Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

An Alaska hunter challenged a state regulation that allocates permits for hunting Kodiak brown bears, with at least 60% reserved for Alaska residents and no more than 40% for nonresidents, who must generally hunt with a professional guide. The hunter argued that this allocation grants nonresidents a special privilege in violation of the Alaska Constitution’s principle of equal access to fish and game and that it fails to manage resources for the maximum benefit of Alaskans.The Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, upheld the regulation, concluding that it did not grant an exclusive right to nonresidents and that the allocation system was within permissible bounds. The court found that the regulation did not exclude residents from hunting and that the allocation balanced various interests, including economic benefits and conservation.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The court held that the regulation did not violate the equal access clauses of the Alaska Constitution. It reasoned that treating residents and nonresidents differently does not, in itself, violate the constitution, and that the regulation did not grant nonresidents an unconstitutional special privilege. The court also found that the state could consider economic benefits when managing wildlife resources and that the Board of Game had taken a hard look at the relevant factors, including conservation and economic benefits, when establishing the permit system. Thus, the regulation was consistent with the constitutional duty to manage resources for the maximum benefit of Alaskans. View "Cassell v. State of Alaska, Department of Fish & Game" on Justia Law

Captain Matthew Hight trained with the Saint Lawrence Seaway Pilots Association from 2015 to 2018 to become a maritime pilot on Lake Ontario and the St. Lawrence River. The Great Lakes Pilotage Act of 1960 requires certain ships on these waters to have a registered pilot on board. The Coast Guard oversees the registration of American pilots and supervises private pilotage associations responsible for training new pilots. Hight applied for registration in 2018, but the Pilots Association recommended denial, citing incomplete training and concerns about his temperament. The Coast Guard denied his application after an independent review.Hight challenged the decision in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing that the Coast Guard acted arbitrarily and capriciously, unconstitutionally delegated authority to the Pilots Association, and violated the First Amendment by requiring him to train with and join the Pilots Association. The district court rejected all claims, finding that the Coast Guard's decision was supported by substantial evidence, including Hight's failure to complete the required training and concerns about his temperament.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Coast Guard's decision was reasonable and supported by the record, as Hight had not completed the required supervised trips on the St. Lawrence River. The court also found that the Coast Guard did not unconstitutionally delegate authority to the Pilots Association, as the association's role was limited to providing advice and gathering facts. Finally, the court determined that Hight's First Amendment claim regarding mandatory association membership was not ripe for review, as he was not yet eligible to join the Pilots Association. The court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Hight v. DHS" on Justia Law

Kenneth Michael Sikorsky purchased a property in Newburgh, New York, in 2006 but fell behind on his property taxes, leading to foreclosure by the City of Newburgh in 2012. Sikorsky and the City later agreed on a contract for Sikorsky to repurchase the property, but the sale fell through when Sikorsky failed to make the required payments. The City subsequently sold the property for $350,500, significantly more than the $92,786.24 Sikorsky owed in taxes, but did not return the surplus to Sikorsky.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed Sikorsky's pro se complaint, which alleged a constitutional taking and violations of New York state laws. Sikorsky, now represented by counsel, appealed the dismissal, arguing that he had stated a valid claim under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment and that he had a right to recover under new New York state laws enacted during the appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that Sikorsky had indeed stated a claim for a constitutional taking against the City of Newburgh and Jeremy Kaufman. The court found that the new New York laws did not provide Sikorsky with a remedy, as they only applied to properties sold on or after May 25, 2023, or to those with active proceedings under N.Y. CPLR § 7803(1) on the effective date of the act. Since Sikorsky's property was sold in June 2021 and he had not initiated an Article 78 proceeding, he lacked a local remedy.The Second Circuit vacated the District Court's dismissal of Sikorsky's constitutional taking claims against the City of Newburgh and Jeremy Kaufman and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Sikorsky v. City of Newburgh" on Justia Law

Christine Stary and Brady Ethridge divorced in 2018 and agreed to share custody of their three children. In March 2020, Stary was arrested and charged with felony injury to a child, but the charges were dismissed in February 2025. Ethridge applied for a civil protective order a week after Stary's arrest, alleging family violence and seeking an order lasting longer than two years. The trial court issued a temporary order preventing Stary from contacting her children. At the hearing, Ethridge testified about instances of Stary injuring the children, supported by medical records. Stary denied the allegations and testified on her own behalf. The trial court found that Stary committed felony family violence and issued a lifetime protective order prohibiting all contact between Stary and her children.The trial court's decision was appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas affirmed the order. The appellate court held that a lifetime protective order prohibiting a parent from contacting her children is not equivalent to terminating parental rights and does not require heightened procedural safeguards. One justice dissented, arguing that the order effectively terminated Stary's parental rights.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that constitutional due process requires clear and convincing evidence to support a protective order prohibiting contact between a parent and her children for longer than two years. The court emphasized that such orders profoundly interfere with a parent's fundamental right to care, custody, and control of their children. The court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings, requiring the trial court to apply the clear and convincing evidence standard and consider the best interest of the children. View "STARY v. ETHRIDGE" on Justia Law

An inmate, Trever Ballheim, appealed the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus by the district court. Ballheim was originally sentenced to two different terms: 2 to 2 years for possession of a controlled substance and 10 to 11 years for being a habitual criminal. The district court later issued an order nunc pro tunc, changing the sentence for possession to 10 to 11 years, which Ballheim argued was void as it was issued without his presence and beyond the court's term.The district court dismissed Ballheim's petition without a hearing, citing that habeas corpus is not available for mere errors in judgment. Ballheim contended that the nunc pro tunc order was a nullity and that his sentence for being a habitual criminal was void, as it is not a crime. He argued that he had already served the valid sentence for possession.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and found that the nunc pro tunc order was void because it improperly changed the original sentence beyond correcting a clerical error. The court held that the original sentence for being a habitual criminal was void, as habitual criminality is not a separate crime but an enhancement. Since Ballheim had served the valid sentence for possession, he was entitled to habeas relief.The court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case with directions to issue the writ of habeas corpus and hold a hearing to determine if Ballheim should be discharged from custody. View "Ballheim v. Settles" on Justia Law

John G. Strawn entered a plea agreement to plead no contest to two counts of third-degree assault. The State agreed not to mention any sexual contact in the factual basis for the charges. However, the county court found that Strawn had subjected a victim to sexual contact based on information in the presentence investigation report (PSR) and ordered him to register as a sex offender under Nebraska’s Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA).Strawn appealed to the district court, arguing that the county court erred in requiring him to register as a sex offender because the factual basis provided by the State did not include any evidence of sexual contact. He also contended that the county court should have made a specific credibility finding and that he was denied procedural due process. Additionally, Strawn challenged the county court's advisement that his conviction might result in a federal firearms prohibition. The district court rejected Strawn's arguments and affirmed the county court's judgment.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and found no merit in Strawn's arguments. The court held that SORA does not require evidence of sexual contact to be present in both the factual basis and the PSR; it is sufficient if such evidence is found in the record, which includes both the factual basis and the PSR. The court also determined that the county court was not required to make an express credibility finding and that there was sufficient evidence in the PSR to support the finding of sexual contact. The court concluded that Strawn was afforded procedural due process, as he was given notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding SORA registration. Finally, the court noted that the county court's advisement about the potential federal firearms prohibition did not impose any prohibition itself. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "State v. Strawn" on Justia Law

The defendant is being prosecuted for the murder of DB. The state challenged a trial court order that suppressed statements the defendant made about DB while in custody for an unrelated crime. At the time of his arrest for the unrelated crime, the defendant was already a suspect in DB's death and was represented by counsel in connection with the DB investigation. The counsel had instructed officers to contact her before questioning the defendant about DB. However, when officers arrested the defendant for the unrelated crime, they advised him of his right to remain silent and to speak with an attorney but did not notify his attorney before conducting an interrogation that led to incriminating statements about DB.The Deschutes County Circuit Court granted the defendant's pretrial motion to suppress the statements, ruling that officers violated the defendant's right to counsel under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution by conducting the interrogation without notifying the defendant's counsel. The state pursued an immediate and direct appeal to the Oregon Supreme Court.The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that the right to counsel under Article I, section 11, was not triggered by the defendant's arrest and custodial interrogation regarding crimes for which he had not been charged. The court emphasized that protections under Article I, section 11, ordinarily do not arise until a person has been charged with a crime. The court also declined to consider the defendant's alternative argument that Article I, section 12, provided a basis for affirming the trial court's decision. Consequently, the Oregon Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Kilby" on Justia Law

Kyli Jenae Labrum was charged with ten counts of rape and one count of forcible sexual abuse after allegedly engaging in a sexual relationship with T.S., a sixteen-year-old boy. The State's case relied on two theories of nonconsent: a special trust theory and an enticement theory. At the preliminary hearing, the stand-in prosecutor only argued the special trust theory, which the magistrate judge rejected, ruling that the State had not shown the relationship was nonconsensual. The State then moved to reduce the charges to a lesser offense but later decided to pursue the original charges, filing a motion for reconsideration and then refiling the charges with both theories of nonconsent.The magistrate judge denied the motion for reconsideration and dismissed the refiled charges, ruling that the State's actions were procedurally inappropriate and constitutionally barred under the Utah Constitution’s Due Process Clause. The State appealed, arguing that the magistrate erred in its determination.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case, clarifying the standard for refiling charges after a dismissal for insufficient evidence. The court held that the State must show that it did not act in bad faith or with intent to harass when refiling charges. The court vacated the magistrate's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings under the clarified standard. The court instructed the lower court to determine whether the State acted in bad faith when it failed to argue the enticement theory at the first preliminary hearing and subsequently refiled the charges. If the State prevails, it may proceed with a second preliminary hearing on both theories of nonconsent. If Labrum prevails, the State may only proceed on the lesser charges. View "State v. Labrum" on Justia Law

The case involves the defendant, Gene L. Zarella, who is charged with four counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault. Following his indictment, Zarella sought the production of the complainant's confidential counseling and hospitalization records for in camera review by the trial court. The trial court granted these motions and reviewed the records, finding them discoverable. Zarella then moved for in camera review of additional records from various private counseling, mental health, and medical care providers. The trial court granted these motions as well.The complainant, joined by one of the counseling providers, moved to intervene and quash the orders for production, citing statutory privileges and the complainant's constitutional right to privacy under Part I, Article 2-b of the New Hampshire Constitution. The Superior Court (Ignatius, J.) granted the motion to intervene but denied the motion to quash, applying the standard from State v. Gagne, which allows in camera review if the defendant establishes a reasonable probability that the records contain material and relevant information.The New Hampshire Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that Part I, Article 2-b of the State Constitution abrogates the application of the Gagne standard to records held by private organizations, as established in State v. Cressey. The court held that to obtain in camera review and disclosure of confidential or privileged records held by private organizations, the defendant must follow the procedures outlined in RSA 173-C:5 for records privileged under RSA chapter 173-C or demonstrate an essential need for the records for those privileged under RSA 329-B:26 and RSA 330-A:32. The court also mandated that notice and an opportunity to object must be provided to the individual whose records are sought. The court vacated the trial court's order and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "State v. Zarella" on Justia Law

Julio Alvarado Dubon moved to suppress firearms and ammunition discovered during a warrantless search of his home. The district court denied the motion, concluding that Alvarado Dubon voluntarily consented to the search and, even if he had not, the items were found during a valid protective sweep. The case involves officers searching for a man named Rolman Balcarcel, who was reported to have weapons and potentially planning violent acts. Alvarado Dubon allowed officers into his home, where they saw a handgun magazine. After a brief interaction, Alvarado Dubon gestured and verbally indicated consent for the officers to check the rest of the house, where they found firearms.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied Alvarado Dubon's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search. The court found that Alvarado Dubon had voluntarily consented to the search and that the search was justified as a protective sweep. Alvarado Dubon entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. He was sentenced to 16 months of imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the district court's finding of voluntary consent was not clearly erroneous. The court noted that Alvarado Dubon's actions and body language indicated consent and that the conditions under which he consented did not suggest coercion or duress. The court also concluded that Alvarado Dubon did not effectively revoke his consent before the rifle was found. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "US v. Dubon" on Justia Law