Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The case concerns a man who was convicted of first degree murder with a deadly weapon enhancement and resisting and obstructing an officer after his uncle was found fatally stabbed in the home they shared. The defendant was located by police shortly after the incident, with injuries and physical evidence linking him to the crime. During jury selection, the only Black juror in the venire was removed by the prosecution using a peremptory strike, prompting the defendant, who is also Black, to raise a Batson challenge alleging racial discrimination. The trial court denied the challenge, finding the State’s reasons for the strike—juror distraction due to personal circumstances and apparent disengagement—were race-neutral and not pretextual. The jury ultimately found the defendant guilty, and he was sentenced to 40 years to life.The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the defendant had not established a prima facie case of discriminatory intent under Batson v. Kentucky. The defendant then sought review by the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his Batson challenge, limiting cross-examination about alternate perpetrators, and restricting his closing argument. He also invoked the doctrine of cumulative error.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho clarified that, under Hernandez v. New York, once the prosecution offers a race-neutral explanation and the trial court rules on discriminatory intent, the initial prima facie showing under Batson is moot. The court found no clear error in the trial court’s acceptance of the State’s race-neutral reasons for the peremptory strike. The court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting cross-examination or closing argument, and found no cumulative error. The judgment of conviction was affirmed. View "State v. Buck" on Justia Law

A member of the Lowell police department’s gang unit created an undercover Snapchat account using a “nonwhite” username and bitmoji, aiming to monitor gang activity by befriending users connected to other officers’ undercover accounts. The officer became “friends” with a user believed to be the defendant, though he did not know the user’s identity or race at the time. The defendant posted a video of himself discharging a firearm from a car, which led police to identify and locate him. A search of the defendant’s vehicle uncovered a firearm matching the one in the video and shell casings consistent with those found at the scene. The defendant did not possess a license to carry a firearm.The Lowell Division of the District Court Department charged the defendant with multiple firearms offenses. The defendant sought discovery on a selective enforcement claim, and the court ordered the production of relevant police records and policies. The records showed that all suspects charged from Snapchat investigations with identifiable race were nonwhite. The defendant moved to suppress evidence, arguing racial motivation in the investigation, but a District Court judge denied the motion, finding no reasonable inference of racial motivation. The defendant also moved to dismiss the firearms charges, claiming the resident firearm licensing scheme violated the Second Amendment. Another District Court judge denied this motion, finding the problematic provision severable. The defendant entered conditional guilty pleas, reserving his right to appeal.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. It held that the defendant had raised a reasonable inference of selective enforcement under the Commonwealth v. Long framework and remanded for an evidentiary hearing, requiring the Commonwealth to rebut the inference with a race-neutral reason. The court also held that the Commonwealth’s resident firearm licensing scheme was not facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, affirming the denial of the motion to dismiss. View "Commonwealth v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Colorado established a Universal Preschool Program (UPK) following a 2020 voter-approved proposition and subsequent legislation. The program provides public funding for voluntary, universal preschool and requires participating preschools to sign a nondiscrimination agreement. This agreement mandates that preschools offer equal enrollment opportunities regardless of characteristics such as race, religious affiliation, sexual orientation, gender identity, income, or disability. The plaintiffs—two Catholic parishes, their preschools, the Archdiocese of Denver, and two parents—challenged the nondiscrimination requirement, arguing that it conflicted with their religious beliefs, particularly regarding sexual orientation and gender identity, and violated their rights under the First Amendment.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado held a three-day bench trial. The court found that the nondiscrimination requirement did not violate the First Amendment, denied the plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief, and dismissed the Archdiocese for lack of standing. However, the court did enjoin the state from enforcing the nondiscrimination requirement as to religious affiliation for as long as a congregation preference existed, a ruling not challenged on appeal. The plaintiffs appealed the denial of injunctive relief and the dismissal of the Archdiocese.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Tenth Circuit held that the nondiscrimination requirement is a neutral law of general applicability and does not target religious status or use. The court found no evidence of religious hostility or individualized exemptions that would undermine general applicability. The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ expressive association claim, distinguishing the facts from Supreme Court precedents. Applying rational basis review, the court concluded that the requirement is rationally related to the legitimate government interest of ensuring equal access to preschool. The district court’s denial of injunctive relief was affirmed. View "St. Mary Catholic v. Roy" on Justia Law

On May 29, 2003, two Blaine County Sheriff’s deputies responded to a domestic disturbance involving Laurence Dean Jackson Jr. in Harlem, Montana. During a pursuit through a field, both deputies were shot; Deputy Rutherford died from a gunshot wound to the chest, and Deputy Janis was severely injured. Jackson, claiming an alcohol-induced blackout, could not recall the events, leaving Janis as the sole eyewitness. At trial, the State relied on Janis’s testimony and physical evidence to argue that Jackson shot both deputies after a struggle. Jackson’s defense presented expert testimony challenging the State’s account, including a theory that the fatal bullet may have been fired by Janis, not Jackson.Following a 17-day trial in October 2004, Jackson was convicted of deliberate homicide and attempted deliberate homicide, receiving life sentences without parole. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed his conviction in 2009, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in 2010. In 2011, Jackson filed a petition for postconviction relief in the Seventeenth Judicial District Court, Blaine County, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The District Court allowed for additional evidence and expert review but ultimately denied the petition without an evidentiary hearing, finding Jackson’s claims lacked specific factual support as required by Montana law.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the District Court abused its discretion by denying Jackson’s petition without a hearing. Applying the Strickland v. Washington standard, the Court held that Jackson failed to present established facts showing deficient performance or prejudice by counsel. The Court found Jackson’s claims speculative and unsupported by the record, concluding the District Court acted within its discretion. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of postconviction relief. View "Jackson v. State" on Justia Law

Patrick Jones Jr. was hired as a probationary deputy sheriff by the Lake County Sheriff’s Office and sent to a police training academy. During his training, Jones obtained a document from his girlfriend, believing it to be a study guide, and offered to share it with classmates. The document was actually a cheat sheet for a prior version of the Illinois state law enforcement exam. After an investigation by the training institute, which concluded Jones likely did not understand the document’s true nature, the Sheriff’s Office nonetheless terminated his employment. The termination letter, authored by Undersheriff Lawrence Oliver, cited Jones’s conduct as violating the office’s code of conduct and was distributed internally and to the office’s Merit Commission. Jones later struggled to find new law enforcement employment, attributing this difficulty to the termination letter.Jones filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, alleging that the termination letter was defamatory and that it deprived him of occupational liberty in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment for the Sheriff’s Office and Undersheriff Oliver, finding that Jones failed to show it was virtually impossible for him to find new employment and that the statements in the letter were either true or opinion, and that Oliver was entitled to absolute immunity under Illinois law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that the Sheriff’s Office was not a proper defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because Jones did not allege a policy or custom as required for municipal liability. The court further held that Jones’s occupational liberty claim failed because there was no evidence that Undersheriff Oliver publicly disclosed the termination letter. Finally, the court held that Undersheriff Oliver was entitled to absolute immunity under Illinois law for statements made within the scope of his official duties. View "Jones v. Lake County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

A prisoner at a Michigan correctional facility was involved in a physical altercation with another inmate, after which he was subdued and handcuffed by corrections officers. Two officers then escorted him through a hallway and into a prison yard. Upon entering the yard, the officers performed a takedown maneuver, throwing the prisoner to the ground and fracturing his foot. The prisoner claimed he did not resist or act aggressively before the takedown, while the officers asserted that he had lunged away, prompting their response. Surveillance footage captured much of the incident, but some key moments were obscured or unclear. The prisoner suffered significant injury as a result of the takedown.Following the incident, a prison misconduct hearing was held, and the hearing officer found the prisoner guilty of assaulting staff, relying heavily on the video evidence, which the prisoner was not permitted to view. The prisoner did not seek judicial review of this administrative finding. He then filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment to the officers, holding they were entitled to qualified immunity. The court reasoned that the hearing officer’s factual findings should have preclusive effect and that the video evidence clearly contradicted the prisoner’s account.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the hearing officer’s findings should not have preclusive effect because the prisoner lacked a full and fair opportunity to litigate the facts, particularly due to his inability to access crucial evidence. The court also found that the video evidence did not so clearly contradict the prisoner’s version as to warrant summary judgment. The court concluded that there was a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether the officers used excessive force, and that the officers had forfeited the “clearly established” prong of their qualified immunity defense. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Nash v. Bryce" on Justia Law

A sixth-grade student with behavioral disabilities, X.M., attended Mount Pleasant Public Schools under an Individualized Education Plan that allowed him to use a breakroom to manage stress. In the fall of 2021, after a student reported that X.M. had brought a gun to school, school officials, including special-education teacher Jason Russell, searched X.M.’s locker and questioned him, but found nothing. The next day, after X.M. made a comment about not having his gun at school, officials again searched his belongings. According to X.M., Russell then ordered him to pull down his trousers and lift his shirt in a search for a gun. Days later, after X.M. was suspended for violence, he claimed Russell locked him in the breakroom for over 20 minutes.Cheyenne Johnson, X.M.’s mother, sued Russell, the school district, and other officials, alleging violations of X.M.’s constitutional rights. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted summary judgment to all defendants except Russell, denying him qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claims. The district court found that disputed facts—specifically, whether Russell conducted a strip search and locked X.M. in the breakroom—required a jury’s determination.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case on interlocutory appeal. The court held that, even accepting X.M.’s version of events, Russell did not violate clearly established Fourth Amendment rights. The court found that Russell’s search was justified at its inception and not clearly excessive in scope given the suspicion of a gun. It also concluded that it was not clearly established that locking a student in a breakroom for 20 minutes under these circumstances constituted an unreasonable seizure. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity and remanded with instructions to dismiss the Fourth Amendment claims against Russell. View "Johnson v. Mount Pleasant Public Schools" on Justia Law

A confidential informant reported seeing Anthony Miller, known as “Thugsy,” carrying a handgun and selling drugs in Wilmington, Delaware. Police surveilled the area, observed Miller, and attempted to arrest him. Miller fled, resisted arrest, and was subdued. Officers recovered a loaded handgun and drugs, including pills that tested positive for MDMA and cocaine. Miller admitted to selling MDMA and possessing the firearm. He was initially indicted by a New Castle County grand jury for several offenses, including Drug Dealing MDMA (a Class B felony). A subsequent reindictment changed the main drug charge to Drug Dealing Methamphetamine (a Class C felony), reflecting the actual substance involved.Before his suppression motion was heard, Miller entered a plea agreement in the Superior Court of the State of Delaware, pleading guilty to Drug Dealing Methamphetamine, Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, and Resisting Arrest. Due to clerical errors, the plea paperwork and colloquy incorrectly identified the drug dealing charge as a Class B felony with a higher sentencing range, even though the court read the correct substance and quantity from the reindictment. Miller was sentenced to a total of seven years of unsuspended prison time. He did not seek to withdraw his plea but appealed, arguing that his constitutional right to be indicted by a grand jury was violated because he pled guilty to an unindicted, more serious offense.The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reviewed the case for plain error, as Miller had not raised the issue below. The court held that Miller’s substantial rights were not affected because he received significant benefits from the plea, including immediate sentencing and avoidance of a much longer potential sentence. The court found no plain error and affirmed the conviction, but remanded to the Superior Court to consider Miller’s pending motion for sentence reduction. View "Miller v. State" on Justia Law

Late one night, a homeowner called 911 to report that her security camera showed a Black man and woman taking items from her back porch. Within minutes, a police officer arrived and encountered Michael Campbell near the reported location. Campbell claimed to live at the residence and was uncooperative with the officer’s instructions, repeatedly dropping his hands and reaching for his wallet despite being told not to. The officer noticed what appeared to be a gun magazine in Campbell’s waistband and, after a brief exchange, frisked Campbell, discovering a firearm and a knife. Campbell was subsequently indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm.The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma denied Campbell’s motion to suppress the firearm, finding that the officer had reasonable suspicion to detain and frisk Campbell and that this suspicion had not dissipated before the frisk. Campbell was convicted at trial. At sentencing, the district court determined that Campbell’s five prior Oklahoma armed robbery convictions qualified as violent felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), subjecting him to a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence. Campbell was sentenced to 240 months, above the statutory maximum for the felon-in-possession offense but below the Guidelines range.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the suppression motion and upheld the constitutionality of the felon-in-possession statute. However, the Tenth Circuit held that Oklahoma armed robbery can be committed with a reckless state of mind and therefore does not categorically qualify as a violent felony under the ACCA’s elements clause. The court vacated Campbell’s sentence and remanded for resentencing, while affirming his conviction. View "United States v. Campbell" on Justia Law

A woman who immigrated from China to the United States and later became a U.S. citizen founded an educational institution that participated in a Department of Defense tuition program. In 2010, the FBI began investigating her for statements made on immigration forms, conducting interviews, searches, and seizing personal and business materials. Although the U.S. Attorney’s Office ultimately declined to file charges, Fox News later published reports about her, including confidential materials from the FBI investigation. These reports cited anonymous sources and included documents and photographs seized during the FBI’s search. Following the reports, the Department of Defense terminated her institution’s participation in the tuition program, resulting in significant financial losses.She filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the FBI and other federal agencies, alleging violations of the Privacy Act due to the unauthorized disclosure of her records. During discovery, she was unable to identify the source of the leak despite extensive efforts. She then subpoenaed a Fox News journalist, who authored the reports, to reveal her confidential source. The journalist invoked a qualified First Amendment reporter’s privilege. The district court found that the plaintiff had met the requirements to overcome this privilege—demonstrating both the centrality of the information to her case and exhaustion of alternative sources—and ordered the journalist to testify. When the journalist refused, the court held her in civil contempt.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s orders. The appellate court held that, under its precedents, a qualified First Amendment reporter’s privilege may be overcome in civil cases if the information sought is crucial to the case and all reasonable alternative sources have been exhausted. The court also declined to recognize a broader federal common law reporter’s privilege. View "Chen v. FBI" on Justia Law