Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The Appellants in consolidated cases filed pretrial writs of habeas corpus challenging the facial constitutionality of portions of the statutes they were charged under. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review to decide the cognizability of their pretrial claims and the meaning of “immediate release”—release from what? The Court held the facial challenges were cognizable in a pretrial writ of habeas corpus if a grant of relief would result in immediate release from prosecution for an alleged offense. Release from prosecution for every alleged offense is not required. In Appellant Tonya Couch's case, the claim was not cognizable: if her indictments alleged one offense committed via four different, alternative, statutory manner and means, she challenged the constitutionality of two of those purported manner and means in her habeas application, leaving two unchallenged. If she were granted relief, her single-count indictment would still stand, and trial on it could still proceed. A grant of relief on her claim would not result in her release from prosecution for the offense alleged in her indictment. In Appellant Glenda Hammons’ case, her claim was cognizable because she challenged the constitutionality of the statute defining two counts of her three-count indictment. If she were granted relief, she would be released from prosecution for two alleged offenses, and trial on those counts could not proceed though trial on the third one could. View "Ex parte Couch, Hammons" on Justia Law

Defendant Jeffrey LaRoche deprived Antonio Davila a hunting trophy. Following a plea, LaRoche was convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon, receiving a stolen vehicle, and second degree burglary. Pursuant to the agreement, he was sentenced to an aggregate term of two years eight months in state prison. LaRoche challenged the amount of restitution ordered to Davila for his loss. Davila claimed the loss of the ram’s head (the trophy)amounted to $7,500, which included the cost of the associated hunting trip, taken approximately 10 years prior. The Court of Appeal agreed with defendant that the trial court erred when it included the hunting trip as an economic loss because the experience was not property lost as a result of defendant’s criminal conduct. "While the statutory framework for victim restitution is broad, we conclude it is not so broad as to include costs attendant to the acquisition of the stolen property." View "California v. LaRoche" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Paul Hupp was convicted by jury on four counts of violating Penal Code section 69 based on threatening statements he made to four judges. On appeal, Hupp raised an issue of first impression: Is a judge an “executive officer” within the meaning of section 69, which makes it a crime to attempt to deter, by means of any threat, an executive officer from the performance of a legal duty? The Court of Appeal concluded the answer was no: in this context, “executive officer” unambiguously refers to an officer of the executive branch, and judges are not part of the executive branch. The Court therefore agreed with Hupp that his convictions had to be reversed. View "California v. Hupp" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit granted the government’s motion to dismiss Defendant’s appeal based on the appeal waiver in Defendant’s plea agreement.Defendant pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to conspiracy to communicate, transmit, or disclose Restricted Data of the United States Navy relating to Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines with the intent to injure the United States or to secure an advantage to a foreign nation. At sentencing, the district court calculated her Sentencing Guidelines range and sentenced Defendant to 262 months imprisonment, which was at the bottom of that range. Defendant contends that “the district court so severely infected the sentencing [and] the sentencing process that [her] due process rights were violated during the course of the sentencing hearing to an extent that could not have been contemplated by, and transcends, the appeal waiver.” She also contends that the government, in its appellate brief, breached the plea agreement and therefore that the agreement “is now void” and the “waiver in it is invalid.” The government filed a motion to dismiss the appeal based on the appeal waiver in Defendant’s plea agreement.   The Fourth Circuit granted the government’s motion to dismiss. The court concluded that Defendant had failed to make a sufficient showing to avoid the clear terms of her plea agreement, which she acknowledges she entered into knowingly and intelligently. The court also concluded that the government did not breach the plea agreement. Further, the court noted that the plea agreement provided further that once the district court exercised its authority to sentence Defendant, the government was authorized to advance arguments on appeal in support of that sentence. View "US v. Diana Toebbe" on Justia Law

Weeks after Hampton left his employment at a restaurant, the restaurant was robbed. During Hampton's January 2022 trial, the judge dismissed two jurors for reasons related to COVID-19 and seated the two remaining alternate jurors. After jury deliberations began, the judge was called away by a personal emergency. Another judge took her place. A juror subsequently tested positive for COVID-19. Hampton claimed that the original judge had made an off-the-record ruling prohibiting remote deliberations. After consulting the original judge, the substitute judge denied a mistrial and permitted the COVID-positive juror to deliberate remotely for one day, after which the jury returned its verdicts. The foreperson disclosed that the jury agreed on the verdicts while all the jurors were present in person; during the remote deliberations, the jury discussed only the lesser weapon enhancements on which it hung. Hampton was convicted of felony counts of second-degree robbery and false imprisonment but acquitted of accompanying firearm enhancements, and placed on probation for three years.The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that the substitute judge improperly relied on ex parte communications with the original judge and that the jury deliberations in which one juror participated remotely were unauthorized and unconstitutional. The judges’ communications were ethical and did not deny Hampton a fair trial. Any error in permitting the jury to deliberate remotely for one day was harmless because that deliberation did not result in a finding of guilt. View "People v. Hampton" on Justia Law

Three private contractors providing war-zone security services to the Department of Defense (DOD) appealed a district court order remanding to Nevada state court this suit brought by a group of their employees who guarded DOD bases, equipment, and personnel in Iraq. The guards alleged that their working conditions violated the contractors’ recruiting representations, their employment contracts, and the Theater Wide Internal Security Services II (TWISS II) contract between the contractors and the Department of Defense.The Ninth Circuit reversed. The panel held that the contractors met the limited burden imposed by the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. Section 1442(a)(1), which permits removal of a civil action against “any officer (or any person acting under that officer) of the United States or of any agency thereof . . . for or relating to any act under color of such office.” To satisfy this requirement, a removing private entity must show that (a) it is a “person” within the meaning of the statute; (b) there is a causal nexus between its actions, taken pursuant to a federal officer’s directions, and the plaintiff’s claims; and (c) it can assert a colorable federal defense. There was no dispute that the contractors, as corporations, were “persons” for purposes of Section 1442(a)(1). The panel held that the contractors sufficiently pleaded that there was a causal nexus between their actions and the guards’ claims. View "NICHOLAS DEFIORE, ET AL V. SOC LLC, ET AL" on Justia Law

Defendant Joseph Das appealed a trial court’s denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. The trial court denied the petition without issuing an order to show cause or holding an evidentiary hearing, concluding the stated factual basis for defendant’s guilty plea refuted the allegations in his petition for resentencing, rendering him ineligible for relief. While the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court’s assessment that the stated factual basis, if true, demonstrated defendant stabbed the attempted murder victim with the intent to kill, defendant did not stipulate to the factual basis or otherwise admit the truth of the facts recited by the prosecutor. The Court agreed with defendant that the trial court improperly engaged in factfinding at the prima facie stage and reversed for that reason. View "California v. Das" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from a partial final judgment of the district court dismissing his Connecticut state law claims for defamation and tortious interference with contract against Defendant, who accused Plaintiff of sexual assault in 2015 while the two were students at Yale University. Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in finding (1) Defendant to enjoy absolute quasi-judicial immunity for statements made at the 2018 Yale disciplinary hearing that resulted in Plaintiff’s expulsion from the university and (2) Plaintiff’s tortious interference claims based on Defendant’s original 2015 accusations to be untimely. On preliminary review, the Second Circuit was unable to determine whether Connecticut would recognize the Yale disciplinary hearing at issue as a quasi-judicial proceeding supporting absolute immunity in this case. Accordingly, the court certified questions pertinent to that determination to the Connecticut Supreme Court. That court responded that absolute immunity does not apply in this case because Yale’s disciplinary hearing was not a quasi-judicial proceeding in that it lacked procedural safeguards associated with judicial proceedings.   In response, The Second Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court explained that while the Connecticut Supreme Court recognized the possibility for participants in such a hearing to be shielded by qualified immunity, the Connecticut Supreme Court concluded that Defendant is not presently entitled to dismissal on that ground because Plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently pleads the malice necessary to defeat such immunity. With this guidance as to Connecticut law, the court concluded on this appeal that Plaintiff’s complaint should not have been dismissed against Defendant except as to his tortious interference claim based on 2015 statements, which is untimely. View "Khan v. Yale Univ." on Justia Law

Defendant, a school resource officer, took issue with Plaintiff’s plan for managing her son’s afternoons and eventually sought and obtained arrest warrants for first- and second-degree child cruelty—felonies that are punishable by mandatory prison terms. Plaintiff was arrested, charged with both crimes and spent four days in jail before posting bond. All charges were eventually dismissed. Plaintiff sued Defendant for malicious prosecution under both federal and state law. The district court granted Defendant summary judgment on the ground that she had probable cause to believe that Plaintiff had engaged in both first and second-degree child cruelty.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed. The court, applying the summary-judgment standard, the court that, taken together (1) the facts that Defendant included in the affidavits that she filed in support of the arrest warrants and (2) the material facts that she knew but omitted from those affidavits do not support even arguable probable cause to believe that Plaintiff committed first- or second-degree child cruelty under Georgia law. Accordingly, the court held that Defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity. Further, the court held that Plaintiff presented a genuine dispute about whether Defendant acted with “malice.” Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Defendant had a close relationship with Plaintiff’s son, she felt disrespected by Plaintiff, she sought the arrest warrants very soon thereafter, seemingly without substantial additional investigation, and she inexplicably omitted material exculpatory information from her affidavits. Collectively, those facts give rise to a reasonable inference that Defendant didn’t just make a mistake. View "Kameron Butler v. Charlene Smith" on Justia Law

Defendant Keith Chandler was convicted by jury on five counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault, two counts of attempted aggravated felonious sexual assault, and two counts of felonious sexual assault. Defendant argued on appeal that the trial court erred when it: (1) denied his motion in limine to preclude the admission of a printed image of electronically stored information; (2) denied his motion for a new trial based upon ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3) failed to disclose records following in camera review. THe New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed in part, but remanded for the trial court to review the confidential records in accordance with the standard set forth in New Hampshire v. Girard, 173 N.H. 619 (2020). "When the trial court conducted its in camera review, it did not have the benefit of our opinion in [Girard]. We agree with the parties that this case should be remanded for the purpose of having the trial court review any undisclosed records again, in accordance with the standard set forth in Girard. If the trial court concludes that the records do contain evidence that should have been disclosed to the defense, the court may release that evidence to the parties with any necessary protective order, taking into account the victim’s rights ... If the court releases any evidence to the parties, the court should then provide the parties with an opportunity to make arguments as to whether a new trial is warranted." View "New Hampshire v. Chandler" on Justia Law