Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

McMullen was convicted under Indiana law of possession of cocaine and marijuana. In preparation for sentencing, McMullen’s attorney, Lewis, said he “really didn’t do anything independently to develop any mitigation” and “just relied” on the PSR although he knew McMullen “came from a seriously troubled background.” Lewis did not consider having a mental health professional evaluate McMullen, who was given a 50-year sentence, largely based on his criminal history. State courts rejected his claim of ineffective assistance. The district court denied his petition for federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254.The Seventh Circuit vacated. Although in 2021, an Indiana trial court modified McMullen’s sentence and placed him on probation, the issue was not moot. The Indiana Court of Appeals' decision was contrary to “Strickland.” Given that the state was asking for the statutory maximum prison term, Lewis’s investigation should have gone beyond reliance on the PSR, and talking to a relative. The state appellate court failed to evaluate the totality of the available mitigation evidence, which is significant and compelling. On remand, the district court must consider evidence and argument as to whether Lewis had any strategic reasons for the limits of his investigation into McMullen’s mental health and background and the presentation of mitigating circumstances. View "McMullen v. Dalton" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon. He was sentenced to 77 months in prison, followed by three years of supervised release. On appeal, Defendant raised three challenges to the district court’s sentencing calculation under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.” or “Guidelines”).   The Ninth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s sentence. The panel rejected Defendant’s argument that the district court’s application of a Sentencing Guidelines enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for possessing the firearm in connection with another felony violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights under Apprendi v. New Jersey and Alleyne v. United States. The panel wrote that the determination of a sentencing enhancement based on a new offense can be made by a judge without a jury and by a standard of proof lower than beyond a reasonable doubt, that there is no mandatory minimum sentence at play, and the enhancement still placed Defendant’s Guidelines range within the maximum possible sentence for the offense to which he pled guilty; and that Defendant received all the notice that is required for the enhancement.   The panel rejected Defendant’s argument that there was insufficient evidence to support the district court’s finding that he used or possessed a firearm in connection with another felony offense under Montana law for purposes of applying the enhancement. The panel concluded that the district court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety. View "USA V. JOHN BARLOW" on Justia Law

While a passenger during an unrelated traffic stop, defendant-appellant Audrey Monroe was recognized by a Bingham County Sheriff’s deputy as having an outstanding warrant. Pursuant to the warrant, the deputy attempted to take her into custody. In the course of the arrest, Monroe refused to release her phone, which was secured on her finger by a phone ring holder. As Monroe’s resistance escalated, she fell to the ground and began violently kicking, making contact with the officer. Ultimately, she was secured in the police cruiser. The incident was captured on video by the arresting officer’s body camera. For her conduct during the arrest, Monroe was charged with felony battery on a police officer. During trial, Monroe asked the district court for jury instructions regarding two misdemeanor offenses, asserting that they were lesser included offenses of the crime charged. The district court declined to give either instruction. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Monroe guilty of the felony charge. On appeal, Monroe argued the district court erred in failing to give the requested lesser included jury instructions. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Idaho v. Monroe" on Justia Law

Defendant’s mother called local dispatch and said an officer needed to come by because her son was “acting up.” A Bureau of Indian Affairs Officer was dispatched to the home, learning on the way that Defendant had an active tribal arrest warrant. Defendant’s mother invited Defendant into the living room and told Defendant to join them. The officer told Defendant he was “going to have to take you because you got that warrant.” Defendant fled to the garage, pursued by the officer, where Defendant knocked the officer down and escaped. Defendant was charged with forcibly assaulting, resisting, opposing, impeding, intimidating, or interfering with a federal officer and inflicting bodily injury. The jury convicted him of the lesser included offense of forcible assault of a federal officer involving physical contact. The district court sentenced Defendant to 44 months’ imprisonment. He appealed, raising numerous evidentiary issues and challenging the assessment of a two-level sentencing increase.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that here, the amicable conversation -- dominated by Defendant-- occurred in his mother’s home, a non-custodial atmosphere. The officer testified he did not know what the warrant was based on. Defendant fled only after the officer later told him he would be arrested, confirming that Defendant initially believed or at least hoped that he could avoid immediate arrest. Further, the court explained that even if Defendant was in custody, follow-up questions to clarify ambiguity do not amount to “interrogation” unless “their point is to enhance the defendant’s guilt.” The court concluded the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress. View "United States v. Jade LaRoche" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's convictions for felony charges stemming from an inventory search of an impounded truck that Defendant was driving when he was pulled over by a law enforcement officer, holding that the search was reasonable and lawful under the Fourth Amendment.Law enforcement performed an inventory search as to the truck at issue and found a handgun in the truck's right door panel. After Defendant unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence of the gun the trial court found him guilty. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the search was not reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because the state's evidence was insufficient. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the inventory search was lawful. View "State v. Toran" on Justia Law

Appellant Francisco De la Rosa was tried by jury for the non-consensual sexual assault and sexual assault of a child. The body of Appellant’s indictment charged him with three counts of sexual assault for non-consensual contact between his sexual organ and that of "LAM," and the abstract portion of the jury charge defined “sexual assault of a child” in terms of non-consensual sexual contact. The indictment’s caption called the counts sexual assault of a child, its application paragraph authorized conviction for sexual assault of a child, and the case was tried as if it were such a case. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review to decide whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the evidence was legally sufficient to uphold the convictions. To this, the Court concluded the appellate court did, reversed the lower court’s judgments and entered a judgment of acquittal for each count of sexual assault. View "De La Rosa v. Texas" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal brought by the State of an order and judgment dismissing with prejudice criminal charges against Defendant, holding that there was no final, appealable judgment, and therefore, the State lacked statutory authority to appeal pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 547.200.Defendant, who was charged with second-degree murder, first-degree robbery, and armed criminal action, filed a motion to dismiss the indictment. The circuit court sustained the motion in part and dismissed the murder and robbery charges with prejudice, concluding that the Double Jeopardy Clause precluded those charges. The State appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that this was an improper appeal. View "State v. Harris" on Justia Law

The Plaintiffs—three doctors, a news website, a healthcare activist, and two states —had posts and stories removed or downgraded by the platforms. Their content touched on a host of divisive topics like the COVID-19 lab-leak theory. Plaintiffs maintain that although the platforms stifled their speech, the government officials were the ones pulling the strings. They sued the officials for First Amendment violations and asked the district court to enjoin the officials’ conduct. The officials argued that they only “sought to mitigate the hazards of online misinformation” by “calling attention to content” that violated the “platforms’ policies,” a form of permissible government speech. The district court agreed with the Plaintiffs and granted preliminary injunctive relief.   The Fifth Circuit granted the petition for panel rehearing and affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated the injunction in part, and modified the injunction in part. The court affirmed with respect to the White House, the Surgeon General, the CDC, the FBI, and CISA and reversed as to all other officials. As to the NIAID officials, it is not apparent that they ever communicated with the social media platforms. Instead, the record shows, at most, that public statements by Director Anthony Fauci and other NIAID officials promoted the government’s scientific and policy views and attempted to discredit opposing ones—quintessential examples of government speech that do not run afoul of the First Amendment. Further, as for the State Department, while it did communicate directly with the platforms, so far, there is no evidence these communications went beyond educating the platforms on “tools and techniques” used by foreign actors. View "State of Missouri v. Biden" on Justia Law

Plaintiff resigned from her tenured professorship at the Thurgood Marshall School of Law at Texas Southern University (TSU) in August 2020. She then sued TSU and several TSU employees for Title VII constructive discharge, Equal Pay Act (EPA) retaliation, and civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The district court dismissed all her claims, holding that res judicata barred her Section 1983 claims and that she failed to state Title VII and EPA claims.   The Ffith Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that Plaintiff alleges that TSU investigated her for discrimination but found no evidence that Plaintiff discriminated, that defendant “threw her hair into Plaintiff’s face in the law school lobby,” and that defendant yelled at Plaintiff that she couldn’t park in a church parking lot. But no facts suggest that these were more than personal disputes between the parties. Indeed, their parking lot confrontation was not even on school property. Plaintiff also alleges that defendant “has made comments about [her] race,” but she does not identify the comments or their context. The court explained that Plaintiff does not allege conduct by TSU that plausibly—not just possibly—states a constructive discharge claim. Further, the court held that Plaintiff fails to allege that Defendant acted under color of state law and thus fails to state a Section 1983 claim. View "Sacks v. Texas Southern University" on Justia Law

Early in the COVID-19 pandemic, the California Institution for Men (“CIM”) suffered a severe COVID-19 outbreak. In an attempt to protect CIM inmates, high-level officials in the California prison system transferred 122 inmates from CIM to San Quentin State Prison, where there were no known cases of the virus. The transfer sparked an outbreak of COVID-19 at San Quentin that infected over two-thousand inmates and ultimately killed over twenty-five inmates and one prison guard. The wife of one of the deceased inmates sued, claiming that the prison officials had violated her husband’s constitutional and statutory rights. The officials moved to dismiss, asserting that the claims were barred by various federal and state immunities, including immunity under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act and qualified immunity. The district court held that the officials were not entitled to immunity at this stage of the proceedings, and the officials filed this interlocutory appeal.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s order denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss on the basis of immunity under the PREP Act and qualified immunity in an action brought against California prison officials arising from the death of a San Quentin inmate from COVID-19; and (2) dismissed for lack of jurisdiction Defendants’ claims asserting immunity under state law. The panel held that Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim, which adequately alleged that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to the health and safety of San Quentin inmates, including Hampton. View "MICHAEL HAMPTON, ET AL V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, ET AL" on Justia Law