Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, former pretrial detainees in Prince George’s County, Maryland, appealed from the district court’s denial of their motion for a preliminary injunction. The detainees sought an injunction that would require the County to release them, and others similarly situated, on the ground that the County’s pretrial-release program violates the Due Process Clause. The district court denied the motion without stating its factual findings and legal conclusions.   The Fourth Circuit vacated. The court explained that the detainees’ motion for a preliminary injunction presented the district court with a disputed factual record and a difficult, fact-bound constitutional question. Thus, the district court had to explain the factual findings and legal conclusions that supported its determination that the preliminary injunction should be denied. Yet it only made generalized comments about the difficulty of deciding. So it violated Rule 52(a)(2). Further, the court wrote that it will disregard a Rule 52(a)(2) error and reach the merits of the district court’s preliminary-injunction order only if there is a record sufficient “to enable us to pass upon the questions involved.” However, there isn’t one here. View "Robert Frazier v. Prince George's County, Maryland" on Justia Law

Plaintiff resisted arrest during a traffic stop, and Officer Patrick deployed a burst of pepper spray to her forehead. Further, Sheriff S. Kincaid’s officers required Plaintiff to remove her hijab for the purpose of taking booking photographs. Plaintiff claimed that Officer Patrick used excessive force in arresting her and that Sheriff Kincaid was liable for her office’s policy that disregarded Plaintiff’s religious beliefs in violation of the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s claim against Officer Patrick on the basis of qualified immunity, but it granted Plaintiff a permanent injunction, requiring Sheriff Kincaid to destroy all copies of the booking photographs of Plaintiff without her hijab. Sheriff Kincaid filed an appeal seeking to reverse the district court’s order, and Plaintiff filed an appeal from the district court’s order denying her motion for attorneys fees.   As to Sheriff Kincaid’s appeal, the court dismissed it as moot and remanded with instructions to vacate the district court’s judgment. As to Plaintiff’s appeal of the dismissal of her claim against Officer Patrick, the court affirmed. And as to Plaintiff’s appeal of the district court’s order denying her motion for attorneys fees, the court vacated and remanded. The court explained that under Section 1988(b), a prevailing party should ordinarily be awarded reasonable attorneys fees unless special circumstances would render them unjust, whereas under Rule 54(d)(1), a prevailing party is presumed to be entitled to an award of costs unless the court finds an element of injustice in doing so. By addressing Plaintiff’s motion under the incorrect legal standard, the district court erred. View "Abrar Omeish v. Stacey Kincaid" on Justia Law

Four inmates at the Buckingham Correctional Center in Dillwyn, Virginia, commenced this action pro se against agents of the IRS, alleging that the IRS unlawfully denied them all or part of their COVID-19 stimulus payments. The complaint alleged that the IRS was categorically denying payments to inmates on account of their incarcerated status. The four inmates contended that the IRS had “violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection of the law,” and they sought an injunction requiring the IRS to disburse the proper payments to them. The four inmates filed a motion to amend it by adding five additional inmates with the same claims. The three inmates whose claims were severed from the original action filed these appeals, challenging the legal and factual underpinnings of the district court’s order. They contend that the district court erred both in applying Section 1915(b)(1) as they were not proceeding in forma pauperis and in making factual findings that were not supported by the record.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the court’s order severing Plaintiffs’ claims and its order denying amendment and remanded. The court explained that Section 1915(b)(1), by its explicit terms, is restricted to in forma pauperis actions. The court wrote that because Plaintiffs here did not proceed in forma pauperis, the court should not have construed Section 1915(b)(1) and applied it to them, and it was an error to have done so. View "Aaron Ellis v. Daniel I. Werfel" on Justia Law

In New Jersey v. Olenowski ("Olenowski I"), 253 N.J. 133 (2023), the New Jersey Supreme Court adopted for criminal cases a non-exclusive, multi-factor test for the reliability of expert testimony patterned after the standard established in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The issue presented in this case involves whether Drug Recognition Expert (DRE) testimony was reliable and admissible under that standard. The Court also considered the appropriate standard of review for Daubert-based expert reliability determinations in criminal appeals. Defendant Michael Olenowski was convicted of drug-impaired driving based in part on DRE evidence. His convictions were upheld on appeal, and the Supreme Court granted certification to determine whether DRE testimony was admissible under the “general acceptance” admissibility standard established in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Finding that the record was not sufficient to make that determination, the Court asked a Special Master to conduct a hearing. The Special Master concluded that DRE evidence should be admissible under Frye. In Olenowski I, the Court adopted a “Daubert-type standard” for determining the reliability of expert evidence in criminal and quasi-criminal cases and remanded this matter to the Special Master to apply that standard. After remand, the Special Master concluded that the twelve-step DRE protocol satisfied the reliability standard of N.J.R.E. 702 when analyzed under the methodology-based Daubert standard. The Supreme Court concluded after review that Daubert-based expert reliability determinations in criminal appeals would be reviewed de novo, while other expert admissibility issues were reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Here, the Court found the extensive record substantiated that DRE testimony sufficiently satisfied the Daubert criteria to be admissible, enumerating four limitations and safeguards to be followed in such analysis. View "New Jersey v. Olenowski" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction for possession of child pornography, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress or to dismiss the indictment and that the government set forth sufficient evidence to support Defendant's conviction.On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the fruits of a warrantless search of his residence and in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment due to inadequate notice of the warrantless search. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) assuming that the search of Defendant's home was in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the facts gathered legally provided an independent and adequate source for the warrant application; (2) the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment or suppress the fruits of the warrant due to insufficient notice; and (3) there was sufficient evidence to sustain Defendant's conviction under 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(B). View "United States v. Royle" on Justia Law

In late 2018 a grand jury in Mobile, Alabama, charged Defendant with possessing a stolen firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(j). The district court allowed him to be released on bond pending trial. Defendant then faked his own kidnapping. After trial, but before sentencing, the government filed a notice informing Defendant that it was going to seek a ten-year consecutive sentence pursuant to Section 3147. The district court ruled that there was no Apprendi problem because the jury found Defendant guilty of receiving a firearm while under indictment in violation of Section 922(n), and sentenced him to a prison term of 300 months. Defendant appealed.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed and held that a sentence imposed pursuant to Section 3147 can exceed the maximum term prescribed for the underlying offense(s) of conviction. But in such a circumstance, the issue of whether the person committed a felony offense while on pretrial release must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt pursuant to Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000), and its progeny. The court explained that the Apprendi error here was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant did not dispute at any point that he was on pretrial release at the time of the Section 922(n) offense, and his counsel recognized that this fact was undisputed at oral argument. The court explained that no reasonable jury could have convicted Defendant of the Section 922(n) offense without also finding that he committed this crime while on pretrial release. View "USA v. Marco Antonio Perez" on Justia Law

The appellants in this case filed an action to permanently enjoin enforcement of five Acts of the Oklahoma Legislature. Each Act concerned the termination of a pregnancy. The appellants' challenges were based upon Oklahoma law and not federal law. They argued there was a constitutional right to terminate a pregnancy under the Oklahoma Constitution. The trial court denied a temporary injunction on three of the Acts, which was the basis of this appeal. The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted a temporary injunction pending appeal, vacated the trial court's order denying temporary injunction, directed it to grant a temporary injunction and remanded the matter for further proceedings on the merits. View "Oklahoma Call for Reproductive Justice v. Drummond" on Justia Law

Defendant Terrence Taylor plead guilty to two counts of being a felon in possession of ammunition and one count of felon in possession of firearms. On appeal, he argued these charges were multiplicitous in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument because he waived his multiplicity claim when he entered his plea to the three separate offenses. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Defendant Charles Paul was convicted by jury of attempted murder and of being a felon in possession of a deadly weapon. Defendant argued the trial court erred by: (1) granting the State’s motion in limine to admit evidence of his prior convictions under New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 609; and (2) failing to disclose additional portions of the victim’s mental health records submitted for in camera review. the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not err in either respect and therefore affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Paul" on Justia Law

The LSBA is a mandatory bar association. Attorneys are required to join and pay fees to the organization as a condition of practicing law in the state. Plaintiff has been a member in good standing of the LSBA since 1996. Upset that he was forced to associate with and contribute to certain causes, Plaintiff sued the LSBA, the Louisiana Supreme Court, and its justices (collectively, “the LSBA”) in 2019. He claimed that compulsory membership in the LSBA violated his rights to free speech and association. Defendants moved to dismiss, and the district court granted the motion. Plaintiff appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment in part and reversed it in part. The court remanded to the district court for a determination of the proper remedy. The court explained that although it takes no position on the proper injunctive or declaratory relief. The court also rendered a preliminary injunction preventing the LSBA from requiring Plaintiff to join or pay dues to the LSBA pending completion of the remedies phase. The court wrote that because the LSBA engages in non-germane speech, its mandatory membership policy violates Plaintiff’s rights to free speech and free association. Additionally, Plaintiff is entitled to a limited preliminary injunction for the same reasons as the plaintiffs in McDonald. View "Boudreaux v. LA State Bar Assoc" on Justia Law