Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Montanez was convicted based on the 2002 murder of Villalobos and Ramirez. The court sentenced him to mandatory natural life for two first-degree murder convictions, a 20-year consecutive sentence for an aggravated vehicular hijacking conviction, and a 27-year consecutive sentence for an aggravated kidnapping conviction.Montanez challenged the denial of his request for leave to file a successive postconviction petition. He sought to raise a claim that the prosecution violated “Brady” by failing to disclose evidence relevant to his defense that was stored in a file in the basement of the Chicago Police Department and was discovered after his convictions. Montanez claims that although he became aware of the file during his first postconviction proceedings (which included 46 constitutional claims) he was unable to obtain the file during those proceedings to establish that it contained material that would have been helpful to his defense.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the denial. In addition to failing to raise a Brady violation claim based on the entirety of the CPD file in his proposed successive petition, Montanez’s attempt to raise this claim on appeal was barred by res judicata. Montanez’s motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition falls short of demonstrating that the procedural hurdles for filing a successive petition should be lowered in this case. View "People v. Montanez" on Justia Law

In 2010, Agee strangled his girlfriend, Davis, during a physical altercation. He went directly to the police station and voluntarily made a statement, which was recorded on video. Agee did not realize that Davis had died and expressed concerns that she would be okay. Agee pled guilty to first-degree murder and was sentenced to 25 years.Agee filed a pro se post-conviction petition, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to seek an expert to testify as to his mental health. Postconviction counsel was appointed and filed an amended petition adding a claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise Agee that he could pursue a second-degree defense murder at trial. The court dismissed the amended petition. Agee appealed, arguing that postconviction counsel erroneously failed to allege all the elements of a second-degree murder claim. The appellate court affirmed, reasoning that Rule 651(c), requiring reasonable assistance of postconviction counsel, does not require “any level of representation in the presentation of new claims.”The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The appellate court erred in finding that Rule 651(c) does not require any level of representation in the presentation of added claims in an amended pro se postconviction petition but Agee failed to demonstrate that postconviction counsel failed to make amendments to the pro se petition as necessary for an adequate presentation of his claims. He cannot show deficient performance. The record rebuts Agee’s claims about a second-degree murder defense. View "People v. Agee" on Justia Law

Roland, filed a pro se postconviction petition alleging he received ineffective assistance of counsel during his bench trial for a 2002 attempted murder when his attorney failed to present evidence of his mental health history. After a pre-trial evaluation, Roland had been found fit to stand trial. The expert determined he was legally sane at the time of the offense but that he may have been experiencing symptoms of a depressive mood disorder that was likely exacerbated by alcohol and illegal substances. At trial, Roland testified to having attempted suicide in jail and that he fired a gun while being chased by police because he had wanted police to shoot and kill him.After the petition was advanced to the second stage of proceedings, it was dismissed. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a third-stage evidentiary hearing. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the dismissal. It is not reasonably likely that further evidence of Roland’s mental health history would have changed the trial court’s determination that Roland’s conduct during the shooting did not demonstrate that he wanted to commit suicide by police; the court noted that he fled from the police, taking evasive measures to avoid being shot. Roland’s postconviction petition failed to satisfy the prejudice prong of “Strickland.” View "People v. Roland" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was bitten and injured by a police dog after Plaintiff’s partner called 911 to report that Plaintiff was suicidal, had hurt herself, and had left her house on foot. In the operative third amended complaint, Plaintiff asserted various claims against Sutton and Montes in their individual capacities as well as claims against the City of Conroe and Montgomery County. Specifically, as relevant to this appeal, she asserted (1) a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 excessive force claim against Sutton; (2) a Section 1983 failure-to-intervene/bystander liability claim against Montes; (3) a Section 1983 municipal/Monell liability claim against the City of Conroe; and (4) various failure-to-accommodate claims under Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act against both the City of Conroe and Montgomery County. Montgomery County and Montes jointly moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, raising, inter alia, a qualified immunity defense as to Montes.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff failed to allege specific and nonconclusory facts that would show that the City was deliberately indifferent in adopting its training policy. Accordingly, the court found that the district court did not err in dismissing Sligh’s failure-to-train claim against the City of Conroe. Further, the court explained that Plaintiff can “prevail only by showing that ‘the disability, resulting limitation, and necessary reasonable accommodation’ were ‘open, obvious, and apparent’ to the entity’s relevant agents.” But she does not attempt to make this showing. Nor could she. View "Sligh v. City of Conroe" on Justia Law

After the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions of Kendrick Eugene Duldulao and Medardo Queg Santos for the roles they played in a Florida “pill mill,” the Supreme Court vacated the court’s judgment and remanded for further consideration in light of Ruan v. United States.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Duldulao’s conviction on count one of the second superseding indictment; affirmed Santos’s conviction on count one, vacated Santos’s convictions on counts seven, eight, and nine, vacated Santos’s sentence, remanded for resentencing, and remanded for a new trial on counts seven, eight, and nine. The court explained that in the context of sentencing errors, the Supreme Court has explained that “the risk of unnecessary deprivation of liberty particularly undermines the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings” when the court is responsible for the error. The court explained it has repeatedly upheld jury instructions that misstated the mens rea requirement under Section 841. A jury then convicted Santos based in part on that misstatement. Santos received a prison sentence on these counts, and “the possibility of additional jail time . . . warrants serious consideration in a determination whether to exercise discretion under Rule 52(b).” Further, the court explained that the jury was reasonably able to find that the government had not shown beyond a reasonable doubt that Duldulao violated Section 841 on that occasion but had nevertheless knowingly joined a conspiracy to unlawfully distribute controlled substances in the abstract and on other occasions. View "USA v. Kendrick Eugene Duldulao, et al." on Justia Law

Appellant Robert Velasco, who was serving a sentence for attempted home invasion robbery, assault with a firearm, and possession of a firearm by a felon, was identified as eligible for resentencing pursuant to California Senate Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess., codified at Penal Code section 1172.75). At a September 2022 resentencing hearing, Velasco’s attorney made an oral motion to strike Velasco’s one year prison prior enhancement, which had been imposed pursuant to section 667.5(b) and did not involve a sexually violent offense. Velasco was not present at the hearing and, although the minute order reflected his presence was waived, the record did not contain a written waiver. The trial court granted the request, struck the enhancement, and resentenced Velasco to a total term of 26 years and four months. Neither counsel nor the court addressed whether other new sentencing laws might impact Velasco’s sentence or whether postconviction factors should influence the new sentence. Velasco argued on appeal the trial court abused its discretion by not conducting a full resentencing hearing as was required by section 1172.75. He further contended the trial court violated his federal and state constitutional rights by holding a resentencing hearing in his absence without a valid waiver. The State argued the trial court lacked jurisdiction to conduct this resentencing hearing at all because Velasco’s case was already on appeal before the Court of Appeal in case No. D080603. However, should the appeals court determine that the trial court had jurisdiction, the State conceded remand was warranted because Velasco did not waive his presence at the resentencing hearing. The Court concluded the trial court had jurisdiction to resentence Velasco pursuant to section 1172.75 but reversed and remanded for a new hearing on the grounds that Velasco was not present at the sentencing hearing and did not validly waive his presence. View "California v. Velasco" on Justia Law

The trial court appointed the same attorney (counsel) to represent defendant Mark Foley and Raymond Gladden, who had been a codefendant in the underlying criminal trial, at a consolidated evidentiary hearing after both had filed separate petitions for resentencing. Both men were not the actual killer, but both had been convicted of murder on a felony-murder theory. At the hearing, to save the murder convictions, the prosecution was required to prove that defendant’s and Gladden’s individual participation in the underlying felony of kidnapping made them major participants in the kidnapping and that they acted with reckless indifference to human life. The prosecution argued those elements were satisfied for defendant and Gladden. Counsel then argued factors she considered favorable to defendant and also argued factors favorable to Gladden. But the same factors did not favor both, and counsel stated Gladden “certainly [had] the stronger petition.” The court granted Gladden’s petition only. The Court of Appeal reversed the denial of defendant’s petition because the court violated defendant’s constitutional right to conflict-free representation. The case was remanded for a new evidentiary hearing. View "California v. Foley" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty in 2011 to possessing a firearm in furtherance of a “crime of violence” in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c), with the underlying crime of violence being VICAR assault with a dangerous weapon. Since his conviction, the Supreme Court has narrowed the kinds of crimes that can support a Section 924(c) conviction. At issue is whether VICAR assault with a dangerous weapon is still one of them.   The Fourth Circuit upheld Defendant’s conviction and found that VICAR assault with a dangerous weapon remains a valid crime-of-violence predicate. The court explained that the VICAR statute makes it a crime to commit any of the statute’s enumerated offenses “in violation of the laws of any State or the United States.” The court explained that it has interpreted this language to mean that one element of a VICAR conviction is that the defendant committed the enumerated federal offense, and another is that the defendant’s conduct violated an independent state or federal law. The court wrote that the federal assault with a dangerous weapon easily qualifies as a crime of violence. That this element of VICAR assault with a dangerous weapon qualifies as a crime of violence is sufficient in and of itself to render the offense a crime of violence; we need not progress to the state-law predicates. The court explained that to require courts to “look through” the VICAR offense to the underlying state crimes in every instance would unnecessarily send them on a scramble through innumerable state laws across the circuit. View "US v. Dearnta Thomas" on Justia Law

The trial court here dismissed a violent felony charge filed against defendant-respondent Brian Turner for the third time, finding that the two prior dismissals did not result from any excusable neglect. The Riverside County District Attorney appealed. If a charge for a violent felony has been dismissed twice, Penal Code section 1387.1 authorized prosecutors to refile the charge for a third time so long as one of the dismissals was “due solely to excusable neglect . . . on the part of the court, prosecution, law enforcement agency, or witnesses,” and the prosecution did not act in bad faith. Because the first dismissal was due to the trial court’s excusable neglect, the Court of Appeal reversed. View "California v. Turner" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted following a jury trial in 2004 of first-degree murder and robbery arising from a shooting death and attempted murder and a second count of robbery based on two separate incidents on June 30, 2022. In January 2020, the superior court granted Defendant’s petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6 expressly finding Defendant had been a major participant in the robbery but not the actual shooter and impliedly finding he did not act with reckless indifference to human life during the robbery. The court vacated the murder conviction, resentenced Defendant on the remaining three convictions and ordered him released from custody based on time served. Defendant petitioned pursuant to section 851.8 for a finding of actual innocence, arguing as evidence of his innocence that the victim’s companion, the only eyewitness to the robbery-murder, had not identified Defendant as a participant in the crime and that the prosecutor had withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83. The superior court denied the petition. On appeal, Defendant argued the order vacating his murder conviction under section 1172.6 necessarily entitled him to a finding of factual innocence.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court held that Defendant’s successful section 1172.6 petition did not entitle him to a finding of factual innocence. The court explained that an order granting Defendant’s petition for resentencing does not mean, without more, Defendant is factually innocent of the crime of murder. The court noted that the record must exonerate, not merely raise a substantial question as to guilt. View "P. v. Hollie" on Justia Law