Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 2017, the California Legislature enacted the LGBT Long-Term Care Facility Residents’ Bill of Rights, which included a provision prohibiting staff at long-term care facilities from willfully and repeatedly failing to use a resident’s preferred name or pronouns after being clearly informed of them, when such conduct is based on the resident’s sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, or HIV status. The law was designed to address documented discrimination and mistreatment of LGBT seniors in long-term care settings, where residents are particularly vulnerable and often lack alternative support networks.Before the pronouns provision took effect, Taking Offense, an association opposed to laws requiring recognition of transgender identities, filed a petition for writ of mandate in Sacramento County Superior Court, seeking to block enforcement of the provision as facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment. The trial court denied the petition, finding the law to be a permissible, narrowly tailored regulation serving a significant state interest in preventing discrimination. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reversed in part, holding that the pronouns provision was a content-based restriction on speech that failed strict scrutiny and was therefore facially unconstitutional.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case. The State argued for the first time that Taking Offense lacked taxpayer standing under Code of Civil Procedure section 526a, as amended in 2018, which now limits such standing to suits against local, not state, entities. The Supreme Court agreed but exercised its discretion to address the merits due to the public importance of the constitutional question. The Court held that the pronouns provision regulates discriminatory conduct that only incidentally affects speech, is not subject to First Amendment scrutiny as an abridgment of free speech, and, even if intermediate scrutiny applied, the provision would satisfy that standard. The Court reversed the Court of Appeal’s judgment. View "Taking Offense v. State of Cal." on Justia Law

A police officer in Casper, Wyoming, observed a pickup truck driven by Mark Davis traveling slowly and approaching a stop sign. The officer noticed Davis activated his right turn signal only shortly before stopping at the intersection, estimating the signal was turned on no more than twenty feet before the turn, rather than the statutorily required 100 feet. After stopping Davis, the officer discovered an open beer can and learned Davis’s license was suspended. A subsequent search of the vehicle revealed methamphetamine, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia. Davis was charged with felony possession of methamphetamine and felony possession with intent to deliver.Davis filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing the officer lacked reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop because he had activated his turn signal more than 100 feet before the turn. At the suppression hearing in the District Court of Natrona County, the officer testified about his training in estimating distances, and Davis’s expert witness presented calculations based on the dash cam video, but conceded uncertainty about Davis’s speed. The district court reviewed the video and testimony, ultimately finding the officer’s estimate credible and concluding the State met its burden to show reasonable suspicion for the stop. The court denied the motion to suppress, and Davis entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the district court’s denial of the suppression motion, deferring to its factual findings unless clearly erroneous and reviewing constitutional questions de novo. The Supreme Court held that, under the totality of the circumstances, the officer had reasonable suspicion to believe Davis violated the turn signal statute, justifying the stop. The district court’s findings were supported by the record, and the evidence obtained was admissible. The judgment was affirmed. View "Davis v. The State of Wyoming" on Justia Law

A petitioner sought to file a referendum challenging a specific section of a recently enacted state law concerning student and parental rights in public education. The law included provisions aimed at promoting student safety, preventing discrimination, and ensuring parental notification in certain circumstances. The legislature included an emergency clause in the bill, declaring it necessary for the immediate preservation of public peace, health, or safety, which made the law effective immediately. When the petitioner submitted the referendum to the Secretary of State, the Secretary refused to process it, citing the emergency clause as rendering the legislation exempt from the referendum process under the state constitution.After the Secretary’s refusal, the petitioner filed an original action in the Supreme Court of the State of Washington, seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary to process the referendum and to challenge the validity of the emergency clause. The court granted expedited review due to the time-sensitive nature of referendum signature collection. The petitioner argued that the Secretary had a mandatory duty to process all properly filed referenda, regardless of the presence of an emergency clause, and that the validity of such a clause was a judicial question.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that the Secretary of State does not have a mandatory duty to process a referendum on legislation that is, on its face, constitutionally exempt from referendum due to a valid emergency clause. The court further found that the legislature’s declaration of emergency in this case was valid, as the record and legislative history supported the need for immediate action. As a result, the petition for a writ of mandamus was denied. View "Eyman v. Hobbs" on Justia Law

Soloman Longchase was charged with multiple offenses, including aggravated assault (domestic), aggravated kidnapping, grand theft, interference with emergency communication, and false impersonation to deceive law enforcement, stemming from incidents on August 20, 2022. After the initial complaint and indictment, Longchase was held in the Hughes County Jail on unrelated charges. He was granted a medical furlough but failed to return, resulting in an escape charge and a period as a fugitive until his rearrest in December 2023. He later appeared in court for the Hyde County charges, was appointed counsel, and ultimately entered a plea agreement to plead guilty to grand theft and simple assault, with other charges dismissed.The Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Hyde County, presided over the case. Longchase moved to dismiss the indictment, alleging a violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The circuit court denied the motion after applying the Barker v. Wingo factors. At sentencing, the court ordered Longchase to reimburse the county for court-appointed attorney fees, finding he had the ability to work and pay after release from prison. Longchase objected, arguing the court was required to make specific findings about his ability to pay and that recoupment was unconstitutional given his current financial status.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. It held that Longchase’s unconditional guilty plea waived his right to appeal the alleged speedy trial violation, as the right to a speedy trial is not a jurisdictional defect that survives a guilty plea. The court also held that the circuit court’s order requiring reimbursement of attorney fees did not violate Longchase’s constitutional rights to counsel or due process, as he was afforded counsel at all critical stages and had a meaningful opportunity to contest the recoupment order. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s rulings. View "State v. Longchase" on Justia Law

A group of landowners in Summit County, Utah, challenged a proposed ballot measure to incorporate a new municipality called West Hills. The sponsor of the incorporation, Derek Anderson, had modified the proposed boundaries after the statutory deadline for landowners to request exclusion from the new municipality had passed. As a result, certain landowners whose properties were added late were unable to seek exclusion, even though similarly situated landowners had previously been allowed to do so.The landowners filed suit in the Third District Court, Silver Summit, arguing that the Municipal Incorporation Code, as applied, violated the Uniform Operation of Laws Clause of the Utah Constitution. The district court granted summary judgment for the landowners, finding the code unconstitutional as applied and invalidating the certification of the West Hills ballot measure. The court determined that the plaintiffs were “specified landowners” who would have been entitled to exclusion if their properties had been added earlier, and that the legislature’s interest in certainty did not justify the disparate treatment.The sponsor then filed an emergency petition for extraordinary relief with the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, seeking to overturn the district court’s order before the upcoming election. The Utah Supreme Court, after expedited briefing and oral argument, denied the petition for extraordinary relief. The court held that, under the unique circumstances, it would not exercise its discretion to issue a writ due to the potential disruption and confusion in the election process, including the risk of voter suppression and interference with electioneering efforts. The denial was without prejudice to the sponsor’s ability to pursue an appeal or interlocutory review of the district court’s order. View "Anderson v. Bates" on Justia Law

In March 2023, a New York State grand jury indicted a former President on thirty-four counts of falsifying business records in the first degree. The indictment alleged that he orchestrated a scheme to influence the 2016 presidential election by directing his personal lawyer to pay $130,000 to an adult film star to prevent disclosure of an alleged sexual encounter. The payments were disguised as legal fees in business records. After arraignment, the defendant sought to remove the case to federal court under the federal officer removal statute, arguing the conduct was within the color of his office and involved federal defenses. The federal district court remanded the case to state court, finding the prosecution fell outside the scope of federal officer removal jurisdiction. A state court jury subsequently convicted the defendant on all counts.After conviction but before sentencing, the United States Supreme Court issued a decision in Trump v. United States, holding that the President is absolutely immune from criminal prosecution for conduct within his exclusive constitutional authority and that evidence of immunized official acts is inadmissible even when an indictment alleges only unofficial conduct. The defendant then sought leave to file a second, untimely notice of removal in federal court, arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision provided new grounds for removal and established good cause for the delay. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied leave, concluding that good cause had not been shown and that the hush money payments were private, unofficial acts.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial. The Second Circuit held that the district court had not adequately considered issues relevant to the good cause inquiry, including the impact of the Supreme Court’s decision and whether evidence admitted at trial related to immunized official acts. The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded for reconsideration of the motion for leave to file a second notice of removal, instructing the district court to address these issues. View "New York v. Trump" on Justia Law

In October 2022, a man crashed his car into a parked vehicle in southeast Washington, D.C. After the collision, the car’s owner confronted him, and as police arrived, the man fled on foot. Officers pursued and apprehended him, discovering a gun with a large-capacity magazine under a vehicle along his escape route and another large-capacity magazine with ammunition inside his car. He was charged with several firearm-related offenses, including possession of a large-capacity ammunition feeding device and unlawful possession of ammunition.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia denied the defendant’s motions to dismiss the large-capacity magazine charges on Second Amendment grounds and to suppress the evidence found at the scene, ruling that the search and seizure were justified. After a jury trial, he was convicted of one count of possession of a large-capacity ammunition feeding device and one count of unlawful possession of ammunition, both based on the magazine found in his car. He was acquitted of other charges. The defendant appealed, challenging the denial of suppression, the sufficiency of the evidence for the large-capacity magazine conviction, the lack of a jury instruction on knowledge, and the constitutionality of the statute.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. After oral argument, the government moved to vacate the large-capacity magazine conviction due to a change in its position on the statute’s constitutionality, which the court granted. The court affirmed the denial of suppression and upheld the unlawful possession of ammunition conviction, holding that the officers’ entry into the car to seize the magazine was justified under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, as they had probable cause to believe the car contained evidence of criminal activity. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Miller v. United States" on Justia Law

A police dispatcher who worked for a Michigan city alleged that she and other female dispatchers were required to conduct searches of female arrestees, even when female officers were available, exposing them to health and safety risks. The department did not have a similar policy for male dispatchers. In 2020, the dispatcher and several colleagues filed a lawsuit alleging sex discrimination. Eleven days after filing, the dispatcher became the subject of an Internal Affairs investigation, which ultimately led to her termination for violating department policy by using a case-management system for personal reasons. She later settled with the department, resulting in her reinstatement with a demotion, suspension, and loss of promotion eligibility.Following these events, the dispatcher filed a second lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, claiming that the city and its police commissioner retaliated against her for exercising her First Amendment rights by filing the original lawsuit. She also brought a claim under Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act. The district court granted summary judgment to the city on the retaliation claim, finding no municipal liability, but denied summary judgment to the commissioner in his individual capacity, holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding causation. The commissioner appealed, asserting qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the denial of qualified immunity. The court held that the dispatcher alleged legally cognizable adverse actions and that her right to be free from retaliation for protected speech was clearly established. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to the commissioner and dismissed the remainder of the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction over factual disputes. The court declined to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over the state-law claims. View "DeVooght v. City of Warren" on Justia Law

The case involved a defendant who was convicted by a jury of two counts of gross sexual imposition, one a class AA felony and one a class A felony. During jury deliberations, the jury requested to review a recorded interview that was part of the evidence. Because there was no device available for the jury to listen to the recording in the jury room, the district court decided to play the recording in the courtroom. The court then closed the courtroom to the public during this process, reasoning that the jury’s review of evidence constituted deliberations, which required exclusion of the public.The District Court of Dunn County, Southwest Judicial District, presided over the trial and made the decision to close the courtroom. The defendant did not object to the closure at trial but did ask the court to consider whether reviewing evidence was truly deliberation. The court performed a Waller v. Georgia analysis and found that an overriding interest justified closure, and both parties agreed the findings were adequate for the record. The defendant was convicted and sentenced to a 20-year term, with 10 years suspended, and the sentences to run concurrently.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed whether the closure of the courtroom during the jury’s review of evidence violated the defendant’s right to a public trial. The court held that the district court erred by treating the jury’s review of evidence as deliberations requiring closure. The Supreme Court found this was a plain and obvious error that affected the defendant’s substantial rights, constituting a structural error. The Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial, holding that the closure of the courtroom under these circumstances violated the defendant’s constitutional right to a public trial. View "State v. Barrett" on Justia Law

Mark and Jane Thompson, residents of Aiken County and the City of Aiken, paid road maintenance fees levied by both the county and city for several years. After the City of Aiken rescinded its fee in 2021 and agreed to reimburse fees paid after that date, the Thompsons filed suit against various city and county officials and entities. They sought a declaratory judgment that the ordinances imposing the fees were invalid, reimbursement of unlawfully collected fees, damages under section 8-21-30 of the South Carolina Code, and relief for alleged violations of their constitutional rights.The case was first heard in the Circuit Court for Aiken County. The Thompsons voluntarily dismissed some claims and parties before and during the hearing. The trial court ultimately dismissed the remaining claims, finding that the South Carolina Revenue Procedures Act (RPA) deprived it of subject matter jurisdiction, that section 12-60-80(C) barred class actions against political subdivisions, that section 8-21-30 did not apply to the road maintenance fees or the actions of the county treasurer, and that sovereign immunity barred the unjust enrichment claim. The constitutional claim was dismissed by stipulation. The Thompsons appealed, and the Supreme Court of South Carolina certified the appeal before the Court of Appeals could rule.The Supreme Court of South Carolina held that the road maintenance fees at issue were not “taxes” under the RPA, so the RPA did not deprive the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over the individual or class claims. The catchall provision of section 12-60-80(C) does not bar class actions against political subdivisions unless the claim concerns value-based property taxes. The court affirmed the dismissal of the unjust enrichment, section 8-21-30, and constitutional claims, but reversed the dismissal of the declaratory judgment claim and remanded for further proceedings on that claim, both individually and as a class. View "Thompson v. Killian" on Justia Law