Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries
Boone v. Lowell Area Schools
Stefanie Boone, a parent with children enrolled in Lowell Area Schools, publicly criticized the district’s curriculum and practices, particularly those she saw as promoting diversity, equity, inclusion, and social justice issues. She shared her views on a Facebook page, often referencing specific district employees. In response to one post, the high school principal sent Boone a letter requesting that she stop referencing district employees on social media and warning her that failure to comply could result in legal action. The letter also directed her not to contact staff without prior permission. Boone felt threatened and stopped making public comments or contacting teachers directly.Boone filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, naming the district and several officials in their official capacities. She alleged violations of her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a Title IX violation, and state law claims. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, concluding that neither the “Social Media Policy” nor the “Communication Policy” constituted unconstitutional restraints on speech—characterizing the request as non-binding and the communication restriction as merely channeling her speech. The court also rejected her Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state law claims.Reviewing the case de novo, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that Boone plausibly alleged a First Amendment violation regarding the Social Media Policy, as the district’s letter amounted to a coercive threat of legal action capable of chilling protected speech. However, the Communication Policy, which required Boone to channel communications through administrators, did not violate her speech rights. The court affirmed the dismissal of her Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX claims, reversed the dismissal of her First Amendment claim as to the Social Media Policy, and remanded for further proceedings, including consideration of her state law claims. View "Boone v. Lowell Area Schools" on Justia Law
Henderson v. Kent County
A Michigan state prisoner filed a lawsuit against various defendants, alleging constitutional violations and seeking to proceed in forma pauperis, which would allow him to pay filing fees over time or not at all. The key dispute concerned whether the prisoner had accumulated three “strikes” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), which would bar him from proceeding in forma pauperis unless he was in imminent danger of serious physical injury. Two of the actions identified as strikes by the district court involved claims dismissed on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan denied the prisoner’s request to proceed in forma pauperis, finding that he had three strikes under § 1915(g) and that the imminent-danger exception did not apply. Because he had not paid the filing fee, the court dismissed his action without prejudice. The prisoner appealed, specifically challenging the district court’s determination that two actions dismissed on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds counted as strikes.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that dismissals based solely on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds do not count as strikes under § 1915(g), unless the dismissing court explicitly labels the claims as frivolous or malicious, which was not done in the actions at issue. The appellate court also determined that issue preclusion did not bar the prisoner from contesting the strike status because the relevant issue was not actually litigated in prior proceedings. Additionally, the court found that the timing of another proposed strike did not meet the statutory requirements. As a result, the Sixth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings, concluding that the prisoner is not barred from proceeding in forma pauperis in this action. View "Henderson v. Kent County" on Justia Law
Lanier v. State
A motorist was stopped by a police officer after turning right from a gas station parking lot onto a city street without using a turn signal. The officer, parked nearby, followed and initiated the stop, which led to the discovery of drugs and a handgun in the vehicle. The State charged the motorist with felony and misdemeanor offenses related to the handgun and drugs. Prior to trial, the motorist moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that no traffic law required signaling for this type of turn, so the stop violated his rights under both the federal and Indiana constitutions.The Marion Superior Court denied the suppression motion. The court relied on a previous appellate decision, Datzek v. State, and found that the officer’s interpretation of Indiana Code section 9-21-8-24, which requires signaling when turning “from a direct course upon a highway” or changing lanes, was not mistaken. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the officer’s interpretation of the statute was objectively reasonable, and thus the stop complied with the Fourth Amendment. The appellate panel similarly upheld the stop under the Indiana Constitution.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and vacated the Court of Appeals’ opinion. The Court held that the statute in question is unambiguous and does not require a turn signal when exiting a private parking lot onto a city street. The officer’s contrary interpretation was not objectively reasonable, meaning the stop violated the Fourth Amendment. Because the State did not argue for any exception to the exclusionary rule, the evidence must be suppressed. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s suppression ruling and remanded with instructions to grant the motion; it did not reach the Indiana constitutional issue. View "Lanier v. State" on Justia Law
In re: Application
The case centers on a government investigation into a leak of highly classified information regarding a military operation. After a news article revealed details previously unreported, authorities suspected that journalists associated with the news outlet might have communicated with confidential sources via LinkedIn. The government obtained two orders under the Stored Communications Act: one requiring LinkedIn to disclose metadata records for the journalists over an eighteen-month period, and another barring LinkedIn from informing anyone, including the journalists and their employer, about the existence of the orders for one year. LinkedIn challenged both orders, arguing that they were substantially overbroad and threatened First Amendment protections by sweeping in unrelated confidential sources.A magistrate judge for the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia found LinkedIn had standing but sided with the government on the merits, holding that LinkedIn could only challenge the orders based on logistical or practical burdens, not on overbreadth or constitutional grounds. The district court adopted this recommendation, rejecting LinkedIn’s arguments regarding overbreadth and First Amendment protections, and upholding both the Disclosure and Secrecy Orders. LinkedIn’s motion for access to ex parte materials and for reconsideration following new information about the government’s disclosure to the news outlet was also denied.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found LinkedIn had standing to challenge both orders. The court held that the Disclosure Order was substantially overbroad, violating statutory and constitutional norms, and required the district court to narrow its scope. The court also held that the Secrecy Order was overly broad as a prior restraint and must be modified to allow LinkedIn to disclose the existence of the orders to a single vetted attorney for the news outlet. However, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of LinkedIn’s request for access to ex parte materials, citing national security concerns. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "In re: Application" on Justia Law
DICKINSON V. TRUMP
Five individuals, who were either peaceful protesters or independent journalists, attended demonstrations at the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement facility in Portland, Oregon. During these events, they were exposed to tear gas and pepper balls used by federal agents to disperse crowds. The protests involved both peaceful activities and significant unrest, including vandalism, blocking entrances, and attacks on law enforcement. The plaintiffs claimed that federal agents specifically targeted them in retaliation for exercising their First Amendment rights.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon against federal officials and the Department of Homeland Security. After discovery and an evidentiary hearing, the District Court issued a preliminary injunction restricting the use of non-lethal munitions to situations involving an imminent threat of physical harm, prohibiting their use on certain parts of the body, imposing limits on pepper spray, and requiring redesign of agent uniforms for better identification. Additionally, the District Court provisionally certified a class of all individuals who had protested or reported on DHS activities at the Portland ICE facility. The government’s motion to stay the injunction pending appeal was denied by the District Court but granted by the Ninth Circuit.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated both the preliminary injunction and the provisional class certification. The court held that the plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment retaliation claim, as law enforcement may use non-lethal force to clear crowds and restore order without facing an imminent threat of physical harm. The record did not support claims of an unwritten policy or intent to retaliate against First Amendment activity. The court also found the injunction overbroad and unworkable, and the class failed to meet Rule 23’s commonality and indivisible remedy requirements. The preliminary injunction and class certification were vacated. View "DICKINSON V. TRUMP" on Justia Law
REACH COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT V. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Several tenants of an apartment complex located across the street from a federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) facility in Portland, Oregon, claimed harm from exposure to tear gas used by federal law enforcement officers to disperse disruptive crowds during demonstrations. The plaintiffs, including individuals and entities associated with the apartment complex, argued that the government’s deployment of tear gas infringed their substantive-due-process rights under the Fifth Amendment.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon granted a preliminary injunction, enjoining several federal agencies from using tear gas for crowd control outside the ICE facility. The district court found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their substantive-due-process claim and determined that the government’s actions could violate a constitutional right to bodily integrity.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s preliminary injunction. Applying de novo review to the underlying legal issues, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its prior stay of the injunction and concluded that the plaintiffs lacked a substantive-due-process right to be free from incidental exposure to tear gas used for non-lethal crowd control. The court held that such a right is not deeply rooted in the nation’s history and tradition nor implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, as required by Supreme Court precedents, including Washington v. Glucksberg and Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization. The panel further clarified that a substantive-due-process challenge to executive action requires both conscience-shocking conduct and deprivation of a historically rooted right, rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument that only the shocks-the-conscience standard should apply. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s preliminary injunction. View "REACH COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT V. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY" on Justia Law
McVAY v. LEPAK
A group of Oklahoma voters challenged the constitutionality of Senate Bill 1027, which imposed new restrictions and requirements on the state’s initiative and referendum petition process. Key provisions included requiring petition circulators to be registered Oklahoma voters, placing caps on the number of petition signatures that could be collected from individual counties, banning incentive-based compensation for circulators, prohibiting out-of-state contributions for petition circulation, and imposing new disclosure requirements regarding circulator compensation and funding. The petitioners argued that these changes made the petition process prohibitively expensive and violated their fundamental rights to propose and sign petitions.The Oklahoma Supreme Court assumed original jurisdiction due to the urgency and statewide importance of the issues raised, given the immediate impact of S.B. 1027 on pending and future initiative petitions. No lower courts reviewed the merits of this case before the Supreme Court’s intervention; the challenge was brought directly to this court through an application for declaratory relief and prohibition of enforcement.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma held that several core provisions of S.B. 1027 violated both the U.S. and Oklahoma Constitutions, specifically the First Amendment and state constitutional rights to speech, assembly, and petition. The court found that the offending provisions—including the registered voter circulator requirement, county signature caps, incentive-based compensation ban, out-of-state contribution ban, and disclosure requirements—were unconstitutional and could not be severed from the Act. As a result, the court declared S.B. 1027 void in its entirety, restoring the prior statutes governing the petition process. The court granted the petitioners’ request for declaratory relief. View "McVAY v. LEPAK" on Justia Law
Abramowitz v. Lake
Congress established the U.S. Agency for Global Media to oversee several federally funded international news broadcasters and later created the International Broadcasting Advisory Board as an independent agency with authority over hiring and firing the heads of these networks. Michael Abramowitz was appointed head of Voice of America with unanimous Board approval. After a change in presidential administration, most Board members were fired and the Agency’s Acting CEO, along with a Senior Advisor, attempted to remove Abramowitz without Board approval, placing him and other employees on indefinite administrative leave and later reassigning him. Abramowitz refused the reassignment and was subsequently notified of his removal.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted preliminary injunctions to restore Voice of America programming and, after proceedings, granted partial summary judgment and a permanent injunction barring Abramowitz’s removal without Board approval. The district court found it had federal-question jurisdiction over the claim and that the Agency’s actions violated statutory requirements, specifically 22 U.S.C. § 6205(e), which protects the independence of network heads by requiring Board approval for removal.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s order. The appellate court held that the district court had jurisdiction, as Congress did not intend for claims under section 6205(e) to be channeled through the Civil Service Reform Act’s administrative framework. The court concluded that section 6205(e) is constitutionally valid under Article II, as Congress may vest removal authority in department heads, and the Broadcasting Board qualifies as such. The Agency’s unilateral removal of Abramowitz was contrary to law. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s permanent injunction, holding that injunctive relief was appropriate and necessary to protect the statutory safeguard of the broadcaster’s independence. View "Abramowitz v. Lake" on Justia Law
Mills v. New York City
Three New York State residents brought a lawsuit challenging several New York City rules regulating the acquisition, sale, registration, and carry of handguns. The plaintiffs alleged that these rules violated their rights under the Second Amendment. One plaintiff claimed he could not afford the mandatory fees required to obtain a handgun license. Two other plaintiffs, who held licenses, asserted that City rules prevented them from registering more than two handguns to their carry licenses and from carrying more than one handgun at a time. They also challenged a rule imposing a 90-day waiting period between handgun purchases, and the prior-authorization process for acquiring handguns.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted the City’s motion to dismiss the complaint. That court dismissed some claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the plaintiffs failed to show injury-in-fact necessary for standing regarding certain acquisition and registration requirements. It found standing for other claims, such as the one-gun-carry rule, the two-gun-registration rule, the 90-day purchase rule, and the licensing fees. However, the court dismissed these claims for failure to state a claim, concluding at the first step of the Bruen analysis that the challenged rules did not regulate activity covered by the Second Amendment’s plain text.Reviewing the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of claims for lack of jurisdiction and the dismissal of the fees challenge, relying on Kwong v. Bloomberg. However, the Second Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal of challenges to the one-gun-carry rule, the 90-day purchase limitation, and the two-gun-carry-license registration rule. The court held that these rules regulate conduct covered by the Second Amendment, requiring further analysis at the second step under Bruen. The case was remanded for further proceedings regarding those claims. View "Mills v. New York City" on Justia Law
United States v. Robinson
Five individuals who participated as peaceful protesters and independent journalists at demonstrations outside the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) facility in Portland, Oregon, alleged that federal law enforcement officers targeted them with non-lethal crowd-control munitions such as tear gas and pepper balls. The plaintiffs claimed this was retaliation for exercising their First Amendment rights. The protests, which occurred between June 2025 and February 2026, often involved both peaceful dissent and significant unrest, including vandalism, trespassing, and obstruction of law enforcement. The plaintiffs were exposed to crowd-control devices during these protests, frequently while in proximity to unlawful activity.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting federal officers from using non-lethal munitions except against individuals posing an imminent threat of physical harm, and ordered that agents’ uniforms be redesigned with conspicuous identifying markings. The district court also certified a provisional class encompassing all individuals who had protested or reported on DHS activities at the Portland ICE facility since June 2025, and denied the government’s motion to stay the injunction pending appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s orders. The Ninth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and provisional class certification, holding that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate a likelihood of success on their First Amendment claim. The court found no evidence of an unwritten policy or pattern of retaliation by DHS and held that law enforcement may use non-lethal force to clear crowds and restore order without waiting for an imminent threat of physical harm. The injunction was found to be overbroad, improperly granting relief to non-parties, and unworkable. The class certification was vacated for lack of commonality and failure to satisfy Rule 23(b)(2)’s indivisible-remedy requirement. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law