Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm as a felon. The district court determined an advisory sentencing guideline range of 57 to 71 months’ imprisonment and varied upward from the range to impose a term of 92 months’ imprisonment. Defendant argued on appeal that the district court plainly erred in calculating an advisory guideline range because his prior conviction for kidnapping in Arizona was not a conviction for a “crime of violence.”The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant contends that Marquez-Lobos is obviously wrong and that the Arizona kidnapping plainly does not qualify as a generic kidnapping. His theory is that the Arizona statute encompasses kidnappings that do not involve an unlawful deprivation of liberty as defined by most States. But he contends that kidnapping in Arizona is broader than the generic offense because the Arizona statute assertedly applies to the restraint of any person who is incapable of giving consent—even if the person is neither a minor nor incompetent. Defendant’s argument is premised on a decision of an intermediate state appellate court, State v. Bernal, 713 P.2d 811 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985). The court explained that it is not convinced that Bernal establishes an obvious error by the district court. Further, the court wrote that Defendant has not produced evidence that most of the States would disagree with the alternative line of reasoning suggested in Bernal: he simply argues that the expanded set of victims identified in Bernal would exceed the set of victims identified in most state statutes and the Model Penal Code. View "United States v. Michael Goforth" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction for numerous drug offenses. The court held that the evidence against him was overwhelming, and he does not claim a reasonable probability that, but for the introduction of the challenged evidence, he would not have been found guilty.Defendant operated a website on which he once advertised 4- Fluoroamphetamine, a drug similar to the prescription medicine Adderall. Broussard received numerous orders for the Adderall analogue. But instead of shipping his customers the drug they ordered, he sent them fentanyl, a potent narcotic. As a result, eleven people died, and several others were seriously injured. Police investigated, and a grand jury indicted Defendant on numerous drug offenses. Broussard, representing himself, filed several motions in limine. One of his motions sought exclusion of all evidence “presented to invoke sentiment by expressing how the deaths or injuries of the alleged victims influenced personal experiences.” The jury found Defendant guilty on all counts, and the district court sentenced Broussard to life in prison. He appealed, arguing that the district court erred in allowing the Government to introduce evidence about the victims’ lives.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the challenged evidence was arguably relevant to show that the victims were unlikely to have knowingly sought fentanyl or to have obtained it from some other source. It was also relevant to show that the victims were in good health, making it less likely that they died from some cause other than a fentanyl overdose. And taking into account the evidence’s arguable relevance, its introduction was not obviously unfairly prejudicial. Further, the court wrote that the evidence against him was overwhelming, and he does not claim a reasonable probability that, but for the introduction of the challenged evidence, he would not have been found guilty. View "United States v. Aaron Broussard" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of one count of financial institution bribery in violation of Section 215(a)(2) and one count of conspiracy to commit financial institution bribery. The district court sentenced Defendant to a term of 366 days’ imprisonment, followed by two years’ supervised release, and imposed a $1.25 million fine. On appeal, Defendant raiseed four challenges. First, Defendant challenged (a) what constitutes “corrupt” conduct under Section 215(a); (b) what constitutes a “thing of value” under Section 215(a); and (c) how to determine the monetary value of a “thing of value” under Section 215(a), all elements of the crime. Second, Defendant argued that there is insufficient evidence in the record to uphold his convictions. Third, Defendant argued that the district court’s jury instructions were erroneous. Fourth, Defendant claimed that the district court failed to exclude prejudicial testimony that the prosecution allegedly procured through the improper use of a grand jury subpoena.   The Second Circuit affirmed and concluded that Defendant’s challenges are without merit. First the court explained that “corrupt” conduct describes actions motivated by an improper purpose, even if such actions (a) did not entail a breach of duty, and (b) were motivated in part by a neutral or proper purpose, as well as by an improper purpose. Second, that a “thing of value” may cover subjectively valuable intangibles, such as political assistance, including endorsements, guidance, and referrals. Third, that the “thing of value” may be measured by its value to the parties, by the value of what it is exchanged for, or by its market value. View "United States v. Calk" on Justia Law

Federal prisoner Sargeant filed a grievance against a prison official, Cruze, after she commented on his sexual preferences and refused to give him books that he had ordered. When Sargeant's case manager, Barfield, showed Sargeant the prison’s response, Sargeant noticed that it was signed by Cruze and pointed out that, under the prison’s rules, Cruze should not have seen a grievance lodged against her. Barfield then told others about the grievance. Sargeant filed a separate grievance against Barfield. In retaliation, Barfield “repeatedly” put Sargeant, who had cooperated with the government, in cells with prisoners known to be violent. This led to fights until Sargeant was transferred to another prison.Sargeant sued seeking monetary damages, alleging that Barfield retaliated against him for filing grievances. He did not identify which of his constitutional rights she had allegedly violated. In screening under 28 U.S.C. 1915A, the judge decided that Sargeant could proceed only on a First Amendment retaliation claim and did not discuss any possible Eighth Amendment claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. Under the Bivens doctrine, a federal prisoner cannot recover damages for a violation of First Amendment rights. Recognizing a failure-to-protect claim in this context would risk intrusion with the federal prison system; the claim presents separation-of-powers concerns and special factors not accounted for by any of the Supreme Court’s Bivens precedents. View "Sargeant v. Barfield" on Justia Law

In this case addressing the General Assembly districting plan adopted by the Ohio Redistricting Commission in September 2023 the Supreme Court granted motions to dismiss brought by Petitioners, who filed motions for leave to file objections instanter to the plan and denied motions to vacate and for leave to file objections, holding that dismissal was warranted.The Commission adopted a new redistricting plan in September 2023 by a unanimous vote. Petitioners moved for leave to file objections. Respondents, members of the Commission, moved to dismiss the cases and to vacate the court's orders declaring the districting plan adopted by the General Assembly in September 2021 as unconstitutional. The Supreme Court granted the motions to dismiss, denied the motions to vacate as moot, and denied the motions for leave to file objections to the September 2023 plan, holding that now that the Commission has adopted a plan with bipartisan support, the facts before the Court bore no resemblance to the allegations in Petitioners' complaints. View "League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm'n" on Justia Law

This is the second appeal arising out of Defendant’s special motion to strike the complaint filed by Plaintiffs.  In the first appeal, the Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s order denying Defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion, concluding that Defendant failed to show Plaintiffs’ claims arose out of protected activity because he filed only a “perfunctory antiSLAPP motion.” In this appeal, Defendant challenges the fee award.   The Second Appellate District reversed and remanded the matter with directions for the court to enter a new order denying plaintiffs’ attorney fees motions. The court wrote that Plaintiffs don’t contend that it would have been impractical for them to provide Defendant safe harbor notice before filing their attorney fees motions. Indeed, Plaintiffs’ motions were not complex and include less than a single page of analysis explaining why Defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion was frivolous. Nor do Plaintiffs contend that Defendant could not have withdrawn or corrected his anti-SLAPP motion had they provided him timely notice of their attorney fees motions under section 128.5, subdivision (f). The court explained that the trial court should have denied Plaintiffs’ attorney fees motions because they failed to provide Defendant a 21-day safe harbor notice before filing their attorney fees motions. View "Zarate v. McDaniel" on Justia Law

After the district court denied Petitioner’s initial 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 petition, he obtained new counsel and filed a motion to reopen that judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). He argued that exceptional circumstances warranted this relief because his original Section 2254 counsel had, in effect, abandoned him by submitting a Section 2254 petition that omitted several potentially meritorious issues and inadequately presented the issues that had been raised. He asked the court to reopen the judgment and allow him to file additional briefings and new claims. The district court concluded that Petitioner’s motion was not a true Rule 60(b) motion. Rather, Petitioner was attempting to use Rule 60(b) to circumvent the statutory limits placed on second or successive Section 2254 petitions. Recognizing that it would lack jurisdiction to consider a second Section 2254 petition, the district court denied Petitioner’s motion without considering its merits. Petitioner appealed.   The Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court’s conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion because he effectively sought to file a second or successive Section 2254 petition, something that a district court cannot authorize. The court also wrote that because it also concludes that the district court should have dismissed Petitioner’s motion rather than deny it, it vacated the district court’s order and remanded with instructions to dismiss. View "Steven Bixby v. Bryan Stirling" on Justia Law

In July 2020, a correctional sergeant was processing mail in the prison mailroom and searched two large manila envelopes addressed to inmate Arlonzo Banks. The sergeant intercepted the envelopes in the prison mailroom, and inmate Banks was issued a rules violation report charging him with conspiracy to introduce a controlled substance into prison for distribution or sale. During the investigation, inmate Banks tried to ask the sergeant who issued the rules violation report, "'What, if any, evidence demonstrates I agreed with another individual to introduce a controlled substance into the facility?'" The hearing officer deemed the question irrelevant, but the Court of Appeals found Banks’s question was "spot on:" the record contained no evidence of the first element of conspiracy, namely, the existence of an agreement between at least two persons. The Court therefore affirmed the trial court’s grant of inmate Banks’s petition for writ of habeas corpus that vacated a guilty finding of conspiracy. View "In re Banks" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court denying Petitioner's petition for relief and resentencing under the new procedure set forth in Senate Bill No. 1437 (former Cal. Penal Code 1170.95, subd. (a); now Cal. Penal Code 1172.6, subd. (a)), holding that the trial court erred.Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Twelve years later, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill 1437 narrowing or eliminating certain forms of accomplice liability for murder. Petitioner petitioned for relief and resentencing under the new procedure, but the trial court denied the petition for failure to state a prima facie case. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court erred in rejecting Petitioner's prima facie showing and should have proceeded to an evidence hearing on Petitioner's resentencing petition. View "People v. Curiel" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who was formerly incarcerated at Downstate Correctional Facility, brought claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against the officers for violating his First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion. Plaintiff named as defendants additional corrections officers. He alleged that the officers violated his First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion by preventing him from observing the Jewish holiday of Shavuot on two consecutive evenings. The district court granted summary judgment to the officers because (1) some named officers were not personally involved in the alleged violation on the first night of Shavuot, and (2) Plaintiff’s observance of the second night of the holiday was only shortened, not denied entirely, which did not rise to the level of a “substantial burden” on his religious beliefs.   The Second Circuit vacated in part and affirmed in part the judgment of the district court. The court wrote that the district court erred in holding that Plaintiff could not prevail on his claim because he did not make the threshold showing of a “substantial burden” on his religious beliefs. Such a showing is not required. Rather, because Plaintiff has shown a burden on his sincere religious beliefs, he has established a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. The court vacated the judgment insofar as the district court granted summary judgment because of a purported “substantial burden” requirement, and affirmed the judgment insofar as the district court granted summary judgment to those officers for whom there was no evidence of personal involvement. View "Kravitz v. Purcell" on Justia Law