Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Bailey, an RN employed by MMBH, West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR) psychiatric facility, alleges that he intervened when M.C., a patient with a known history of self-harm, attempted to harm himself. A struggle ensued. M.C. suffered minor injuries. Subsequently, an employee of Legal Aid of West Virginia (LAWV), observed M.C.'s bruising, read the nursing notes, and viewed a security video of the struggle, then filed a referral with Adult Protective Services. MMBH’s Director of Nursing filed a patient grievance form on behalf of M.C. Bailey was suspended. Several witnesses were never interviewed and the report failed to relate M.C.’s history of self-harm. Bailey’s employment was terminated. The Board of Nursing initiated proceedings against his nursing license.The West Virginia Public Employees Grievance Board reinstated Bailey. The Board of Nursing dismissed the complaint against his license. During the investigation, MFCU allegedly made Bailey submit to a “custodial interrogation,” conducted by MFCU employees and a West Virginia Attorney General’s Office lawyer. Bailey was not advised of his Miranda rights. Medicaid Fraud Control Unit (MFCU) investigator Lyle then referred the matter to the Prosecuting Attorney’s Office, which filed criminal charges. MMBH again suspended Bailey. The charges were later dismissed.Bailey sued DHHR, MMBH, MFCU, LAWV, and several individuals under 42 U.S.C. 1983 based on unreasonable and unlawful seizure of the person, malicious prosecution, and violation of the Whistle-Blower Law.The West Virginia Supreme Court issued a writ of prohibition. Bailey cannot maintain section 1983 claims against MFCU and Lyle. Bailey’s whistle-blower claim against Lyle is unsustainable because Lyle had no authority over Bailey’s employment. Bailey’s malicious prosecution claim fails to allege sufficient facts to meet the required heightened pleading standard to overcome MFCU’s and Lyle’s qualified immunity. View "State of West Virginia v. Ballard" on Justia Law

Hagerman used a shotgun to kill his former brother-in-law, while drinking with friends at Hagerman’s home. Charged with first-degree murder, he argued self-defense. After his conviction for second-degree murder, a lesser included offense, Hagerman discovered that six individuals who reside in or near the community of Bradshaw, where the shooting occurred, had been selected for the jury panel but the circuit court had directed the circuit clerk not to call them. The trial court denied Hagerman a new trial, stating: No juror was excluded from the case on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, economic status or being a qualified individual with a disability. The six jurors were from a “tight-knit community” of approximately 259 people, would generally know each other, and would be aware of the local knowledge or gossip. The court reasoned that the jurors would have likely been removed from the jury panel based on their relationships with people involved in the case.The West Virginia Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting arguments that the circuit court violated his right to a randomly selected jury representing a fair cross-section of the community and committed plain error when it instructed the jury on the offense of voluntary manslaughter. View "State of West Virginia v. Hagerman" on Justia Law

Ward, charged with felony possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, moved to suppress evidence under the Fourth Amendment. He alleged that Raleigh County Sheriff’s Officers arrived at his mother’s residence, questioned him regarding a dispute, and asked him for identification. Ward stated he could retrieve it from “downstairs in [his] mother’s house in the [t]-shirt shop.” Both officers and Ward walked around to the door. Ward opened the door. The officers grabbed the door and followed him in. Ward then walked through another door that led into a separate room used for his t-shirt printing shop. While Ward retrieved his identification, an officer observed a firearm. Ward testified that a person standing at the entryway to the basement door would not have been able to see the firearm because it would have been obscured by two doors and a curtain. The basement was not his residence and there was a lock on the front door. Detective Queen stated that he watched Ward retrieve his identification “[f]or officer safety” although he did not have a specific reason to fear for his safety.The West Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the denial of his motion to suppress. Officers conducted the search and seized the firearm without a warrant; the plain view and officer safety exceptions do not apply. View "State of West Virginia v. Ward" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jane Doe AW, a former criminal clerk in the Burleson County Attorney’s Office, alleged that Burleson County Judge Mike Sutherland used his power and authority as a county judge to sexually assault her on several occasions. Doe claimed that Sutherland sexually assaulted her once in his restaurant, Funky Junky, LLC (“Funky Junky”), and twice in his office. According to Doe, when she complained to Sutherland about the abuse, she was terminated from her job. The district court entered final judgment, ordering that Doe take nothing against Burleson County. Doe timely appealed the judgment. Doe raised three issues on appeal: (1) whether Sutherland, as the Burleson County Judge, was a policymaker with final decision-making authority for Burleson County with respect to Doe’s claim; (2) whether the Magistrate Judge abused her discretion when she reversed and vacated a prior order on a dispositive motion; and (3) whether the Magistrate Judge erred in indicating that she would deny a party’s challenge for cause unless the parties agreed on the challenge.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that despite his position as County Judge, Sutherland lacked the requisite policymaking authority to hold Burleson County liable for his alleged sexual misconduct. Monell requires that “the municipal official . . . possess final policymaking authority for the action in question.” The court wrote that even if the Texas constitutional provision gave Sutherland, as County Judge, broad ability to oversee operations in the county, this authority is immaterial because Doe fails to establish that Sutherland possessed the requisite authority as it relates specifically to the alleged sexual abuse. View "Doe AW v. Burleson County, TX" on Justia Law

Defendant Edwin Rodriquez appealed the denial of his motion to be resentenced. Defendant was charged with aggravated domestic assault and related criminal counts for physically assaulting his then-romantic partner. After defendant pled not guilty, the trial court ordered defendant to be held without bail. While awaiting trial, defendant remained incarcerated throughout the COVID-19 pandemic and unsuccessfully sought to be released on bail based on health concerns arising from conditions of his confinement. At a change-of-plea hearing in December 2021, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated domestic assault in the first degree and one count of domestic assault. As part of that plea agreement, the State agreed to a cap of twelve years of incarceration. in advance of his sentencing hearing, defendant submitted a sentencing memorandum in which he sought a 4- to 8-year sentence. Defendant referenced several mitigating factors in support of his sentence. The trial court evaluated the pertinent factors and arrived at what it considered an appropriate sentence: 9- to 12-years. On appeal, defendant argued the trial court failed to adequately consider the mitigating factors presented and improperly relied on prior uncharged conduct. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the sentence. View "Vermont v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the determination of the Utah State Tax Commission that the Property Tax Division correctly followed the requirements of the Aircraft Valuation Law, Utah Code 59-2-201 subsection 4, in determining the 2017 value of Delta Air Lines' aircraft, holding that Salt Lake County failed to demonstrate that the Law, as applied to Delta's 2017 assessment, violated the fair market value provision of the Utah Constitution.For tax year 2017, the Division valued Delta's aircraft according to section 59-2-201's preferred methodology. The County appealed, arguing that the valuation did not reflect the fair market value of Delta's aircraft, in violation of the Utah Constitution. The Commission upheld the assessment, concluding that the County did not establish that the Legislature's preferred method of valuation did not reasonably reflect fair market value. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Aircraft Valuation Law was not unconstitutional as applied by the Commission to assess the value of Delta's aircraft for tax year 2017. View "Salt Lake County v. Utah State Tax Commission" on Justia Law

In a prior case before the Washington Supreme Court, the Court rejected Petitioner Amanda Knight’s claim her separate convictions for felony murder (based on first-degree robbery) and first degree robbery violated the constitutional protection against double jeopardy. Double jeopardy did not apply because Knight’s felony murder and robbery convictions were premised on different conduct: the felony murder charge was based on the robbery of a safe whereas the first degree robbery was based on the robbery of a ring. Knight moved for reconsideration and that petition was denied. Here, Knight argued that given the Court’s previous holding, her conviction for felony murder had to be reversed because the jury was presented with insufficient evidence to justify a conviction for robbery of the safe. The Supreme Court concluded the basis for the felony murder conviction could not be sustained, granted Knight’s petition for relief, vacated the felony murder conviction and remanded for resentencing. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Knight" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Ark. Code Ann. 12-9-301, which provides immunity from both suit and liability for certain officials "except to the extent that they have be covered by liability insurance," does not apply to a federal cause of action brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 but does apply to a state claim brought under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act.Plaintiff filed a complaint against the Benton School District, a principal in the strict (Lori Bacon), and an assistant superintendent (Lisa Gattis). The district court concluded that all Defendants were liable under section 1983 and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act for violating Plaintiff's rights to free speech and to petition the government under the First Amendment. The court granted Bacon and Gattis's motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds but determined that their motion was limited to the extent they were covered by liability insurance. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) section 21-9-301 does not impact a claim brought under section 1983; and (2) the circuit court correctly ruled that section 21-9-301 immunity applies to claims arising under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act. View "Benton School District v. Greer" on Justia Law

Rodney Harrell appealed his conviction for trafficking in methamphetamine, trafficking in marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Harrell argued his convictions should have been vacated because: (1) the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress; and (2) the district court erred in denying his objection to the reduction of peremptory challenges imposed by the Idaho Supreme Court’s emergency order adopted in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed Harrell’s judgment of conviction. View "Idaho v. Harrell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court granting Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop, holding that because Defendant's license plate cover violated Iowa Code 321.37 it was reasonable for Iowa State Patrol troopers to stop his SUV, the stop was not unconstitutional, the exclusionary rule did not apply, and there were no grounds to suppress evidence from the stop.Because Defendant's rear license plate was shrouded with a tinted plastic cover troopers found it difficult to read the plate. The troopers stopped Defendant to warn him that the cover violated Iowa law and during the stop uncovered evidence leading to Defendant's charges for operating while intoxicated and child endangerment. The district court granted Defendant's motion to suppress, concluding that the traffic stop was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the traffic stop was constitutional because the license plate cover violated an Iowa traffic statute; and (2) therefore, the district court erred in suppressing evidence from the stop. View "State v. Griffin" on Justia Law