Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Christopher Sosebee was convicted by jury of felony murder in the 2020 death of Brian Hayes resulting from a car wreck. A sheriff’s deputy was looking for a black car that had been spraypainted and was missing its front grill, in order to serve arrest warrants on a person who, the day before, had reportedly been driving a vehicle matching that description. After a few minutes of following a SUV at 45 to 50 mph in a 45 mph zone, the deputy activated his blue lights and siren. The SUV accelerated and pulled away from the patrol car. At a curve, the SUV’s right rear tire left the road, then the SUV veered sharply to the left, crossed the oncoming lane, traveled up an embankment, hit some boulders, flipped, landed on top of an approaching truck, and then rolled off. The driver of the truck (Hayes) showed no signs of life when the deputy reached him, and Sosebee’s girlfriend, Tiffany Franklin, who had been a passenger in the SUV during the incident, was very badly injured. A test of Sosebee’s blood after the wreck revealed methamphetamine, at an impairment level, as well as marijuana. Sosebee contended felony murder (Count 1), and homicide by vehicle in the first degree (Count 4), which were both predicated on Count 6, fleeing or attempting to elude, defined exactly the same criminal conduct. Sosebee argued that the rule of lenity therefore required that he be sentenced within the range for homicide by vehicle in the first degree, rather than for felony murder. He also contended his sentence of life without parole violated the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment in the Eighth Amendment because neither felony murder nor homicide by vehicle in the first degree, when predicated on fleeing and attempting to elude as in this case, requires malice or specific intent to harm, and because the prior felonies that triggered his sentencing as a recidivist were nonviolent. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Sosebee v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Donald Steele appealed his convictions for felony murder and aggravated assault in connection with the stabbing death of Kevin McGruder. Steele argued on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support his felony murder conviction and that the trial court should have merged his conviction for aggravated assault into his conviction for felony murder, which was based on aggravated assault. The Georgia Supreme Court concluded the evidence was sufficient to support Steele’s convictions, but the State conceded his conviction for aggravated assault should have merged into his felony murder conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed Steele’s conviction for felony murder and vacated his aggravated assault conviction. View "Steele v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Harold Kinlaw was convicted by jury of the malice murder of Felipe Herrera, the aggravated stalking and kidnapping of Kinlaw’s former wife Damaris Kinlaw, and other related crimes. Kinlaw appealed, arguing: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated stalking; (2) the trial court erred by refusing to provide an interpreter for a witness at trial; (3) the trial court erred by excluding evidence that Herrera had threatened Kinlaw; (4) the trial court erred by failing to charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter and self-defense; and (5) the trial court erred by employing an improper remedy after finding that the State had violated Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Kinlaw v. Georgia" on Justia Law

On May 19, 1996, the body of Bridgett Parker was discovered near an abandoned mobile home. Parker’s throat had been cut, and she had been raped. Soon after, law enforcement officers identified Appellant Octavious Rivera as a possible suspect, and over the next few weeks, they interviewed Rivera regarding Parker’s death, executed a search warrant for his car and residence, and obtained a sample of his DNA; however, they did not arrest Rivera at that time. In February 2018, following the GBI’s reexamination of Parker’s sexual assault kit using new DNA testing methods and technology, Rivera’s DNA was identified as a match for DNA found inside Parker’s vaginal area, and he was arrested. Rivera was later convicted of felony murder predicated on aggravated assault, as well as rape. On appeal, Rivera contended the trial court erred: (1) by denying Rivera’s motion for directed verdict on the ground that the State failed to allege the applicable tolling provision or exception to the statute of limitation with respect to Count 3 (aggravated assault) and Count 4 (rape) in the indictment, and on the ground that the statute of limitation on those counts was not tolled; and (2) by permitting the State to admit other-acts evidence under OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) and OCGA § 24-4-413 at trial. After review, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Rivera’s felony murder conviction and reversed his rape conviction. View "Rivera v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs—five individuals and the California Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc.—filed this action in the Southern District of California challenging the constitutionality of Section 32310 under the Second Amendment. On September 22, 2023, the district court issued an order declaring Section 32310 “unconstitutional in its entirety” and enjoining California officials from enforcing the law. Defendant Rob Bonta, the Attorney General of California, filed an emergency motion for a partial stay pending appeal. The Attorney General seeks to stay “all portions of the order except those regarding Sections 32310(c) and (d), which relate to large-capacity magazines that were acquired and possessed lawfully prior to the district court’s order granting a permanent injunction.”   The Ninth Circuit granted the motion. First, the court concluded that the Attorney General is likely to succeed on the merits. The court explained that the Attorney General makes strong arguments that Section 32310 comports with the Second Amendment under Bruen. Second, the Attorney General has shown that California will be irreparably harmed absent a stay pending appeal by presenting evidence that large-capacity magazines pose significant threats to public safety. Third, it does not appear that staying portions of the district court’s order while the merits of this appeal are pending will substantially injure other parties interested in the proceedings. Finally, the court concluded that the public interest tips in favor of a stay. View "VIRGINIA DUNCAN, ET AL V. ROB BONTA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was convicted of the 2000 murder of an 80-year-old woman. After the jury found him to be guilty of the offense, evidence of his future dangerousness was offered at sentencing. Among the evidence was testimony from the victim of another vicious crime who identified Plaintiff as her attacker. Plaintiff was not tried for that offense. Plaintiff is now seeking DNA testing of evidence from that other crime that he argues could exonerate him. A different district court agreed with a similar argument and declared that Texas must provide testing if a sufficient basis is shown that it would have affected sentencing and not just the finding of guilt. The district court relied on the pendency of a decision in Gutierrez as a reason to grant Plaintiff a stay of execution. The State of Texas sought to vacate the stay of execution.   The Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court that a stay is appropriate at least until a decision in that case. The court explained that at that time it will order additional briefing. Accordingly, the court entered no ruling on the motion to vacate the stay at this time. The related appeal has similar issues that could affect the proper resolution in this case. Waiting for that decision is not required by any general procedural rule or by rules of the court. Nonetheless, the court explained that it should wait for that decision unless there is some basis to distinguish the present appeal. View "Murphy v. Nasser" on Justia Law

Whitaker, an Illinois prisoner, had $573 when he filed a notice of appeal in his Section 1983 lawsuit; he subsequently spent most of his money at the prison commissary and on postage. The district court denied his request to proceed in forma pauperis, 28 U.S.C. 1915(a)(1).The Seventh Circuit reversed. The district court did not adequately consider the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) balance between the need to collect fees and a prisoner’s discretionary use of his funds. The PLRA mandates that a court apply a statutory formula and collect an initial partial filing fee, then collect the remainder of the fees in installments. Whitaker had enough money to pay the fees in full when they were due and when this court sent him a notice informing him as much but the statute does not mandate that prisoners prioritize their filing fees above all other expenses. Drawing the line for in forma pauperis eligibility at the mere ability to pay the full fee can lead to odd, unintended results. There is nothing suggesting that Whitaker deliberately depleted his account to avoid payment. Whitaker should be permitted to prepay the prescribed portion of the fee with the rest to be collected from his future income, as Congress envisioned. View "Whitaker v. Dempsey" on Justia Law

Alyssa was visiting her friend when Lundy, intoxicated forced his way into the house. A neighbor called 911 after hearing “a woman crying” and someone “being thrown around.” Lundy left before officers arrived. The women stated that Lundy left in a red Pontiac. Officers, looking for Lundy, received another call. Lundy had returned with a gun. Officer Martin returned to the house in about two minutes, activated his bodycam, and recorded the women saying that Lundy pointed the gun at them, loaded it, and threatened to kill them in front of Alyssa and Lundy’s young children. Officer Brown found Lundy near the house and looked through the window of the red Pontiac. A loaded pistol sat on the passenger’s seat. During booking, Lundy stated that he’d take the gun charge because “it’s mine.”Lundy was convicted of possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). The prosecution introduced Martin’s bodycam footage and Martin’s testimony about that conversation. Lundy argued that because Alyssa did not testify, her out-of-court statement was barred. The Sixth Circuit upheld the admission of that evidence. The excited-utterance exception applied because there was an event startling enough to cause nervous excitement, the statement was made before there was time to contrive or misrepresent, and the statement was made while Alyssa was under the stress of the excitement caused by the event. The statement was nontestimonial, and the Confrontation Clause does not apply. View "United States v. Lundy" on Justia Law

After entering a conditional guilty plea, Defendant appealed his convictions on four counts related to child pornography. At the start of the COVID-19 global pandemic, Defendant was arrested on a criminal complaint on March 10, 2020. Thereafter, the district court entered a series of pandemic-related administrative orders that continued grand jury sessions five times at the ends of justice, spanning March 26, 2020, to November 16, 2020. Due to the pandemic, a grand jury did not formally indict Defendant until December 1, 2020. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss his indictment for failure to indict him within thirty days from his arrest, as required by the Speedy Trial Act. Defendant does not challenge the time between indictment and his guilty plea, but only between his arrest on March 10 and grand jury indictment on December 1, 2020.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Defendant’s motion to dismiss his indictment. The court concluded that the pandemic-related continuances in 2020 were not an abuse of discretion and were within the ends-of-justice exception to the Speedy Trial Act. The court explained that the magistrate judge was not required to expressly consider each statutory factor in its order or recite specific language from the statute. The court explained that not every statutory factor will be relevant to the circumstances warranting the continuance. Instead, it is sufficient if the record shows, as it does here, that the magistrate judge considered the pertinent factors. View "USA v. Robert Dunn" on Justia Law

While on juvenile parole related to a commitment to Oregon Youth Authority (OYA) in an earlier case, B.Y. was adjudicated to be within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court for interfering with a peace officer. Based on that conduct, the juvenile court imposed a new disposition, which also committed B.Y. to OYA custody, to commence at the conclusion of his existing commitment. B.Y. challenged that order, contending that the juvenile court lacked authority to impose consecutive commitments. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals agreed with B.Y. and reversed the juvenile court. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the appellate court: “the statutory text neither expressly permits nor expressly prohibits the imposition of consecutive commitments. The statutory scheme does, however, confer broad authority on the juvenile court to fashion appropriate dispositions; that stands in contrast to the criminal code, where courts’ sentencing authority is more circumscribed. Given that contrast, the fact that the legislature did not explicitly provide for consecutive commitments in a circumstance such as this is unsurprising. In light of the wide latitude that the legislature has chosen to give juvenile courts, it is more reasonable to expect that if the legislature had intended to limit the juvenile court’s ability to impose consecutive commitments in this circumstance, the legislature would have indicated as much.” View "Oregon v. B. Y." on Justia Law