Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, two licensed medical marijuana businesses in Arkansas challenged the validity of twenty-eight legislative amendments made by the Arkansas General Assembly to Amendment 98 of the Arkansas Constitution, which established a framework for medical marijuana use in the state. The businesses argued that these amendments were unconstitutional because they had not been submitted for voter approval, as they claimed was required, and that the amendments were not germane to the pertinent section as required by the constitutional language.The Pulaski County Circuit Court agreed with the plaintiffs, relying on the precedent set by Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. Edgmon, and ruled that the General Assembly lacked authority to amend a voter-initiated constitutional amendment without submitting those amendments to a public vote. The court also found that the legislative amendments were not germane to section 23 of Amendment 98 and were therefore unconstitutional and void. The State of Arkansas appealed this ruling.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case and reversed the circuit court’s decision. The court held that Article 5, section 1 of the Arkansas Constitution does grant the General Assembly authority to amend voter-initiated laws, including initiated constitutional amendments, by a two-thirds vote of both legislative chambers. The court explicitly overruled Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. Edgmon, finding its reasoning inconsistent with the plain constitutional text. Additionally, the court determined that the word “section” in section 23(a) of Amendment 98 should be interpreted as “amendment,” so the germaneness requirement applies to the amendment as a whole. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed and dismissed the lower court’s ruling. View "STATE OF ARKANSAS v. GOOD DAY FARM ARKANSAS, LLC" on Justia Law

Two individuals each pleaded guilty in separate cases to unlawful possession of controlled substances in Washington State. As part of their sentences, both were required to pay legal financial obligations (LFOs), which they partially satisfied through cash payments and through performing community service. Years later, following the Washington Supreme Court’s invalidation of the simple drug possession statute in State v. Blake, both individuals successfully moved to vacate their convictions and sought reimbursement for both the cash paid and the labor performed in community service that had satisfied portions of their LFOs.The trial courts vacated their convictions and reimbursed the cash payments but declined to reimburse for the value of the community service hours. Both individuals appealed. The Washington State Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts’ decisions, holding that there was no substantive due process right to monetary reimbursement for community service work performed in lieu of LFO payments and that equal protection was not violated. The appellate court found that the appellants had not shown they were treated disparately from similarly situated individuals based on economic status, and even if there was disparate treatment, the decision to not reimburse for community service hours was rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the consolidated appeals. The court held that there is no constitutional right—fundamental or otherwise—to reimbursement for community service work performed in satisfaction of court-imposed financial obligations when convictions are later invalidated. The court found no disparate treatment based on economic status and therefore no actionable equal protection claim. The decision of the Court of Appeals and the trial courts was affirmed. View "State v. Danielson" on Justia Law

A female senior administrator at a Mississippi public university, who had served as Vice President and Chief of Staff since 2017, alleged that she was not hired for the position of university president on two occasions, in 2020 and 2023, despite her extensive qualifications and expressed interest. In 2020, following the resignation of the then-president, the university’s governing board appointed a less-experienced male interim president without conducting a search or soliciting applications, even though the plaintiff had managed university affairs in the president’s absence. After the interim president was placed on administrative leave in 2023, the board began a new search. The plaintiff applied but was denied an interview; instead, the board selected another male candidate with less experience, who had not applied for the position.The plaintiff filed suit against the board members in their individual capacities, alleging sex discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause via 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as Title VII claims. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi dismissed all claims against the individual board members except for the § 1983 equal protection claim regarding the 2023 hiring decision. The district court found that the plaintiff stated a prima facie case of sex discrimination and that the right to be free from such discrimination was clearly established, thus denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the denial of qualified immunity de novo. The court held that the plaintiff adequately pleaded a violation of clearly established equal protection rights, including allegations that each defendant took individual actions causing the asserted harm. The Fifth Circuit therefore affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss as to the § 1983 equal protection claim arising from the 2023 hiring decision. View "Jackson v. Duff" on Justia Law

Federal and state law enforcement officers executed a search warrant at the home and business of George Peterson, a federally licensed firearms dealer operating out of his residence in Louisiana. The warrant was supported by an affidavit detailing months of investigation by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), including undercover purchases where Peterson failed to report firearm sales as required and sold firearms under circumstances suggesting knowledge of illegal transactions. During the search, agents discovered a homemade, unregistered firearm suppressor in Peterson’s closet safe. The suppressor lacked a serial number and was not registered as required by the National Firearms Act (NFA).A grand jury in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana indicted Peterson for possession of an unregistered suppressor in violation of the NFA. Peterson moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing the NFA’s registration scheme violated his Second Amendment rights as applied to him, and also moved to suppress the evidence, claiming the search violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied both motions. Peterson entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal those rulings. He was sentenced to twenty-four months’ imprisonment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions. The court held that, assuming suppressors are protected by the Second Amendment, the NFA’s “shall-issue” licensing and registration regime is presumptively constitutional under New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen and related precedent. Peterson failed to show that the NFA’s requirements denied him his rights or were applied abusively. Regarding the motion to suppress, the court found that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied because the officers reasonably relied on a warrant issued by a magistrate judge, even if probable cause was disputed. Thus, both denials were affirmed. View "United States v. Peterson" on Justia Law

Federal agents learned that a previously convicted felon arranged the sale of a World War II-era Russian machinegun, which he acknowledged could not be lawfully transferred. The defendant, though not in physical possession of the weapon, set up the transaction between an undercover federal agent—posing as a firearms and drug trafficker—and a third party who actually had the gun. The agent and the defendant traveled together to complete the purchase, and the defendant was later arrested.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon presided over the prosecution. A grand jury indicted the defendant for both possessing or transferring a machinegun under 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) and for being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Before trial, the defendant moved to dismiss the machinegun charge, arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen required invalidation of the statute, and also that the statutory exemption in § 922(o)(2)(A) applied since the transfer was to a federal agent. The district court denied the motion, relying on Ninth Circuit precedent in United States v. Henry, which held that machineguns are not protected by the Second Amendment, and on earlier cases interpreting the statutory exemption narrowly. At trial, the jury acquitted on the felon-in-possession count but convicted on the possession or transfer count, and the district court sentenced the defendant to twenty-seven months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the conviction. The court held that the exemption in § 922(o)(2)(A) for transfers to the United States does not apply to transfers to undercover agents unless the transfer is authorized by the government for its benefit. The court also held that its prior decision in Henry remains binding, and that § 922(o) does not violate the Second Amendment. View "USA V. KITTSON" on Justia Law

A police officer in Des Moines, Iowa attempted to stop a vehicle driven by Dylan Pettyjohn for lacking license plates or a temporary registration. Pettyjohn fled, leading the officer on a high-speed chase through a residential area before crashing. He then ran from the vehicle, discarding a loaded revolver and a fanny pack containing 54 fentanyl pills, $389 in small bills, marijuana, and about 85 grams of methamphetamine. A search of his vehicle yielded a digital scale with white residue, more marijuana, and shell casings. Pettyjohn was arrested, and a federal grand jury indicted him on multiple counts related to drug possession with intent to distribute, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and being a felon in possession of a firearm.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa denied Pettyjohn’s motion to dismiss the felon in possession charge, rejecting his argument that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) violated the Second Amendment. The court also allowed limited admission of his prior felony convictions for impeachment purposes, after an agreement between Pettyjohn and the government. At trial, Pettyjohn moved for acquittal based on insufficient evidence, but the district court found the evidence sufficient and denied the motions. The jury found Pettyjohn guilty on all counts, and the court sentenced him to 300 months’ imprisonment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, affirmed the district court’s evidentiary rulings under Rules 404(b) and 609, and upheld the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) based on circuit precedent. The Eighth Circuit held that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting prior conviction evidence, and § 922(g)(1) is constitutional. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Pettyjohn" on Justia Law

The case involved a fatal shooting that followed a car accident in Hartford, Connecticut. The defendant, after colliding with the victim’s vehicle, agreed to pay for the damages and arranged to meet the victim later that day. Surveillance footage and eyewitness accounts linked the defendant to the scene, describing his distinctive clothing and actions. Evidence showed the defendant met with the victim, shot him multiple times, and fled the scene. Forensic analysis detected gunshot residue on the defendant’s clothing, and cellphone data further corroborated his involvement. The defendant was subsequently arrested and charged with murder and criminal possession of a firearm.At trial in the Superior Court for the judicial district of Hartford, the jury found the defendant guilty of murder, and the court found him guilty of criminal possession of a firearm. The defendant appealed directly to the Connecticut Supreme Court, raising several unpreserved constitutional claims. He argued that his right to confrontation was violated when the State’s gunshot residue expert testified based on data and notes from a nontestifying analyst, and when the prosecutor elicited testimonial hearsay on cross-examination. He also alleged prosecutorial impropriety for introducing facts not in evidence during cross-examination.The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the claim regarding the expert’s reliance on the nontestifying analyst’s materials failed because the record was inadequate to determine whether those materials were testimonial. The court declined to adopt the State’s proposed rule barring all unpreserved confrontation claims and reaffirmed that such claims may still be reviewed if the record is sufficient. The court further held there was no confrontation clause violation or prosecutorial impropriety regarding the cross-examination, as the questions did not introduce hearsay or inadmissible evidence. The judgment of conviction was affirmed. View "State of Connecticut v. Bester" on Justia Law

A five-year-old child and her mother, recently arrived from the Dominican Republic, were staying with family in New Britain, Connecticut. The defendant, who was married to the mother's niece, lived in the same apartment. On New Year's Eve, the defendant sexually assaulted the child. Later that evening at a family party, the child told her mother that the defendant had kissed her, and after further questioning, disclosed more details of the assault. The next day, the mother confronted the defendant, who made incriminating admissions both in person and via text. Police interviewed the defendant at the station after he voluntarily agreed to meet and requested a Spanish-speaking detective. During the interview, which was conversational and not confrontational, the defendant confessed to inappropriate sexual conduct.The Superior Court, Judicial District of New Britain, denied the defendant’s pretrial motion to suppress his statements to police, finding he was not in custody for Miranda purposes. At trial, the court admitted the child’s statements to her mother under the spontaneous utterance exception to hearsay, and limited the testimony of the defense expert regarding the U visa program, which provides immigration benefits to victims of certain crimes who cooperate with law enforcement. The jury convicted the defendant of sexual assault in the first degree and risk of injury to a child.On direct appeal to the Connecticut Supreme Court, the defendant argued the trial court erred in denying his suppression motion, admitting the victim’s hearsay statements, and restricting expert testimony, and further sought review of confidential personnel records of one detective. The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the trial court properly denied the suppression motion, as the defendant was not in custody. The admission of the child’s statements was error but harmless, given other strong evidence. The limitations on the expert’s testimony did not deny due process or affect the verdict. Review of the confidential records revealed no material requiring disclosure. The conviction was affirmed. View "State of Connecticut v. Lazaro D." on Justia Law

Michelle Evans attended a debate at the Texas Capitol in May 2023 regarding gender reassignment treatments for children. While at the Capitol, Evans encountered a transgender politician in the women’s restroom. A photo of this individual washing their hands was posted to Facebook by someone in Evans’s group, and Evans subsequently tweeted the same photo with a caption expressing her belief that the politician should not have used the women’s restroom. The tweet led to controversy and an investigation by the Department of Public Safety, prompted by Travis County District Attorney José Garza, to determine if Evans’s actions violated Texas Penal Code § 21.15(b), which prohibits transmitting images of individuals in bathrooms or changing rooms without consent and with intent to invade privacy.Evans sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, aiming to prevent Garza from investigating or prosecuting her for disseminating the photograph. She argued that the statute was unconstitutional both facially and as applied to her conduct, citing First and Fourteenth Amendment grounds. The district court denied her requests for injunctive relief, reasoning that the equities weighed against granting the injunction, and that the values underlying abstention doctrines informed its decision. The court found no ongoing state judicial proceeding that would trigger abstention and did not make explicit findings on the likelihood of success on the merits.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction. The appellate court held that Evans had standing but agreed that she failed to meet her burden to demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits or that the balance of harms justified injunctive relief. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the statute was not facially unconstitutional and that Evans had not shown it was unconstitutional as applied to her situation. The district court’s judgment was affirmed. View "Evans v. Garza" on Justia Law

The appellant was charged with several serious offenses after allegedly shooting a neighbor during a dispute at their apartment complex. The evidence included eyewitness testimony, gunshot residue on the appellant’s hands, and ammunition found in the appellant’s apartment matching shell casings at the scene. The appellant ultimately entered a no-contest plea to reduced charges, but later sought to withdraw the plea, claiming that his attorney’s actions led him to enter the agreement involuntarily and without full understanding of the case against him.After the appellant attempted to file a pro se motion to withdraw his plea, his defense counsel followed guidance from a prior decision (Reed v. State) by moving to withdraw as counsel and requesting substitute counsel. The Superior Court of the State of Delaware held a hearing, but did not first address the motion to withdraw as counsel. Instead, the court required the appellant to advocate for his own plea withdrawal and ultimately granted the motion to withdraw the plea, finding it had not been entered voluntarily. However, the court denied counsel’s motion to withdraw and required the same attorney to represent the appellant at trial, where he was convicted by a jury and sentenced to prison.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware held that when defense counsel moves to withdraw after a defendant expresses a desire to withdraw a plea, the trial court must first address and resolve the motion to withdraw as counsel, applying the established “good cause” standard. The failure to do so in this case resulted in the defendant being denied his constitutional right to counsel at a critical stage. The Supreme Court reversed the appellant’s convictions and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Bolden v. State" on Justia Law