Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In the case of a sex offender diagnosed with severe schizophrenia and psychosis, the New York Court of Appeals held that due process does not require a competency examination before a sex offender's risk level can be determined under the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). The defendant, who was found not mentally fit to stand trial, argued that his risk classification hearing should have been adjourned until he was deemed competent to understand the proceedings. The court disagreed, stating the numerous safeguards already provided under SORA, including the rights to notice, counsel, disclosure of relevant information, and an opportunity to object and present evidence at a hearing, adequately balance the interests involved. The court also rejected the defendant's argument that the classification hearing was premature under SORA itself, holding that SORA authorizes risk-level determinations "[30] calendar days prior" to a registrant's release from incarceration, regardless of pending civil commitment proceedings. The court affirmed the lower court's decision to designate the defendant as a level two (moderate risk) sex offender. View "People v Watts" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit addressed a dispute involving the owners of two parcels of real estate in Chicago who contended that banks tried to collect notes and mortgages that belonged to different financial institutions. The state judiciary had ruled that the banks were entitled to foreclose on both parcels, but the properties had not yet been sold and no final judgments defining the debt were in place. The plaintiffs attempted to initiate federal litigation under the holding of Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., arguing that their case was still pending. However, the district court dismissed the case, citing the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which states that only the Supreme Court of the United States can review the judgments of state courts in civil suits.The Appeals court held that the application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine was incorrect in this case because the foreclosure litigation in Illinois was not yet "final". According to the court, the foreclosure process in Illinois continues until the property is sold, the sale is confirmed, and the court either enters a deficiency judgment or distributes the surplus. Since these steps had not occurred, the plaintiffs had not yet "lost the war", and thus parallel state and federal litigation could be pursued as per Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp.However, by the time the district court dismissed this suit, the state litigation about one parcel was over because a sale had occurred and been confirmed, and by the time the Appeals court heard oral argument that was true for the second parcel as well. The Appeals court stated that Illinois law forbids sequential litigation about the same claim even when the plaintiff in the second case offers novel arguments. The court found that the plaintiffs could have presented their constitutional arguments in the state court system and were not free to shift what is effectively an appellate argument to a different judicial system.The court also noted that Joel Chupack, the lead defendant, was the trial judge in the state case and was not a party to either state case. He did not claim the benefit of preclusion. Judge Chupack was found to be entitled to absolute immunity from damages, as he acted in a judicial capacity.The judgment of the district court was modified to reflect a dismissal with prejudice rather than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, and as so modified it was affirmed. View "Bryant v. Chupack" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the defendant, a registered sex offender, was convicted for knowingly failing to update his registration as required by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). The appellant argued that as he was mobile without a fixed abode, he was not required to register anywhere under SORNA. He also contested the district court's jury instruction on SORNA’s definition of “resides,” claiming it expanded the definition. Furthermore, he argued that SORNA, as applied to him, violated the Tenth Amendment. He also contested two aspects of his sentence: an eight-level enhancement for his third degree sexual abuse of a minor and possession of child pornography, and his lifetime term of supervised release.The court held that the district court correctly instructed the jury on the meaning of “resides” and “habitually lives” under SORNA and that SORNA, as applied to the appellant, did not violate the Tenth Amendment. The court also affirmed the district court’s sentence as procedurally and substantively reasonable. It concluded that the appellant, who was required to register as a sex offender due to a previous conviction, failed to update his registration while residing in West Virginia, thus violating SORNA. The court found that his argument of not having a fixed abode did not exempt him from the registration requirements of SORNA. View "United States v. Kokinda" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld a township ordinance that regulated the discharging of firearms within the township, except at indoor and outdoor shooting ranges. The plaintiff, a resident of the township, challenged the ordinance, claiming it violated his Second Amendment rights by limiting his ability to practice and maintain proficiency in firearm use. The court determined that the ordinance does not violate the Second Amendment. Applying the historical tradition test outlined by the United States Supreme Court in New York State Rifle & Pistol Assoc., Inc. v. Bruen, the court found the ordinance to be consistent with the nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation, which includes restrictions on when and where firearms can be discharged. The court also found that the ordinance does not interfere with the plaintiff's right to bear arms as it does not prevent him from owning or possessing firearms, but simply regulates where they can be discharged. The court also noted that the ordinance allows for shooting ranges in certain areas of the township, providing opportunities for individuals to gain proficiency in firearm use. View "Barris v. Stroud Township" on Justia Law

In 2012, Damian McElrath, a young man diagnosed with multiple serious mental health disorders, killed his mother. Georgia charged McElrath with three crimes: malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault. At trial, McElrath asserted an insanity defense. The jury found him not guilty by reason of insanity on the malice-murder charge but guilty but mentally ill on the felony-murder and aggravated-assault charges. The state courts, however, decided that these verdicts were "repugnant" because they required contradictory conclusions about McElrath's mental state at the time of the crime. They therefore nullified both the "not guilty" and "guilty" verdicts and authorized McElrath’s retrial.The Supreme Court of the United States held that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment prevents the State from retrying McElrath for the crime that had resulted in the “not guilty by reason of insanity” finding. The court clarified that a jury’s determination that a defendant is not guilty by reason of insanity is a conclusion that “criminal culpability had not been established,” just as much as any other form of acquittal. Despite the seemingly inconsistent findings, the court emphasized that, once rendered, a jury’s verdict of acquittal is inviolate, and the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits second-guessing the reason for a jury’s acquittal. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Georgia and remanded the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with its opinion. View "McElrath v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the case involved Marco Antonio Abundiz, the defendant-appellant, who was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment for sexually abusing his six-year-old niece, K.Z. Abundiz appealed his conviction arguing that the district court erred in several areas including: allowing the victim to testify via closed-circuit television (CCTV) which he claimed violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation; failing to make the necessary findings before permitting the victim to testify via CCTV; admitting evidence of a previous sexual assault; admitting evidence that he possessed child pornography; and the instructions given to the jury regarding evidence admitted under the Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414.After reviewing the case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the district court. The Court held that the district court did not err in allowing the victim to testify via CCTV. The Court determined that the district court made the necessary findings showing that the child would be unable to testify in open court due to fear and a substantial likelihood she would suffer emotional trauma.The Court also found no error in the district court's admission of evidence regarding prior sexual assaults and child pornography possession. The Court observed that the district court had appropriately exercised its discretion to admit this evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414, providing that such evidence can be considered in sexual assault and child molestation cases, respectively.Lastly, the Court concluded that the district court's jury instructions regarding the use of evidence admitted under Rules 413 and 414 were not erroneous. The Court noted that the instructions appropriately informed the jury that such evidence could be used for any relevant purpose only if it was proven by a preponderance of the evidence. The instructions did not allow the jury to convict using a lower standard of proof or confuse the preponderance and beyond a reasonable doubt standards. View "USA v. Abundiz" on Justia Law

In November 2018, Joseph Hoskins was stopped by a Utah state trooper, Jared Withers, because his Illinois license plate was partially obscured. The situation escalated when Trooper Withers conducted a dog sniff of the car, which led him to search the car and find a large amount of cash. Mr. Hoskins was arrested, and his DNA was collected. Mr. Hoskins sued Trooper Withers and Jess Anderson, Commissioner of the Utah Department of Public Safety, alleging violations of the First and Fourth Amendments and state law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that Trooper Withers had reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop because Utah law requires license plates to be legible, and this applies to out-of-state plates. The court also found that the dog sniff did not unlawfully prolong the traffic stop, as Mr. Hoskins was searching for his proof of insurance at the time. The court ruled that the trooper's protective measures, including pointing a gun at Mr. Hoskins, handcuffing him, and conducting a patdown, did not elevate the stop into an arrest due to Mr. Hoskins's confrontational behavior.The court further held that the dog's reaction to the car created arguable probable cause to search the car and that the discovery of a large amount of cash provided arguable probable cause to arrest Mr. Hoskins. The court found that Trooper Withers did not violate any clearly established constitutional rights by pointing a gun at Mr. Hoskins in retaliation for protected speech or as excessive force. Lastly, the court found no violation of Mr. Hoskins's due process rights related to the handling of his DNA sample, as neither the Due Process Clause nor state law created a protected interest in a procedure to ensure the destruction of his DNA sample. View "Hoskins v. Withers" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, Donald Alvin Tolbert, appealed against the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) opening his emails and attachments without a warrant. These emails contained child pornography and were detected by AOL's software, which reported them to the NCMEC. The NCMEC, state law enforcement in New Mexico, and the federal government subsequently conducted investigations leading to Tolbert's conviction.Tolbert argued that his Fourth Amendment rights had been violated by the warrantless search of his emails and attachments. The court, however, ruled that even if Tolbert's Fourth Amendment rights had been violated, the evidence would still be admissible under the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule. This exception allows illegally obtained evidence to be admitted if it would have inevitably been discovered by legal means.The court found that the investigations by the NCMEC and law enforcement would have proceeded in the same way, even if the emails and attachments had not been opened, based on their routine practices. They would have used information available in the CyberTips, such as IP addresses and email addresses, to link the CyberTips to Tolbert and conduct further investigations. Thus, the evidence against Tolbert would have been discovered even without opening his emails and attachments.The court, therefore, affirmed the district court's denial of Tolbert's motion to suppress and motion to reconsider. View "United States v. Tolbert" on Justia Law

In a dispute involving a fatal stabbing outside a Manhattan bar in 2000, defendant Gonzalo Aguilar appealed his conviction of murder in the second degree, attempted murder in the second degree, and assault in the first degree. Aguilar asserted that the trial court erred by not including a reinstruction on the justification defense in its response to a jury note, and that the court's interested witness charge violated his constitutional right to due process.The Court of Appeals of the State of New York disagreed with Aguilar's claims. The court held that the trial court's response to the jury's note was meaningful and appropriate. It reasoned that the jury's note had specifically requested the definitions of the charges, not a reinstruction on the justification defense. Furthermore, the court noted that the trial court was in the best position to evaluate the jury's request and had significant discretion in determining the scope and nature of its response. The court also pointed out that the jury did not seek further instruction or clarification after the recharge, indicating that the trial court's response was satisfactory.In addition, the court found that Aguilar's argument concerning the interested witness charge was unpreserved as it had not been raised in the trial court and no exception to the preservation rule applied in this case. Thus, the court affirmed the decision of the Appellate Division. View "People v Aguilar" on Justia Law

In this case, Jamie Avila Reyes, the appellant, appealed his 15-year prison sentence for crimes including homicide by vehicle in the first degree and driving under the influence of alcohol. Reyes, an undocumented immigrant, contended that the trial court improperly considered his immigration status during sentencing, violating his due process and equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Reyes also argued that OCGA § 17-10-1.3, a Georgia statute that allows a trial court to consider potential deportation when determining whether to probate a convicted person's sentence, is unconstitutional both on its face and as applied to him.The Supreme Court of Georgia held that OCGA § 17-10-1.3 is constitutional. The court found that the statute survived rational basis review because it bears a rational relationship to the legitimate governmental interest in ensuring the complete execution of judicial sentences. The court also held that the trial court did not violate Reyes' due process or equal protection rights when it applied the statute and declined to probate any portion of his sentence due to his impending deportation. The court noted that there was no evidence the trial court based its sentence on discriminatory animus towards undocumented noncitizens. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. View "REYES v. THE STATE" on Justia Law