Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

A man with a prior felony conviction used another person’s identity to purchase a firearm and later used fraudulent identification to obtain a U.S. passport, which he used for international travel. He was indicted and ultimately pleaded guilty to making a false statement during a firearms transaction, making a false statement in a passport application, and aggravated identity theft. As part of his plea agreement, he waived his right to appeal his sentence if it was within or below the guideline range calculated by the court.After entering his plea but before sentencing, the defendant requested a psychological evaluation under 18 U.S.C. § 4241 to determine his mental competency, specifically asking that the examiner’s report be filed with the court. The evaluation was conducted by a Bureau of Prisons examiner, who informed the defendant that the results would be shared with the court. The report was included in the presentence report. At sentencing in the United States District Court for the District of Montana, the defendant objected to the use of the evaluation, arguing it violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The district court overruled his objections, including those to a sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice and to certain supervised release conditions, and imposed a sentence within the guideline range.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the defendant argued that the district court’s consideration of his psychological evaluation at sentencing violated his Fifth Amendment rights. The Ninth Circuit held that the Supreme Court’s decision in Estelle v. Smith does not extend to voluntary psychological evaluations requested by the defendant and that the district court did not violate his right against self-incrimination. The court also held that the defendant’s waiver of appeal barred his remaining challenges to the sentence. The sentence was affirmed. View "USA V. DAVIS" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, who worked for a bank that operated a branch inside a public high school, was terminated from her employment after she publicly criticized the local school district’s mask mandate on social media and at school events. The bank’s operation at the school was part of a partnership in which the bank provided funds and services to the school district. The plaintiff’s children attended schools in the district, and she was active in school-related activities. After a series of confrontations and a critical Facebook post about a school board member, the school superintendent communicated with the bank’s branch manager, expressing disapproval of the plaintiff’s conduct and requesting that she be barred from school property. The bank subsequently suspended and then fired the plaintiff, citing her conduct and the school’s ban.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota granted summary judgment to all defendants, finding that the plaintiff’s First Amendment rights were not violated and that there was insufficient evidence of a conspiracy or tortious interference. The court applied the Pickering balancing test, treating the plaintiff as a government contractor, and found no actionable retaliation. It also found no evidence of a meeting of the minds between the bank and the school district, and held that the superintendent and other officials were entitled to qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part. The court held that the plaintiff was not a government employee or contractor for First Amendment purposes and was entitled to ordinary citizen protections. It found that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to decide whether the superintendent, the bank, and the branch manager retaliated against the plaintiff for protected speech, and whether the superintendent tortiously interfered with her employment. However, the court affirmed summary judgment for the school board chair and the school district, finding insufficient evidence of their direct involvement or policy liability. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "McNeally v. HomeTown Bank" on Justia Law

Officers investigating a drug trafficking ring observed Devin Long engaging in several suspected drug transactions, including controlled buys involving other individuals. Surveillance revealed Long’s repeated visits to known stash houses and his own registered residence, where officers witnessed activity consistent with drug dealing. Based on these observations and information from a confidential source, officers obtained a warrant to search Long’s home. The search uncovered illegal drugs, firearms, and related paraphernalia, leading to Long’s indictment on federal drug and firearm charges.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio reviewed Long’s motion to suppress the evidence seized from his home, which argued that the affidavit supporting the search warrant failed to establish a sufficient nexus between his alleged criminal activity and the residence. The district court denied the motion, finding that the affidavit provided probable cause for the search. Long subsequently pleaded guilty to four charges but preserved his right to appeal the suppression ruling.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit considered whether the search warrant for Long’s home was supported by probable cause. Applying a deferential standard to the issuing magistrate judge’s determination, the Sixth Circuit held that the affidavit established both that Long’s home was his residence and that he was engaged in ongoing drug trafficking. The court further found that even a single drug transaction observed outside Long’s home provided an independent basis for probable cause. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of Long’s motion to suppress, concluding that the warrant was properly issued under the Fourth Amendment. View "United States v. Long" on Justia Law

A prisoner in the Illinois Department of Corrections was issued two disciplinary tickets for alleged gang affiliation after a gang-related questionnaire, purportedly filled out by him, was found in another inmate’s belongings. The first ticket was dismissed after a hearing, but a second, nearly identical ticket was issued shortly thereafter, leading to his immediate placement in segregation. The second ticket included additional allegations, such as handwriting analysis and claims of self-admitted gang membership. The prisoner remained in segregation for three months under conditions he described as inhumane, including exposure to mold, mildew, insects, rust, and leaking sewage. He filed grievances challenging the process and the conditions, and the ticket was eventually expunged for failure to follow internal procedures, but only after he had served the segregation term.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding that even if there were factual disputes about whether the prisoner was denied witnesses, he had not demonstrated that the conditions of segregation constituted an “atypical and significant hardship” sufficient to implicate a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit assumed, without deciding, that the prisoner’s conditions in segregation established a liberty interest. However, the court held that, under its recent precedent in Adams v. Reagle, prisoners who do not face the loss of good-time credits or other sentence-lengthening punishments are entitled only to informal, nonadversarial due process. The court found that the prisoner received the required process: notice of the charges, an opportunity to respond, and an impartial decisionmaker. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Torres v Brookman" on Justia Law

In 2023, Charlotte Chemuti was arrested by officers from the Mooresville Police Department for resisting a public officer. To prepare for her trial, Chemuti served a subpoena on the police department requesting body camera footage related to her arrest. The Town of Mooresville responded, arguing that the requested recordings were confidential under North Carolina General Statute § 132-1.4A and could only be released through the procedure outlined in that statute, not by subpoena.Chemuti subsequently filed a motion in the District Court of Iredell County, without notice to the town, seeking release of the recordings. The district court granted her request, finding that while the statutory petition in superior court was the generally accepted practice, it was not the exclusive method for obtaining such evidence, and ordered the town to comply with the subpoena. The town appealed to the North Carolina Court of Appeals, which dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction, concluding that the order did not affect a substantial right. The town then petitioned the Supreme Court of North Carolina for review.The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that orders compelling disclosure of information protected by statutory confidentiality are immediately appealable, and the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the appeal. On the merits, the Supreme Court determined that N.C.G.S. § 132-1.4A provides the exclusive procedure for obtaining law enforcement recordings in criminal cases, requiring a petition in superior court, and that district court subpoenas cannot be used to compel their release. The Court further held that this procedure does not violate constitutional rights to present a complete defense, as courts must still ensure defendants’ constitutional protections. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Chemuti" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers investigated a breaking and entering at a market in Fletcher, North Carolina, where cash, cigarettes, and lottery tickets were stolen. Days later, someone attempted to redeem one of the stolen lottery tickets at a store in Edneyville. Security footage showed a woman leaving the store and entering a black Dodge Durango with distinctive features. Detective Diaz traced the vehicle to a nearby residence, discovered it had a fictitious license plate, and observed items inside the vehicle that appeared related to the theft. Officers later conducted a search of the vehicle and the residence, recovering stolen property and tools linked to the crime.The Superior Court of Henderson County denied the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence, which argued that law enforcement’s observations at the residence and of the vehicle were improper without a warrant. The defendant subsequently pled guilty to several charges but reserved the right to appeal the suppression ruling. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that probable cause existed for the search warrant and that officers acted lawfully at the scene. The majority also found that the inevitable discovery doctrine would apply, while a dissenting judge disagreed on both points.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and held that, even excluding information obtained during the contested “knock and talk,” the remaining facts in the warrant affidavit established probable cause to search the vehicle. The Court did not decide whether the officers’ conduct during the knock and talk was unconstitutional, nor did it address the inevitable discovery doctrine. The Court modified and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, holding that the search warrant was properly issued based on probable cause supported by untainted evidence. View "State v. Norman" on Justia Law

The defendant was indicted on multiple charges, including two counts of first-degree murder, stemming from an armed robbery in which two victims were killed and another was left paralyzed. During jury selection at his trial in Cleveland County Superior Court, the State used peremptory challenges to excuse two black female prospective jurors. The defense objected, raising a Batson challenge and arguing that the State’s strikes were racially discriminatory. The trial court heard arguments from both sides, including the State’s race-neutral explanations for the strikes, and ultimately denied the Batson challenge, finding no prima facie case of discrimination.Following his conviction on all charges and sentencing to consecutive life terms plus additional imprisonment, the defendant appealed. The North Carolina Court of Appeals, in a divided decision, found that the trial court had moved past Batson’s first step by soliciting and hearing the State’s race-neutral reasons before ruling. The majority held that this rendered the first step moot and remanded the case for a new Batson hearing under the procedural requirements established in State v. Hobbs, 374 N.C. 345 (2020). The dissent argued that the trial court had not actually proceeded to Batson’s third step and that the first step was not moot.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding Batson’s first step moot and remanding for a new hearing. The Supreme Court held that the mootness exception to Batson’s three-step process is to be applied cautiously and only when the trial court has fully completed all three steps. Because the trial court had clearly ruled at step one and had not proceeded to step three, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for consideration of whether the trial court’s step-one determination was clearly erroneous. View "State v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Law enforcement in New Hanover County received information from a confidential source that the defendant was trafficking and distributing large quantities of cocaine. Based on this tip, Detective Wenk applied for a court order to obtain cell-site location information (CSLI) for the defendant’s phone, along with other investigative tools. The trial court found probable cause and granted the order, allowing law enforcement to monitor the defendant’s CSLI. This data showed the defendant’s phone traveling from Wilmington, North Carolina, to Hayward, California, and back, coinciding with suspected drug trafficking activity. Officers later stopped and searched the defendant’s vehicle, discovering trafficking amounts of cocaine. The defendant was indicted on multiple drug-related charges and moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the CSLI and subsequent searches.The Superior Court of New Hanover County denied the motion to suppress, finding reasonable suspicion supported the order and the vehicle stop. The defendant entered an Alford plea but appealed the suppression ruling. The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that the order for CSLI was not supported by probable cause as required by the Fourth Amendment, and that the evidence should be suppressed. The appellate court rejected the State’s argument that a statutory good faith exception applied, citing prior precedent that the North Carolina Constitution did not recognize such an exception.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and held that the statutory good faith exception in N.C.G.S. § 15A-974 applies only to evidence obtained in substantial violation of Chapter 15A, not to evidence obtained in violation of constitutional rights. However, the court further held that neither the United States Constitution nor the North Carolina Constitution required exclusion of the CSLI in this case, and formally adopted a good faith exception under the state constitution equivalent to the federal standard. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, upholding the trial court’s denial of the suppression motion. View "State v. Rogers" on Justia Law

A police officer observed a vehicle late at night on a rural road in Vermont, where the passenger-side wheels of the vehicle left the paved portion of the road twice in quick succession. The road had only a center line and no edge markings. The officer, who had extensive training and experience in detecting impaired driving, interpreted the vehicle’s movements as erratic and indicative of possible impairment. The officer stopped the vehicle, and the driver was subsequently arrested for suspicion of driving under the influence (DUI) and driving with a suspended license. The officer’s observations were recorded on the cruiser’s camera.The defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the stop, arguing that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to justify the stop. The Vermont Superior Court, Addison Unit, Criminal Division, held a hearing and denied the motion to suppress, finding the officer’s testimony credible and concluding that the observed driving behavior—specifically, the vehicle’s wheels leaving the paved road twice—constituted erratic driving and provided reasonable suspicion of impairment. The defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea to the DUI charge and appealed the denial of her suppression motion to the Vermont Supreme Court. The charge for driving with a suspended license was dismissed with prejudice.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the trial court’s factual findings for clear error and considered de novo whether those facts met the legal standard for reasonable suspicion. The Court held that the officer had reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop the defendant based on the totality of the circumstances, specifically the erratic driving observed. The Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress, concluding that the stop was justified under both the Fourth Amendment and Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution. View "State v. Norton" on Justia Law

Six women who were formerly incarcerated at the Jasper City Jail in Alabama alleged that they suffered repeated sexual abuse by jailers, primarily by one officer, while serving as inmates. The plaintiffs described a range of sexual assaults and harassment, with one plaintiff also alleging abuse by a second jailer. The jail operated under the authority of the City of Jasper’s police chief, with a chief jailer and other supervisory staff responsible for daily operations. Jail policies expressly prohibited sexual contact between staff and inmates, and there were procedures for reporting grievances, but the plaintiffs claimed these mechanisms were ineffective or inaccessible.After the alleged abuse, the Alabama State Bureau of Investigation began an inquiry, leading to the resignation of the primary alleged abuser and, later, his indictment on state charges. The plaintiffs filed six separate lawsuits, later consolidated, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Eighth Amendment violations against the police chief, chief jailer, and the City, as well as claims under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA). One plaintiff also brought claims against a second jailer. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama granted summary judgment to all defendants, finding insufficient evidence that the supervisory officials or the City had knowledge of, or were deliberately indifferent to, the alleged abuse, and that the claims against one jailer failed for lack of proper service.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to establish a causal link between the actions or inactions of the supervisory officials or the City and the alleged constitutional violations, as there was no evidence of a widespread custom or policy of tolerating sexual abuse, nor of deliberate indifference or failure to train. The court also found that certain claims were time-barred and that the TVPRA claims failed due to lack of evidence that the City knowingly benefited from or had knowledge of the alleged trafficking. View "Bridges v. Poe" on Justia Law