Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendants responded to calls from the decedent’s neighbor that he was driving a pickup truck erratically on a rural field on his own property, that he was drunk and belligerent and may have fired a gun. An hour after thirty officers arrived at the property in marked police cars with their overhead lights on, Defendants used an unmarked armored vehicle to twice execute a pursuit intervention technique (“PIT”) maneuver by intentionally colliding with decedent’s truck in the field. Officers reportedly shot decedent after they thought they heard a gunshot and saw a rifle pointed at them. Decedent’s widow brought this civil suit seeking damages from the officers and the County pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and state law. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment. The panel first rejected Plaintiff’s argument that Defendants violated decedent’s Fourth Amendment rights by entering the property without a warrant. The officers’ decision not to obtain a warrant before entering the property was not the proximate cause of decedent’s death. The panel next held that a jury could find that Defendants’ second PIT maneuver constituted deadly and excessive force because (1) it created a substantial risk of serious bodily injury, (2) decedent did not pose an imminent threat to the officers or others at that point, and (3) less intrusive alternatives were available. Nevertheless, no clearly established law would have provided adequate notice to reasonable officers that their use of the armored vehicle to execute a low-speed PIT maneuver under these circumstances was unconstitutional. View "APRIL SABBE V. WASHINGTON CNTY BD OF COMM'RS, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant, The Riverside County District Attorney, appealed a trial court’s dismissal of three felony charges against defendant-respondent Danny Manzo due to evidence lost during the prosecution’s five-year delay in prosecuting the case after filing charges against defendant. Because there was no evidence that the loss of evidence prejudiced defendant, the Court reversed the order dismissing the complaint. View "California v. Manzo" on Justia Law

Storme faced multiple charges of cyberstalking and unauthorized intrusion into a cell phone. He was ordered released on bond into the custody of his mother subject to conditions. He immediately attempted suicide. Months later, Pretrial Services reported that Storme had violated his curfew over 30 times and had been arrested for allegedly stalking a fourth woman. Storme was abusing alcohol and expressing suicidal ideation. The court did not his revoke release. Storme's mother moved to Virginia. The court did not appoint a new custodian. Months later, the court received a report from Storme’s therapist, expressing concern that Storme would kill himself if he thought the court might deny his motion to dismiss. Storme then began transferring assets to his mother and appeared multiple times in court to watch unrelated proceedings before his assigned judge.The district court heard arguments, then, without advance notice, revoked Storme’s pretrial release and ordered him detained, without making supporting findings. Storme began slamming his head to the floor and urging the marshals to kill him. In a holding cell, he tried to hang himself. After review by the Seventh Circuit, the government filed a motion to revoke. The district court granted its motion, finding probable cause to believe that, while on release, Storme committed crimes and otherwise violated his release conditions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that the court reached the correct conclusion, based on the ongoing threat to the community, despite procedural irregularities under the Bail Reform Act (18 U.S.C. 3142(d)). View "United States v. Storme" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's conviction of attempt to possess pseudoephedrine in an altered state and remanded this case for further proceedings, holding that the circuit court plainly erred by finding a factual basis for Defendant's no contest plea.Defendant was charged in an indictment with possession of pseudoephedrine in an altered state, a felony. Defendant pled nolo contendere to attempt to possess pseudoephedrine in an altered state and was sentenced to one to three years' imprisonment. Defendant appealed, challenging the circuit court's denial of his motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's conviction, holding that the circuit court erred when it found that a factual basis existed for a plea to attempt to commit possession of pseudoephedrine in an altered state where the only evidence was Defendant's possession of completed methamphetamine. View "State v. Finley" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and using a firearm during a crime of violence. Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255. He argued that his Section 924(c) conviction and its mandatory 15-year consecutive sentence should be vacated because his predicate crime, voluntary manslaughter, does not qualify as a crime of violence.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion. The panel wrote that for purposes of Section 924(c), voluntary manslaughter has the same mental state as murder—intent to commit a violent act against another or recklessness with extreme indifference to human life. Like murder, voluntary manslaughter requires at least an “extreme and necessarily oppositional” state of mind. The panel held that the district court therefore properly denied Defendant’s Section 2255 motion. View "USA V. DANIEL DRAPER" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged in a five-count indictment with attempted bank robbery involving assault with a dangerous weapon. The district court found Defendant guilty of the five offenses and sentenced him to 230 months imprisonment. Defendant appealed his conviction, arguing the evidence was insufficient to convict him of any offense; the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress involuntary custodial statements he made to an FBI agent; and the district court erred by failing to include the term “knowingly” in reciting the elements of the Count II, III, and IV offenses when explaining its decision during a post-trial hearing.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court considers the evidence submitted at trial and makes findings of fact and conclusions of law in determining whether the government has proved the offenses charged in the indictment beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, the indictment charged that Defendant “knowingly” brandished and used a pistol during and in relation to a crime of violence (Count II), “knowingly” discharged and used a pistol during and in relation to a crime of violence (Count III), and “knowingly” discharged and used an AR-15 rifle during and in relation to a crime of violence (Count IV). The court explained that neither filed a post-trial motion challenging the court’s findings and conclusions even though stand-by counsel was granted a one-month extension of time to do so. The evidence that Defendant committed these three offenses “knowingly” was overwhelming. There was no error, plain or otherwise. View "United States v. Jacob Monteer" on Justia Law

Roberts was convicted for federal crimes relating to the death of Caldwell, who was in a child-custody dispute with his ex-wife (Roberts’ girlfriend). Roberts tried to kill, or at least seriously harm, Caldwell by luring him through false guise to a remote location. Caldwell escaped but was later murdered after a family counseling session.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Roberts’ arguments under the Confrontation Clause, federal evidentiary rules, and the attorney-client privilege, that the district court improperly admitted evidence related to the earlier attack and other incriminating proof and his two constitutional challenges to the interstate stalking statute under which he was convicted, 18 U.S.C. 2261A, claiming that it exceeded congressional power under the Commerce Clause and that the counts of his conviction are multiplicitous. Testimonial statements are allowed into evidence under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception, Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6), for “[a] statement offered against a party that wrongfully caused . . . the declarant’s unavailability as a witness, and did so intending that result.” Caldwell was the declarant of the written-witness statement and an affidavit, which were to be used against Roberts, who intentionally caused Caldwell’s unavailability as a witness. The court also upheld the admission of “excited utterances’ made by Roberts to Caldwell’s attorney. View "United States v. Roberts" on Justia Law

This case presents the questions of what Defendant must prove to establish affirmative defenses to pay-discrimination claims under federal and state laws: the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”) and New York Labor Law Section 194(1). Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Culinary Institute of America, violated these equal-pay laws by compensating her less than a male colleague. The Culinary Institute responded that a “factor other than sex”—its sex-neutral compensation plan, which incorporates a collective bargaining agreement—justifies the pay disparity. Plaintiff argued that the compensation plan cannot qualify as a “factor other than sex” because it creates a pay disparity unconnected to differences between her job and her colleague’s job. The district court did not consider the divergent requirements imposed by the EPA and Section 194(1) when assessing Plaintiff’s claims and the Culinary Institute’s defense.   The Second Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded insofar as the district court granted summary judgment for Defendant on the Section 194(1) claim. The court explained that Plaintiff’s position that a “factor other than sex” must be job-related is incorrect as to the EPA. The plain meaning of the EPA indicates the opposite. The court held that to establish the EPA’s “factor other than sex” defense, a defendant must prove only that the pay disparity in question results from a differential based on any factor except for sex. But Plaintiff’s position is correct as to New York Labor Law Section 194(1). A recent amendment to Section 194(1) explicitly added a job-relatedness requirement. View "Eisenhauer v. Culinary Institute of America" on Justia Law

Defendant challenged the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the forty-five-year sentence imposed by the district court following her guilty plea to one count of conspiracy to sexually exploit a child and two substantive counts of sexual exploitation of a child. On appeal, Defendant argues that the district court erred when it (1) predetermined her sentence at the outset of the sentencing proceeding, (2) failed to verify at sentencing whether she and her counsel had read and discussed the presentence investigation report, (3) miscalculated her offense level under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, and (4) imposed a substantively unreasonable term of imprisonment.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court rejected Defendant’s contentions that the district court predetermined her sentence and imposed a substantively unreasonable term of imprisonment. The court also rejected Defendant’s claim that the district court’s purported miscalculation of her offense level under the Guidelines warrants remand in this case. With respect to Defendant’s remaining argument, the court agreed that the district court failed to verify whether she and her counsel had read and discussed the PSR in advance of sentencing, as is required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(1)(A). The court concluded that the error was not prejudicial. View "United States v. Gates" on Justia Law

The case at hand is about whether Plaintiff was retaliated against by her former employer, Advanced Pharmaceutical Consultants, Inc. (“APC”), and the company that contracted with her employer, Centurion of Florida, LLC (“Centurion”) (together, “Defendants”), for engaging in protected activity. Plaintiff’s complaint alleged four counts. Centurion and APC both moved for summary judgment on all counts. The district court granted summary judgment on three of them. The district court directed the clerk to enter a final judgment on the three resolved counts, and it certified that the fourth count satisfied the requirements of 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(b) for immediate interlocutory review, should either party file an appropriate application with the Eleventh Circuit. At issue is whether the district court’s certification was proper as to Plaintiff’s direct appeal and whether the requirements of 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(b) have been met as to Centurion’s cross-appeal.
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the answer to both questions is not and dismissed the appeals for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The court explained that there are substantial reasons to delay resolving Plaintiff’s appeal of her whistleblower counts against APC. Plaintiff’s whistleblower counts against Centurion and APC are identical. It makes good sense that appeals of an order dismissing those counts should be heard together. But because there is no final judgment against Centurion, the court wrote that it lacks the power to adjudicate those counts against Centurion at this time. View "Ronda Scott v. Advanced Pharmaceutical Consultants Inc, et al." on Justia Law