Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Debbie Mayfield, a former member of the Florida House of Representatives and Florida Senate, sought to run in a special election for Senate District 19 after the incumbent announced his resignation. Mayfield submitted the necessary paperwork to qualify for the ballot, but the Secretary of State and Director of the Division of Elections refused to place her on the ballot, citing a constitutional provision on term limits.The Circuit Court did not review the case. Mayfield directly petitioned the Supreme Court of Florida for writs of mandamus and quo warranto, arguing that the Secretary misinterpreted his authority and failed to fulfill his statutory duty.The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the case and granted Mayfield's petition for mandamus relief. The court held that Mayfield had a clear legal right to appear on the ballot, as she had met all statutory requirements for qualification. The court found that the Secretary's role in reviewing candidate qualifications is ministerial and does not include the authority to assess a candidate's constitutional eligibility. The court also rejected the Secretary's interpretation of the term-limits provision, concluding that Mayfield's break in service meant she had not served more than eight consecutive years in the Senate. The court ordered the Secretary to place Mayfield on the ballot by a specified deadline and denied the petition for quo warranto as moot. View "Mayfield v. Secretary, Florida Department of State" on Justia Law

The case involves the appeals of Rolando Williamson, Hendarius Archie, Ishmywel Gregory, and Adrien Taylor, who were convicted of various drug distribution and conspiracy charges. Williamson argued that the district court erred in denying his motions to suppress evidence obtained from warrants to search his house and apartment, claiming the use of pole cameras violated the Fourth Amendment. Archie contended that the district court allowed improper opinion testimony from a case agent. Gregory challenged the district court’s findings on the type and amount of drugs attributable to him at sentencing. All defendants questioned the sufficiency of the evidence supporting their conspiracy convictions.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama convicted the defendants on multiple counts. Williamson was sentenced to life imprisonment for several counts, including engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise and conspiracy to distribute drugs. Taylor was convicted of distributing methamphetamine and using a communication facility to commit a drug trafficking crime. Gregory was convicted of distributing cocaine and conspiracy to distribute drugs. Archie was convicted of conspiracy to distribute marijuana and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the use of pole cameras did not violate Williamson’s Fourth Amendment rights as they surveilled areas exposed to the public. The court found that the case agent’s opinion testimony did not affect Archie’s substantial rights. The evidence was deemed sufficient to support each defendant’s conspiracy conviction. However, Williamson’s conspiracy conviction was vacated as it was a lesser-included offense of his continuing criminal enterprise conviction. Gregory’s sentence was vacated and remanded for resentencing as it exceeded the statutory maximum. The court affirmed the remaining convictions and sentences. View "United States v. Gregory" on Justia Law

Kein Eastman was abducted at gunpoint from his grandmother’s house by Kenwyn Frazier, taken to an apartment in East St. Louis, and subjected to threats, beatings, and a gunshot over a piece of jewelry. Eastman fled the scene with a bloodied face and has not been seen since. Kenwyn and his brother Kendrick Frazier were charged with kidnapping and found guilty by a jury. They appealed on several grounds, including a violation of Kendrick’s Sixth Amendment right to his choice of counsel, the constitutionality of the federal kidnapping statute, the sufficiency of the evidence, and aspects of their sentencing.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois denied the Fraziers' motion to dismiss the indictment and their post-trial motions for acquittal or a new trial. The court also applied a four-level sentencing enhancement, finding that Eastman sustained permanent or life-threatening bodily injury. Kendrick’s request for joint representation by attorney Beau Brindley was denied due to potential conflicts of interest, and he retained separate counsel.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in denying Kendrick’s choice of counsel, given the potential for conflicts of interest. The court upheld the constitutionality of the federal kidnapping statute, citing precedent that the use of instrumentalities of interstate commerce, such as cars and cellphones, suffices for federal jurisdiction. The court also found sufficient evidence to support Kendrick’s conviction for aiding and abetting the kidnapping. Lastly, the court affirmed the application of the sentencing enhancement, agreeing that the evidence supported the finding that Eastman sustained a permanent or life-threatening injury. View "United States v. Frazier" on Justia Law

Several members of the public requested records from the Seattle Police Department (SPD) regarding officers who attended the January 6, 2021, rally in Washington, DC. The officers involved filed a lawsuit to prevent the release of their identities, arguing that their identities should be exempt from disclosure based on statutory and constitutional privacy rights. They sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the release of their identities within those public records.The King County Superior Court denied the officers' motion for a preliminary injunction, determining that the officers failed to show that the information in the public records was likely exempt from disclosure. The court also denied the officers' motion to proceed under pseudonyms. The officers appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the denial of the preliminary injunction, concluding that the First Amendment prohibited the disclosure of the officers' identities. The Court of Appeals did not evaluate whether the disclosure would violate the officers' statutory right to privacy under the Public Records Act (PRA).The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case and held that the officers did not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits that their identities were exempt based on either a statutory or constitutional right to privacy. The court concluded that the officers did not have a privacy interest in their identities as public employees who attended a highly publicized event. The court also held that the officers did not show a need to litigate under pseudonyms. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "John Does v. Seattle Police Dep't" on Justia Law

In this case, inmates at the Louisiana State Penitentiary (LSP) filed a class action lawsuit in 2015 against the warden, the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, and other officials. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to their serious medical needs, violating the Eighth Amendment, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court bifurcated the case into liability and remedy phases. After an eleven-day bench trial, the court found in favor of the plaintiffs on all claims. Subsequently, a ten-day trial on remedies concluded that the plaintiffs were entitled to permanent injunctive relief, but the court did not specify the relief in its judgment.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana entered a "Judgment" in favor of the plaintiffs and a "Remedial Order" outlining the appointment of special masters to develop remedial plans. The defendants appealed, arguing that the district court's judgment and remedial order were final and appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 or, alternatively, under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the district court had not entered a final decision appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, nor had it entered an injunction appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). The appellate court determined that the district court's actions were not final because they contemplated further proceedings, including the appointment of special masters and the development of remedial plans. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and vacated the stay of the remedial order. View "Parker v. Hooper" on Justia Law

Garrett Alan Lee, a 25-year-old, engaged in an online conversation with an undercover law enforcement officer posing as a 12-year-old girl. Lee discussed meeting the girl for sex and was apprehended by law enforcement when he arrived at the arranged location. He was charged with Sexual Abuse of Children under Montana law and pleaded guilty.The Thirteenth Judicial District Court sentenced Lee to 100 years at the Montana State Prison, with 65 years suspended, and imposed a 25-year parole restriction. Lee appealed, arguing that the mandatory 25-year parole restriction was unconstitutional and that the District Court violated his due process rights by considering information from a prior psychosexual examination not admitted into evidence.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court held that Lee's constitutional and statutory arguments concerning the mandatory parole restriction were not properly before the court because he was not sentenced under the mandatory minimum provision. Instead, the District Court imposed the parole restriction under its discretionary sentencing power. The court also found that Lee's due process rights were not violated, as he had the opportunity to rebut or correct any information in the presentence investigation report, and the information was not materially false.The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's judgment, concluding that Lee's sentence was legal and within the statutory parameters. The court declined to review the constitutional and statutory claims related to the mandatory parole restriction and did not find plain error in the due process claim. View "State v. Lee" on Justia Law

In 2012, the City of Providence suspended cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) pension benefits for retired police and fire department members. The retirees challenged this suspension, leading to a series of legal actions. Most retirees settled, agreeing to a ten-year suspension of their COLA benefits, but some plaintiffs opted out and pursued further legal action, claiming breach of contract and constitutional violations.The Superior Court granted partial summary judgment for the City on some claims and, after a bench trial, ruled against the plaintiffs on the remaining claims. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Rhode Island Supreme Court in Andrews I found that the 2012 ordinance violated the separation of powers doctrine by attempting to override prior consent judgments and judicial decisions. The case was remanded, and the Superior Court reinstated the plaintiffs' COLAs and awarded accrued benefits but did not address prejudgment interest.The plaintiffs then sought prejudgment interest on the past-due COLA payments, which the Superior Court denied, reasoning that the damages were not contractual in nature but were awarded based on constitutional grounds. The plaintiffs appealed this decision.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. The Court held that the plaintiffs' recovery of past-due COLAs was based on the enforcement of final judgments, not on a breach of contract. Since the award was rooted in constitutional law rather than contract law, the plaintiffs were not entitled to prejudgment interest under the relevant statute, which applies strictly to tort and contract claims. View "Andrews v. Lombardi" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, retired police officers and firefighters, challenged the constitutionality of a 2011 Medicare Ordinance enacted by the City of Providence, which required retirees to enroll in Medicare upon eligibility and terminated city-paid health care coverage for Medicare-eligible retirees. The plaintiffs, who opted out of a settlement agreement that provided certain Medicare-related benefits, sought retroactive reimbursement for out-of-pocket health care expenses incurred during the litigation.The Superior Court initially granted partial summary judgment in favor of the City on some claims and, after a bench trial, denied relief on the remaining claims. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Rhode Island Supreme Court in Andrews II remanded the case with instructions to enter judgment consistent with the specific provisions of the 2013 Final and Consent Judgment, which did not include retroactive reimbursement for health care expenses.Upon remand, the plaintiffs sought reimbursement for out-of-pocket expenses, but the Superior Court denied this request, concluding that such relief was outside the scope of the Supreme Court's mandate in Andrews II. The plaintiffs appealed this decision.The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment, holding that the mandate in Andrews II did not contemplate or include retroactive relief for health care expenses. The Court emphasized that the mandate was prospective in nature and aligned with the 2013 Final and Consent Judgment, which did not provide for reimbursement of past expenses. The Court also noted that the plaintiffs had waived claims for individual damages during the trial and had not sought such damages in their amended complaint. View "Andrews v. Lombardi" on Justia Law

A bakery refused to sell a predesigned white cake to a same-sex couple for their wedding reception, citing a policy against providing cakes for same-sex weddings based on the owner's religious beliefs. The California Civil Rights Department (CRD) filed a lawsuit on behalf of the couple, alleging discrimination under the Unruh Civil Rights Act (UCRA). The trial court ruled in favor of the bakery, finding no violation of the UCRA because the CRD failed to prove intentional discrimination and concluded that referring the couple to another bakery constituted full and equal access under the UCRA. The trial court also considered the bakery's First Amendment defenses, concluding that the UCRA compelled the bakery to speak a message about marriage to which they objected.The CRD appealed, challenging the trial court's interpretation and application of the UCRA and its conclusions regarding the bakery's affirmative defenses. The California Court of Appeal reviewed the case and determined that the bakery's policy was not facially neutral and misconstrued the intentional discrimination standard. The court found that the policy was inherently discriminatory as it required a distinction in service based on the sexual orientation of the end user. The court also concluded that referring the couple to another bakery did not satisfy the UCRA's full and equal access requirement.The court further analyzed the bakery's First Amendment defenses, determining that the cake in question did not constitute pure speech or expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment. The court found that the cake was a generic, multi-purpose product and that its preparation and delivery did not convey any particularized message about marriage. Additionally, the court concluded that the UCRA is a neutral and generally applicable law that satisfies rational basis review and does not violate the bakery's free exercise of religion under the federal or state constitutions.The California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Civil Rights Dept. v. Cathy's Creations" on Justia Law

F.S. was found guilty by a jury of statutory sodomy of an 11-year-old victim and sentenced to five years in prison. After completing her sentence and parole, she was subjected to lifetime electronic monitoring by the Missouri Department of Corrections under section 217.735. This monitoring involves wearing an ankle bracelet that tracks her location via GPS. F.S. challenged the constitutionality of this lifetime monitoring requirement, arguing it violated her Fourth Amendment rights.The Circuit Court of Cole County upheld the constitutionality of section 217.735. During the bench trial, the court received stipulated facts, exhibits, and testimony from experts. The court found that GPS monitoring can deter recidivism among sex offenders by enforcing exclusion zones and increasing the certainty of legal repercussions. The court also noted that F.S. had not reoffended since completing parole but found that sex offenders with child victims tend to reoffend over a longer period. The court concluded that the GPS monitoring was a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, given F.S.'s diminished expectation of privacy as a convicted sex offender and the state's legitimate interest in protecting potential victims.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the circuit court's judgment. The court held that F.S. failed to present particularized evidence showing that section 217.735 was unconstitutionally applied to her circumstances. The court emphasized that F.S.'s status as a female offender and her lack of reoffending did not suffice to demonstrate that the statute was unreasonable as applied to her. The court concluded that the statute did not clearly contravene any specific constitutional provision and upheld the lifetime monitoring requirement. View "F.S. v. Missouri Department of Corrections, Division of Probation and Parole" on Justia Law