Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was convicted in 1982 of first-degree murders. He was also convicted of one count of mutilation of human remains and one count of attempted murder and mayhem. The jury found a multiple murder special circumstance allegation and sentenced Petitioner to death. The California Supreme Court reversed Petitioner’s conviction for attempted murder and mayhem and affirmed Petitioner’s murder convictions and death sentence.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Petitioner’s petition challenging his California conviction and capital sentence for six counts of first-degree murder. The panel held that Petitioner’s pre-AEDPA October 1992 pro se filing seeking appointment of counsel was not an “actual application” that sought “adjudication” on the merits and that AEDPA applied to the habeas petition filed by appointed counsel in April 1997. The panel held that the California Supreme Court’s decision that Petitioner’s July 1982 pre-trial Faretta request to represent himself was equivocal was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the United States Supreme Court. The panel held that the California Supreme Court’s decision that Clark’s August 1982 Faretta request was untimely was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the United States Supreme Court. The panel held that the district court properly concluded that the California Supreme Court’s opinion holding that Petitioner’s Marsden rights were not violated was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the United States Supreme Court View "DOUGLAS CLARK V. RON BROOMFIELD" on Justia Law

After Defendant violated the conditions of his supervised release, the district court sentenced him to 24 months in prison even though the Sentencing Guidelines recommended 5–11 months. He maintains that the district court failed to explain the sentence adequately and imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that when explaining a sentence, a court need only set forth enough to satisfy us that it considered the parties' arguments and had a reasoned basis for exercising its legal decision-making authority. The district court provided ample reason for imposing an upward variance, including the fact that Defendant stayed at the sober-living house only briefly, previously received leniency, frequently violated court orders, and absconded for months on end. The court explained that the court isn't required to discuss or recite each statutory sentencing consideration before imposing a sentence; when, as here, the court mentions some of them, we presume it is aware of them all. View "United States v. Lamar Bertucci" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for interference with a peace officer, holding that the district court did not violate Defendant's due process rights by conducting a hearing under Asch v. State, 62 P.3d 945 (Wyo. 2003), in Defendant's absence after he refused to attend the hearing.Defendant, who was serving three consecutive life sentences at the Wyoming State Penitentiary, was charged with interference with a peace officer. Before the scheduled trial date, the State moved to require Defendant to be restrained during trial. The district court conducted an Asch hearing without Defendant and decided to impose restraints at trial. Defendant was convicted of one count of felony interference with a peace officer. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant waived any right he had to be present at the Asch hearing by knowingly and voluntarily failing to appear at the hearing due to circumstances within his control. View "Castellanos v. State" on Justia Law

In this case concerning how an Ohio prisoner is to enforce his constitutional right to a speedy trial on an untried indictment the Supreme Court held that a prisoner satisfies the "causes to be delivered" requirement of Ohio Rev. Code 2941.401 when he delivers the written notice and the request to the warden where he is imprisoned, even if the warden fails to deliver the notice and the request to the prosecuting attorney or the appropriate court.Appellant, who was indicted on counts of aggravated robbery and robbery, moved to dismiss the indictment on speedy-trial grounds. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that Appellant had strictly complied with section 2941.401 when he provided written notice of his place of imprisonment and a request for a final disposition and that the 180-day speedy trial time was not tolled by the warden's failure to comply with his duty to send out Appellant's written notices and requests to the prosecuting attorney or the appropriate court. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Appellant had not strictly complied with the requirements of the statute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellant caused to be delivered his written notice and request for final disposition under the statute when he provided them to the warden. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was convicted of the 2000 murder of an 80-year-old woman. After the jury found him to be guilty of the offense, evidence of his future dangerousness was offered at sentencing. Among the evidence was testimony from the victim of another vicious crime who identified Plaintiff as her attacker. Plaintiff was not tried for that offense . Plaintiff is now seeking DNA testing of evidence from that other crime that he argues could exonerate him. The State of Texas filed an emergency appeal seeking to vacate a stay of execution entered by the district court. The issue on which the district court decided to enter a stay is whether the inmate is entitled to have DNA testing performed on certain evidence. The district court granted a stay because similar issues were pending before the Fifth Circuit in a case brought by a different Texas prisoner. That related case is fully briefed and has been orally argued, and a decision in the case is pending.   The Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court that a stay is appropriate, at least until a decision in that related pending case. The court explained that here the district court order bars Texas officials from carrying out “lawful and important conduct” because it prevents them from performing Plaintiff’s execution. Moreover, the district court’s order does not operate on the judicial proceeding but restricts the actions of specific defendants. That is the function of an injunction.  The court entered no ruling on the motion to vacate the stay at this time. Therefore, the stay of execution will remain in effect. View "Murphy v. Nasser" on Justia Law

A trial court convicted defendant Brian Hubbell of delivery under ORS 475.752 based on evidence that defendant’s extended-stay hotel room contained a large quantity of fentanyl, a portion of which was packaged in a manner consistent with an intent to sell it to individual users or dealers. Over defendant’s objection, the trial court ruled that that evidence was sufficient to convict him of delivery under Oregon v. Boyd, 756 P2d 1276 (1988). In Boyd, the Court of Appeals construed the phrase “attempted transfer” in ORS 475.005(8) by applying principles of liability for the inchoate crime of attempt, ORS 161.405(1), whereby a person who intentionally takes a “substantial step” toward committing a crime is liable for attempting the crime. Boyd held that possessing a controlled substance in a quantity too large to be consistent with personal use, combined with evidence of an intent to transfer that substance, constitutes a substantial step toward transferring it and hence is sufficient to show an “attempted transfer.” On appeal in this case, defendant argued the evidence was insufficient to show delivery even under Boyd. The Court of Appeal, on its own initiative, re-examined Boyd, overruled it, and held that possession plus an intent to deliver, without more, was insufficient to show an “attempted transfer” for purposes of the completed crime of delivery of controlled substances, though it could establish a “substantial step” for purposes of the inchoate crime of attempt. To this, the Oregon Supreme Court concurred and affirmed the appellant court. View "Oregon v. Hubbell" on Justia Law

Michigan’s Uniform Unclaimed Property Act (UUPA) allows the state to take custody—not ownership—of unclaimed property “in trust for the benefit of the rightful owner” After publishing required notices, the state sells or liquidates the unclaimed property within three years of receiving it, unless the owner brings a valid claim, then deposits the proceeds into its general fund, subtracting reasonable administration costs; the owner can no longer reclaim his property, but can still recover the “net proceeds” from its sale. UUPA apermits owners to recover the interest earned on their property and post-liquidation interest if the property accrued interest before the state took custody of it.Two companies delivered O’Connor’s properties—checks collectively worth no more than $350— to the state after he failed to claim them. The state liquidated them. O’Connor filed a claim for compensation. Michigan reimbursed O’Connor for the value of his property, but not any post-liquidation interest. O’Connor alleges that neither the state nor the third-party holders provided him with the statutorily required notices. O’Connor sued Michigan under the Fifth Amendment; Michigan’s Treasurer, and the Administrative Manager of the Unclaimed Property Program, under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit held that the officials are entitled to qualified immunity on O’Connor’s taking claims but not his due process claims. The district court correctly dismissed O’Connor’s claims against the state but should not have dismissed them with prejudice. View "O'Connor v. Eubanks" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court sentencing Defendant to seventy years in Montana State Prison for deliberate homicide, a felony, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) Defendant's claim that his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance when he advised Defendant and the court that mitigated deliberate homicide was not a lesser-included offense of deliberate homicide was more appropriate for postconviction relief; and (2) the district court did not err when it concluded that the State's offer of proof provided sufficient evidence to accept Defendant's Alford plea. View "State v. Bristow" on Justia Law

Leslie “Bo” Galloway’s was convicted by jury of the capital murder of Shakeylia Anderson. Galloway’s conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Mississippi Supreme Court on direct appeal. His motion for rehearing was subsequently denied, and he sought relief from the United States Supreme Court by way of a petition for writ of certiorari, which was denied on May 27, 2014. Galloway returned to the Mississippi Supreme Court with a Motion for Leave to Proceed in the Trial Court with a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, and his subsequently filed Motion for Leave to Proceed in the Trial Court with Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. The Supreme Court treated both filings together as one and referred to it as Galloway’s amended petition for post-conviction relief. Finding no error, the Court denied his amended petition. View "Galloway v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Since 1979, Tennessee has made it a crime for anyone other than election officials to distribute the state’s official form for applying to vote absentee. During much of this time, Tennessee kept close guard of this form to deter fraud. Election officials now make the form widely available online so that eligible voters may easily apply. According to the Plaintiffs, this change has rendered the ban on distributing the application form “outdated.” They want to distribute the form while encouraging absentee voting at their get-out-the-vote drives. They allege that the First Amendment gives them the right to do so and that, because they seek to distribute the form while expressing a political message, the ban is subject to strict scrutiny.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Tennessee’s ban prohibits an act--distributing a government form--that qualifies as conduct, not speech. While the First Amendment provides some protection to “expressive conduct,” strict scrutiny does not apply to Tennessee’s ban because it neutrally applies no matter the message that a person seeks to convey and because it burdens nobody’s ability to engage in actual speech. At most, the Supreme Court’s lenient First Amendment test for neutral laws that regulate conduct applies and the ban survives that nondemanding test, View "Lichtenstein v. Hargett" on Justia Law