Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Solomon Bolen was convicted of multiple offenses, including attempted second-degree murder and aggravated assault and battery. Bolen appealed, arguing that the district court violated his due process rights by not instructing the jury on his plea of not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency (NGMI). He also claimed that his attorneys were ineffective for not seeking those instructions. Additionally, Bolen contended that his convictions for attempted second-degree murder and aggravated assault and battery violated his right against double jeopardy.The district court had found Bolen mentally fit to proceed with the trial. Despite Bolen's NGMI plea, the court-designated examiner, Dr. Wilkinson, opined that Bolen did not meet the statutory criteria for an NGMI defense. She noted that Bolen's altered state of mind and psychosis at the time of the crimes were caused by self-induced intoxication, which is specifically excluded from the statutory definition of mental illness or deficiency. Bolen's attorneys did not pursue the NGMI defense and focused instead on the self-induced intoxication defense.The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that Bolen did not present competent evidence to support an NGMI defense, and thus was not entitled to have the jury instructed on the defense. The court also found that Bolen's attorneys were not ineffective for not pursuing the NGMI defense, as the instructions would not have been proper even if they had renewed their request for them. Lastly, the court held that Bolen's convictions for attempted second-degree murder and aggravated assault and battery did not violate his right against double jeopardy, as the crimes contained separate elements. View "Bolen v. State" on Justia Law

In 2015, Zachary Penna committed a series of violent crimes in Florida, including two murders. After his arrest, Penna was read his Miranda rights and initially invoked his right to counsel. However, during his hospitalization, Penna voluntarily initiated several conversations with Deputy Michael Nettles, during which he made incriminating statements. Penna was subsequently charged with several crimes, including two counts of first-degree murder. Before trial, Penna moved to suppress the statements made to Deputy Nettles, arguing that they were obtained in violation of Miranda. The trial court denied the motion, and Penna was found guilty on all counts and sentenced to life in prison.Penna appealed to the Fourth District Court of Appeal, which found that the statements during the first two conversations were not obtained in violation of Miranda. However, the court ruled that Deputy Nettles violated Miranda by failing to re-read Penna his Miranda rights prior to the final three conversations. The court relied on its own precedent, which had interpreted a previous Florida Supreme Court decision to require a full re-reading of Miranda warnings under the circumstances of this case. The court found that the error was not harmless, despite the overwhelming evidence of Penna’s guilt.The Supreme Court of Florida accepted the case for review. The court was asked to consider whether a defendant’s Fifth Amendment Miranda rights are automatically violated when an officer fails to re-read a Miranda warning following a defendant’s voluntary re-initiation of contact. The court held that there is no per se requirement that an officer remind or readvise a defendant of his Miranda rights. The court found that the Fourth District Court of Appeal had improperly expanded the requirements of Miranda and receded from its previous decision that had established a categorical rule requiring a full re-reading of Miranda warnings. The court remanded the case for reconsideration under the proper standard. View "State of Florida v. Penna" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Intellectual Tech LLC (IT), a wholly owned subsidiary of OnAsset Intelligence, Inc. (OnAsset), and its patent dispute with Zebra Technologies Corporation (Zebra). In 2019, IT asserted U.S. Patent No. 7,233,247 against Zebra, claiming that it was the owner and assignee of the patent. However, Zebra moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that IT lacked standing. The district court initially denied the motion, but later granted it based on its determination that IT lacked constitutional standing, leading to the dismissal of all claims without prejudice.Previously, OnAsset had granted Main Street Capital Corporation (Main Street), a lender, a security interest in its patents, including the one in question, as part of a loan agreement. When OnAsset defaulted on the loan, Main Street gained certain rights. Subsequently, OnAsset assigned the patent to IT, which also defaulted on its obligations. The district court found that Main Street's ability to license the patent upon default deprived IT of all its exclusionary rights, leading to a lack of constitutional standing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit disagreed with the district court's interpretation. The appellate court found that IT retained at least one exclusionary right, even considering the rights Main Street gained upon default. The court clarified that a patent owner has exclusionary rights as a baseline matter unless it has transferred all exclusionary rights away. The court concluded that IT still suffered an injury in fact from infringement even if IT and Main Street could both license the patent. Therefore, the appellate court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Intellectual Tech LLC v. Zebra Technologies Corp." on Justia Law

The case revolves around the defendant, Luke Strommen, who was charged with Sexual Intercourse Without Consent (SIWC) and Sexual Abuse of Children. The charges stemmed from allegations made by two women, one of whom claimed that she had an ongoing sexual relationship with Strommen when she was a minor. The other woman alleged that Strommen possessed digital images of her engaged in sexual activity when she was 17. Strommen pleaded not guilty to both charges.In the lower courts, the State of Montana sought to present the testimony of a sexual assault behavioral psychologist, Dr. Sheri Vanino, remotely via two-way video conferencing due to her unavailability to travel to Montana for the trial. The defense objected, asserting that personal in-court cross-examination was essential. The District Court granted the State's motion, allowing Dr. Vanino to testify remotely. The trial resulted in Strommen being found guilty of SIWC and sentenced to a 40-year prison term.In the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, Strommen appealed his conviction, arguing that the District Court erroneously allowed the State to present adverse expert testimony remotely via two-way video conferencing at trial. The Supreme Court agreed with Strommen, holding that the allowance of Dr. Vanino's remote testimony violated Strommen's fundamental right to personal face-to-face confrontation of adverse prosecution witnesses in the courtroom at trial, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and Mont. Const. art. II, § 24. The court reversed Strommen's conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. View "State v. Strommen" on Justia Law

Andre Ricardo Briscoe was involved in the purchase and sale of narcotics in Baltimore. He learned from a contact, Kiara Haynes, that Jennifer Jeffrey had received a large supply of heroin. Briscoe and Haynes decided to rob Jeffrey. Briscoe went to Jeffrey’s house, robbed her of at least 80 grams of narcotics, shot and killed her, and shot and killed her seven-year-old son, K.B., whom Briscoe feared might testify against him. Briscoe was arrested and initially charged with possession with intent to distribute narcotics, conspiracy to distribute narcotics, and possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. A later superseding indictment added three new counts: two counts of murder with a firearm during the commission of a drug trafficking crime and one count of killing a witness to prevent communication with law enforcement. After a twelve-day jury trial, Briscoe was convicted on all charges.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland denied Briscoe's motion to dismiss the indictment as barred by the statute of limitations, concluding that the indictment related back to the earlier filed information. The court also denied Briscoe's motion to suppress evidence obtained through the use of a cell site simulator, finding that the police had obtained a tracking order which authorized them to use the simulator. The court further found that the police had obtained consent to search the apartment where Briscoe was found and that their subsequent actions were part of a lawful protective sweep of the apartment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the government properly tolled the statute of limitations by filing an information within the five-year period and that the subsequent indictment related back to that filing. The court also held that the police had authority to use a cell site simulator to obtain Briscoe's location information and to search the apartment where he was found. The court rejected Briscoe's arguments that the government committed a Brady violation by failing to follow up on whether any footage was contained on a broken camera and that the government knowingly relied upon false testimony to secure his conviction. The court further held that the evidence was sufficient to convict Briscoe on all counts. View "United States v. Briscoe" on Justia Law

The case involves a non-marital couple, A.M.B. and T.G., who sought to adopt A.M.B.'s biological child, M.M.C. T.G. had been a father figure to M.M.C. for over a decade and had assumed various parental duties. The parental rights of M.M.C.'s biological father had been terminated. Despite a positive Home Study Report recommending the adoption, the Circuit Court for Ashland County denied the adoption petition. The court cited Wisconsin's adoption statutes, which only allow a non-marital partner to adopt their partner's child if they are married to the child's parent. A.M.B. and T.G. appealed, arguing that the statutes violated their equal protection rights.The Circuit Court for Ashland County denied the adoption petition, citing Wisconsin's adoption statutes. The statutes only allow a non-marital partner to adopt their partner's child if they are married to the child's parent. The court referenced a previous case, Georgina G. v. Terry M., which held that an adoption by a third party who is not the spouse of the parent is not permissible. A.M.B. and T.G. appealed the decision, arguing that the statutes violated their equal protection rights.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the adoption statutes did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court found that the statutes did not restrict a fundamental right or regulate a protected class. The court concluded that the state had a legitimate interest in promoting stability for adoptive children through marital families, which provided a rational basis for the legislative limits on eligibility to adopt a child. View "A. M. B. v. Circuit Court for Ashland County" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute arising from the financial fallout of Winter Storm Uri, which severely impacted Texas's electrical grid in 2021. The Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), responsible for managing the grid, took measures including manipulating energy prices to incentivize production. This resulted in Entrust Energy, Inc., receiving an electricity bill from ERCOT of nearly $300 million, leading to Entrust's insolvency and subsequent bankruptcy filing. ERCOT filed a claim seeking payment of the invoice, which was challenged by Anna Phillips, the trustee of the Entrust Liquidating Trust. The trustee argued that ERCOT's price manipulation violated Texas law, that ERCOT was grossly negligent in its handling of the grid during the storm, and that ERCOT's transitioning of Entrust’s customers to another utility was an uncompensated taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment.The bankruptcy court declined to abstain from the case and denied ERCOT’s motion to dismiss all claims except for the takings claim. ERCOT appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, arguing that the bankruptcy court should have abstained under the Burford doctrine, which allows federal courts to abstain from complex state law issues to avoid disrupting state policies.The Fifth Circuit found that the bankruptcy court erred in refusing to abstain under the Burford doctrine. The court reversed the bankruptcy court's denial of ERCOT’s motion to abstain and its denial of ERCOT’s motion to dismiss the trustee’s complaint. The court also vacated the bankruptcy court’s order dismissing the takings claim with prejudice. The court remanded the case with instructions to dismiss certain counts and stay others pending the resolution of related state proceedings. View "Electric Reliability Council of Texas v. Phillips" on Justia Law

Shamar Betts was indicted for inciting a riot in violation of the Anti-Riot Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2101, after he posted a flyer on Facebook calling for a riot at a mall in Champaign, Illinois. The riot resulted in damage to several businesses. Betts moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the Anti-Riot Act was overbroad and violated the First Amendment, but the district court denied his motion. Betts then pled guilty and was sentenced to 48 months’ imprisonment and ordered to pay $1,686,170.30 in restitution to 35 businesses under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3663A.On appeal, Betts challenged the constitutionality of the Anti-Riot Act, the application of a sentencing guideline by analogy, and the district court's order of restitution. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the Anti-Riot Act, finding no compelling reason to overrule its previous decision in United States v. Dellinger, which upheld the Act. The court also found no error in the district court's application of a sentencing guideline by analogy to the Anti-Riot Act.However, the court agreed with Betts's argument that the government failed to meet its burden of showing that he directly and proximately caused damages to all businesses included in the restitution order. The court vacated the sentence with regard to the amount of restitution ordered and remanded the case for the limited purpose of reconsidering the amount of restitution. View "United States v. Betts" on Justia Law

The Greenwald Family Limited Partnership, a landowner in the Village of Mukwonago, Wisconsin, had a longstanding positive relationship with the Village, collaborating on several development projects. However, this relationship soured after a failed land deal in 2014 and several other conflicts. The Partnership sued the Village, alleging that it had been irrationally singled out for unfavorable treatment, violating its Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Partnership pointed to several adverse municipal decisions, focusing primarily on the failed land deal and a new road that was rerouted from the Partnership’s property.The case was initially filed in state court but was later removed to federal court. The district court concluded that the Village had a rational basis for its actions regarding the failed land deal, the new road, and other decisions affecting the Partnership’s properties. The court entered summary judgment in favor of the Village and relinquished jurisdiction over the state-law claims.The case was then brought before the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The court affirmed the district court's decision, stating that the Partnership had failed to show that the Village’s actions lacked any conceivable rational basis. The court found that the Village’s decisions were rationally related to its legitimate interests in promoting its land-use objectives and protecting public funds. The court concluded that the Partnership was a disappointed landowner, but not a victim of unconstitutional discrimination. View "Greenwald Family Limited Partnership v. Village of Mukwonago" on Justia Law

The case involves the City of San José and the Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association (HJTA). The city had a significant unfunded liability in its pension plans for city employees. To address this shortfall, the city council adopted a resolution authorizing the issuance and sale of bonds, provided they result in savings for the city. The HJTA argued that this action violated the constitutional debt limitation, which prohibits cities from incurring any indebtedness or liability exceeding the income and revenue provided for a given year without the assent of two-thirds of the voters.The trial court upheld the city's actions, ruling that the bond issuance falls under the obligation imposed by law exception to the debt limitation. The HJTA appealed this decision, arguing that the city's actions violate the constitutional debt limitation and lack statutory authority.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Sixth Appellate District, affirmed the judgment, but for different reasons than the trial court. The appellate court concluded that the city has not incurred any indebtedness or liability exceeding its annual income and revenue because the city's actions do not trigger the constitutional debt limitation. The court also found that the city has the authority under state law to issue the bonds. View "City of San Jose v. Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn." on Justia Law