Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, which are corporate entities owned by Kenneth Gay, challenged cannabis dispensary licensing schemes in Washington State and the City of Sacramento. Both jurisdictions require applicants to have been residents of the respective area for a specified period to be eligible for a dispensary license, or to receive priority in licensing. Plaintiffs applied for licenses in both places, but their applications were rejected solely for failing to meet the residency requirements, despite fulfilling all other criteria. Plaintiffs then filed lawsuits, alleging that these residency preferences violate the dormant Commerce Clause by discriminating against out-of-state economic interests in the cannabis market.In the Western District of Washington and the Eastern District of California, the district courts dismissed the actions at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage and denied preliminary injunctions. Both courts found that the dormant Commerce Clause does not apply to residency requirements for cannabis dispensaries because marijuana remains illegal under federal law. They reasoned that the constitutional protection of interstate commerce does not extend to a market Congress has expressly prohibited.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the consolidated appeals. It affirmed both district courts’ dismissals, holding that the dormant Commerce Clause does not apply to state or local laws restricting licensing in a market (cannabis) that Congress has deemed illegal. The Ninth Circuit declined to extend dormant Commerce Clause protections to interstate commerce in a federally prohibited drug market, noting that Supreme Court precedent counsels “extreme caution” before exercising implied authority in this area. The panel found insufficient basis to use the judge-made dormant Commerce Clause to create a constitutional right to interstate cannabis commerce that is unlawful under federal law. Thus, both judgments were affirmed. View "PERIDOT TREE WA, INC. v. WASHINGTON STATE LIQUOR AND CANNABIS CONTROL BOARD" on Justia Law

Several trusts and entities purchased properties in Nevada that were subject to deeds of trust held by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. After unsuccessful attempts in state court to extinguish the deeds of trust and quiet title, each property remained encumbered. Between 2022 and 2024, foreclosure proceedings were initiated on these properties, with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac acting through their conservator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). In response, the plaintiffs brought suit against the FHFA and its Director, seeking to prevent foreclosure and challenging the constitutionality of the FHFA’s funding mechanism under the Appropriations Clause and the nondelegation doctrine.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada reviewed the case. The district court denied the plaintiffs’ motions for preliminary relief, then dismissed their amended complaint with prejudice, finding that the FHFA’s funding structure was constitutional. The court determined that the Recovery Act, which created the FHFA and provides for its funding via regulatory assessments rather than Congressional appropriations, met constitutional standards by specifying both a source and purpose for the funds. The court also found that the Recovery Act’s limitation to “reasonable costs” provided an intelligible principle, satisfying the nondelegation doctrine. Leave to amend was denied as futile.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs had Article III standing, but rejected their arguments on the merits. It concluded that the FHFA’s funding mechanism, as established by the Recovery Act, does not violate the Appropriations Clause because it identifies a source and purpose for expenditures, consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Community Financial Services Association of America, Limited. It further held the mechanism does not violate the nondelegation doctrine, as the statute provides an intelligible principle. The judgment of dismissal was affirmed. View "DAISEY TRUST v. FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY" on Justia Law

Thomas Sanderson, a registered sex offender in Missouri, challenged a statutory provision requiring all registered sex offenders to post a sign at their residence on Halloween stating, “No candy or treats at this residence.” Sanderson had a history of elaborate Halloween displays, but after his 2006 conviction and imprisonment, he was informed by police that he was “grandfathered in” and could continue participating in Halloween festivities. This changed in 2022 when Hazelwood police arrested and convicted him for violating the statute, specifically the sign mandate. Sanderson then brought a facial challenge under the First Amendment, arguing that the mandate compelled speech.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri first granted a preliminary injunction, finding Sanderson was likely to succeed on the merits. After a bench trial, the court found that the sign mandate was unconstitutional compelled speech under the First Amendment and issued a permanent injunction barring enforcement of the mandate statewide. The State appealed, contesting both the constitutional ruling and certain evidentiary decisions made during the trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error, applying heightened scrutiny to facts relevant to the First Amendment claim. The appellate court held that the sign mandate compelled speech and thus required strict scrutiny. While the State’s interest in protecting children on Halloween was compelling, the court found the sign mandate was not narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. The evidence failed to show the signs provided any additional protection beyond existing restrictions, and no justification was presented for their necessity. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that the sign mandate facially violates the First Amendment, vacated the injunction due to recent Supreme Court precedent, and remanded for reconsideration of the scope of injunctive relief. View "Sanderson v. Hanaway" on Justia Law

A healthcare clinic and several physicians providing abortion services in North Dakota challenged the constitutionality of N.D.C.C. ch. 12.1-19.1, a law criminalizing most abortions with certain exceptions. The plaintiffs argued that the statute was unconstitutionally vague regarding when abortions could be performed to preserve the life or health of a pregnant woman. They asserted that the law's language failed to provide clear guidance to physicians about permissible conduct, especially given the severe criminal penalties for violations. Testimony from medical experts detailed the unpredictable and rapidly evolving risks that pregnancy can pose to a mother's health, and highlighted the difficulties in interpreting the statutory terms such as “serious health risk,” “substantial physical impairment,” and “major bodily function.”The District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial District, granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs. The court found that the statute was impermissibly vague, concluding that its unclear language chilled physicians from providing constitutionally protected medical care. The court also determined that the law infringed on pregnant women’s fundamental rights under the North Dakota Constitution and was not narrowly tailored to promote health or protect life. As a result, the court declared N.D.C.C. ch. 12.1-19.1 unconstitutional and void.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the district court’s judgment. The justices issued separate opinions, but did not reach the four-member majority required by the state constitution to declare a legislative enactment unconstitutional. Therefore, the effect was that the district court’s judgment was reversed, and N.D.C.C. ch. 12.1-19.1 was not declared unconstitutional. The main holding is that, due to the lack of a sufficient majority, the abortion law was not invalidated and the lower court's judgment was reversed. View "Access Independent Health Services, Inc. v. Wrigley" on Justia Law

After the Texas Legislature passed the Election Protection and Integrity Act of 2021 (“S.B.1”), a sweeping law that amended numerous aspects of the state’s election procedures, multiple groups of plaintiffs—including civil rights and voter advocacy organizations—challenged thirty-eight provisions of the law. They alleged violations of various constitutional amendments, the Voting Rights Act (VRA), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act, naming state officials including the Texas Secretary of State and Attorney General as defendants.In the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, the defendants moved to dismiss on grounds of sovereign immunity and lack of standing. The district court addressed the motions on a provision-by-provision basis, concluding that the Secretary and Attorney General were sufficiently connected to the enforcement of most challenged provisions to overcome sovereign immunity under Ex parte Young, and that plaintiffs had standing to sue. It denied the motions to dismiss for the majority of the claims, although it dismissed others as moot, for lack of standing, or for failure to state a claim. The defendants appealed the denials.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held it had appellate jurisdiction over the interlocutory sovereign immunity appeals. On the merits, the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. It held that the VRA claims were not barred by sovereign immunity. For the constitutional and other statutory claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the court determined that the Secretary of State is a proper defendant only for those provisions she directly enforces—such as those involving the design of forms and sanctioning of registrars—and not for those enforced by other officials. Similarly, it held the Attorney General could be sued only for one provision authorizing civil penalties. The court affirmed standing for claims against provisions enforced by these officials. View "Un del Pueblo Entero v. Nelson" on Justia Law

A former lieutenant in a county sheriff’s office was accused of using excessive force during two arrests. After an internal investigation was initiated, he was suspended and scheduled for a public hearing before a merit board, which is required under Indiana law for disciplinary actions. The lieutenant alleged that the sheriff manipulated both the investigation and the merit board to ensure an unfavorable outcome for him. Faced with the possibility of an unfair hearing and negative publicity, the lieutenant negotiated a severance agreement with the sheriff: he would resign and waive his hearing in exchange for withdrawal of the charges and a promise of a neutral reference.Despite the agreement, on the day the resignation became effective, two county prosecutors and the sheriff broadly disclosed the excessive-force allegations to local legal professionals and the lieutenant’s current and prospective employers, including through Brady/Giglio disclosures. The disclosures described the alleged misconduct and claimed issues with the lieutenant’s credibility, leading to his suspension from his part-time job and the loss of other employment opportunities. The lieutenant claimed these actions were part of a premeditated scheme to render him unemployable in law enforcement.In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, the complaint was dismissed. The district court found that absolute and qualified immunity protected the prosecutors and that the sheriff could not be liable because the lieutenant had voluntarily resigned, waiving his due process rights. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the prosecutors were entitled to absolute immunity only for Brady/Giglio disclosures made in pending criminal cases. For disclosures to the bar association and employers, neither absolute nor qualified immunity applied at this stage because the alleged coercion through misrepresentation could constitute a procedural due process violation. The appellate court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Martin v. Goldsmith" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with criminal possession of a firearm or ammunition and criminal violation of a protective order. These charges stemmed from two prior cases involving allegations of sexual assault in the fourth degree and risk of injury to a child, both concerning a minor family member. In each prior case, the Superior Court issued protective orders requiring the defendant to surrender firearms and ammunition. In 2022, the defendant was arrested for allegedly possessing firearms or ammunition in violation of those protective orders.After the 2022 arrest, the defendant moved to dismiss the new charges, arguing that the protective orders were not issued "in a case involving the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force" as required by Connecticut General Statutes § 53a-217(a)(4)(A), since the underlying offenses did not explicitly include use of physical force as an element. The Superior Court denied the motion to dismiss. The defendant then entered a conditional plea of nolo contendere to one count each of criminal possession of a firearm or ammunition and criminal violation of a protective order. The state entered a nolle prosequi as to the remaining charges. The defendant appealed, and the case was transferred from the Appellate Court to the Connecticut Supreme Court.The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. It held that the phrase "a case involving" in § 53a-217(a)(4)(A) is broadly inclusive and refers to the overall proceeding, not just the elements of the charged offense. Therefore, protective orders issued during prosecutions for sex offenses, where the use or threat of physical force or superior physical strength was present in any aspect, satisfy the statute. The court also rejected the defendant’s claim that the statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied, finding it provided sufficient guidance. Finally, the court determined that the defendant’s Second Amendment challenge to the validity of the protective orders was barred by the collateral bar rule. View "State v. Enrrique H." on Justia Law

The case concerns the fatal shooting of Kwamena Ocran by four Gaithersburg Police Department officers in January 2021. Ocran, who had recently been released from prison and was reported by a confidential informant to be armed, was surveilled by the officers after the informant indicated Ocran might attempt to sell a handgun. When Ocran left an apartment with the informant and was approached by the officers, he fled. The officers pursued him, and during the chase, multiple officers reported seeing a muzzle flash and believed Ocran fired a weapon in their direction. The officers collectively discharged 27 rounds, resulting in Ocran’s death. Forensic evidence revealed Ocran was shot multiple times in the back, and a handgun was found near his body, though no evidence indicated it had been fired.After discovery, Melody Cooper, Ocran’s mother and personal representative, brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The United States District Court for the District of Maryland denied the officers’ motion for summary judgment and rejected their claim of qualified immunity, finding genuine disputes of material fact existed—particularly regarding whether Ocran pointed or fired his weapon at the officers. The court also denied the officers’ motion for reconsideration.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit dismissed the officers’ appeal to the extent it challenged the district court’s findings of disputed material facts, as such findings are not reviewable under the collateral order doctrine. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that, accepting the undisputed facts, the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity because the right to be free from deadly force when fleeing and not posing a significant threat was clearly established at the time of the incident. The case was remanded for further proceedings, including a jury trial. View "Cooper v. Doyle" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs in this case are trustees who own a property in Kīhei, Maui, which they use as a vacation home for personal use. In 2021, Maui County reclassified their property as a “short-term rental” based solely on zoning, not actual use, resulting in a higher property tax rate. The plaintiffs paid the assessed taxes but did not utilize the administrative appeals process available through the Maui County Board of Review. Instead, they filed a class action in the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit, seeking a refund and alleging that the County’s collection of the higher taxes was unconstitutional, violated due process, and resulted in unjust enrichment.The Circuit Court of the Second Circuit granted the County’s motion to dismiss, finding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court determined that under Hawai‘i Revised Statutes chapter 232 and Maui County Code chapter 3.48, the proper procedure for contesting real property tax assessments—including constitutional challenges—requires first appealing to the County Board of Review and, if necessary, then to the Tax Appeal Court. Because the plaintiffs bypassed these required steps and missed the statutory deadline to appeal, the court dismissed the case with prejudice.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal. The Supreme Court held that the Tax Appeal Court has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals regarding real property tax assessments, including those raising constitutional issues, and found that the plaintiffs’ claims were time-barred due to their failure to timely pursue the established administrative remedies. As a result, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Piezko v. County of Maui" on Justia Law

Police officers stopped a motorist for driving without a front license plate and failing to use a turn signal in a high-crime area of Denver known for gang activity. The driver, Antoan Raban, was identified as a member of the Tre Tre Crips gang and was driving in rival Bloods gang territory. During the stop, a known Crips gang member, Deshay Armstrong, parked nearby, watched the officers, and called Raban’s phone. Raban did not have identification, and a records check revealed violent and weapons-related convictions. Officers called for backup, removed Raban from his car to fingerprint him, frisked him, and found no weapons. While preparing to take fingerprints, an officer conducted a protective sweep of Raban’s car and discovered a loaded pistol and ammunition.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado denied Raban’s motion to suppress, finding that under the totality of the circumstances—including the high-crime area, Raban’s gang affiliation, Armstrong’s presence, and Raban’s ankle monitor—the officers had reasonable suspicion that Raban was dangerous. Initially, the district court questioned whether the officers genuinely intended to return Raban to his car but later reconsidered and found it was objectively reasonable for the officers to believe Raban might be released with a citation and allowed to reenter his vehicle.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. It held that the officers had reasonable suspicion that Raban was presently dangerous and that he might regain access to a weapon in his car if released. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s denial of the suppression motion and upheld Raban’s conviction, holding that the protective sweep was lawful under the Fourth Amendment given the circumstances. View "United States v. Raban" on Justia Law