Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Two long-time residents of Nashua, New Hampshire, sought to fly various flags on a designated "Citizen Flag Pole" located at City Hall Plaza. The City had previously allowed private citizens and groups to fly flags representing diverse causes and cultural events on this pole, with minimal oversight and no substantive review of flag content. After one of the plaintiffs flew a "Save Women's Sports" flag, the City received complaints, revoked permission, and removed the flag, stating that it was discriminatory toward the transgender community. Subsequently, the City adopted a written policy in 2022 asserting that the flagpole’s use constituted government speech and reserving the right to deny flags not aligned with City policies.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire, alleging violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent viewpoint-based denials of flag applications. Before the City filed its opposition, it enacted a new policy to exercise exclusive government control over the flagpoles. The magistrate judge recommended denying the injunction, finding the flag program to be government speech, and the district court adopted that recommendation and denied relief. The plaintiffs then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.The First Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial for abuse of discretion and legal conclusions de novo. Applying the government speech test from Shurtleff v. City of Boston, the court held that Nashua’s Citizen Flag Pole program was not government speech, but rather operated as a forum for private expression. Because Nashua conceded that, absent a government speech determination, its actions constituted impermissible viewpoint discrimination, the First Circuit reversed the district court. The case was remanded with instructions to enter interim declaratory relief in favor of the plaintiffs. View "Scaer v. City of Nashua" on Justia Law

HRT Enterprises pursued a takings claim against the City of Detroit after losing a jury verdict in state court in 2005. Subsequently, HRT filed suit in federal court in 2008, alleging a post-2005 violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan dismissed the federal action, citing the requirement from Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), to exhaust state remedies first. HRT then returned to state court, where its claim was dismissed on claim preclusion grounds, a decision affirmed by the Michigan Court of Appeals. After the state court denied compensation, HRT initiated a federal § 1983 action in 2012. The case was stayed when the City filed for bankruptcy, prompting HRT to participate in bankruptcy proceedings to protect its compensation rights. Ultimately, the bankruptcy court excepted HRT’s takings claim from discharge, allowing the federal case to proceed. After two jury trials, the district court entered judgment for HRT in September 2023.Following its success, HRT moved for attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, presenting billing records that included work from related state and bankruptcy proceedings. The district court applied a 33% discount to the claimed hours due to commingled and poorly described entries, set an average hourly rate, and awarded $720,486.25, which included expert witness fees. Both parties appealed aspects of the fee award to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.The Sixth Circuit held that the district court erred by concluding it had no discretion to award fees for work performed in the related state-court and bankruptcy proceedings, as such fees are recoverable when the work is necessary to advance the federal litigation. The court also found the district court erred in awarding expert witness fees under § 1988(c) in a § 1983 action, as the statute does not authorize such fees for § 1983 claims. The appellate court vacated the fee award and remanded for recalculation consistent with its opinion. View "HRT Enterprises v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

HRT Enterprises owned an 11.8-acre parcel adjacent to Detroit’s Coleman A. Young International Airport, with about 20 percent of the property falling within a regulated runway “visibility zone” that restricted development. Over time, the City of Detroit acquired other properties in a nearby area for airport compliance but did not purchase HRT’s. By late 2008, HRT’s property had become vacant and vandalized, and HRT alleged it could no longer use, lease, or sell the property due to City actions and regulatory restrictions.HRT first sued the City in Michigan state court in 2002, alleging inverse condemnation, but the jury found for the City; the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. In 2008, HRT sued in federal court, but the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan dismissed the action without prejudice because HRT had not exhausted state remedies. HRT then filed a second state suit in 2009, which was dismissed on res judicata grounds; the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed. HRT did not seek further review.In 2012, HRT filed the present action in federal court, alleging a de facto taking under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court denied the City’s preclusion arguments, granted summary judgment to HRT on liability, and held that a taking had occurred, leaving the date for the jury. A first jury found the taking occurred in 2009 and awarded $4.25 million; the court ordered remittitur to $2 million, then a second jury, after a new trial, awarded $1.97 million.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings, holding that HRT’s claim was ripe, not barred by claim or issue preclusion, that the district court properly granted summary judgment on liability, and that its remittitur decision was not an abuse of discretion. View "HRT Enterprises v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

Several individuals attended a Loudoun County School Board meeting intending to speak during the public-comment period about recent news involving the Board’s reinstatement of a student who had previously been arrested and allegedly threatened another student. They wished to express concerns regarding the Board’s handling of school safety, particularly in relation to this specific student. During the meeting, the School Board Chair interrupted several of these individuals, invoking a Board policy that prohibits speakers from targeting, criticizing, or attacking individual students during public comments, and advised that such concerns should instead be directed privately to school officials.After these interruptions, the affected individuals filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Their complaint alleged that, as applied to them, the Board’s policy constituted impermissible viewpoint discrimination under the First Amendment, and that the policy was unconstitutionally vague. They sought a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of the policy against them. The district court denied both requests, finding that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits of their claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of the preliminary injunction. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on either claim. The court found that the policy was a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral restriction appropriate to the limited public forum of the school board’s meetings, and that the interruptions were consistent with the policy’s facial requirements, not discriminatory based on viewpoint. Furthermore, the court determined that the policy language—prohibiting comments that “target, criticize, or attack individual students”—was not unconstitutionally vague, providing sufficient notice and guidance for enforcement. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Platt v. Mansfield" on Justia Law

Ryan O’Donnell and Michael Goree each had their vehicles disposed of by the City of Chicago after failing to pay multiple traffic tickets. The City acted under a municipal code provision that allows for immobilization, towing, and eventual disposition of vehicles registered to owners with outstanding violations. O’Donnell’s vehicle was sold to a towing company at scrap value; Goree’s vehicle was relinquished to a lienholder. Neither was compensated or had proceeds offset against their ticket debt.After these events, O’Donnell and Goree filed a putative class action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. Their complaint alleged that the City’s forfeiture scheme was facially unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause and the Illinois constitution, and included a state-law unjust enrichment claim. They also asserted a Monell claim against the towing company, URT United Road Towing, Inc. The district court dismissed all claims for failure to state a claim, finding that the vehicle forfeiture under the traffic code was not a taking.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The appellate court held that the City’s graduated forfeiture scheme is an exercise of its police power to enforce traffic laws rather than a taking for public use. The court reasoned that this type of law enforcement forfeiture does not trigger the Takings Clause of either the federal or Illinois constitutions. The court further found that because there was no constitutional violation, the plaintiffs’ Monell and unjust enrichment claims also failed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of all claims. View "O'Donnell v City of Chicago" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted by a jury in Macomb Circuit Court of first-degree criminal sexual conduct for the sexual assault of his five-year-old daughter. He was originally sentenced to 360 to 550 months in prison, along with lifetime electronic monitoring and lifetime registration under Michigan’s Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA). After an initial appeal, his sentence was vacated for exceeding the statutory minimum without justification, and upon resentencing, he received 300 to 480 months, with the same monitoring and registration requirements.The Michigan Court of Appeals first affirmed the conviction but vacated the original sentence and remanded for resentencing. On remand, the trial court imposed a new sentence, and the defendant again appealed, arguing that lifetime registration under SORA was cruel or unusual punishment, and that lifetime electronic monitoring was both cruel or unusual and constituted an unreasonable search. The Court of Appeals affirmed the revised sentence and rejected his constitutional challenges.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on whether the 2021 SORA, as amended, constituted cruel or unusual punishment under the Michigan Constitution, and whether lifetime electronic monitoring posed constitutional issues. The Supreme Court held that the 2021 SORA does constitute punishment but is not cruel or unusual, either facially or as applied to the defendant. The Court found that the statute’s requirements, although burdensome and excessive in some respects, are not grossly disproportionate to the offense for Tier III offenders. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ judgment regarding SORA but vacated it to the extent that its reasoning was inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion. The Court denied leave on the defendant’s challenges related to lifetime electronic monitoring. View "People Of Michigan v. Kardasz" on Justia Law

Three business entities and individuals associated with the operation of a retail store in Cedar Park, Texas, were subject to enforcement under a city ordinance banning “head shops”—stores selling items commonly used to ingest or inhale illegal substances. After receiving notices from the City, two of the appellants were charged in municipal court and fined for violating the ordinance, while the third appellant, a related business entity, was not charged. Following the municipal court’s judgment, the two charged parties appealed for a trial de novo in the county court, which annulled the municipal court’s judgment and began new criminal proceedings. They also pursued state habeas relief, which was still ongoing at the time of this appeal.Separately, the appellants filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, challenging the ordinance’s validity and constitutionality under federal and state law, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court dismissed all claims as barred by the doctrine announced in Heck v. Humphrey, which precludes certain civil claims that would imply the invalidity of existing criminal convictions. The district court also dismissed a distinct claim related to termination of utility services.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that because the municipal court’s judgments were annulled by the trial de novo and criminal proceedings were still pending under Texas law, there were no outstanding convictions to trigger the Heck bar. Thus, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the claims challenging the ordinance and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the standalone water termination claim, as the appellants had disclaimed any intent to pursue it. View "Kleinman v. City of Cedar Park" on Justia Law

Alvin Beasley was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm after police responded to gunshots at his ex-girlfriend’s house in Danville, Illinois. Officers saw a car fleeing the scene, found Beasley inside, and recovered a discarded firearm. As Beasley was on parole for a felony conviction, he could not lawfully possess a firearm. After a jury found him guilty, a presentence investigation identified three prior felony convictions: armed robbery in 2004, aggravated battery in 2005, and second-degree murder in 2011. The probation office concluded that Beasley qualified for enhanced sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA).The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois overruled Beasley’s objection that a jury should decide whether his prior convictions occurred on “different occasions,” and sentenced him to 300 months’ imprisonment. The court relied on then-controlling Seventh Circuit precedent, which permitted judges to make this finding. Beasley appealed, arguing that recent Supreme Court decisions (Wooden v. United States and Alleyne v. United States) required that this factual question be determined by a jury.While the appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Erlinger v. United States, holding that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require a jury to decide whether prior offenses occurred on different occasions under ACCA. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed that the district court erred under Erlinger, but concluded the error was harmless. The appellate court found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a properly instructed jury would have reached the same result, given the substantial gaps in time and the distinct nature of the offenses. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Beasley" on Justia Law

A research scientist who had worked for over a decade at a public university in Ohio coauthored several well-regarded articles during her tenure. After she left the university for a new position, allegations of research misconduct surfaced regarding some of her publications. The university convened an investigative committee, as required by federal regulations due to its receipt of federal funding. The committee found that she had committed research misconduct and recommended barring her from future university employment, retracting or correcting certain articles, and reported its findings to relevant journals and her current employer. The scientist alleged that the committee deviated from standard investigatory procedures, failed to provide exculpatory evidence, and did not require proof of intent or recklessness.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio dismissed her complaint, which had sought equitable relief under federal and state law. The court held that sovereign immunity shielded the university’s Board of Trustees and the officials sued in their official capacities from most claims. It found several claims time-barred and determined that the remaining constitutional claims, including due process and equal protection, failed on the merits. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims against individuals in their personal capacities.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that sovereign immunity barred all claims against the Board of Trustees and all state-law claims against the officials in their official capacities. As to the remaining federal due process claims, the court determined that the plaintiff failed to identify a constitutionally protected liberty interest under the stigma-plus doctrine and that the alleged conduct—even if malicious or in violation of confidentiality regulations—did not amount to conscience-shocking behavior under substantive due process standards. View "Pichiorri v. Burghes" on Justia Law

A citizen advocacy group and two individuals challenged five provisions of a city ordinance in Kerrville, Texas, that regulated "canvassing" and "soliciting" activities at private residences and public streets. The ordinance defined "canvassing" as door-to-door advocacy on topics like religion, politics, or philosophy, and "soliciting" as seeking donations or advertising services, with both activities subject to restrictions on timing, signage, permitting, and location. Plaintiffs argued that these rules chilled their protected speech, including political canvassing, religious outreach, and commercial solicitation, and feared fines under the ordinance.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas considered the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction. After a hearing, the district court found that the plaintiffs had standing as to most provisions except the rule applying to minors. On the merits, the district court enjoined enforcement of the permitting requirement for solicitors but declined to enjoin the hours, signage, and street restrictions, finding those likely constitutional under intermediate scrutiny.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The Fifth Circuit agreed that plaintiffs had standing except as to the minor-related provision. It held that the hours and signage restrictions—because they targeted canvassing based on content—must be reviewed under strict scrutiny rather than intermediate scrutiny, and remanded for reconsideration. The court also found the city failed to justify the streets provision even under intermediate scrutiny and remanded for further injunction analysis. It affirmed the injunction against the permitting requirement but vacated it as overbroad, directing the district court to limit relief to the plaintiffs. The Fifth Circuit denied as moot the motion for an injunction pending appeal. View "LIA Network v. City of Kerrville" on Justia Law