Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant Cody Regan appealed his sentence of 20 years in prison, with one year to serve, for one count of felony child molestation, following his non-negotiated guilty plea. Regan argued he improperly received a felony sentence for child molestation, in violation of his rights to equal protection under the United States and Georgia Constitutions, because he was similarly situated to people receiving misdemeanor sentences for aggravated child molestation. Regan also argued his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the federal and state constitutions, because his sentence was grossly disproportionate to his crime. After review, the Georgia Supreme Court held that the sentencing scheme for child molestation set out at OCGA § 16-6-4 (b), as applied to Regan, violated his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. These sentencing provisions provided for a misdemeanor sentence where the victim is at least 14 years old (among other conditions), but the misdemeanor sentencing provisions for aggravated child molestation provided for a misdemeanor sentence where the victim is at least 13 years old. Because the victim in this case was 13 years old, Regan did not qualify for the misdemeanor sentence he would have received if he had instead committed aggravated child molestation. "There is no rational basis for such disparate treatment." The Court therefore reversed the trial court’s order denying Regan's motion in arrest of judgment, vacated the sentence, and remanded the case for Appellant to be resentenced for misdemeanor child molestation under OCGA § 16-6-4 (b) (2). Because the Court resolved Regan's challenges to his sentence on federal equal-protection grounds, it did not reach his cruel-and-unusual-punishment claims. View "Regan v. Georgia" on Justia Law

The issue presented for the Georgia Supreme Court's review centered on whether Larry Jenkins’ unequivocal statement that he would not talk to law enforcement without a lawyer was a valid invocation of his Miranda rights. The trial court concluded that the statement came at a time that Jenkins was not being interrogated and at which no interrogation was imminent, and thus it was “anticipatory” and invalid under a line of precedent from several federal courts of appeals. The Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred by extending that precedent to the circumstances in this case. The Court found that at the time that Jenkins invoked his Miranda rights, he (1) was in custody for the crimes at issue in this case, (2) had been given Miranda warnings, (3) had already been subjected to custodial interrogation by law enforcement on the way to the jail, and (4) was going through the booking process. "Whether or not the booking process itself was custodial interrogation, the facts of this case show that a reasonable person in Jenkins’s position would have believed that interrogation was at least imminent." Accordingly, the Supreme Court held his unequivocal invocation was valid, the State’s failure to honor it rendered his custodial statements inadmissible, and the State failed to show that the use of that inadmissible evidence was harmless. Accordingly, the Court reversed Jenkins’s convictions; because the evidence against him was constitutionally sufficient, he could be retried. View "Jenkins v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Facing a tight deadline from the Ninth Circuit, the Environmental Protection Agency banned the use of chlorpyrifos on food crops. Two environmental groups petitioned the EPA in 2007 to have all tolerances revoked. In denying the petition, the EPA concluded that their objections were “not supported by valid, complete, and reliable evidence.”   The Eighth Circuit granted the petitions, finding that the EPA’s decision was arbitrary and capricious. The court explained that in this case, the EPA believed it lacked discretion or at least acted that way. The Ninth Circuit’s opinion had already narrowed its options down to two: revoke the tolerances or modify them. With little time to act, the agency ruled out the second option, leaving only revocation by default. In doing so, however, it misread the statute and misunderstood the “scope of its discretion”. Therefore, the court set aside the decision as arbitrary and capricious. Further, the court explained that a partial ban was a real alternative for the EPA. It could have canceled some registrations and retained others that satisfied the statutory safety margin. View "RRVSG Assoc. v. Michael Regan" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Edgar Flores appealed the denial of his petition for resentencing on his second degree murder conviction. The superior court denied the petition without holding an evidentiary hearing on the ground Flores was ineligible for resentencing because he had been convicted of provocative act murder. Flores contended the superior court erred by denying his Penal Code section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie review stage. He argued the instructions given at his trial allowed the jury to find him guilty of murder based on a now-invalid theory of imputed malice, namely, that he aided and abetted co-defendant Anthony Paez’s provocative act without himself acting with malice. Flores also argued his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to amend the petition after legislation made relief available to persons convicted of murder on any theory that imputed malice based solely on participation in a crime and by failing to make the instructional argument he urged here. The Court of Appeal found no reversible error and affirmed the superior court. View "California v. Flores" on Justia Law

Using a blocked number, an anonymous individual twice called 9-1-1 in Abilene, Texas, relaying a serious threat of gun violence against officers and an alleged hostage while providing his location. Abilene Police responded, only to find the apartment occupied by Plaintiff and his dog, with no hostage or lethal firearm in sight. Plaintiff was detained, taken to the police station, and ultimately released when an investigation proved inconclusive. Weeks later, Plaintiff was charged with making a false report, though the charges were eventually dropped. Plaintiff subsequently sued three individuals involved in his arrest and prosecution as well as Taylor County, Texas. Each defendant moved for summary judgment, with the individuals asserting qualified immunity. The district court granted the Defendants’ motions.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court affirmed the district court’s order regarding the exclusion of the affidavits, the dismissal of Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims against the officer and detective, and the dismissal of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims against all Defendants. The court reversed the district court’s order regarding Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim against the officer. The court explained that the investigator is the only Taylor County employee involved in this suit, serving in the Taylor County District Attorney’s Office. Plaintiff’s suit against Taylor County is, therefore, wholly premised on the investigator’s alleged wrongdoing. Affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim against the investigator vitiates Plaintiff’s Monell claim. View "Reitz v. Woods" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued the Arkansas Division of Corrections (ADC), alleging its policies violate the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA). After a bench trial, the district court dismissed the complaint. It found that their religious beliefs were not sincerely held; that even if they were sincerely held, the policies did not substantially burden those beliefs; and that even if there was a substantial burden, the policies were the least restrictive means to further ADC’s compelling interests. Plaintiffs appealed.   The Eighth Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. The court explained that the district court found that ADC lacks the staff and space for separate Jumu’ah services. But Plaintiffs proposed alternatives, including utilizing other available spaces, partitioning the same space, and scheduling two Jumu’ah services in the same space at different times. The district court neither addressed these proposed alternatives to determine whether they were available or would effectively address ADC’s compelling security interests nor addressed whether the prison’s reasons for refusing to offer an accommodation were persuasive in light of the evidence that other prisons are able to do so. Correctly applying the governing law to Plaintiffs’ challenge requires that the court do so. Further, the court wrote that the district court also found that ADC’s religious headdress policy did not substantially burden Plaintiffs’ beliefs because ADC informally allows them to wear kufis in violation of the policy. But even if ADC does not enforce it consistently, the policy expressly prohibits Plaintiffs from wearing their kufis except during religious services. View "Gregory Holt v. Dexter Payne" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the trial court denying Petitioner's petition for post-conviction review (PCR) arguing that her trial counsel provided ineffective assistance, holding that Petitioner's conviction of domestic violence assault against her daughter must be vacated.In her PCR petition, Petitioner argued that trial counsel's representation was ineffective by opening the door during opening statements to prejudicial evidence about her parenting practices and because he did not object to prosecutorial error at trial. The PCR denied relief. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment below, holding that trial counsel's decision to open the door to evidence regarding Petitioner's parenting practices and his failure to object at trial to the prosecutorial error made his conviction unreliable and unworthy of confidence. View "Pratt v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant Julie Hellinger was tried on charges of disobeying a police officer (class A misdemeanor), and driving after suspension (violation-level offense). Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress, arguing that the motor vehicle stop by the police was unlawful. Her motion was denied, and defendant was convicted on both charges. She appealed her conviction for disobeying an officer to the superior court, and appealed her conviction for driving after suspension directly to the New Hampshire Supreme Court. In superior court, defendant again moved to suppress. The trial court denied the motion without a hearing. Defendant then filed an interlocutory appeal of that ruling. The Supreme Court consolidated the two appeals. After review, the Supreme Court reversed her circuit court conviction for driving after suspension, vacated the superior court order denying her motion to suppress, and remanded both matters. The State conceded the trial court erred with respect to the driving after suspension charge, agreeing that the officer did not have the reasonable, articulable suspicion necessary to support a motor vehicle stop of defendant. If the stop was illegal, then the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not make findings "sufficient to purge the taint" with regard to the remaining charge. View "New Hampshire v. Hellinger" on Justia Law

In 2019, the Alabama Legislature passed -- and Governor Kay Ivey signed -- House Bill 380 ("H.B. 380"), which became Act No. 2019-393, Ala. Acts 2019. As enacted, H.B. 380 amended various Code provisions, including § 15-22-21(a), Ala. Code 1975, creating the position of director of the Alabama Bureau of Pardons and Paroles ("the Bureau"), and § 15-22-20(b), Ala. Code 1975, addressing the nomination and appointment processes for the members of the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles ("the Board"). After H.B. 380 was enacted, Governor Ivey appointed Leigh Gwathney as chair of the Board pursuant to the new procedures set forth in § 15-22-20(b). In November 2020, the three-member Board convened and held a parole-consideration hearing for Angela Turner, an inmate who was serving a life sentence for murder. Following a review of Turner's file, the Board unanimously denied Turner's parole request. Around that same time, Governor Ivey appointed Cam Ward as the new director of the Bureau. In response to the Board's denial of parole, Turner filed suit against Governor Ivey, Ward, Gwathney, and the other members of the Parole Board, in which she sought a judgment declaring that Governor Ivey's appointment of Ward and Gwathney to their respective positions pursuant to the changes created by H.B. 380 violated the Alabama Constitution of 1901. She also, on behalf of the State of Alabama, petitioned for writs of quo warranto pursuant to § 6-6-591, Ala. Code 1975, alleging that Ward and Gwathney unlawfully held their respective positions. Finally, she alleged a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against all the defendants on the basis that she had been denied due process during her parole-consideration hearing. The circuit court dismissed Turner's claims with prejudice. Finding no reversible error in the circuit court's order, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. View "Turner and the State of Alabama ex rel. Angela Turner v. Ivey, et al." on Justia Law

This case involved the complicated relationship between a mother, Teri A., and her son, Zachary H. During a tense period in their relationship, Zachary H. moved out of Teri A.’s home and informed her that he did not want to have further contact. Over Zachary H.’s repeated objections, Teri A. continued to reach out to him by mail, text message, e-mail, and by showing up to his home unannounced. Zachary H. claimed that after he moved out, Teri A. nearly ran him over with her car as he walked along the sidewalk near his residence. Following this incident, Teri A. sent Zachary H. a series of e-mails that caused him significant emotional distress. Immediately after receiving Teri A.’s e-mail referencing firearms, Zachary H. sought a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO). During the DVRO hearing, the trial court found Zachary H.’s testimony to be credible, and evidence established Zachary H. was in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily harm and issued a DVRO for a period of one year, including a related firearms prohibition. Teri A. appealed, claiming the trial court abused its discretion by issuing the DVRO because it was not supported by substantial evidence and because the DVRO resulted from evidentiary errors by the trial court. She also contended the firearms prohibition violated her constitutional rights under the Second and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Finding no abuse of discretion, and that the firearms restriction issued in conjunction with the DVRO was constitutional. View "Zachary H. v. Teri A." on Justia Law