Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Minnesota Tax Court affirming the assessment of the Commissioner of Revenue assessing tax on an apportioned share of Cities Management, Inc.'s (CMI) income from the sale of the S corporation, holding that the income from the corporation's sale was apportionable business income.CMI, which did business in Minnesota and Wisconsin, and its nonresidential partial owner filed Minnesota tax returns characterizing the sale of CMI's goodwill as income that was not subject to apportionment by the State under Minn. Stat. Ann. 290.17. The Commissioner disagreed and assessed tax on an apportioned share of the corporation's income from the sale. The tax court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that CMI's income did not constitute "nonbusiness" income under section 290.17, subd. 6 and may be constitutionally apportioned as business income. View "Cities Management, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue" on Justia Law

Eli Richter appealed an order deferring imposition of a sentence imposed after a jury found him guilty of the unlawful use of an operator's license. The State charged Richter with the unlawful use of the license, alleging he showed a counterfeit Minnesota driver's license to a police officer in Grand Forks, North Dakota. At trial, the officer testified the "license was nonexistent or it was never issued through any state." At the close of the State's case, Richter moved to acquittal, arguing "the definition [of operator's license] stats an operator's license is issued or granted by the laws of this state. The ID that was taken from Mr. Richter is not issued under the laws of this state. It does not meet the definition, Your Honor." The district court denied the motion and the jury ultimately found Richter guilty. The North Dakota Supreme Court concurred: N.D.C.C. § 39-06-40 made it a crime to display a fictitious license. View "North Dakota v. Richter" on Justia Law

Danial Curtis was convicted of the unauthorized use of personal identifying information. At trial, a bank teller testified Curtis entered the bank where she worked producing a check for cashing. The teller noticed several "red flags" on the check; her manager testified to noticing the same red flags. The manager contacted the account holder to inquire if the check was authorized; the account holder testified she had thrown out any checks she had remaining once she closed the account. Representing himself, Curtis called a friend who testified Curtis was not attempting to cash the check, but was only attempting to see if the check was valid. Based on the evidence presented, the district court found beyond a reasonable doubt Curtis willfully presented the check to cash, and found Curtis guilty of the unauthorized use of personal identifying information "to obtain money without the authorization of consent of the holder of the account, and the value of the money exceeded $1,000." On appeal, Curtis argued there was insufficient information presented to support his conviction. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed Curtis' conviction. View "North Dakota v. Curtis" on Justia Law

David Geiger was convicted by jury of stalking. The victim testified she was an employee at a bank where Geiger was a customer. The victim, in conjunction with other bank employees, decided to close out Geiger’s account after what the victim described as abusive conduct by Geiger towards bank employees. Geiger was informed of the closure and instructed to collect the remaining funds in his account through the drive-up window. The victim and other employees then observed Geiger sitting in his car across the street. Due to concerns surrounding this behavior, bank staff contacted law enforcement to escort staff from the building to their vehicles at closing. Later that same night, the victim received a phone call to her personal phone, verified by law enforcement as having been placed from a phone belonging to Geiger. Upon answering the call, the victim’s husband said “hello” several times, but there was no response. These incidents served as grounds for the stalking charge. On appeal, Geiger argued the district court failed to make a mandatory determination regarding whether the conduct he was alleged to have engaged in was constitutionally protected. He further argued the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict of guilty. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "North Dakota v. Geiger" on Justia Law

Ashton Steele appealed after conditionally pleading guilty to delivery of a controlled substance and possession with intent to manufacture or deliver a controlled substance. The plea reserved the right to appeal the denial of a motion to suppress evidence. After review of the trial court record, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded Steele had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the rented bedroom and a reasonable officer would not have believed the homeowner could consent to a search of the bedroom. Accordingly, the judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "North Dakota v. Steele" on Justia Law

Lawrence Didier appealed an order and judgment denying his discharge from civil commitment. Between 1988 and 2008, Didier was convicted of gross sexual imposition and indecent exposure, and was twice convicted of sexual assault. After a State petition, the district court ordered Didier committed as a sexually dangerous individual in November 2010 under N.D.C.C. ch. 25-03.3. Didier petitioned for an annual review hearing under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-18 seeking discharge from commitment. Dr. Deirdre D’Orazio, Ph.D., a doctor of clinical and forensic psychology, submitted a report for the North Dakota State Hospital stating her expert opinion was that Didier remained a sexually dangerous individual. The district court held a hearing and subsequently issued an order and judgment denying Didier’s petition for discharge from civil commitment. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the trial court's finding by clear and convincing evidence that Didier had serious difficulty controlling his behavior based on both his past and present conduct was not clearly erroneous, and was supported by the record. Accordingly, the distric court's order and judgment were affirmed. View "Matter of Didier" on Justia Law

Charles Brame pleaded guilty to two counts of sexual assault. On appeal, Brame sought to withdraw his guilty pleas because the district court failed to explicitly ask him whether he was entering his plea voluntarily or whether his plea resulted from force, threats, or promises. "A Rule 11 error does not automatically lead to reversal." The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that a defendant who failed to first raise the alleged error at the district court must show a Rule 11 violation’s impact on substantial rights before the Court will undo a guilty plea. Because Brame did not show the alleged violation had an impact on his substantial rights, the Court affirmed the judgment. View "North Dakota v. Brame" on Justia Law

Carolyn Nelson appealed her conviction from a bench trial for the crime of accomplice to theft. Nelson was the president of the Oberon School Board. Laura Schnieber-Bruns and her business, Victim Survivor the Voice, LLC, were engaged to perform services for the school. The exact nature of the services was disputed, but an agreement signed by Nelson and Schnieber-Bruns described the work as “investigate, research, compile and deliver ongoing actions request of the Oberon School Board.” The agreement specified a “set-up fee” of $7,500, an “on-going management” fee of $7,500, and a $200 hourly rate for “services outside the scope of this Agreement.” Schnieber-Bruns was later charged with class A felony theft for taking more than $150,000 from the Oberon School “through a deceptive scheme pursuant to” the agreement. She pleaded guilty by an Alford plea. Nelson challenged her conviction as an accomplice. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. The Court declined to address issues Nelson did not raise at the district court or brief on appeal under the obvious error standard of review. View "North Dakota v. Nelson" on Justia Law

In 1882-1883, the Railway acquired property and constructed the now-abandoned railroad line. In 2008, the Railway filed a notice of exemption from formal abandonment proceedings with the Surface Transportation Board (STB). The Illinois Department of Natural Resources showed interest in railbanking and interim trail use under the 1983 National Trails System Act Amendments, 16 U.S.C. 1247(d). The STB issued a Notice of Interim Trail Use (NITU). The owners of property adjoining the railroad line sued, alleging takings by operation of the Trails Act with respect to 51 parcels; 22 parcels were conveyed by instruments including the words “right of way” (ROW Agreements); three were conveyed by instruments including the words “for railroad purposes” (Purpose Agreements); and three are those for which no instruments were produced.The Claims Court granted the government summary judgment, finding that the Railway held the ROW Agreement and Purpose Agreement parcels in fee simple and that the owners failed to show that they had cognizable property interests in the non-instrument parcels. The Federal Circuit reversed. The court rejected the government’s argument that using the term “right of way” in the ROW Agreements referred to the land conveyed, not a limitation on the interest conveyed. For the Purpose Agreements, the Claims Court mistakenly relied on cases discussing deeds that did not include an expression of purpose in the granting clause. Illinois law indicates that the Railway obtained, at most, an easement over the non-instrument parcels. View "Barlow v. United States" on Justia Law

In April 2017 and June 2017, Appellant Diane Zilka filed petitions with the Philadelphia Department of Revenue (the “Department”), seeking refunds for the Philadelphia Tax she paid from 2013 to 2015, and in 2016, respectively. During the relevant tax years, Appellant resided in the City, but worked exclusively in Wilmington, Delaware. Thus, she was subject to four income taxes (and tax rates) during that time: the Philadelphia Tax; the Pennsylvania Income Tax (“PIT”); the Wilmington Earned Income Tax (“Wilmington Tax”); and the Delaware Income Tax (“DIT”). The Commonwealth granted Appellant credit for her DIT liability to completely offset the PIT she paid for the tax years 2013 through 2016; because of the respective tax rates in Pennsylvania versus Delaware, after this offsetting, Appellant paid the remaining 1.93% in DIT. Although the City similarly credited against Appellant’s Philadelphia Tax liability the amount she paid in the Wilmington Tax — specifically, the City credited Appellant 1.25% against her Philadelphia Tax liability of 3.922%, leaving her with a remainder of 2.672% owed to the City — Appellant claimed that the City was required to afford her an additional credit of 1.93% against the Philadelphia Tax, representing the remainder of the DIT she owed after the Commonwealth credited Appellant for her PIT. After the City refused to permit her this credit against her Philadelphia Tax liability, Appellant appealed to the City’s Tax Review Board (the “Board”). The issue this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review as whether, for purposes of the dormant Commerce Clause analysis implicated here, state and local taxes had to be considered in the aggregate. The Court concluded state and local taxes did not need be aggregated in conducting a dormant Commerce Clause analysis, and that, ultimately, the City’s tax scheme did not discriminate against interstate commerce. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court order. View "Zilka v. Tax Review Bd. City of Phila." on Justia Law