Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The Chelsea King Child Predator Prevention Act of 2010 penalizes human trafficking of a minor. It targets a person who preys upon, and forces, a minor to engage in commercial sex acts for the person’s financial benefit. The penalty for this crime is fifteen years to life imprisonment. That was the sentence imposed here. Defendant appealed the judgment after a jury convicted him of human trafficking of a minor (“Doe”) for a commercial sex act and found true the allegation that the offense involved force, fear, fraud, deceit, coercion, violence, duress, menace, or threat of unlawful injury. Appellant contends: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless search of his vehicle, (2) he has standing to challenge the search of Doe’s cell phone, (3) the evidence is insufficient that he used force or fear to induce Doe to engage in commercial sex, (4) the prosecutor committed misconduct during argument, (5) the trial court erred in failing to instruct on the lesser included offense of attempted pandering, and (6) the cumulative impact of the “errors” requires reversal.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. First, the court found that sufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding that Defendant used force, fear, fraud, deceit, coercion, violence, duress, menace, or threat of unlawful injury as set forth in section 236.1, subdivision (c)(2). Further, the court explained here there is no substantial evidence that Defendant was guilty of the lesser offense of attempted pandering but not the greater offense of trafficking of a minor. View "P. v. Banks" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed suit against multiple private entities and government officials, including, as relevant to the instant appeal, the Social Security Commissioner, a Social Security claims representative, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of Education (the “Federal Defendants”), asserting a number of claims relating to the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) allegedly improper withholding of his disability benefits.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over Mr. Chambers’ claims against the Social Security Administration representatives concerning his Social Security benefits and that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim as to its remaining claims against the Federal Defendants. The court explained that while the lack of jurisdiction is a sufficient basis on which to affirm the district court, Plaintiff’s broad challenges to “any of [the court’s] holdings dismissing the federal government defendants” warrant but a brief note. The court found no error in the district court’s dismissal of the Treasury Secretary, given its purely ministerial role in administering the offset for Plaintiff’s outstanding loan, or its dismissal of the Secretary of Education, given Plaintiff’s similar failure to exhaust administrative remedies with that department and failure to advance a colorable constitutional violation. View "Chambers v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the appellate division reversing the decision of Supreme Court granting Plaintiffs summary judgment and enjoining enforcement of New York City Administrative Code 10-181, which makes criminal the use of certain restraints by police officers during an arrest, holding that Administrative Code 10-181 does not violate the New York Constitution on either preemption or due process grounds.After Administrative Code 10-181 became law Plaintiffs - law enforcement unions - commenced this action seeking a declaration that the local law was unconstitutional because it was field and conflict preempted by a combination of state laws and that it was void for vagueness and seeking to enjoin the law's enforcement. Supreme Court granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs and enjoined enforcement of section 10-181. The appellate division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) section 10-181 was a valid exercise of the City's municipal law-making authority because the legislature has not preempted the field; and (2) Plaintiffs were not entitled to relief on their vagueness challenge. View "Police Benevolent Ass'n of City of New York, Inc. v. City of New York" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the appellate division affirming Defendant's convictions for second degree robbery and petit larceny, holding that admission of a criminalist's testimony and underlying exhibits was error, and the error was not harmless, thus entitling Defendant to a new trial.On appeal, the appellate division ruled that Defendant's constitutional right to confrontation was not violated when the criminalist performed his own analysis about the creation of DNA profiles. The Court of Appeals disagreed and reversed, holding that because the record failed to establish that the testifying analyst had the requisite involvement with the DNA profiles the admission of the criminalist's testimony and underlying exhibits was erroneous, and the People did not establish that there was no reasonable possibility that the error might have contributed to Defendant's conviction. View "People v. Jordan" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed Defendant's convictions of two counts of murder in the first degree and two counts of murder in the second degree, holding that the admission of two autopsy reports through an expert witness who did not perform the autopsies, combined with that witness's testimony, violated Defendant's constitutional right to confrontation, but the error was harmless.Defendant was convicted of murdering the two young children in her care by repeatedly stabbing them. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding (1) People v. Freycinet, 11 NY3d 38 (NY 2008), should no longer be followed because it is inconsistent with the demands of the Confrontation Clause as recently articulated by the Supreme Court; and (2) Defendant's constitutional right to confrontation was violated by the admission of the autopsy reports and the testimony of the witness at issue, but the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "People v. Ortega" on Justia Law

Defendant le 120c(b) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), codified at 10 U.S.C. Section 920c(b) (2012). He later failed to register as a sex offender in Iowa and pleaded guilty to violating the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). On appeal, Defendant argued the “categorical approach” applies to his SORNA tier analysis.   The Eighth Circuit reversed. The court explained that it held pursuant to the categorical approach, that his prior statute of conviction is “overbroad” in relation to SORNA’s Tier III listed comparator offenses. The court held for the first time, in line with a consensus of authority from other circuits, that the categorical approach applies to SORNA’s tier analysis. Further, the court agreed with Defendant that the application of the categorical approach resulted in his classification as a Tier I offender. The court explained that turning to the application of the categorical approach, the present case leaves no room for the United States’ suggested and generalized broadening of the analysis based on SORNA’s use of the term “comparable.”   Here, the offense of conviction is unambiguously broader in scope than the SORNA comparators. The offense of “forcible pandering” employs the defined term “prostitution,” which may be found based on “sexual contact.” “Sexual contact” includes over-the-clothes touching. Such contact falls outside the scope of SORNA’s Tier III comparator offenses as found in 18 U.S.C. Sections 2241 and 2242, both of which require a “sexual act” as defined in 18 U.S.C. Section 2246 and which does not include over-the-clothes touching. View "United States v. Michael Coulson" on Justia Law

Defendant conditionally pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sections 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A). The district court sentenced Defendant to a 132-month term of imprisonment and 5 years of supervised release. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress. Defendant argued that because he was arrested without probable cause when officers placed him in handcuffs during an investigative stop, the evidence seized from his backpack must be suppressed as the fruit of his unlawful arrest.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that here the officers had a legitimate concern that Defendant might try to run from the scene. When Detective Love asked for permission to search his suitcase, Defendant was calm and cooperative, giving the impression that it was “not a big deal.” However, as an additional officer started asking him questions, he showed physical signs of nervousness. Defendant already knew that the K-9 had alerted to his suitcase. Then, as Love was searching the suitcase, Defendant asked to go brush his teeth, which would have allowed him to leave the scene with his backpack, out of the officers’ sight. Given the change in Defendant’s demeanor over a short period of time, the perceived attempt to discard contraband outside the presence of the officers, and the other factors that aligned at least in part with drug-trafficking behavior, the officers had a legitimate concern that Defendant might try to flee. View "United States v. Daniel Bonilla" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute and to unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon. The district court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence found during a police search of a vehicle after concluding Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the reportedly stolen vehicle. Defendant appealed, arguing the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed under the alternative rationale that the search was reasonable under the automobile exception. The court explained that a reasonable officer would believe there was a fair probability that evidence of a crime would be found in the vehicle at the time of the search. The court further wrote that because the vehicle was reported stolen, officers could search it for evidence of it being stolen. Additionally, the court noted that officers may consider the known criminal history of a suspect in conducting the probable cause analysis. Therefore, the officers had probable cause to search the vehicle and the district court was ultimately justified in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress. The court wrote that It follows that it would not exclude the evidence obtained from the storage unit because the warrant to search the unit was based on probable cause from the evidence obtained during the valid search of the car. View "United States v. Bryce Vittetoe" on Justia Law

The Arkansas NAACP and the Arkansas Public Policy Panel, two advocacy groups with members living throughout the state, oppose the new map. They sued nearly everyone who had anything to do with it under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. After reviewing the text, history, and structure of the Voting Rights Act, the district court concluded that private parties cannot enforce Section 2. The enforcement power belonged solely to the Attorney General of the United States, who was given five days to join the lawsuit. When he declined, the case was dismissed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that Congress did not give private plaintiffs the ability to sue under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The court explained that in substance, the advocacy groups asked the court to excuse the absence of text because legislative history answers the question. The court explained that at one point, this approach may have held sway. But here, the legislative history does not complete the statutory story. Rather, it tells a different story, one not reflected in the text of anything Congress passed. To the extent that legislative history can be helpful in any case, this one is not it. View "AR State Conference NAACP v. AR Board of Apportionment" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought an action alleging that he received constitutionally inadequate medical care as an inmate in the custody of the Connecticut Department of Correction. But before the district court could proceed with his case, Plaintiff, like all civil litigants in federal court, was required to pay a filing fee of $402. Plaintiff believed he could not pay the fee while also paying for the necessities of life. So, he moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 23 U.S.C. Section 1915, which would allow Plaintiff to bring his suit without having to prepay the full filing fee. The Second Circuit denied Plaintiff’s motion, finding that the prison provided Plaintiff’s necessities of life. Plaintiff moved for reconsideration, and the district court again denied his motion. On reconsideration, the district court found that Plaintiff had the resources to pay for both the necessities of life and the filing fee but had instead chosen to prioritize contributions to his family members for their necessities. Plaintiff argued that both conclusions are the result of legal error.   The Second Circuit reversed and remanded for consideration of the rest of Section 1915’s requirements. The court concluded that Plaintiff demonstrated that he lacks the resources to pay the costs of the lawsuit and for his own necessities of life and those of his dependents. The court explained that Plaintiff would not be immediately destitute if required to pay the $402 filing fee; he has nonetheless established that he cannot pay the costs associated with this suit and still provide the necessities of life for himself and his dependents. View "Rosa v. Doe" on Justia Law