Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The New Mexico Supreme Court explained its reasoning for reversing a district court's denial of the State's motion for pretrial detention of Defendant Joe Anderson. Anderson had been charged with first-degree murder. Under Article II, Section 13 of the New Mexico Constitution, a defendant charged with a felony could be detained without bail prior to trial if the State demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) the defendant was dangerous; and (2) no release conditions would reasonably protect the safety of any individual or the community. Here, the Court determined Defendant’s dangerousness was not disputed. At issue was the second prong of the pretrial detention inquiry: whether the State met its burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that no release conditions could reasonably protect any individual or the community. The Court found the State presented reliable evidence that Defendant had an extensive criminal history that included crimes of violence, failures to appear, violations of probation, new charges while on probation, committing felonies while incarcerated, knowingly possessing a firearm while a felon, and noncompliance with pretrial services requirements. The Court held the district court abused its discretion when it denied the State’s motion without properly weighing the required factors under Rule 5-409(F)(6). View "New Mexico v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Petitioner Rufino Torres petitioned for habeas relief, contending the judgment and sentence which required him to serve consecutive, i.e., “stacked,” five-year terms of probation was illegal. Four different indictments were filed against Petitioner with sixteen crimes which occurred between June 1, 2010, and June 3, 2010. Petitioner received a twenty-seven year term of imprisonment, and there was no issue about whether the term of imprisonment imposed on each count was correct. The total term of twenty-seven years resulted from the fact that the district court imposed a sentence of incarceration for every crime charged in each case. Petitioner violated probation multiple times over the years following his sentencing. Acting pro se, on October 17, 2018, Petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition, asserting he was illegally sentenced, did not receive the proper credit calculations, and received ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court appointed an attorney to review the illegal sentence and credit calculation claims, but did not order the attorney to review the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The district court entered a procedural order on Petitioner’s petition for habeas corpus in which the district court recalculated Petitioner’s credit for presentence confinement. Ultimately, the New Mexico Supreme Court granted habeas corpus relief. The district court’s order consolidating the four cases resulted in a single judgment and sentence. The Supreme Court reversed the district court because the February 21, 2017, order of discharge on suspended sentence, as amended, not only terminated Petitioner’s probation but also determined that Petitioner satisfied his criminal liability for the crimes charged, and discharged Petitioner from any obligation imposed by the judgment and sentence as of June 4, 2016. In addition, upon remand, the district court was directed to enter an amended judgment and sentence vacating two conspiracy convictions. View "Torres v. Santistevan" on Justia Law

A jury found that Child-Respondent Antonio M. (Child) committed felony murder, attempted armed robbery, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, child abuse, and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. The State charged Child as a participant in the fatal shooting of Fabian Lopez (Victim) at Frenger Park in Las Cruces. Uncontested evidence at Child’s adjudicatory hearing established that M.M. and two other participants killed Victim in his car in the course of a drug deal. During opening statements and closing arguments, defense counsel’s theory of the case was that the State could not present sufficient evidence of Child’s participation in the crime and that the robbery and resulting homicide were unplanned and unintended results of a simple drug purchase. Defense counsel did not challenge Child’s presence in the car that transported M.M. to and from the park. On appeal, Child challenged the admission of three in-court identifications under federal and state due process. The Court of Appeals reversed for plain error, finding that the in-court identifications were impermissibly suggestive and thereby violated Child’s due process right to a fair trial under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The New Mexico Supreme Court determine that identity was not at issue regarding the testimony of the three relevant witnesses and thus that Child’s due process rights were not violated by the relevant in-court identifications. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals. View "New Mexico v. Antonio M." on Justia Law

While Defendant was working at a convenience store in St. Louis, a suspected shoplifter appeared to steal a piece of candy. Defendant pointed a loaded pistol at the man and chased him from the store. The pistol ultimately discharged and killed the man. Defendant initially pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm while being unlawfully present in the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(5). The district court applied a homicide guideline cross reference pursuant to U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1(c)(1)(B). While Defendant’s appeal was pending, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Rehaif v. United States. On remand, the district court again applied the second-degree murder guideline as the cross reference. Defendant now appeals his conviction.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the record is more than sufficient to support the guilty verdict. Further, the court explained that the record adequately supports the guilty verdict and its implicit finding of subjective knowledge. Immigration authorities repeatedly informed Defendant that he lacked legal status. Moreover, the fact that he purposefully committed fraud in an effort to obtain legal status indicates an understanding that he lacked legal status. Further, the use of potentially deadly violence against another may demonstrate the malice necessary to support a second-degree murder conviction. Accordingly, whether Defendant purposefully shot the victim in the head, or accidentally shot the victim in the head while potentially fatally beating his head with a pistol, the district court permissibly concluded the mens rea rose above the baseline recklessness required for manslaughter and reached the level of malice required for murder. View "United States v. Taleb Jawher" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed a judgment of conviction entered by the district court convicting him on his plea of guilty to possession and receipt of child pornography, and (b)(1), and obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. Section 1512(c)(2), contending that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by a probation officer’s search of his cell phone and a further search by New York State Police and that the trial court erred in failing to allow him allocution at sentencing.   The Second Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction but rejected the government’s argument and remanded for resentencing. The court explained that Defendant argued that resentencing is required because he was not afforded his right to allocute. He argued that the court’s failure to provide allocution calls for automatic resentencing, even under plain error review, given that he made no objection during the sentencing proceeding. The government’s brief focuses on enforcement of his waiver of appeal and advances no argument against ordering resentencing in the event we do not enforce the appeal waiver. The court concluded that it should remand for resentencing, as Defendant has made a reasonable argument that he is entitled to resentencing, and the government has made no argument to the contrary. Because the government makes no argument to the contrary, the court explained that it does so without ruling as to the appropriate standard of review for an unpreserved claim of failure to grant allocution. Accordingly, the court remanded to the district court with instructions to vacate his sentence and resentence, affording him the right of allocution. View "United States v. Lajeunesse" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Steven Dixon appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants the City of Auburn ("the City"); Ron Anders, in his official capacity as the mayor of the City; and Beth Witten, in her official capacity as an Auburn City Council member who served as mayor pro tempore of the City. The underlying action arose from a dispute between Dixon and defendants over Ordinance No. 3288, which amended the City's zoning ordinance to expressly regulate short-term rentals of residential property within the City's geographical limits. Dixon claimed that the adoption and enforcement of the short-term-rental ordinance violated his right to due process and also violated his right to equal protection as guaranteed by the Alabama Constitution. Finding that the trial court properly entered summary judgment in defendants' favor, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. View "Dixon v. City of Auburn, et al." on Justia Law

In 2010, Petitioner was convicted of three counts of juvenile molestation in violation of La. Rev. Stat. Section 14:81.2. Petitioner appealed of the denial of his Section 2254 petition challenging those convictions and his sentence—specifically, his claim on appeal that the evidence at trial was legally insufficient for a conviction on the last count.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of his Section 2254 petition. The court wrote that it did not find that the state court was objectively unreasonable in rejecting Petitioner’s claim that there was insufficient evidence to convict him on Count III. The court explained that the evidence was clearly sufficient for a rational jury to find that the described acts were “lewd and lascivious”—and Petitioner’s alternative explanations do not disturb this conclusion. Petitioner’s counsel’s argument, for instance, that it can be normal for adults to “squeeze and pinch” a child’s behind under their clothes flies in the face of common sense. Petitioner provided examples of when such behavior might occur—such as when a child needs help with the restroom—are far afield of the facts before the court. Equally unavailing is counsel’s suggestion that acts must be painful in order to be obscene or indecent. Finally, Petitioner contends that the evidence was insufficient to establish that any molestation occurred in Louisiana as opposed to Mississippi. The court explained that the place of the crime is not an element of the offense of molestation of a juvenile under Louisiana law. View "Terry v. Hooper" on Justia Law

Officers told Plaintiff that he could distribute his tokens in designated zones, referred to as Free Speech Zones, outside the entry gates but not inside the festival itself. Plaintiff nevertheless purchased a ticket, entered the festival, began handing out tokens, and was subsequently ejected. He brought suit alleging that the Cal Expo fairgrounds, in their entirety, constitute a traditional “public forum,” analogous to a public park, thereby entitling his speech to the most robust constitutional protections.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment for Defendants. The panel first held that the enclosed, ticketed portion of the fairgrounds constituted a nonpublic forum under the United States Constitution and the California Speech Clause. The space did not permit free access, its boundaries were clearly delineated by a fence, and no evidence suggested that access had previously been granted as a matter of course. The panel further noted that California courts have drawn distinctions between ticketed and unticketed portions of venues, and Plaintiff pointed to no case holding that an enclosed area with a paid-entry requirement constitutes a public forum. The panel determined that it need not decide whether the area outside the fence was a public forum under the First Amendment because the California Speech Clause provided independent support for Plaintiff’s argument that it was indeed such a forum, albeit subject to reasonable restrictions on speech. The panel concluded that the Free Speech Zones in the exterior fairgrounds were a valid regulation of the time, place, and manner of Plaintiff’s speech. The guidelines on distributing literature in the enclosed area were likewise permissible. View "BURT CAMENZIND V. CALIFORNIA EXPOSITION AND STATE FAIR, ET AL" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court in this action seeking to confiscate money under Indiana's civil forfeiture statute, holding that the right to a jury trial applies in such an action.The State filed a complaint to forfeit $2,435 in cash that police officers recovered after stopping Alucious Kizer for a traffic violation, alleging that the money had been "furnished or intended to be furnished" in exchange for a crime, that it had been "used to facilitate" a crime, or that it was "traceable as proceeds" of a crime. Kizer requested a jury trial. The State moved to strike the demand, arguing that no such right existed under either the Indiana or United States Constitution. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Kizer was not entitled to trial by jury. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' opinion and affirmed the trial court, holding (1) Ind. Const. Art. I, 20 protects the right to a jury trial for in rem civil forfeitures; and (2) therefore, Kizer had a constitutional right to trial by jury. View "State v. $2,435 in U.S. Currency" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court holding that the Arkansas Racing Commission's (ARC) decision to award the Pope County casino license to Cherokee Nation Businesses, LLC (CNB) and Legends Resort and Casino, LLC (Legends) was a "legal nullity, void and of no effect," holding that the circuit court did not err.In this third iteration of appeals involving the issuance of the license Gulfside Casino Partnership (Gulfside) argued that the ARC's action was ultra vires because it was issued in violation of the clear language of amendment 100 to the Arkansas Constitution. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Gulfside, concluding that the casino license issued by the ARC jointly to CNB and Legends was an ultra vires action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in its decision. View "Cherokee Nation Businesses, LLC v. Gulfside Casino Partnership" on Justia Law