Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court held that Senate Bill (S.B.) 126, which amended Ky. Rev. Stat. 452.005, was unconstitutional and declined to extend comity.Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of House Bill 594, which banned certain types of electronic gaming machines. In response, the Attorney General, who was a named defendant, invoked the newly-enacted provision of S.B. 126, seeking to transfer the case to another circuit court by way of a lottery selection. Plaintiffs responded by challenging the constitutionality of S.B. 126's mandatory transfer procedure. The circuit court temporarily stayed its ruling on Defendants' motion to transfer, and Plaintiffs sought a supervisory writ from the Supreme Court to prohibit transfer of the action and seeking a declaration that S.B. 126 was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court granted relief, holding (1) S.B. 126 violates the separation of powers doctrine, contrary to sections 27, 28, 109, 110 and 116 of the Kentucky Constitution; and (2) S.B. 126 is not extended comity. View "ARKK Properties, LLC v. Cameron" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for first-degree rape, first-degree sexual abuse, intimidating a participant in a legal process, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender and his sentence of twenty years' imprisonment, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the Commonwealth did not improperly comment on Defendant's right to remain silence during voir dire or deprive him of an impartial jury by making a burden-shifting argument to the venire should Defendant have chosen to testify; (2) the trial court did not err by denying Defendant's motion to strike two jurors for cause; and (3) no cumulative error occurred because no prejudicial error occurred. View "Finch v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's convictions for arson and attempted arson and otherwise affirmed, holding that the trial court erred in failing to grant a directed verdict in Defendant's favor as to the counts for arson in the first degree and attempted arson.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) hearsay statements regarding the victims' fear of Defendant were admissible under Ky. R. Evid. 803(3)'s state-of-mind exception; (2) the trial court did not err in permitting witnesses to invoke their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination; (3) the trial court properly precluded Defendant from presenting an aaltperp defense; (4) the trial court properly admitted physical evidence; (5) Defendant was entitled to a directed verdict on the charges of first-degree arson and attempted first-degree arson; (6) Defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict on the charges for murder; (7) Defendant's burglary convictions did not violate double jeopardy protections; and (8) reversal was not required on grounds of cumulative error. View "Martin v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The court awarded Plaintiff fees after he prevailed on one of his six causes of action against his former employer ExakTime Innovations, Inc., on his complaint for disability discrimination under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and related causes of action. The jury awarded Plaintiff $130,088 in damages on his claim ExakTime failed to engage in a good faith interactive process with him. Plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s order awarding him $686,795.62 in attorney fees after the court applied a .4 negative multiplier to its $1,144,659.36 adjusted lodestar calculation “to account for [p]laintiff’s counsel’s . . . lack of civility throughout the entire course of this litigation.” Plaintiff contends the $457,863 reduction in attorney fees based on his counsel’s incivility must be reversed.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court agreed with the trial court that it may consider an attorney’s pervasive incivility in determining the reasonableness of the requested fees. A court may apply, in its discretion, a positive or negative multiplier to adjust the lodestar calculation—a reasonable rate times a reasonable number of hours—to account for various factors, including attorney skill. The court explained that the record amply supports the trial court’s finding that Plaintiff’s counsel was repeatedly, and apparently intentionally, uncivil to defense counsel—and to the court— throughout the litigation. View "Snoeck v. ExakTime Innovations" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing the complaint brought by Appellant, a certified nursing assistant at Soldiers' Home, a state-funded healthcare facility housing veterans, alleging violations of his constitutional substantive due process rights to a safe work environment, to be free from a state-created danger, and to bodily integrity, holding that there was no error.Appellant brought this action pursuant to 24 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that Appellees violated his substantive due process rights during the COVID-19 pandemic by failing to protect him from harm, to provide safe working environment, and to provide adequate medical and nursing equipment. Appellees filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, claiming qualified immunity. The district court dismissed the suit. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that where Appellant pointed to no precedent establishing that Appellees' COVID-19 response violated clearly established law, Appellees were entitled to qualified immunity. View "Ablordeppey v. Walsh" on Justia Law

The Appellants in consolidated cases filed pretrial writs of habeas corpus challenging the facial constitutionality of portions of the statutes they were charged under. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review to decide the cognizability of their pretrial claims and the meaning of “immediate release”—release from what? The Court held the facial challenges were cognizable in a pretrial writ of habeas corpus if a grant of relief would result in immediate release from prosecution for an alleged offense. Release from prosecution for every alleged offense is not required. In Appellant Tonya Couch's case, the claim was not cognizable: if her indictments alleged one offense committed via four different, alternative, statutory manner and means, she challenged the constitutionality of two of those purported manner and means in her habeas application, leaving two unchallenged. If she were granted relief, her single-count indictment would still stand, and trial on it could still proceed. A grant of relief on her claim would not result in her release from prosecution for the offense alleged in her indictment. In Appellant Glenda Hammons’ case, her claim was cognizable because she challenged the constitutionality of the statute defining two counts of her three-count indictment. If she were granted relief, she would be released from prosecution for two alleged offenses, and trial on those counts could not proceed though trial on the third one could. View "Ex parte Couch, Hammons" on Justia Law

Defendant Jeffrey LaRoche deprived Antonio Davila a hunting trophy. Following a plea, LaRoche was convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon, receiving a stolen vehicle, and second degree burglary. Pursuant to the agreement, he was sentenced to an aggregate term of two years eight months in state prison. LaRoche challenged the amount of restitution ordered to Davila for his loss. Davila claimed the loss of the ram’s head (the trophy)amounted to $7,500, which included the cost of the associated hunting trip, taken approximately 10 years prior. The Court of Appeal agreed with defendant that the trial court erred when it included the hunting trip as an economic loss because the experience was not property lost as a result of defendant’s criminal conduct. "While the statutory framework for victim restitution is broad, we conclude it is not so broad as to include costs attendant to the acquisition of the stolen property." View "California v. LaRoche" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Paul Hupp was convicted by jury on four counts of violating Penal Code section 69 based on threatening statements he made to four judges. On appeal, Hupp raised an issue of first impression: Is a judge an “executive officer” within the meaning of section 69, which makes it a crime to attempt to deter, by means of any threat, an executive officer from the performance of a legal duty? The Court of Appeal concluded the answer was no: in this context, “executive officer” unambiguously refers to an officer of the executive branch, and judges are not part of the executive branch. The Court therefore agreed with Hupp that his convictions had to be reversed. View "California v. Hupp" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit granted the government’s motion to dismiss Defendant’s appeal based on the appeal waiver in Defendant’s plea agreement.Defendant pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to conspiracy to communicate, transmit, or disclose Restricted Data of the United States Navy relating to Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines with the intent to injure the United States or to secure an advantage to a foreign nation. At sentencing, the district court calculated her Sentencing Guidelines range and sentenced Defendant to 262 months imprisonment, which was at the bottom of that range. Defendant contends that “the district court so severely infected the sentencing [and] the sentencing process that [her] due process rights were violated during the course of the sentencing hearing to an extent that could not have been contemplated by, and transcends, the appeal waiver.” She also contends that the government, in its appellate brief, breached the plea agreement and therefore that the agreement “is now void” and the “waiver in it is invalid.” The government filed a motion to dismiss the appeal based on the appeal waiver in Defendant’s plea agreement.   The Fourth Circuit granted the government’s motion to dismiss. The court concluded that Defendant had failed to make a sufficient showing to avoid the clear terms of her plea agreement, which she acknowledges she entered into knowingly and intelligently. The court also concluded that the government did not breach the plea agreement. Further, the court noted that the plea agreement provided further that once the district court exercised its authority to sentence Defendant, the government was authorized to advance arguments on appeal in support of that sentence. View "US v. Diana Toebbe" on Justia Law

Weeks after Hampton left his employment at a restaurant, the restaurant was robbed. During Hampton's January 2022 trial, the judge dismissed two jurors for reasons related to COVID-19 and seated the two remaining alternate jurors. After jury deliberations began, the judge was called away by a personal emergency. Another judge took her place. A juror subsequently tested positive for COVID-19. Hampton claimed that the original judge had made an off-the-record ruling prohibiting remote deliberations. After consulting the original judge, the substitute judge denied a mistrial and permitted the COVID-positive juror to deliberate remotely for one day, after which the jury returned its verdicts. The foreperson disclosed that the jury agreed on the verdicts while all the jurors were present in person; during the remote deliberations, the jury discussed only the lesser weapon enhancements on which it hung. Hampton was convicted of felony counts of second-degree robbery and false imprisonment but acquitted of accompanying firearm enhancements, and placed on probation for three years.The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that the substitute judge improperly relied on ex parte communications with the original judge and that the jury deliberations in which one juror participated remotely were unauthorized and unconstitutional. The judges’ communications were ethical and did not deny Hampton a fair trial. Any error in permitting the jury to deliberate remotely for one day was harmless because that deliberation did not result in a finding of guilt. View "People v. Hampton" on Justia Law