Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Kiresa Cooper was convicted by jury of malice murder, feticide, and other related crimes in connection with the shooting death of Auriel Callaway, who was pregnant at the time she died. On appeal, Cooper argued: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support her malice murder conviction; and (2) that her trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to twenty portions of the lead detective’s testimony on various grounds, such as inadmissible hearsay, confrontation violations, improper opinion and speculation, and failure to properly authenticate evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Cooper v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In 1970, Michigan voters approved Proposal C, amending Article VIII, section 2 of Michigan’s constitution: “No public monies or property shall be appropriated or paid or any public credit utilized, by the legislature or any other political subdivision or agency of the state directly or indirectly to aid or maintain any private, denominational or other nonpublic, pre-elementary, elementary, or secondary schools.” The plaintiffs allege that Proposal C was spurred by the legislature’s passage of 1970 PA 100, which “allowed the Department of Education to purchase educational services from nonpublic schools in secular subjects,” and authorized $22 million in spending during the 1970-71 school year. Plaintiffs allege that “nonpublic schools” meant “religious schools”; opposition to 1970 PA 100 resulted in Proposal C. In 2000, Michigan voters rejected a ballot initiative that would have amended the section to authorize “indirect” support of non-public school students and create a voucher program for students in underperforming public school districts to attend nonpublic schools.Plaintiffs brought unsuccessful free exercise claims, alleging they have funded Michigan Education Savings Program plans and wish to use those plans to pay for their children’s religious school tuition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of their equal protection claim that section 2, while facially neutral, creates a political structure that unconstitutionally discriminates against religion because religious persons and schools cannot lobby their state representatives for governmental aid or tuition help without first amending the state constitution. View "Hile v. State of Michigan" on Justia Law

In 2011, Lutter began working for Essex County, in a bargaining unit represented by JNESO. Under Supreme Court precedent (Abood), a public-sector union could charge fees from non-union members whom the union represented. New Jersey law permitted public-sector unions to deduct an "agency fee." Lutter joined JNESO and authorized payroll deductions of her union dues.In 2018, New Jersey enacted the Workplace Democracy Enhancement Act (WDEA): a union member could revoke authorization for payroll deductions only during the 10 days following the anniversary of his employment start date. Previously, union members could give notice of revocation at any time. A month later, the Supreme Court (Janus) held that the First Amendment prohibits public-sector unions from collecting agency fees from nonmembers without their clear and affirmative consent. Under WDEA Janus would have to wait nearly a year to revoke her payroll deduction authorization. In July 2018, she nonetheless requested that deductions of her union dues cease and resigned from JNESO. Essex County deducted Lutter's union dues for 10 months.Lutter filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983. JNESO sent her a check in the amount of the contested union dues plus interest. She did not cash or deposit that check. The district court dismissed the case. The Third Circuit affirmed in part. The check did not moot her damages claims against JNESO but Lutter, as a non-union member no longer subject to payroll deductions, lacks standing for her claims against the other parties and for her additional requests for relief against JNESO. View "Lutter v. Jneso" on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals brought in connection with a federal investigation of an organization that operated in Puerto Rico's prisons and was allegedly involved in carrying out murders-for-hire and trafficking drugs, the First Circuit held that one challenge raised on appeal required a limited remand to the district court and that Appellants were not entitled to further relief.Each of the six appellants in this case was convicted of conspiracy to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance. The First Circuit granted a limited remand and otherwise affirmed, holding (1) the argument brought by three appellants that hearsay statements by alleged coconspirators were admitted into evidence at trial, in violation of United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1977), required a remand for further fact-finding as to whether the statements were made in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy; (2) Appellants' sufficiency of the evidence challenges failed; and (3) Appellants were not entitled to relief on their remaining allegations of error. View "United States v. Ramos-Baez" on Justia Law

The Protect Illinois Communities Act, Pub. Act 102-1116 (effective January 2023) and three municipal laws regulate assault weapons and high-capacity magazines. The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the Act, which makes it unlawful for any person within Illinois knowingly to “manufacture, deliver, sell, import, or purchase … an assault weapon, assault weapon attachment, .50 caliber rifle, or .50 caliber cartridge,” without reaching Second Amendment issues. The Act includes exceptions for “trained professionals” and “grandfathered individuals.”The Seventh Circuit upheld denials of injunctions, concluding that the state and the municipalities have a strong likelihood of success in the pending litigation. There is a long tradition, unchanged from when the Second Amendment was added to the Constitution, supporting a distinction between weapons and accessories designed for military or law-enforcement use, and weapons designed for personal use. The Act respects and relies on that distinction. “From Blackstone through the 19th-century cases, commentators and courts routinely explained that the right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.” The fact that many people own assault weapons does not insulate them from regulation. View "Herrera v. Raoul" on Justia Law

In 1993, Fields, having spent the day drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana, fought with Burton, who lived in a duplex owned by Horton. That night, Burton was locked outside. Fields appeared, with a knife, and broke a window in the duplex. Fields and Burton fled before police arrived, having been called by a neighbor. Officers found Fields in Horton’s residence, a block away, in possession of Horton’s jewelry, saying that he had killed Horton, who was dead in her bedroom. At his second trial, the prosecution argued that Fields broke into Horton’s residence through a storm window, murdered her, and started burglarizing the residence before police arrived. To test that theory, the jury conducted an experiment using a flat-tipped knife submitted into evidence to remove a cabinet door in the jury room (in place of the storm window). Satisfied with the outcome, the jurors convicted Fields of intentional murder and sentenced him to death.In 2022, the Sixth Circuit granted Fields conditional habeas corpus relief. On rehearing, en banc, the court affirmed the denial of relief. The Supreme Court has not addressed when jury experiments of this type violate state or federal law. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act habeas relief is unavailable unless a state court has unreasonably applied “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court,” 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1). View "Fields v. Jordan" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The presentence investigation report recommended a base offense level of 20 under USSG Section 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) because Defendant’s 2013 Missouri conviction for second-degree robbery is a “crime of violence” under the Sentencing Guidelines. Overruling Defendant’s objection, the district court adopted this recommendation, resulting in an advisory guidelines sentencing range of 63 to 78 months imprisonment. The court imposed a 72-month sentence followed by three years of supervised release. Defendant appealed the sentence, arguing the district court erred in determining that his prior conviction for Missouri second-degree robbery is a crime of violence under the Guidelines.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the Guidelines define “crime of violence” to mean “any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,” that either “(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another” (the force clause), or “(2) is murder . . . robbery [etc.]” (the enumerated offenses clause). The court concluded that controlling Eighth Circuit precedent has established that a prior conviction for Missouri second-degree robbery under Mo. Rev. Stat. Section 569.030.1, the statute in effect when Defendant committed the offense, is a crime of violence under USSG Section 4B1.2(a)(1). View "United States v. Cody Rethford" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to Possession of a Firearm by a Felon in violation. The district court sentenced him to 100 months imprisonment. Bailey appealed the sentence, arguing the court erred by increasing his base offense level under USSG Section 2K2.1(a)(2), based on two prior Illinois convictions for Delivery or Manufacture of Cocaine in violation of 720 ILCS 570/206(b)(4); and by applying a four-level increase under Section 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) because he used a firearm in connection with another felony offense, Intimidation with a Dangerous Weapon in violation of Iowa Code Section 708.6(2).   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant contends he is entitled to this stand-your-ground exception, despite being a felon in possession, because his illegal activity was not germane to his use of force against the person who was shooting at him. The court explained that the Supreme Court disagreed. Thus, his “possession of the handgun was germane to the use of deadly force.” Further, the court wrote that here, the district court found that Defendant did not have “reason to believe that somebody was actually shooting at him or endangering his life.” Thus, even if Defendant had no duty to retreat, his use of force was not necessary to avoid injury or harm to himself (or to anyone else). View "United States v. Lamont Bailey" on Justia Law

This appeal arises from a protest of the Dakota Access Pipeline at the Backwater Bridge in Morton County, North Dakota. Police officers deployed water, tear gas, rubber bullets, and bean bags to disperse a crowd. Plaintiffs participated in the protest, and they were allegedly injured by the officers’ use of force. The protestors sued Morton County, the City of Mandan, Stutsman County, the law enforcement chiefs for those municipalities, and one hundred unnamed officers. The district court* granted summary judgment for Defendants.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it was not clearly established in November 2016 that the officers’ use of force to disperse protestors violated a constitutional right under the Fourth Amendment. Thus, the need for training and supervision on dispersal of protestors was not so obvious that it can be characterized as deliberate indifference to the protestors’ rights to be free from unreasonable seizures. Further, the court explained that as with the municipalities, there is insufficient evidence here of deliberate indifference by supervisors where the alleged constitutional right was not clearly established. View "Vanessa Dundon v. Kyle Kirchmeier" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Petitioner's petition seeking habeas relief on ineffective assistance of counsel claims, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below.Petitioner was convicted in a Massachusetts state court of three counts each of rape, rape of a child, and assault and battery with a dangerous weapon. The appeals court affirmed the trial court's denial of Petitioner's petition for a new trial. Petitioner then sought habeas relief in a federal district court, claiming that he was denied the constitutionally affective assistance of counsel. The district court denied relief. The First Circuit affirmed upon applying the deference required by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, holding that Petitioner failed to establish that he was entitled to habeas relief. View "Quintanilla v. Marchilli" on Justia Law