Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Dontarious Burke was convicted of malice murder and armed robbery for the shooting death of Kentrell Jones. The incident occurred on November 27, 2019, and Burke was indicted on March 1, 2021. His trial was severed from his brother DeMarcus Burke's trial. Burke was tried by a jury from October 19 to 20, 2021, and found guilty on all counts. He was sentenced to life in prison for malice murder and an additional 20 years for armed robbery. Burke filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court on May 6, 2024. He then filed a timely notice of appeal.The trial court denied Burke's motion for a new trial, and he appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia. Burke raised several claims, including a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights under the Confrontation Clause, ineffective assistance of counsel, and the cumulative effect of errors requiring a new trial. The trial court had admitted testimony from police officers about information obtained from non-testifying witnesses, which Burke argued violated his Confrontation Clause rights. However, because Burke did not raise this objection at trial, the Supreme Court reviewed it for plain error and found none.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed Burke's claims and found that none of them warranted a reversal of his convictions. The court held that Burke's Confrontation Clause rights were not violated, as the testimony in question did not clearly and obviously violate established law. Additionally, the court found that Burke's trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance, as the decisions made by counsel were within the bounds of reasonable trial strategy. Finally, the court determined that there was no cumulative error that would require a new trial. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed Burke's convictions. View "BURKE v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

In 2022, the Georgia General Assembly enacted House Bill 839 (HB 839), which incorporated the City of Mableton within unincorporated Cobb County and provided for the creation of one or more community improvement districts (CIDs) within Mableton. Deidre White and other residents of Cobb County challenged the constitutionality of HB 839, arguing that it violated the "Single Subject Rule" of the Georgia Constitution by creating more than one unit of government, specifically Mableton and the CIDs.The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court found that HB 839 did not violate the Single Subject Rule, as the creation of CIDs within Mableton was germane to the overall objective of incorporating the city. The Appellants then appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's dismissal. The court held that HB 839 did not violate the Single Subject Rule because the creation of CIDs within Mableton had a logical and natural connection to the incorporation of the city. The court also rejected the argument that the ballot question for HB 839 contravened the precedent set in Rea v. City of LaFayette, as the creation of CIDs was related to the single objective of establishing Mableton. Thus, the court concluded that HB 839 was constitutional and upheld the trial court's decision. View "WHITE v. CITY OF MABLETON" on Justia Law

Tico Holloway was convicted of malice murder and related crimes in connection with the shooting death of Mercedes Dejesus Antunez-Flores and violent crimes against N.H. and M.H. The crimes occurred on August 17, 2019. Holloway was indicted on multiple counts, including malice murder, felony murder, criminal attempt to commit armed robbery, aggravated assault, aggravated battery, armed robbery, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. A jury found Holloway guilty of all counts except armed robbery. He was sentenced to life in prison without parole for malice murder, with additional concurrent sentences for other charges. Holloway's motion for a new trial was denied, and he appealed.The trial court, Cobb County, denied Holloway's motion for a new trial. Holloway argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his malice murder conviction and that the trial court made errors. He claimed the evidence did not disprove his self-defense argument beyond a reasonable doubt. Holloway also contended that the trial court erred by allowing the medical examiner to testify remotely via videoconference, which he argued violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. Additionally, he claimed that errors in the Spanish-to-English interpretation of M.H.'s testimony violated his right to a fair trial.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support Holloway's malice murder conviction, as the jury was entitled to reject his self-defense claim. The court also found no plain error in allowing the medical examiner to testify remotely, noting that Holloway had consented to this procedure. Finally, the court concluded that Holloway waived his claim regarding the interpretation errors by agreeing to the procedure used during the trial. View "HOLLOWAY v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

Sherran Wasserman agreed to sell land in Franklin County to Anthony Pham, contingent on the approval of a conditional use permit by the Franklin County Board of Commissioners. Pham applied for the permit to build and operate chicken houses, but the Board denied the application. Wasserman then sued the Board and the County, initially bringing multiple claims under state and federal law. She dismissed some claims, conceded others, and the trial court dismissed her remaining state-law claims due to sovereign immunity. This left two federal claims: one alleging the County violated Pham’s equal protection rights based on race, and another alleging a violation of Wasserman’s equal protection rights as a “class of one.”The trial court denied the County’s motion for summary judgment, applying the federal doctrine of third-party standing, which allows a plaintiff to assert the rights of third parties. The court found genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on standing and the merits of Wasserman’s equal protection claims. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding Wasserman lacked third-party standing and that her “class of one” claim failed as a matter of law.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed whether a plaintiff may rely on the federal doctrine of third-party standing to establish constitutional standing in Georgia courts. The court held that Georgia’s constitutional standing requirements, rooted in the common law and consistent precedent, do not allow a plaintiff to maintain an action by asserting only the rights of a nonparty. The court overruled its previous adoption of the federal doctrine of third-party standing, concluding that a plaintiff must assert her own legal rights to invoke the judicial power of Georgia courts. The judgment was vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "WASSERMAN v. FRANKLIN COUNTY" on Justia Law

Stephen Bryant was sentenced to death by a South Carolina state court. During postconviction proceedings, Bryant filed a new application for relief, claiming his execution would violate the Eighth Amendment due to his intellectual disabilities, as defined in Atkins v. Virginia and Hall v. Florida. Later, Bryant sought to amend his application to include a claim that he suffers from fetal alcohol spectrum disorder (FASD) and that executing individuals with FASD should also be prohibited under the Eighth Amendment. The state postconviction court denied this request, ruling it was both impermissibly successive and filed too late.Bryant's initial appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court, which focused on a single claim of evidentiary error, was denied. He then sought post-conviction relief on several grounds, none of which included the Eighth Amendment claim. The state trial court denied these claims, and the South Carolina Supreme Court denied discretionary review. Bryant subsequently filed for federal habeas corpus relief, which was stayed to allow him to exhaust state remedies. He filed two new applications in state court, one of which was allowed to proceed on the intellectual disability claim but not on the FASD claim. The state trial court ultimately denied the intellectual disability claim on its merits.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the state trial court's refusal to permit Bryant to amend his application to add the FASD claim rested on state procedural grounds that were independent of federal law and adequate to bar federal habeas review. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief, concluding that Bryant's FASD claim was procedurally defaulted and could not be considered on its merits. View "Bryant v. Stirling" on Justia Law

The case involves Access Independent Health Services, Inc., doing business as Red River Women’s Clinic, and several physicians who challenged the constitutionality of North Dakota’s abortion regulation statutes, N.D.C.C. ch. 12.1-19.1. The plaintiffs argued that the law was unconstitutionally vague and violated pregnant women’s rights to life and health-preserving care under the North Dakota Constitution.The District Court of Burleigh County granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, declaring the law unconstitutionally vague and recognizing a fundamental right for pregnant women to choose abortion before viability under the North Dakota Constitution. The court found that the law’s language was ambiguous and did not provide clear guidelines for physicians, thus violating due process. The court also held that the law infringed on the fundamental rights of pregnant women.The State of North Dakota appealed to the Supreme Court of North Dakota, seeking a stay of the district court’s judgment pending appeal. The Supreme Court of North Dakota denied the motion for a stay. The court applied a four-factor test to determine whether to grant a stay: likelihood of success on appeal, irreparable injury to the appellant, substantial harm to any party, and harm to the public interest. The court found that the State was unlikely to succeed on the merits of the appeal, as the law was likely unconstitutionally vague and did not meet the strict scrutiny standard required for laws infringing on fundamental rights. The court also determined that the balance of harms and public interest did not favor granting a stay, noting that the law had never been enforced and that the state’s attorneys had agreed not to enforce it pending the outcome of the appeal. View "Access Independent Health Services, Inc. v. Wrigley" on Justia Law

Louis Chandler, a Michigan prisoner, was convicted of two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and sentenced to concurrent terms of twenty-five to seventy-five years in prison. Chandler filed a habeas corpus petition, claiming that the trial court infringed his right to present a complete defense. The district court denied the petition, and Chandler appealed.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan initially reviewed the case and denied Chandler's habeas corpus petition. Chandler argued that the trial court's refusal to delay the trial, exclusion of key witnesses, and prevention of presenting critical evidence violated his constitutional rights. The Michigan Court of Appeals found that the trial court had abused its discretion by denying Chandler's requests for an adjournment, barring his witnesses, and excluding evidence of the victim's prior false allegations. However, the appellate court affirmed Chandler's conviction, concluding that the errors were not outcome determinative under the state's non-constitutional error standard.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the trial court's actions significantly undermined Chandler's ability to present a complete defense. The court held that the exclusion of evidence and witnesses critical to Chandler's defense violated his constitutional rights. The court concluded that the errors had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury's verdict, creating grave doubt about the trial's fairness.The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's decision, conditionally granted Chandler's habeas corpus petition, and remanded the case with instructions to order Chandler's release unless the State of Michigan grants him a new trial within ninety days. View "Chandler v. Brown" on Justia Law

Iowa enacted Senate File 2340, which criminalizes the presence of aliens who have illegally reentered the United States within its boundaries. The Act mandates that aliens violating it must return to the country they reentered from and prohibits judges from abating state prosecutions due to pending or possible federal determinations of the alien’s immigration status. The United States sought a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the Act, which the district court granted. Iowa appealed the decision.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa ruled that the United States had standing to sue and could state a cause of action to enjoin the Act. The court found that the United States established a likelihood of success on the merits, showing that federal immigration law preempts the Act under both conflict and field preemption. The court also found that irreparable harm would occur if the Act went into effect and that the balance of equities and public interest favored granting the injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion, examining factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the United States had standing and an equitable cause of action to enjoin the Act. The court found that the Act likely conflicts with federal immigration law, as it obstructs the discretion of federal officials and creates a parallel enforcement scheme. The court also agreed that the United States demonstrated irreparable harm and that the balance of equities and public interest favored the injunction. The preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the Act was affirmed. View "United States v. State of Iowa" on Justia Law

An officer on patrol stopped a vehicle for a traffic infraction after receiving information that the vehicle’s occupants might have been involved in a drug sale. After initially interacting with the driver, the officer waited for backup before removing the occupants and conducting a search with a drug-sniffing dog, which led to the discovery of a gun. The passenger, Tyre Brown, admitted ownership of the gun and was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm. Brown argued that the officer unlawfully prolonged the stop beyond the time necessary to address the traffic infraction, violating his constitutional rights.The Iowa District Court for Polk County denied Brown’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search. Brown was found guilty after stipulating to a trial on the minutes of testimony. Brown appealed the denial of his motion to suppress, and the Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling. The court of appeals concluded that the extension of the stop was permissible under the shared-knowledge doctrine and that the officer had smelled marijuana, justifying further investigation.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that the shared-knowledge doctrine allowed the officer to act on information provided by another officer who had observed a potential drug transaction, thus justifying the extension of the stop. The court found that the extension of the stop to investigate for drugs did not violate Brown’s constitutional rights. Consequently, the district court’s ruling denying Brown’s motion to suppress was affirmed. View "State of Iowa v. Brown" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a class of individuals, filed mortgage foreclosure complaints in Illinois circuit courts and paid "add-on" filing fees mandated by section 15-1504.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. They challenged the constitutionality of these fees, asserting that the statute violated the free access clause of the Illinois Constitution. The Illinois Supreme Court previously agreed, declaring the statute unconstitutional and affirming an injunction against its enforcement.The Will County circuit court initially certified the class and granted partial summary judgment, finding the statute unconstitutional. The appellate court reversed, and the case was remanded. On remand, plaintiffs pursued a refund of the fees. The circuit court dismissed the refund claim, citing sovereign immunity, which bars claims against the State. The appellate court reversed, holding that the circuit court had jurisdiction under the officer-suit exception to sovereign immunity, which allows suits against state officials for unconstitutional actions.The Illinois Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that while the officer-suit exception allowed the circuit court to enjoin the enforcement of the unconstitutional statute, it did not apply to the refund claim. The court determined that the refund claim was a retrospective monetary award to redress a past wrong, which falls under the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims, not the circuit court. Consequently, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's judgment and affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of the refund claim. View "Walker v. Chasteen" on Justia Law