Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

This case involves a dispute between American Precision Ammunition, L.L.C. (APA) and the City of Mineral Wells in Texas. APA and the City entered into a Tax Abatement Agreement ("Agreement") where the City promised to gift APA $150,000 and provide APA ten years of tax abatements. However, the City terminated the Agreement, claiming that the $150,000 gift was illegal under the Texas Constitution. APA sued the City for breach of contract, violation of the Texas Open Meetings Act (TOMA), and denial of federal due process and due course of law under the Texas Constitution. The district court dismissed all claims, and APA appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. It held that the Agreement was illegal and unenforceable under Texas law because the City's contractual obligation to "gift" APA $150,000 constitutes a gratuitous payment of public money. The court also dismissed APA's TOMA claim as moot because there was no "agreement" to reinstate given that the Agreement was unenforceable. Furthermore, the court found that APA's due process claims failed because the promise for the $150,000 gift was void and did not constitute a contract, and therefore, APA had no protected property interest in the gift. Even assuming that APA had a property interest in the tax abatements, the court held that APA's due process and due course of law claims still fail because Texas law affords APA sufficient opportunity to pursue that claim in state court. View "American Precision v. Mineral Wells" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, Alexander Alberto Frias, was convicted of stalking. Frias appealed the decision, arguing that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of his choice by denying his four requests to substitute the Castaneda Law firm as his counsel. The trial court denied the first three requests on the grounds that the firm's attorneys were not ready for trial and the case had been pending for three years, with four different attorneys had handled Frias’s defense at his request. However, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Seven held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Frias's fourth request. At the time of the fourth request, the case had been pending for three-and-a-half years, the case was set for trial, and the prosecutor and deputy public defender had announced they were ready for trial. An attorney from the Castaneda firm announced he was ready for trial. The trial court's concerns that the Castaneda firm was not prepared for trial and that Frias would seek to substitute new counsel were not sufficient grounds to deny Frias's request to have retained counsel of his choice. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment based on the trial court's denial of Frias's right to counsel of his choice. However, the court found that there was sufficient evidence to support Frias's conviction for stalking and remanded for a new trial. View "People v. Frias" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed an appeal related to a Fourth Amendment issue involving a warrantless search of a vehicle. The defendant, Charles Hays, was stopped by the police while driving, and his passenger was found in possession of methamphetamine. The police officers then searched the vehicle's interior but found no drugs. However, under the hood of the car, inside the air filter, they discovered more methamphetamine.Hays was indicted and later moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the traffic stop, arguing that the officers did not have probable cause to search under the hood and in the air filter. The district court denied his motion, and Hays subsequently pleaded guilty to possession with the intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, holding that under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, officers may conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle, including all parts of the vehicle where there is a fair probability contraband could be concealed, as long as there is probable cause to believe it contains contraband or evidence of illegal activity. The court found that given the totality of the circumstances, including the passenger's possession of methamphetamine, Hays's previous drug-related arrest, and the presence of a screwdriver in the car - a tool known to be used for hiding drugs in vehicles - officers had a fair probability to believe that methamphetamine could be concealed in the car, including under its hood. View "United States v. Hays" on Justia Law

This case involves Bradley Barlow, Frances Biddiscombe, and others who were members of either the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) Local 668 or the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), Council 13. They all signed union membership agreements authorizing the deduction of membership dues from their paychecks. The authorizations were irrevocable, regardless of union membership status, unless they provided written notice of revocation within a specified annual window. After resigning from their respective unions, their membership dues continued to be deducted until the next annual revocation window. They sued, claiming that the continued collection of dues after their resignations constitutes compelled speech, violating their First Amendment rights. They relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, which held that public-sector unions charging fees to nonmembers is a form of coerced speech that violates the First Amendment. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's dismissal of their complaints, holding that Janus was focused on nonmembers who never elected to join a union, not members who voluntarily join a union and later resign. The court also rejected their due process claims for failure to provide procedures for notice and the ability to object to how their dues were spent, as these procedures were based on avoiding subjecting nonconsenting individuals from subsidizing a political agenda, which was not the case for these appellants. The court also rejected the appellants' contract defenses. View "Barlow v. Service Employees International Union" on Justia Law

In the State of Kansas v. Frank Raymond Crudo, the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas affirmed the decisions of the lower courts, ruling against Crudo on all five arguments he presented. Crudo was pulled over for a non-functioning license plate light, and upon approaching the vehicle, officers smelled marijuana, leading to a search of Crudo's truck and attached camper. They found varying amounts of marijuana in different locations, leading to multiple charges against Crudo.Crudo's arguments included: (1) the search of his camper was unconstitutional as it should not be considered part of his vehicle for the purposes of the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, (2) the testimony of Lieutenant Ricard at his second trial should have been considered expert testimony and therefore inadmissible due to non-compliance with expert testimony rules, (3) the use of a permissive inference instruction was in error and affected the trial outcome, (4) his second trial for possession with intent to distribute marijuana violated double jeopardy principles, and (5) cumulative error.On the first point, the court ruled that probable cause to search a vehicle under the automobile exception does not need to be "localized" to a specific area of the vehicle and therefore extended to the camper. On the second point, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Lt. Ricard's testimony as lay opinion testimony. On the third point, the court agreed that the permissive inference instruction was in error, but found it harmless. On the fourth point, the court found that Crudo's convictions for possession and distribution were based on separate acts and thus did not constitute double jeopardy. Lastly, because there was only one error (the permissive inference instruction), the doctrine of cumulative error did not apply. View "State v. Crudo" on Justia Law

In this Massachusetts case, the defendant, Nyasani Watt, was convicted of first-degree murder and related offenses. After his conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, he filed a motion for a new trial, alleging that his trial counsel had slept during critical portions of the trial, thus depriving him of his constitutional right to counsel. This motion was denied by a lower court judge without a hearing, and the denial was appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court.The Supreme Judicial Court determined that Watt had presented a new, substantial issue that it could not have considered in its previous review - namely, that his trial counsel had been sleeping during significant parts of the trial.Upon reviewing the evidence, which included affidavits from several people who had observed the trial counsel sleeping, the Court found that the trial counsel did indeed sleep through a significant portion of the trial and possibly during an important aspect of the trial. The Court held that this constituted a constructive deprivation of Watt's right to counsel under Article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.The Court further ruled that this error created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice and thus the defendant's convictions were vacated, the verdicts were set aside, and the matter was remanded to the Superior Court for a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Watt" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, Jason Robinson, was convicted of first-degree murder on a joint venture theory of felony-murder, with armed robbery as the predicate offence, in connection with the shooting death of Inaam Yazbek. Robinson appealed his convictions and the denial of his motion for a new trial, claiming insufficient evidence and trial errors.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed Robinson's conviction of murder in the first degree and the order denying his motion for a new trial. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to convict Robinson of felony-murder, as there was enough to permit an inference that Robinson knew that his co-defendant was armed during the commission of the armed robbery.The court also found no error in the admission of certain evidence, rejected Robinson's claim that he was prejudiced by being tried with his co-defendant, and found no error in the jury instructions, the exclusion of certain third-party culprit and police failure to investigate evidence, or in the prosecutor's opening statement and closing argument.However, the court ruled that Robinson's sentence of life without the possibility of parole was unconstitutional because he was nineteen years old at the time of the offense. The case was remanded for re-sentencing in line with the court's decision in Commonwealth v. Mattis. View "Commonwealth v. Robinson" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, the defendant, Sheldon Mattis, was convicted of first degree murder among other charges, and was sentenced to a mandatory term of life in prison without the possibility of parole. At the time of the murder, Mattis was eighteen years old. He appealed his sentence, arguing that it was unconstitutional as applied to him because he was an "emerging adult" (defined in this case as eighteen, nineteen, or twenty years old at the time of the crime), and should be entitled to the same protection as juvenile offenders, who receive a term of life with the possibility of parole.The court considered whether their previous ruling in Diatchenko I, which concluded that sentencing a juvenile to life without parole in any circumstance would violate the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, should be extended to apply to emerging adults. The court reviewed scientific evidence showing that the brains of emerging adults are not fully mature and are similar to those of juveniles, and also considered the treatment of emerging adults in Massachusetts and elsewhere.The court concluded that a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for emerging adult offenders violates the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. As a result, the court invalidated the provisions of Massachusetts law that deny the possibility of parole to emerging adults. The court remanded the matter to the lower court for resentencing consistent with the court's opinion. The court also noted that this ruling does not suggest that emerging adults receiving the benefit of resentencing should be paroled once they have served a statutorily designated portion of their sentences. Instead, the parole board should evaluate the circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime, including the age of the offender, together with all relevant information pertaining to the offender's character and actions during the intervening years since conviction. View "Commonwealth v. Mattis" on Justia Law

A decision from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit concerned whether the Governor of Florida, Ron DeSantis, violated the First Amendment rights of Andrew Warren, a state attorney for Florida’s Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, when he suspended Warren from office. Warren, a vocal advocate for criminal justice reform, had been elected to his position twice. During his time in office, he implemented several policies and signed onto advocacy statements related to issues such as transgender health care and abortion rights. Governor DeSantis suspended Warren from his position, justifying the decision on the basis of these activities. Warren sued, claiming that the suspension was retaliation for his First Amendment-protected activities. The district court found that six factors motivated DeSantis to suspend Warren, two of which were protected by the First Amendment. However, the court concluded that DeSantis would have suspended Warren regardless of these protected activities, basing this conclusion on the other four factors. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit found that the district court erred in not considering all of Warren's activities as protected by the First Amendment. The court emphasized that, as an elected official, Warren had a right to express his views on policy matters of public concern and that his suspension based on these expressions violated his First Amendment rights. The court vacated the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Warren v. DeSantis" on Justia Law

The case concerned Everett Maynard, a police officer in West Virginia, who was convicted of deprivation of rights under color of law. This conviction was based on his use of excessive force against an arrestee, Robert Wilfong, which resulted in Wilfong being hospitalized with a broken nose and lacerations on his upper head. During the trial, witnesses were required to wear face masks due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Maynard appealed his conviction, arguing that the mask requirement violated his Sixth Amendment rights, and that the district court erred in applying sentencing enhancements for obstruction of justice and for causing "serious bodily injury."The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence. It held that the mask requirement did not violate Maynard's Sixth Amendment right, as the protection against the spread of COVID-19 is an important public policy interest and the reliability of the witnesses’ testimony was assured. This was because the witnesses were under oath, cross-examined, and the jury could observe their demeanor. The court also found no error in the application of sentencing enhancements. The court agreed with the district court's finding that the injuries inflicted on Wilfong constituted "serious bodily injury," and affirmed the application of the obstruction of justice enhancement, finding that a defendant's perjurious testimony at trial is relevant to sentencing because it reflects on a defendant’s criminal history, willingness to obey the law, and general character. View "US v. Maynard" on Justia Law