared section 67.1175.1 constitutionally invalid because it mandated the lake area business districts to transfer tax funds to the advisory board, a private nonprofit entity. The court modified the section by removing the phrase "which shall be a nonprofit entity". The Challengers appealed this decision, arguing that the modified sections still violated the constitution.The Supreme Court of Missouri found that the circuit court erred in modifying section 67.1175.1. The court concluded that the section, as modified, and section 67.1177, still required political subdivisions to grant public money to a private entity, violating the Missouri Constitution. The court also concluded that the void provisions were not severable from the remaining provisions of the statutory scheme. As a result, the entire statutory scheme was declared constitutionally invalid. The circuit court’s judgment was reversed, and the Supreme Court entered the judgment the circuit court should have entered, declaring sections 67.1170, 67.1175, 67.1177, and 67.1170 constitutionally invalid and void in their entireties. View "Salamun v. The Camden County Clerk" on Justia Law

The case involves Angel Landa-Arevalo, who was indicted for conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of methamphetamine. He was tried alongside nine co-defendants. Landa-Arevalo was in pretrial confinement for 1,196 days, during which he objected to the protracted timeline and moved to sever his trial from his co-defendants to protect his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. He also requested a mental competency hearing, arguing that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated by not providing him with a second, more extensive evaluation.The district court denied his motions and proceeded with the trial. A forensic psychologist was appointed to examine Landa-Arevalo and concluded that he was competent to stand trial. The court found him competent and proceeded with sentencing.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Landa-Arevalo argued that the district court violated his Fifth Amendment rights by not ordering a second competency evaluation and his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining Landa-Arevalo's competency and denying another evaluation. The court also found that Landa-Arevalo's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was not violated, as the delays were caused by co-defendants and not the government. View "United States v. Landa-Arevalo" on Justia Law

The Attorney General for the State of Oklahoma, on behalf of the state, sought a writ of mandamus and declaratory relief against the Oklahoma Statewide Virtual Charter School Board and its members. The state argued that the board's contract with St. Isidore of Seville Catholic Virtual School, a religious charter school, violated state and federal law and was unconstitutional. The state contended that the contract violated the Oklahoma Constitution, which mandates that all charter schools be nonsectarian in their programs, admission policies, and other operations. The state also argued that the contract violated the federal Establishment Clause, which prohibits the state from using public money for the establishment of a religious institution.The Charter School Board had approved St. Isidore's application to become an Oklahoma virtual charter school and later approved its contract for sponsorship. The contract recognized certain rights, exemptions, or entitlements applicable to St. Isidore as a religious organization under state and federal law. The contract also stated that St. Isidore had the right to freely exercise its religious beliefs and practices consistent with its religious protections.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma assumed original jurisdiction over the case. The court found that the contract violated the Oklahoma Constitution, the Oklahoma Charter Schools Act, and the federal Establishment Clause. The court held that St. Isidore, as a public charter school, was a governmental entity and a state actor. The court also held that the contract violated the Establishment Clause because it allowed for the use of state funds for the benefit and support of the Catholic church and required students to participate in religious curriculum and activities. The court granted the extraordinary and declaratory relief sought by the state and directed the Charter School Board to rescind its contract with St. Isidore. View "DRUMMOND v. OKLAHOMA STATEWIDE VIRTUAL CHARTER SCHOOL BOARD" on Justia Law

In 1999, Sylvester Williams was convicted of indecent exposure with a prior conviction and sentenced to 25 years to life under the Three Strikes law, plus an additional two years for two prior prison term enhancements. In 2012, Williams filed a petition for recall of sentence under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012. The trial court denied Williams’ petition after finding that he posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. In 2023, Williams sought relief for his newly invalid prior prison term enhancements, arguing that he was entitled to be resentenced to a maximum sentence of six years as a “two-striker” under the revised penalty provisions of the Three Strikes Reform Act. The trial court agreed and resentenced Williams to six years, struck the two prior prison term enhancements, and deemed the sentence satisfied.The People appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in applying the revised penalty provisions of the Three Strikes Reform Act when resentencing Williams under section 1172.75 due to invalid prior prison term enhancements. They contended that by doing so, the court bypassed the public safety inquiry required by section 1170.126 of the Three Strikes Reform Act, and that section 1172.75 thereby constitutes an improper amendment of the Three Strikes Reform Act.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Sixth Appellate District agreed with the People. It held that applying the revised penalty provisions of the Three Strikes Reform Act to reduce a defendant’s indeterminate life term to a determinate term when the defendant is being resentenced under section 1172.75 due to an invalid prior prison term enhancement unconstitutionally amends the resentencing procedure and requirements set forth in section 1170.126 of the voter-approved Three Strikes Reform Act. The court issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order resentencing Williams to a six-year term and to hold a new resentencing hearing at which Williams’s sentence of 25 years to life is reinstated. View "People v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The case involves an incarcerated individual, Thomas Alexander, who alleged that two correctional officers violated his Fourth and Eighth Amendment rights by forcibly removing a contraband phone from his rectum in a prison shower. The officers, however, claimed that they found the phone in Alexander's pocket and used no more force than necessary. The incident was partially captured on video, but the footage did not conclusively resolve the dispute over where the phone was located.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina granted summary judgment in favor of the officers. The court relied on the video footage, concluding that it discredited Alexander's version of events to such an extent that no reasonable jury could have believed him.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the lower court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court found that the video did not clearly depict what happened in the shower room and did not blatantly contradict Alexander's account. Therefore, the court held that the district court should have credited Alexander's version of events when considering the officers' summary judgment motion. The appellate court also concluded that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Alexander, a reasonable jury could find that the officers violated Alexander's Fourth and Eighth Amendment rights. View "Alexander v. Connor" on Justia Law

The case involves Tahjair Dorsey, who was convicted for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Dorsey had previously pleaded guilty to carrying a firearm without a license, a felony under Pennsylvania law. He was paroled in June 2021. In August 2021, during an investigation into suspected gang activity, Dorsey was observed leaving a residence under surveillance and was apprehended after fleeing a vehicle stop. A stolen handgun was recovered nearby, and Dorsey's DNA was found on it. He was subsequently indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm.Dorsey pleaded guilty but later appealed his conviction, arguing that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional as applied to him under the Second Amendment. However, he had not raised this objection at any stage of the District Court proceedings. The District Court sentenced Dorsey to time served and three years of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case for plain error. The court referred to its en banc decision in Range v. Attorney General, which held that disarming an individual with a single, almost-thirty-year-old criminal conviction for food stamp fraud was not consistent with the Second Amendment. The court found that Dorsey could not show that he was similarly situated to the appellant in Range for Second Amendment purposes. The court noted that Dorsey's prior conviction was for a state firearm law violation, was more recent, and he was on state parole at the time of the offense. The court concluded that any Second Amendment error inherent in Dorsey’s conviction was not plain and affirmed the lower court's decision. View "USA v. Dorsey" on Justia Law

Three individuals and the State of Texas filed a lawsuit seeking to enjoin federal statutes that criminalize the creation of silencers for personal use without paying a $200 excise tax, applying for permission from the federal government, and, if permission is granted, registering the silencer in a federal database and labeling the silencer with a serial number. The plaintiffs argued that these federal regulations violated their Second Amendment rights. In 2021, Texas had enacted a law stating that a firearm suppressor manufactured in Texas and remaining in Texas is not subject to federal law or regulation.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas granted summary judgment in favor of the federal government, holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring their claims. The court did not address the merits of the plaintiffs' Second Amendment claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the individual plaintiffs failed to demonstrate an injury in fact, a requirement for standing, because they did not express a serious intention to engage in conduct proscribed by law. The court also found that Texas did not have standing to bring the lawsuit. The state's claim that it had a quasi-sovereign interest in its citizens' health and well-being was found to be wholly derivative of the personal Second Amendment interests of its citizens. Furthermore, the court found that Texas's claim that it had a sovereign interest in the power to create and enforce a legal code was not implicated in this case. The court concluded that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the federal statutes. View "Paxton v. Dettelbach" on Justia Law

A group of individuals and businesses challenged the Affordable Care Act's requirement for private insurers to cover certain types of preventive care, including contraception, HPV vaccines, and drugs preventing HIV transmission. The plaintiffs argued that the mandates were unlawful because the agencies issuing them violated Article II of the Constitution, as their members were principal officers of the United States who had not been validly appointed under the Appointments Clause. The district court mostly agreed, vacating all agency actions taken to enforce the mandates and issuing both party-specific and universal injunctive relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed that the United States Preventive Services Task Force, one of the challenged administrative bodies, was composed of principal officers who had not been validly appointed. However, the court found that the district court erred in vacating all agency actions taken to enforce the preventive-care mandates and in universally enjoining the defendants from enforcing them. The court also held that the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services had not validly cured the Task Force’s constitutional problems.The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court did not rule on the plaintiffs' challenges against the other two administrative bodies involved in the case, the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices and the Health Resources and Services Administration, reserving judgment on whether the Secretary had effectively ratified their recommendations and guidelines. View "Braidwood Mgmt v. Becerra" on Justia Law