Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit reversed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment for Appellants on their claim brought under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, holding that the district court should not have dismissed the Title IX claim.MG, a minor child, alleged that he was harassed by fellow students while he was attending Brooke Charter School East Boston. Appellants - MG's mother, on behalf of herself, MG, and his four minor siblings - brought suit against the school asserting claims under Title IX, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and Massachusetts state law. The federal district court granted summary judgment for the school on all claims. The First Circuit reversed the summary judgment on Appellants' Title IX claim and remanded the case, holding that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on the Title IX claim. View "Grace v. Board of Trustees" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(1). The district court sentenced Defendant to 240 months imprisonment, applying the sentencing enhancement provided by the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), after finding that Defendant had three qualifying predicate convictions for a “serious drug offense” or “violent felony.” But after the Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United States, striking down the “residual clause” of ACCA’s violent-felony definition as unconstitutional, 576 U.S. 591, 606 (2015), Defendant filed a Section 2255 motion to vacate his ACCA sentence. He argued that Maryland first-degree assault—which formed the basis for two of his ACCA predicate offenses—was not a “violent felony” under ACCA. The district court denied Defendant’s motion, and he appealed.   The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s Section 2255 motion, vacated Defendant’s ACCA sentence. The court explained that it is quite plain from Maryland’s statutory scheme and from the case law interpreting it, that reckless conduct is included. Therefore, Defendant’s inability to point to a specific case is not dispositive. Rather, the terms of the statute and the decisions of Maryland courts show that a Maryland prosecutor could bring charges for first-degree assault against a defendant for recklessly committing an assault with a firearm. The court concluded that the Maryland first-degree-assault statute sets out an indivisible offense and that one of the modalities of that offense—assault with a firearm—can be committed with a mens rea of recklessness. View "US v. Garfield Redd" on Justia Law

Defendant Deborah Reed moved to suppress evidence resulting from a police interrogation. In her motion, defendant asserted that police officers violated Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution when they interrogated her in compelling circumstances without first advising her of her Miranda rights. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that the interrogation did not occur in compelling circumstances. The case proceeded to a bench trial, and the trial court convicted defendant of multiple drug offenses. Thereafter, defendant’s probation in an earlier case was revoked based in part on the evidence resulting from the interrogation and her new convictions. Defendant appealed both the judgment of conviction and the judgment revoking her probation, challenging the trial court’s conclusion that the interrogation did not occur in compelling circumstances. The appeals were consolidated, and the Court of Appeals affirmed both judgments. After review, the Oregon Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding the interrogation occurred in "compelling circumstances." View "Oregon v. Reed" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s son spent several months at a medium-security facility in St. Louis called “the Workhouse.” None of the guards saw Plaintiff’s son receive or take fentanyl, the drug that killed him. Inmates tried to help by rubbing ice on him once he lost consciousness. Upon arriving a few minutes later, three Officers radioed for medical assistance. In the meantime, rather than try to resuscitate Plaintiff’s son themselves, they stood by and watched as two inmates tried to help him. When trained medical personnel finally arrived four minutes later, it was too late: they were unable to revive Plaintiff’s son, who died from an overdose. Surveillance footage captured some, but not all, of these events. Plaintiff’s mother sued the City of St. Louis, the three responding officers, and two supervisors for their deliberate indifference. The district court denied summary judgment to the responding officers.   The Eighth Circuit vacated and remanded. The court held that the district court misstated the burden and relied on allegations from an unverified complaint to deny summary judgment. The court wrote that the district court erred in how it dealt with the gaps in the video footage. Instead of relying on other evidence to fill in the missing details, the findings mirrored what the plaintiff’s unverified complaint said. The court wrote that unsworn allegations are no substitute for evidence at summary judgment. The court explained that the district court tilted the scales too far in the Plaintiff’s favor by raising the summary-judgment burden on the officers and allowing unsworn allegations to rebut evidence. View "Janice Washington v. City of St. Louis, Missouri" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court denying the State's motion to dismiss the second petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by David Lee in 2004, holding that Lee's claim for habeas relief must be denied.Lee brought his second habeas corpus petition in 2004, alleging that his habeas counsel was ineffective for failing to seek a certificate of probable cause in his first habeas corpus proceeding. It wasn't until 2019, however, that Lee served the State with the provisional writ. The State moved to dismiss the writ, arguing that after the expiration of the statutory 30-day period for filing a motion for a certificate of probable cause under S.D. Codified Laws 21-27-18.1, the court did not have the authority to issue a certificate of probable cause. The circuit court denied the motions to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Lee had no right to appeal absent a certificate of probable cause issued by the habeas court or a member of the Supreme Court, and Lee had no right to a certificate of probable cause; and (2) even if Lee's habeas counsel was ineffective, it did not deprive Lee of any constitutional or statutory right that may be vindicated in a habeas corpus proceeding. View "Lee v. Weber" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the trial court applying New York's Rape Shield Law, N.Y. C.P.L. 60.42, to exclude forensic evidence proffered by Defendant to demonstrate that that the evidence the prosecution was seeking to attribute to him was consistent with masturbation or sexual contact with a third-party, holding that the trial court erred in applying the Rape Shield Law in this case, depriving Defendant of his constitutional right to present a defense.Defendant was charged with two counts of first-degree sexual abuse arising from allegations that he digitally penetrated his minor relative's vagina and fondled her breasts. The jury convicted Defendant of the sexual abuse charge related to the alleged digital penetration of the complainant's vagina. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting Defendant's argument that the trial court improperly excluded the forensic evidence under CPL 60.42. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court's exclusion of the forensic evidence at issue deprived Defendant of a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. View "People v. Cerda" on Justia Law

Lighthart had dated both Buchanan and the victim, who was known to have access to large amounts of money. Lighthart drove the victim to a residence, knowing that Buchanan was there intending to rob the victim. Buchanan beat the victim, demanding money, and eventually shot him to death. Lighthart then injected the victim with a solution that contained Drano or attempted to do so. After cleaning the scene, they disposed of the body by setting it on fire inside the victim’s Jeep in a rural field. In 2004, Lighthart, then 23, entered a partially negotiated plea of guilty to first-degree murder, in exchange for the dismissal of other charges and a sentencing cap of 35 years. Lighthart filed a motion to reduce her 35-year sentence and, subsequently, an untimely pro se motion to withdraw her plea, asserting that she was the victim of domestic violence and ineffective assistance of counsel. After an 11-½ year delay following remand and changes in counsel, the appellate court affirmed the dismissal of her 725 ILCS 5/122-1 post-conviction petition as untimely.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. An ineffective notice of appeal from a negotiated guilty plea, which is dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction due to failure to follow procedural requirements (Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d)) triggers a six-month limitations period for bringing a postconviction petition. However, under the circumstances, Lighthart could not have been culpably negligent in the untimely filing of her petition. View "People v. Lighthart" on Justia Law

In 2012, Givens, Dudley, and Strong burglarized a store and attempted to escape by backing a van out of a closed garage door, striking a police officer. Chicago police officers fired their weapons at the van, resulting in Strong’s death and injuries to Dudley and Givens, who were convicted of felony murder, aggravated battery to a peace officer, and possession of a stolen motor vehicle.Dudley, Givens, and Strong’s estate sued the City, alleging the use of excessive force. With respect to Dudley and Givens, the circuit court granted Chicago summary judgment based on the collateral estoppel effect of their prior criminal proceedings. The estate’s lawsuit resulted in a partial verdict for the estate. The circuit court granted Chicago’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) based on the jury’s answers to special interrogatories. The appellate court reversed, holding that collateral estoppel did not bar Dudley and Givens from litigating their claims and the circuit court erred in vacating the verdict.The Illinois Supreme Court agreed that collateral estoppel did not bar the suit by Dudley and Givens. Chicago did not establish with “clarity and certainty” that the identical question was decided in the earlier proceeding The court reinstated the JNOV. The circuit court properly held that the jury’s special finding related to an ultimate issue of fact upon which the rights of the parties depended and was clearly and absolutely irreconcilable with the verdict returned. View "Givens v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Pacheco was convicted of aggravated assault and other offenses after he tried to hit a Joliet police officer with his car. During the incident, the officer shot and injured Pacheco. The appellate court reversed, finding that the trial court violated Pacheco’s right to confrontation by prohibiting defense counsel from cross-examining the officer who shot Pacheco as to whether the officer believed he could lose his job if the shooting was found to be unjustified and finding the trial court erred in granting the prosecution’s motion in limine to bar defense counsel from asking the officer and his partner why they did not write police reports regarding the incident.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and remanded. The limitation imposed on the officer’s cross-examination was necessary to avoid a highly prejudicial outcome to Pacheco–the admission of testimony that a review panel had found the shooting to be justified. Cross-examination was not otherwise limited. Because of department policy, the officers had no choice about writing reports and their failure to do so was irrelevant to any question of bias or credibility. The question would have distracted the jury from the question of determining the guilt or innocence of Pacheco. View "People v. Pacheco" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court in this real property dispute, holding that the escheat provision of Va. Code 58.1-3967, as applied to the factual circumstances of this case, violated Va. Const. art. I, 11.The City of Richmond obtained a judicial sale of a parcel of property that was subject to a statutory lien for delinquent taxes. The circuit court confirmed the sale and directed that the City's lien for delinquent taxes, along with its costs and legal fees, be fully paid by the purchase proceeds. Although the sale proceeds satisfied the tax lien, the circuit court concluded that section 58.1-3967 required it to award a portion of the surplus sale proceeds to the City instead of an unsatisfied junior lienor. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, as applied to this particular case, section 58.1-3967 unconstitutionally authorized the City to take the proceeds and keep them for itself. View "McKeithen v. City of Richmond" on Justia Law