Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant-appellant Larry Martin appealed the sentence he received after pleading guilty to one count of Stalking and two counts of Non-Compliance with Bond (“NCB”). The trial court entered its first sentencing order on August 12, 2022, followed by three corrected sentencing orders, entered on September 8, September 21, and October 17, 2022, respectively. It was undisputed that the trial court’s first sentencing order was illegal because it imposed a sentence that exceeded the maximum lawful sentence for Stalking, which was three years at Level V supervision. In an email dated August 29, 2022, Martin’s trial counsel informed the trial court of the illegality of the sentence, and that the State recommended that the trial court fix its error by redistributing Martin’s five-year prison sentence across the Stalking conviction and the two NCB convictions. In a corrected sentencing order, issued on September 8, 2022, the trial court reduced Martin’s sentence for Stalking to three years of incarceration at Level V supervision, to bring it in line with the lawful maximum sentence. The trial court then added one year of incarceration at Level V supervision, suspended for probation, to the suspended fines for each NCB conviction. It was undisputed that if this had been the original sentence, Martin’s sentence would have been lawful. Martin appealed the trial court’s sentencing order insofar as it modified his sentence for the NCB convictions, arguing that by increasing his sentence for the NCB convictions, the trial court effectively resentenced him for those convictions despite the fact that he had already served them. This was because those sentences consisted solely of fines that were suspended when imposed and as such, were completed as of the date of the sentence. According to Martin, he completed his sentence for both NCB convictions on August 12, 2022, and any subsequent resentencing was barred by principles of double jeopardy. The Delaware Supreme Court was not persuaded by this argument and affirmed the sentence imposed by the trial court in its September 8, 2022 sentencing order, as modified by the September 21, 2022 and October 17, 2022 sentencing orders. View "Martin v. Delaware" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment for Defendant on Plaintiff's claims for disability discrimination, in violation of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Mass Gen. Laws ch. 151B, and for age discrimination, in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, holding that there was no error.The district court (1) concluded that Plaintiff had failed to carry her burden to make out a prima facie case that she was a "qualified individual" under the ADA and thus also failed to do so under chapter 151B; and (2) concluded that Plaintiff had failed to demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Defendant's proffered reason for her termination was pretextual. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Defendant was entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's ADA and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B disability discrimination claims; and (2) the district court did not err in granting summary judgment for Defendant on Plaintiff's claim of age discrimination under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B. View "Der Sarkisian v. Austin Preparatory School" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court finding that Petitioner violated the conditions of his supervised release and revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to a two-year term in prison, holding that United States v. Haymond, 588 U.S. __ (2019), does not apply to a supervised release revocation pursuant to W. Va. Code 61-12-26 because section 61-12-26 does not require a mandatory minimum sentence upon revocation.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the revocation of Petitioner's supervised release pursuant to W. Va. Code 62-12-26 did not violate Petitioner's constitutional rights; (2) the circuit court did not err by denying Petitioner's motion to dismiss the petition or by sentencing Petitioner to a term of imprisonment without holding a jury trial when revoking his supervised release; and (3) the circuit court did not clearly err in finding by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner conspired to deliver crack cocaine, in violation of conditions of his supervised release. View "State v. White" on Justia Law

An administrative law judge (ALJ) working for the United States Department of Labor (DOL) ordered K & R Contractors, LLC to pay living miner’s benefits to its former employee pursuant to the Black Lung Benefits Act. K & R filed a petitioner for review challenging to the constitutionality of the ALJs' appointment.The Fourth Circuit found that both ALJs were constitutionally appointed and that, even if the dual good-cause removal protections were unconstitutional, K & R was not entitled to relief because it had not identified any harm resulting from those removal provisions. View "K & R Contractors, LLC v. Michael Keene" on Justia Law

Petitioner Juan Boitez moved to suppress evidence obtained during a search of his mother’s car. After the trial court denied his motion, Boitez petitioned for writ of mandate or prohibition The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeals' review was whether Boitez gave voluntary consent for the police to search his mother’s car after he was pulled over for a traffic violation. As a material part of obtaining Boitez's consent, the police officer falsely, but apparently with subjective belief that it was true, stated that he had the authority to tow the car, but would not do so if Boitez consented to the search. Specifically, the Court considered whether, but for the police officer’s false promise of leniency as to the towing of the mother’s car, the prosecution met its burden by a preponderance of the evidence that Boitez's consent was uncoerced. To this, the Court concluded the prosecution did not meet its burden: the false promise of leniency not to tow the car was a material and inextricable part of the agreement inducing defendant’s consent to the search, and thus, under the totality of the circumstances, petitioner's consent was not voluntarily given. As part of its analysis, the Court adopted the reasoning of the First Circuit Court of Appeals that the question of voluntary consent "cannot be based on the subjective good faith of a police officer in making the false statement that induced the defendant’s consent to search." The Court issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order denying the motion to suppress and to enter a new order granting the motion. View "Boitez v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In 2015, the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) identified glyphosate as “probably carcinogenic” to humans. That conclusion is not shared by a consensus of the scientific community. As a result, Certain businesses whose products expose consumers to glyphosate were required to provide a Prop 65 warning that glyphosate is a carcinogen. Plaintiffs, a coalition of agricultural producers and business entities, asserted that Prop 65’s warning violated their First Amendment rights to be free from compelled speech. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel concluded that the government’s proposed Prop 65 warnings as applied to glyphosate were not purely factual and uncontroversial and thus were subject to intermediate scrutiny. The proposed warning that “glyphosate is known to cause cancer” was not purely factual because the word “known” carries a complex legal meaning that consumers would not glean from the warning without context, and thus the word was misleading. As to the most recent warning proposed by the California Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment (OEHHA), the panel held that the warning still conveys the overall message that glyphosate is unsafe, which is, at best, disputed. The panel held that because none of the proposed glyphosate Prop 65 warnings were narrowly drawn to advancing California’s interest in protecting consumers from carcinogens, and California had less burdensome ways to convey its message than to compel Plaintiffs to convey it for them, the Prop 65 warning requirement as applied to glyphosate was unconstitutional. View "NAWG, ET AL V. ROB BONTA, ET AL" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Dalton “Dash” Brown pled guilty to a single count of being a felon in possession of ammunition, and was sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release. On appeal, he challenged the sentence, arguing the district court improperly calculated his offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines. According to Brown, the district court erred in applying: (1) a multiple-firearms enhancement; (2) a stolen-firearm enhancement; (3) a higher base offense for possession of a high-capacity magazine; (4) a reckless-endangerment upward-adjustment; and (5) an “in-connection-with” enhancement. He urges the court to reverse and remand for resentencing with a lower offense level. Findnign no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

Appellant Larry Thomas appealed his convictions for felony murder in connection with the vehicular deaths of Krystof Krawczynski and Elizbieta Gurtler-Krawczynski. On appeal, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in sentencing him for two counts of felony murder (Counts 1 and 2) rather than for two counts of homicide by vehicle (Counts 7 and 8) because both sets of charges were predicated on fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer, and thus the rule of lenity required that he receive the lesser penalty. This argument, however, was foreclosed by the Georgia Supreme Court's decision in Sosebee v. Georgia, __ Ga. __, __ (1) (__ SE2d __) (2023) As explained in Sosebee, the felony-murder and homicide-by-vehicle statutes “are not ambiguous and do not require different punishments for the same conduct” because “[t]he offense of felony murder . . . criminalizes causing the death of a human being ‘in the commission of a felony,’ but the offense of homicide by vehicle in the first degree under OCGA § 40-6-393 (a) does not.” Accordingly, as in Sosebee, “[t]he rule of lenity simply has no application in this case, and this claim of error fails.” View "Thomas v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Armetrius Neason was convicted of malice murder and a related charge in connection with the shooting death of Teresa Carter. On appeal, Neason contended the evidence was insufficient as a matter of federal constitutional due process. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Neason v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Pacer Sebastian Carter appealed his convictions for malice murder and other crimes in connection with the 2017 shooting death of Aramis O’Brad Peterson. Carter argued the trial court erred in omitting a jury instruction on the statutory requirement of corroboration of accomplice testimony in felony cases, and that his trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to it. In addition, Carter argued his attorney was ineffective in admitting a document entitled “Proof of Incarceration.” Because both claims of trial court error were subject to review only for plain error, and Carter failed to carry his burden of showing either plain error or the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of conviction. View "Carter v. Georgia" on Justia Law