Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for panel rehearing, and denied a petition for rehearing en banc, in a case in which the panel: (1) reversed a judgment of the district court granting Petitioner's habeas petition challenging his continued immigration detention after an initial bond hearing; and (2) held that due process does not require a second bond hearing.Judge Paez issued a statement regarding the court's denial. Judge Paez joined by Judges Murguia, Wardlaw, Gould, Berzon, Koh, Sung, Sanchez, H.A. Thomas, Mendoza, and Desai, wrote that the panel opinion conflicts with Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2011). View "AROLDO RODRIGUEZ DIAZ V. MERRICK GARLAND, ET AL" on Justia Law

Petitioner Matthew Ingle waived his right to a jury trial and raised an insanity defense. The trial court found petitioner “guilty except for insanity” on all charges and placed him under the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board and committed him to the Oregon State Hospital. More than eight years after his convictions became final, petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner requested and received court-appointed counsel, who amended the petition. In the operative petition, petitioner acknowledged that the limitations period had run but asserted that an “escape clause” applied. Specifically, he asserted that the escape clause applied because, during the limitations period, he was disabled by “diagnosed schizophrenia” and the “forced consumption of extremely powerful psychotropic medications” and that those conditions “deprived him of the ability” to file a timely petition. The State moved to dismiss the petition, asserting that petitioner’s mental impairments were irrelevant to whether the escape clause applied. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded petitioner’s allegations were sufficient to raise a triable issue on the applicability of the escape clause. Consequently, the post-conviction court erred in granting the State’s motion to dismiss on the pleadings. That judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Ingle v. Matteucci" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of two counts of rape, three counts of first-degree sexual assault, and two counts of sexual indecency with a child and sentencing him to two terms of life imprisonment, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the circuit court abused its discretion by admitting testimony of a certain witness under the pedophile exception to Ark. R. Evid. 404(b). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's first argument was not preserved for appellate review; (2) Defendant's argument that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial was not preserved; and (3) the circuit court did not err in excluding evidence of the victims' prior sexual conduct pursuant to the rape-shield statute set forth in Ark. Code Ann. 16-42-101(c). View "Wilder v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of capital murder and his sentence to life in prison, holding that substantial evidence supported the conviction.After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the murder of his ex-wife and sentenced to life imprisonment. As his sole point on appeal, Defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence supporting his conviction, and therefore, the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed, holding that there was substantial evidence to support Defendant's capital murder conviction, and there was no error with respect to the jury's rejection of Defendant's affirmative defense argument. View "Wofford v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the circuit court finding that the emergency clause contained within Act 237 of 2023 (the LEARNS Act) did not receive a separate roll-call vote as required under the Arkansas Constitution, rendering the clause procedurally invalid, holding that Arkansas General Assembly complied with Ark. Const. V, 1 when it enacted the LEARNS Act emergency clause.After the General Assembly passed the LEARNS Act the legislation was sent the Governor, who signed it into law. Appellees brought the underlying complaint seeking a declaration that the Act's emergency clause, under which certain provisions became effective on the date of the Governor's approval, was invalid. Upon remand, the circuit court declared the LEARNS Act emergency clause invalid because it did not receive a separate roll-call vote. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the emergency clause was passed in compliance with article 5, section 1. View "Ark. Dep't of Education v. Jackson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion filed under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6), which allows a court to grant relief from a judgment under certain circumstances, holding that Defendant's challenge to his conviction could have been brought in a petition for post-conviction relief.Defendant pled guilty to two counts of attempted aggravated sexual abuse of a child. Defendant did not file a direct appeal and did not challenge his conviction under Utah's Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA) but later filed a motion under Rule 60(b)(6) alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied the motion, ruling that Rule 60(b)(6) was not the appropriate vehicle for Defendant to bring his claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the PCRA applied to Defendant's request to set aside his conviction based on his trial counsel's alleged conflict of interest. View "State v. Ogden" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendant had two children together. After the couple separated, the children remained in Mexico with Galaviz. In July 2021, Defendant took the children to El Paso and refused to return them. Plaintiff filed an action in the district court requesting the return of the children to Mexico under the Hague Convention. Defendant raised two affirmative defenses claiming that returning the children would violate their fundamental right to an education and would expose them to a grave risk of harm or an intolerable situation. The district court concluded that Defendant had satisfied his burden and denied Plaintiff’s request for the return of the children. Plaintiff appealed.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court explained that in the present case, the district court’s findings regarding the children’s healthcare, including the children’s cognitive decline, the fact that they remained non-verbal, or their regression to using diapers, may be supported by evidence that would be sufficient in a custody dispute. However, this evidence falls short of meeting Defendant’s clear and convincing burden. Finally, Defendant presented no evidence that unsuitable childcare would expose the children to a grave risk of harm. He merely expressed concern that Plaintiff often left the children with her older daughters, and they did not take care of the children. This is not clear and convincing evidence of a grave risk of harm. View "Galaviz v. Reyes" on Justia Law

When an armed fugitive held a 15-year-old girl hostage inside Plaintiff, City of McKinney (the “City”), police officers employed armored vehicles, explosives, and toxic-gas grenades to resolve the situation. The parties agree the officers only did what was necessary in an active emergency. However, Plaintiff’s home suffered severe damage, much of her personal property was destroyed, and the City refused to provide compensation. Plaintiff brought suit in federal court alleging a violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which states that private property shall not “be taken for public use, without just compensation.” The district court held that, as a matter of law, the City violated the Takings Clause when it refused to compensate Baker for the damage and destruction of her property. The City timely appealed.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court explained that as a matter of history and precedent, the Takings Clause does not require compensation for damaged or destroyed property when it was objectively necessary for officers to damage or destroy that property in an active emergency to prevent imminent harm to persons. Plaintiff has maintained that the officers’ actions were precisely that: necessary, in light of an active emergency, to prevent imminent harm to the hostage child, to the officers who responded on the scene, and to others in her residential community. View "Baker v. City of McKinney" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed Defendant's appeal of the sentence imposed in connection with his plea of guilty to four theft-related charges, holding that Defendant's written plea agreement with the State, which both he and his attorney signed, unambiguously waived his right to appeal his sentence.In exchange for a more lenient sentence, Defendant agreed to plead guilty to four theft-related charges and waive his right to appeal his conviction and sentence. The trial court accepted Defendant's plea and sentenced him to four years for burglary and thirty months for theft, ordering the sentences to run concurrently. Defendant appealed, but the court of appeals dismissed the appeals with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that this Court could not nullify Defendant's appeal waiver through direct appeal based on the claim that the waiver was not knowing and voluntary, but Defendant could still seek relief through post-conviction proceedings. View "Davis v. State" on Justia Law

Officers Simpson and Patrick drove to Perez’s house to execute seven felony arrest warrants. Simpson approached Perez behind the house. After a brief exchange, Perez bolted. Perez wove her way through the neighborhood—including across a two-way street—in a chase the length of two football fields. Patrick ordered her to stop. Perez did not comply. Patrick fired his taser but missed. Perez kept fleeing, heading toward another two-lane street, intending to cross. A row of moving cars stood in her way, so she stopped. Perez alleges she raised her hands and stood still, expecting to be handcuffed. Patrick claims she did not raise her hands and instead took off running. Patrick made the split-second decision to fire his taser again. It connected. Perez fell forward and hit her chin on the ground, fracturing her jaw. She later pled guilty to evading police and resisting arrest.Perez filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive force. The district court denied Patrick’s request for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The Sixth Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction to review the denial of summary judgment, 28 U.S.C. 1291, where the decision depended on issues of fact. View "Perez v. Simpson" on Justia Law