Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

After filing a federal discrimination lawsuit against her former employer, which was dismissed, the petitioner sent emails to the employer’s counsel that led to state criminal charges for terrorizing in Cass County, North Dakota. At trial in state district court, the petitioner was convicted by a jury and sentenced to jail time with probation. During her probation, she was found to possess a firearm, resulting in revocation of probation and a new sentence.The petitioner appealed her criminal conviction to the North Dakota Supreme Court, arguing, among other things, that the State’s failure to preserve and disclose evidence constituted a Brady violation and that the evidence was insufficient to sustain her conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed her conviction. Subsequently, in the district court, the petitioner sought postconviction relief, alleging constitutional violations, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, unlawful withholding of evidence, and ineffective assistance of counsel. She also moved to disqualify the presiding judge. The district court summarily dismissed her application, finding most claims barred by res judicata or misuse of process, and denied the motion for disqualification after a hearing.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the district court’s rulings. It held that the district court erred by summarily dismissing the ineffective assistance of counsel claim without an evidentiary hearing, as the State had not moved for summary disposition on those claims. The court reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on that issue. It affirmed the dismissal of the other claims, finding the district court had subject matter jurisdiction, correctly denied the motion to disqualify the judge, and properly dismissed other claims as procedurally barred or lacking merit. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings on the ineffective assistance claim. View "Pederson v. State" on Justia Law

Several individuals who were employed by the City and County of San Francisco and were at least 40 years old when hired brought a class action lawsuit alleging that the City’s method for calculating disability retirement benefits under its retirement system discriminated against employees based on age. The system employs two formulas; Formula 1 is used if it yields a benefit exceeding a percentage threshold, while Formula 2 is used if the threshold is not met. Plaintiffs argued that Formula 2, which imputes years of service until age 60, resulted in lower benefits for those who entered the retirement system at age 40 or older, in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA).After initial proceedings in the San Francisco City and County Superior Court—including a demurrer sustained on statute of limitations grounds and subsequent reversal by the Court of Appeal—the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint asserting FEHA claims for disparate treatment and disparate impact, as well as claims for declaratory relief, breach of contract, and equal protection violations. The trial court certified a class and denied summary judgment due to triable issues of fact. A bench trial followed, where both parties presented expert testimony on whether Formula 2 disparately impacted older employees.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the trial court’s findings. It affirmed the judgment, holding that plaintiffs failed to prove intentional age discrimination or disparate impact under FEHA. The court found that Formula 2 was motivated by pension status and credited years of service, not by age, and that plaintiffs’ evidence was insufficient as it was based on hypothetical calculations rather than actual data. The trial court’s denial of plaintiffs’ request to amend their complaint after trial was also upheld, as any alleged error was not reversible on the record. The judgment in favor of the City was affirmed. View "Carroll v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

A law enforcement agency served an electronic service provider with a search warrant for data associated with an email account belonging to a university graduate student under investigation for rape. The warrant was accompanied by a nondisclosure order (NDO) prohibiting the provider from notifying the student or anyone at the university about the warrant for 90 days. The provider did not contest the restriction against notifying the account holder but sought permission to inform a trusted contact at the university about the warrant's existence, citing concerns under the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act (CalECPA) and the First Amendment.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed a sealed affidavit and found that several statutory criteria for “adverse results” under CalECPA were present, justifying the NDO. When the provider requested to modify the order to allow notification of a university contact, the court considered the proposal but ultimately declined after law enforcement objected, noting the court lacked jurisdiction over the university and could not ensure compliance with the NDO. The order was extended once and later lifted after the target was arrested. The provider’s initial petition for writ of mandate was summarily denied by the California Court of Appeal. The California Supreme Court then granted review and transferred the matter back to the appellate court for further consideration.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo and held that the trial court made the required findings under CalECPA before issuing the NDO and that the NDO did not violate the provider’s First Amendment rights. The court found the NDO served a compelling government interest and was narrowly tailored to protect the integrity of an ongoing investigation. The petition for writ of mandate was denied. View "Microsoft Corp. v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

Dustin Booth, who had a history of stable employment and no prior mental health issues, began exhibiting signs of severe mental illness in early 2022 after changes in his substance use. His erratic behavior escalated over several days, culminating in a violent incident at home and a lengthy standoff with police after he barricaded himself inside his house. Booth’s wife repeatedly sought police intervention, expressing concerns that he was a danger to himself and others, and noted his access to firearms. After attempts to calm Booth and persuade him to leave his house, he eventually left with a friend, taking a gun with him. Police stopped the vehicle, leading to a confrontation in which Booth brandished the firearm and was fatally shot by officers.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio granted summary judgment to the defendants on all federal claims. The district court held that the proposed accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)—that officers should have used de-escalation techniques—was unreasonable due to the safety risks posed by Booth. The court further found that the officers’ actions during the traffic stop and subsequent use of force, including the deployment of a police dog and takedown maneuver, were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. It also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims.Upon review by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s decision. The Sixth Circuit held that, as a matter of law, the ADA did not require officers to accommodate Booth’s disability in the face of objective safety risks. Additionally, the court found the officers had probable cause for a mental-health seizure and acted reasonably under the Fourth Amendment in both the stop and use of force. The judgment in favor of the defendants was affirmed. View "Booth v. Lazzara" on Justia Law

After receiving a report from his ex-girlfriend that he was threatening suicide and may have shot himself, law enforcement officers in Montana responded to William Case’s home. The officers were aware of Case’s mental health and substance abuse history, as well as prior threats of suicide and confrontations with police. Upon arrival, they received further details about the phone call from Case’s ex-girlfriend, observed an empty handgun holster, a notepad resembling a suicide note, and noted Case’s lack of response to their attempts at contact. Believing Case might be injured or at risk of imminent harm, the officers entered the home without a warrant to render emergency aid. During their search, Case emerged from a closet holding an object that appeared to be a gun, prompting an officer to shoot and injure him. A handgun was found near where Case had been standing.Case was charged with assaulting a police officer and moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the warrantless entry, arguing a Fourth Amendment violation. The trial court denied the motion, finding the entry justified by emergency circumstances. A Montana jury convicted Case. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court upheld the conviction, applying its “community caretaker doctrine” and concluding that police may enter a home for a welfare check if “objective, specific and articulable facts” lead an experienced officer to suspect peril. The court rejected the argument that probable cause was required for such an entry, distinguishing emergency aid situations from criminal investigations.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case to clarify the legal standard for warrantless home entry to render emergency aid. The Court held that officers may enter a home without a warrant if they have an “objectively reasonable basis for believing” that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury. It declined to require probable cause in this context and affirmed the judgment of the Montana Supreme Court, finding the officers’ entry reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. View "Case v. Montana" on Justia Law

Illinois law provides that election officials must count mail-in ballots postmarked or certified no later than election day, as long as those ballots are received within two weeks after election day. Congressman Michael Bost and two other political candidates filed suit against the Illinois State Board of Elections and its executive director, asserting that counting ballots received after election day violates federal statutes that set a single election day for federal offices. The plaintiffs alleged that the challenged law would require them to expend additional campaign resources, potentially harm their reputations, and deprive them of a fair electoral process. Congressman Bost, in particular, claimed he would need to extend campaign activities and monitoring efforts for two additional weeks, incurring costs and risking a reduction in his margin of victory.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the case, concluding that the plaintiffs lacked standing. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the injuries alleged—such as increased campaign costs and potential reputational harm—were speculative or voluntarily incurred. The Seventh Circuit emphasized that Congressman Bost had won his prior election with a significant margin and found the plaintiffs’ injuries to be neither concrete nor particularized enough to support standing.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that Congressman Bost, as a candidate for office, does have standing to challenge the rules governing vote counting in his election. The Court reasoned that candidates possess a concrete and particularized interest in the integrity and legality of the electoral process, which is distinct from the generalized interest of voters. The judgment of the Seventh Circuit was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Bost v. Illinois Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

Law enforcement charged the defendant with multiple counts of possession of child sexual abuse material and child exploitation after content was discovered on his cell phone. The investigation began when Snapchat’s automated hash-based scanning program flagged a 16-second video uploaded from the defendant’s account as known child sexual abuse material (CSAM). Snapchat forwarded this video to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC), which confirmed the file’s hash matched previously identified CSAM but did not view the video itself. NCMEC then sent the report and video to the Wisconsin Department of Justice (DOJ), where a DOJ analyst first viewed the video without a warrant. Subsequently, local law enforcement also viewed the video without a warrant, obtained account information via subpoena, and secured a search warrant for the defendant’s home and devices, leading to the recovery of additional CSAM.In Waukesha County Circuit Court, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that viewing the video without a warrant constituted an unconstitutional search under the Fourth Amendment. The circuit court granted the motion, finding a legitimate privacy interest in the cell phone and concluding that the private search doctrine was inapplicable because no human at Snapchat had seen the video and the hash algorithm used was allegedly unreliable.The State appealed, and the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed, determining that the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the video due to Snapchat’s policies and the nature of the conduct, and found no Fourth Amendment search occurred.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed the case and held that Snapchat’s automated scan constituted a private search, and that the government’s subsequent viewing of the flagged video did not exceed the scope of that private search. Because any expectation of privacy was frustrated by the private scan and there was virtual certainty regarding the video’s contents, the Fourth Amendment was not implicated. The court affirmed the court of appeals’ reversal of suppression and remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Gasper" on Justia Law

During a daytime traffic stop in Lawrence, Massachusetts, a police officer encountered a sixteen-year-old juvenile who had been reported missing by the Department of Children and Families. The juvenile was seated in a vehicle with an infant and three adults, one of whom was known by the officer to be affiliated with a street gang. The officer ordered the juvenile out of the car without asking any questions and immediately conducted a patfrisk, discovering a handgun on the juvenile’s person. The juvenile was subsequently charged with multiple firearms offenses and indicted as a youthful offender on one count.The Essex County Juvenile Court reviewed the juvenile’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from the exit order and patfrisk, arguing violation of constitutional rights. After an evidentiary hearing, the judge granted the motion to suppress, finding the officer's actions unjustified under the circumstances. The Commonwealth sought interlocutory review, and a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk allowed the appeal. The Appeals Court reversed the suppression order, concluding the officer’s actions were reasonable under the community caretaking doctrine. The Supreme Judicial Court then granted further appellate review.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the officer’s exit order was justified under the community caretaking doctrine, as the officer was acting to ensure the safety and well-being of a missing juvenile. However, due to inconsistencies in the Juvenile Court judge’s findings regarding the credibility of the officer’s testimony about key facts supporting the patfrisk, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the suppression order. The case was remanded to the Juvenile Court for clarification of factual findings and reconsideration of the legal conclusions in light of those findings and the Supreme Judicial Court's opinion. View "Commonwealth v. Demos D." on Justia Law

The petitioner is an inmate serving an indeterminate sentence of 45 years to life for first degree murder, who challenged the timing of his initial youth offender parole hearing under Penal Code section 3051. His main contention was that, under regulations adopted by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) following Proposition 57 and Assembly Bill 965, only educational merit credits are counted toward advancing his youth parole eligible date (YPED), whereas a wider range of credits—including good conduct, milestone completion, rehabilitative achievement, and extraordinary conduct credits—may be applied to advance the minimum eligible parole date (MEPD) for other indeterminately sentenced inmates. The petitioner claimed this distinction deprived him of thousands of days of credit and delayed his parole hearing compared to similarly situated inmates.Previously, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District summarily denied the petitioner’s habeas corpus petition. The California Supreme Court then granted review, transferring the case back to the Court of Appeal with instructions to issue an order to show cause and reconsider the petitioner’s claims.Upon review, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District considered both statutory and constitutional arguments, including equal protection and due process claims. The court applied rational basis review to the equal protection claim, emphasizing the deferential standard and the need for a rational relationship between the regulatory distinction and a legitimate state interest. The court concluded that limiting credits for youth offender parole hearings to educational merit credits serves administrative and operational needs, promoting certainty and stability in scheduling, and is rationally related to legitimate governmental objectives. The court found no merit to the statutory, equal protection, or due process challenges and denied habeas corpus relief, discharging the petition. View "In re Thai" on Justia Law

The Missouri General Assembly enacted two statutes effective August 28, 2023: the SAFE Act, which generally prohibits health care providers from performing gender transition surgeries or prescribing cross-sex hormones and puberty-blocking drugs for minors, and the Medicaid ban, which precludes MO HealthNet payments for such treatments when used for gender transition. The statutes include specific exemptions, such as for treatment of certain medical conditions and for minors already receiving such care prior to enactment. E.N., on behalf of her minor child and joined by medical professionals and organizations, challenged both laws, alleging violations of equal protection, due process, and the gains of industry clause under the Missouri Constitution.The Circuit Court of Cole County conducted a two-week bench trial and entered judgment in favor of the State, upholding the constitutionality of both statutes. The court found the challengers had raised only facial challenges and determined that neither statute violated the constitutional provisions cited. The challengers appealed, raising multiple points of error regarding the constitutional analysis and factual findings at trial.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the circuit court’s determination de novo, applying a presumption of constitutionality. Relying on recent decisions from the United States Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the court held that both statutes classify based only on age and medical use, not on sex or transgender status. Thus, rational-basis review applied. The court found that the statutes are rationally related to legitimate state interests, such as safeguarding minors and managing public resources, and do not infringe fundamental rights. The court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment, concluding that the challengers failed to demonstrate any constitutional violation. View "E.N. v. Kehoe" on Justia Law