Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

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In Wyoming, Remi Larsen was facing a misdemeanor charge for possession of a controlled substance. Larsen moved to suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless search of her apartment. The trial court granted Larsen's motion, ruling that she did not voluntarily consent to the search. The State appealed this decision, resulting in the district court reversing the trial court's order. On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Wyoming held that the district court abused its discretion when it initially granted the State's petition for an interlocutory writ of review. The Supreme Court explained that the district court should only grant such a review in "rare and unusual" cases that present questions of first impression, constitutional magnitude, and great public import. The court found that Larsen's case did not meet these criteria. The court's order was reversed, and the lower court was directed to reinstate the original suppression order. View "Larsen v. State" on Justia Law

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In New York, a man named Joshua Messano was indicted for second-degree criminal possession of a weapon after police officers discovered a loaded handgun in his car. Messano moved to suppress this evidence, arguing that it was found as a result of an unlawful detention and search. The police had initially detained Messano on suspicion of a drug transaction based on their observations of him engaging in a conversation with another man in an empty parking lot. They did not, however, observe any actual exchange of drugs. After detaining Messano, the police saw what they believed to be drug-related contraband in plain view on the driver's seat of his car, which led them to search the car and find the gun.The Court of Appeals of New York reversed the lower court's decision, holding that the police did not have reasonable suspicion to detain Messano based on their observations. The court also held that the drug-related contraband was not in plain view, as the officer only saw it after unlawfully detaining Messano. Therefore, the court concluded that the seizure of the gun was unconstitutional and the evidence should be suppressed. The indictment against Messano was dismissed. View "People v Messano" on Justia Law

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In this case, the United States Chamber of Commerce and three other trade associations sued to stop the enforcement of a new state tax in Maryland known as the Digital Advertising Gross Revenues Tax Act. The law requires large technology companies to pay a tax based on gross revenue they earn from digital advertising in the state. The plaintiffs alleged that the Act violates the Internet Tax Freedom Act, the Commerce Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the First Amendment. The United States District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed three of the counts as barred by the Tax Injunction Act, which prevents federal courts from stopping the collection of state taxes when state law provides an adequate remedy. The court dismissed the fourth count on mootness grounds after a state trial court declared the Act unconstitutional in a separate proceeding. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the first three counts, but vacated the judgment to the extent it dismissed those counts with prejudice, ordering that the dismissal be entered without prejudice. The appellate court also vacated the dismissal of the fourth count and remanded for further proceedings, as the plaintiffs' First Amendment challenge to the Act's prohibition on passing the tax onto consumers was not moot. View "Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Lierman" on Justia Law

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The court case involves defendants Juan Alberto Ortiz-Orellana and Minor Perez-Chach, who were convicted under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering statute (VICAR). Ortiz and Perez were part of a gang known as MS-13 and were separately charged with murders related to their involvement in the gang in Maryland. Ortiz was also convicted of VICAR conspiracy to commit murder, discharging a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, and murder resulting from the same crime. Perez, on the other hand, was also convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, and an alien in possession of a firearm and ammunition. Both defendants appealed their convictions and sentences.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the government seizure of historical cell site location information (CSLI) without a warrant did not violate the defendants' Fourth Amendment rights due to the good faith exception. The court also upheld the use of summary exhibits and denied the defendants' claim that their sentences were substantially unreasonable. The court agreed with Ortiz that his firearm convictions must be vacated because the underlying offenses for each VICAR count could not qualify as a "crime of violence" after a recent ruling. The court also rejected Ortiz's claim that his RICO and VICAR convictions violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. As a result, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case for resentencing on certain counts. View "US v. Ortiz-Orellana" on Justia Law

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit partially affirmed and partially reversed a lower court's ruling in a case involving James McDonough, a citizen activist, who was banned from future meetings and arrested for disorderly conduct and cyberstalking by the City of Homestead, Florida. McDonough claimed these actions violated his First and Fourth Amendment rights.The court determined that the city council meetings were designated public forums, and the ban was not narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest as required, thus violating McDonough's First Amendment rights.The court also found that the officers did not have probable cause to arrest McDonough for disorderly conduct, which involved swearing at officers and making obscene gestures. The court stated that such actions do not constitute disorderly conduct and are protected under the First Amendment. However, the court ruled that the City had probable cause to arrest McDonough for cyberstalking, as it was not unreasonable for the City to interpret Florida’s cyberstalking statute as barring McDonough from targeting one of its officers with his series of posts.The case was sent back to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court’s opinion. View "McDonough v. Garcia" on Justia Law

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded a decision by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida, which had ruled against Andrew Warren, a Florida State Attorney for the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit. Warren had filed a lawsuit against Governor Ron DeSantis, claiming that DeSantis had suspended him in retaliation for his First Amendment activity. The circuit court agreed with the district court that Warren had satisfied his initial burden of showing that he had engaged in protected activity, suffered an adverse action, and that DeSantis's actions were motivated by Warren's protected activity. However, the circuit court disagreed with the district court's conclusion that the First Amendment did not protect certain activities that motivated DeSantis's decision, and found that the district court erred in concluding that DeSantis would have suspended Warren based solely on unprotected activities. The case was remanded for the district court to reconsider whether DeSantis would have made the same decision based solely on the unprotected activities. View "Warren v. DeSantis" on Justia Law

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In this case, the Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed a decision from the District Court of Burleigh County, which had granted a motion to suppress evidence in a criminal trial. The defendant, Matthew Gietzen, was charged with possession of controlled substances and drug paraphernalia that were found in a locked bag within a backpack during a vehicle search. The driver of the vehicle had consented to the search, but Gietzen, a passenger, did not give explicit consent. The district court held that the driver's consent did not extend to the search of Gietzen's backpack, particularly the locked bag containing contraband, because it was unreasonable to believe the female driver had authority to consent to a search of a locked bag containing men’s items. On appeal, the Supreme Court agreed with this assessment, stating that it is the officer's burden to obtain affirmative consent for a search when a constitutional protection applies and consent alone serves as the basis for the search. The court therefore affirmed the district court's order to suppress the evidence found in the backpack, upholding the principle that a third party's consent to a search does not necessarily extend to personal items belonging to another individual. View "State v. Gietzen" on Justia Law

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In the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware, defendant Kwesi Hudson, who was convicted of first-degree kidnapping, first-degree robbery, second-degree rape, and other crimes, appealed on two grounds. First, he challenged the Superior Court's decision to deny his pre-trial motion to exclude the State’s expert testimony on DNA mixture interpretation and technology. He argued that the STRmix software used to process the DNA was not scientifically reliable. Second, he contended that the Superior Court erred in denying his motion to suppress cell-site location information collected from cell tower dumps via ten search warrants. He claimed that these warrants violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 6 of the Delaware Constitution, and Delaware statutory law. The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware found Hudson’s challenges to be without merit and affirmed his convictions and the decisions of the Superior Court. The court ruled that the DNA evidence was reliable and admissible, and that a Daubert hearing to test its admissibility was not necessary. Additionally, the court concluded that the cell tower warrants were constitutional under the Fourth Amendment, as they were sufficiently particular and based on probable cause. View "Hudson v. State" on Justia Law

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In California, a defendant, Gary Marcus Hall, convicted of two counts of committing lewd or lascivious acts on a child under the age of 14 years, challenged his sentence on several grounds. He argued that the court (and the parties) mistakenly assumed he was presumptively ineligible for probation, that the aggravating factors found by the court were not pleaded, and that the court erred in finding aggravating factors in the absence of his personal waiver in open court of his right to jury trial on the facts supporting such factors. The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the defendant's 10-year prison sentence, rejecting all his arguments. The court found that the defendant had waived his objections by failing to raise them at trial. It also held that the defendant's constitutional right to a jury trial was not violated by the trial court's reliance on a properly established aggravating factor—namely, the defendant's prior convictions. View "P. v. Hall" on Justia Law

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In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the defendant, Thomas O’Lear, was convicted of healthcare fraud, making a false statement in connection with healthcare services, and aggravated identity theft. O’Lear ran a company that provided mobile x-ray services to residents in nursing homes. However, he used the company to defraud Medicare and Medicaid programs by billing for fictitious x-rays using the identities of nursing-home residents. When an audit revealed the fraud, O’Lear attempted to conceal it by forging staff names and duplicating x-rays in the patient files.On appeal, O’Lear raised several questions. Firstly, he questioned whether his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury was violated by excluding individuals who had not been vaccinated against COVID-19 from the jury pool. The court ruled that the unvaccinated do not qualify as a “distinctive group” that can trigger Sixth Amendment concerns. Secondly, O’Lear questioned whether the nursing-home residents were “victims” of his fraud under a “vulnerable victims” sentencing enhancement, even though the monetary losses were suffered by Medicare and Medicaid. The court ruled that the residents were indeed victims, as O’Lear had used their identities and health records without their permission, which constituted taking advantage of them.O’Lear also challenged his two aggravated-identity-theft convictions and objected to his 180-month sentence on various grounds, but these arguments were also dismissed by the court. Ultimately, the court affirmed O’Lear's conviction and sentence. View "United States v. O'Lear" on Justia Law