Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Cortney Bell was convicted by jury of second degree murder, second degree cruelty to children, and felony contributing to the dependency of a minor in connection with the death of her infant daughter, Caliyah. The Court of Appeals reversed Bell’s convictions for second degree murder and cruelty to children on appeal, concluding that the evidence was insufficient to support those charges. It affirmed her conviction for felony contributing to the dependency of a minor, and the Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the evidence was legally sufficient to support Bell’s conviction on that charge. Because the Supreme Court concluded, based on the facts of this case, that the evidence was insufficient to authorize a jury to conclude that Caliyah’s death was proximately caused by Bell’s conduct as alleged in the indictment, it reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "Bell v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Louisiana prisoner, sued the Louisiana Board of Pardons and Parole (“Parole Board”), seeking to have his parole reinstated on the grounds that its rescission just prior to its effective date violated his due process rights. The district court agreed with Plaintiff and ordered his release on parole within 30 days. On appeal, the Parole Board’s arguments include that there is no constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained the State bases its argument on the premise that the Parole Board has unfettered discretion in all aspects of parole and release decisions. In support of its position, the State relied on an unpublished opinion, Burton v. Bd. of Parole. The court wrote that the opinion relies on Sinclair for its analysis, which the court has already rejected as inapplicable in this case. The court concluded the same now with regard to Burton because, there, the Louisiana First Circuit was considering an appeal from a prisoner’s denial of parole. The opinion discusses “expectancy of release,” while the question here is whether there are limits on the Parole Board to rescind parole after its formal grant but before the effective date of release. The court agreed and explained that Plaintiff’s parole was ostensibly rescinded because of an alleged problem with notice to a victim. He was notified of this reason on May 1, 2017, 10 days after his parole was rescinded. At the time, that was not a permissible reason to rescind his grant of parole. Therefore, Plaintiff’s parole was improperly rescinded. View "Galbraith v. Hooper" on Justia Law

BioCorRx, Inc. (BioCorRx) was a publicly traded company primarily engaged in the business of providing addiction treatment services and related medication. It issued several press releases that allegedly made misrepresentations and improperly disclosed confidential information about a treatment it was developing for opioid overdose. VDM Biochemicals, Inc. (VDM) specializes in the synthesis and distribution of chemicals, reagents, and other specialty products for life science research. It owned a patent (the patent) for VDM-001, a compound with potential use as a treatment for opioid overdose. In September 2018, VDM and BioCorRx entered into a Mutual Nondisclosure & Confidentiality Agreement (the NDA), which restricted each party’s disclosure of confidential information as they discussed forming a business relationship. A month later, VDM and BioCorRx signed a Letter of Intent to Enter Definitive Agreement to Acquire Stake in Intellectual Property (the letter of intent). The letter of intent memorialized the parties’ shared desire whereby BioCorRx would partner with VDM to develop and commercialize VDM-001. BioCorRx and VDM never signed a formal contract concerning VDM-001. Their relationship eventually soured. BioCorRx filed a complaint (the complaint) against VDM; VDM cross-complained. In response, BioCorRx filed the anti-SLAPP motion at issue here, seeking to strike all the allegations from the cross-complaint concerning the press releases. The Court of Appeal found these statements fell within the commercial speech exemption of California's Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP statute) because they were representations about BioCorRx’s business operations that were made to investors to promote its goods and services through the sale of its securities. Since these statements were not protected by the anti-SLAPP statute, the Court reversed the part of the trial court’s order granting the anti-SLAPP motion as to the press releases. The Court affirmed the unchallenged portion of the order striking unrelated allegations. View "BioCorRx, Inc. v. VDM Biochemicals, Inc." on Justia Law

Chapter 423 of the Texas Government Code governs the operation of unmanned aerial vehicles—drones—in Texas airspace. In this case, Plaintiffs claimed a sweeping First Amendment right to use unmanned aerial drones to film private individuals and property without their consent. They also assert a constitutional right to fly drones at low altitudes over critical infrastructure facilities like prisons and large sports venues.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to enter judgment in Defendants’ favor on the constitutional claims. The court explained that it disagreed with Plaintiffs claim that a sweeping First Amendment right to use unmanned aerial drones to film private individuals and property without their consent. The court explained that though it does not foreclose any as-applied constitutional defenses to any hypothetical future prosecutions under the drone laws, we hold that these facial challenges fail. The court also rejected Plaintiffs’ cross-appeal claiming that federal regulations occupy the entire field of drone regulation. On this issue, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the field-preemption claim. The court explained that federal law expressly contemplates concurrent non-federal regulation of drones, especially where privacy and critical infrastructure are concerned. View "National Press v. McCraw" on Justia Law

Castro-White died from a drug overdose. Detective Sivert noticed that Castro-White’s phone had many missed calls from Karaplis, who implicated others but lied to Sivert by denying any involvement. Later, after admitting his involvement, Karaplis described the drug dealer, “Red,” Red’s car, Red’s phone number, and, using Google Maps, the specific home where he bought drugs from Red. Sivert traveled to this home and spotted a nearby car p that fit Karaplis’s description and was registered to “Russell Davis,” called “Big Red.” Karaplis identified Davis’s picture with “100 percent” confidence. Sivert had Karaplis set up a phone call with Davis to discuss Castro-White’s death. Sivert then obtained a warrant to search Davis’s Garden Avenue home. During the search, police found the phone and illegal drugs. Davis unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence and was given a mandatory life sentence.The Sixth Circuit remanded for an evidentiary hearing about what Sivert told the magistrate in person. Although the magistrate described his general practice, he lacked a “specific recollection” of Davis’s case. Sivert was “sure” that he had conveyed the many facts connecting Davis to the home. The court again denied Davis’s motion, despite finding that the affidavit failed to establish a probable-cause nexus between Davis and the home. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Sivert uncovered overwhelming evidence tying Davis to the home and the magistrate (not Sivert) bore any blame for failing to transcribe the additional oral testimony. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

Zakhari, in a program to become a cardiothoracic surgeon, engaged in online sexually explicit conversations with a profile (boredcrbgirl) created by a detective, claiming to be a 15-year-old girl. He received an image of an officer. Zakhari sent an Uber to take boredcrbgirl to his apartment for sex. The officer arrived at Zakhari’s residence in the Uber. Zakhari was arrested. The detective interrogated him after giving the Miranda warnings. Zakhari said, “I can answer some questions and then maybe call.” After responding to basic questions, he said: My sister’s an attorney. Asked if he wanted to call her, Zakhari said “yeah,” then paused. The detective interjected that such a call would end the questioning. Zakhari continued to answer questions and made incriminating statements.Zakhari was convicted of attempting to persuade a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b), attempting to transmit an obscene image to a minor, section 1470, and attempting to produce child pornography sections 2251(a)(e). Zakhari unsuccessfully moved to suppress his statements. The court declined to strike the third charge on grounds of prosecutorial vindictiveness.The Sixth Circuit vacated the convictions. The suppression motion should have been granted. The factual context shows Zakhari had “lawyerly assistance” in mind in wanting to call his sister and the invocation was not ambiguous. The court abused its discretion in failing to require the government to substantiate its explanations concerning Count 3. Zakhari showed enough to presume vindictiveness. View "United States v. Zakhari" on Justia Law

On November 18, 2022, Ashleigh Walthour drove her car off a snowy road into some trees. She ran the four or five blocks to her home and called the Aurora Police Department. When the police arrived at Walthour’s home to speak with her, she smelled like alcohol and had slurred speech, dilated pupils, and bloodshot eyes. She admitted to having consumed a shooter of Jack Daniels and was unable to perform voluntary roadside maneuvers. Walthour was arrested and taken to the Aurora City Jail, where she consented to a blood test. The police submitted Walthour’s blood sample to the CBI for processing on November 23. Walthour appeared in court for the first time on January 6, 2023. At that hearing, she notified the court that she would seek the assistance of the Public Defender’s Office. The court set a second hearing for February 6. However, at the second hearing, Walthour explained that she had not qualified for a public defender and would be representing herself. At the same hearing, the State said it had not yet received the blood test results from the CBI but that they “should” have the results “hopefully within the next week or two.” The court set a third pretrial conference for March 7 and directed the prosecution to disclose the test results by February 28 at 5 p.m. The prosecutor did not have any test results to disclose on that date. The trial court announced that it would suppress blood alcohol test results when no trial had been set and the prosecution had not yet received the results of the test from the Colorado Bureau of Investigation (“CBI”). A day later, on March 8, the prosecutor received the blood test results from the CBI. The Colorado Supreme Court found Colorado Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(I)(b)(3), which required prosecutors to disclose the results of scientific exams such as blood alcohol tests to defendants “as soon as practicable but not later than [thirty-five] days before trial,” did not support the trial court's preemptive suppression. The matter was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Walthour" on Justia Law

The Commonwealth appealed a Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) court’s grant of relief to Appellee Michael Conforti, vacating his convictions for murder of the first degree, kidnapping, rape, criminal conspiracy to commit murder, criminal conspiracy to commit rape and criminal conspiracy to commit kidnapping and his resulting death sentence. Conforti’s convictions and sentence stem from the 1990 kidnapping, rape, and murder of Kathleen Harbison. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the PCRA court’s determination that the Commonwealth committed a Brady violation by failing to disclose another accused perpetrator, James Bellman’s psychological reports. Bellman testified against Conforti at Conforti's trial. Relevant here, immediately prior to a November 2021 PCRA hearing, the Commonwealth provided Conforti’s counsel with two mental health reports relating to Bellman from 1980. The reports were created as part of a criminal case Bellman had in Wayne County in 1979. Bellman was then evaluated by two psychiatrists, both of whom prepared written reports diagnosing Bellman as a sociopath. The PCRA court found that the reports “remained in the possession of the Commonwealth and only surfaced” during the PCRA hearing on November 5, 2021. As such, according to the PCRA court, none of the evidence of Bellman’s mental health issues was disclosed to Conforti’s defense counsel during trial. The PCRA court found that the information contained in the reports would have been extremely damaging to Bellman’s credibility. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the PCRA court's determination the Commonwealth committed a Brady violation by failing to disclose Bellman's psychological reports: "because of the importance of Bellman’s testimony, if those reports were properly disclosed there is a reasonable probability the result of Conforti’s trial would have been different, as it could have led the jury to discredit Bellman’s testimony and given more credit to Conforti’s testimony that he was not involved in Ms. Harbison’s murder. Conforti was prejudiced by the Commonwealth’s nondisclosure." View "Pennsylvania v. Conforti" on Justia Law

Plaintiff John Frank sued Wyoming state and local officials in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, contending Wyoming's electioneering statute violated the First Amendment, facially and as applied. Frank, a Wyoming citizen, and alleging the statute unconstitutionally prevented him from handing out campaign literature and displaying bumper stickers on his car within the 300-foot buffer zone. Frank also claimed the statute was overbroad because it violated the First Amendment rights of third parties who could not display campaign signs on private property falling within the statutory buffer zones. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The court granted each in part, striking down some parts of the electioneering statute and upholding the rest. Specifically, the district court held the ban on electioneering within 300 feet of polling places on election day was unconstitutional, as was the ban on bumper stickers within the election day and absentee period buffer zones. But the district court upheld the statute’s prohibition on electioneering within 100 feet of absentee polling places. It also concluded there was an insufficient factual basis to consider Plaintiff’s overbreadth claim. After its review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The Court upheld the electioneering statute against Frank’s First Amendment challenge to the size of, and conduct proscribed within, the 300-foot election-day buffer zone. The Court reversed and remanded on Frank’s constitutional challenge to the absentee buffer zone, including the electioneering conduct proscribed within that zone. Finally, the Court remanded for the district court to adjudicate in the first instance Frank’s facial overbreadth challenge. View "Frank, et al. v. Wyoming Secretary of State, et al." on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of qualified immunity following Plaintiff’s Section 1983 false arrest claim and a state law false arrest claim against two Huntsville, Alabama police officers and the City itself. Plaintiff brought both a Section 1983 false arrest claim and a state law false arrest claim against two Huntsville, Alabama, police officers and the City itself. After the district court concluded that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because they had arguable probable cause to arrest Plaintiff, he appealed.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. The court explained that the officers violated Plaintiff’s clearly established Fourth Amendment rights when they arrested him with neither actual nor arguable probable cause. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s state law claims against Defendants because it determined that arguable probable cause was a defense to those claims as well. The court wrote that the district court did not conduct any independent analysis of these claims and instead linked its decision directly to the finding of arguable probable cause on the federal claims. There was no actual probable cause to conclude that Plaintiff was driving a car without displaying his license at the time the officer arrived. Nor could any reasonable officer interpret the law as permitting arrest in this case, and therefore there was no arguable probable cause either. Accordingly, the court held that there was no arguable probable cause—i.e., the lack of probable cause was clearly established. View "Roland Edger v. Krista McCabe, et al." on Justia Law