Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Police investigated a domestic disturbance in December 2020 involving the appellant, who was subsequently charged in Yellowstone County, Montana, with his fourth DUI-related offense. The State later amended the charges to include DUI per se for operating a noncommercial vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more, fourth or subsequent offense. The appellant entered a plea agreement, pleading guilty to the amended charge in exchange for dismissal of the original DUI charge. At sentencing, both parties recommended specific incarceration and treatment conditions, and agreed to a $5,000 fine. The appellant requested that certain fees be waived due to his financial circumstances.The Thirteenth Judicial District Court accepted the plea, dismissed the original charge, and imposed the recommended sentence, including the mandatory-minimum $5,000 fine under § 61-8-731(1)(a)(iii), MCA (2019). The court also orally stated it would waive several fees. However, the written judgment subsequently entered required the appellant to pay a variety of fees and surcharges, contrary to the oral pronouncement. The appellant appealed, arguing that the mandatory fine was unconstitutional and that the imposition of fees conflicted with the oral pronouncement.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. Guided by its recent decision in State v. Cole, the Court held that sentencing courts must consider a defendant’s ability to pay when imposing the mandatory-minimum fine and may suspend the portion a defendant is unable to pay. Because the District Court made no findings regarding the appellant’s ability to pay, the Supreme Court reversed the fine and remanded for further proceedings consistent with Cole. The Court also ordered the written judgment to be amended to conform to the fees waived in open court. View "State v. C. Horn" on Justia Law

Two individuals purchased Florida prepaid college tuition savings plans for their daughters in 2004 and 2006. The plans promised to cover tuition at Florida public colleges or transfer an equivalent amount to non-Florida colleges if the beneficiary chose to attend elsewhere. In 2007, the Florida Legislature authorized a new “tuition differential” fee, exempting holders of existing plans from paying that fee at Florida colleges. The Florida Prepaid College Board amended the plan contracts to specify that this new fee was not covered for out-of-state schools. Over a decade later, when both daughters chose to attend out-of-state colleges, the Board declined to transfer an amount equivalent to the tuition differential fee.The purchasers filed a putative class action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida against members of the Board, alleging that the Board’s refusal violated the Contracts and Takings Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the Board from applying the statutory exemption and contract amendments to beneficiaries attending non-Florida schools. The Board moved to dismiss, arguing it was protected by sovereign immunity. A magistrate judge recommended denying the motion, reasoning the relief sought was prospective. However, the district court disagreed, ruling that the relief requested was essentially a demand for a refund, thus barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the suit was barred by sovereign immunity because the relief sought would require specific performance of a contract with the state, which is not permitted under Ex parte Young and related Supreme Court precedent. However, the appellate court vacated the district court’s dismissal with prejudice and remanded with instructions to dismiss without prejudice, as the dismissal was for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "Lavina v. Florida Prepaid College Board" on Justia Law

During demonstrations in Denver protesting police brutality following George Floyd’s death, a police officer shot a pepperball at a protestor, Elisabeth Epps, who was alone, unarmed, and not acting aggressively. The officer fired without warning as Epps crossed a street while recording police on her phone. The pepperball caused physical injury, but Epps complied with police instructions after being shot. The incident was captured on multiple video sources.Epps brought a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, alleging that the officer’s conduct violated her First and Fourth Amendment rights. Her claims were part of a larger action involving other protestors and the City and County of Denver. The officer moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity and for a separate trial (bifurcation), but both motions were denied by the district court. At trial, the jury found the officer liable for violating Epps’s Fourth Amendment rights but not her First Amendment rights, awarding her compensatory and punitive damages. The court later reduced the punitive damages, which Epps accepted.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity, concluding that Epps’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated under clearly established law because she was not committing a serious crime, posed no threat, and was not fleeing. The appellate court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to bifurcate the trial, and it found sufficient evidence to support punitive damages based on the officer’s conduct and statements. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the verdict and all rulings against the officer. View "Packard v. City and County of Denver" on Justia Law

Several New Mexico landowners, holding title to non-navigable streambeds, asserted that they once had the right to exclude the public from walking or wading in these streambeds. They alleged that a recent decision by the New Mexico Supreme Court eliminated this right, amounting to a judicial taking without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The relevant background includes longstanding provisions in New Mexico law declaring all natural waters in the state to be public, subsequent proclamations and statutes requiring permission to access private streambeds, and a 2022 New Mexico Supreme Court decision which clarified that the public had a right to walk and wade in the beds of public water crossing private land, so long as such use was reasonably necessary and minimally invasive.The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico dismissed the landowners’ complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing because their injuries were not traceable to enforcement by the named state officials, but rather to the New Mexico Supreme Court's decision. The district court also concluded that the claims were barred by sovereign immunity, reasoning that any relief would require payments from the state treasury.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the landowners did have standing, as they faced a credible threat of enforcement by the state officials, and their injuries were traceable to those officials and redressable through prospective relief. The Tenth Circuit also determined that sovereign immunity did not bar the claims and that no abstention or jurisdictional doctrine prevented adjudication.Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal on alternative grounds, holding that the landowners failed to state a claim for a Fifth Amendment taking. The court concluded that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated an established property right to exclude the public from the streambeds, but rather that the New Mexico Supreme Court had merely clarified the scope of the public’s preexisting easement. View "Sanchez v. Torrez" on Justia Law

A teacher in Indiana, who was preparing to begin teaching grades 1–3, filed a lawsuit challenging a new state statute that prohibits public schools and teachers from providing “instruction” on “human sexuality” to students in prekindergarten through third grade. While the law allows teachers to answer students’ questions and to teach academic subjects and child abuse prevention, it does not define the key terms “instruction” or “human sexuality.” The teacher argued that the statute would chill or restrict her protected speech, such as including certain books in her classroom library, displaying pro-LGBTQ+ stickers, and addressing students’ use of pejorative language related to sexual identity. She also claimed the law is unconstitutionally vague, fearing she might inadvertently violate it and risk losing her teaching license.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana denied her request for a preliminary injunction. The district court concluded that the teacher had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of her First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment claims. The court reasoned that most of the speech affected by the statute—classroom instruction and related communications—was official speech not protected by the First Amendment, and that any protected speech affected was not substantial enough to make the law overbroad. It also found that the terms “instruction” and “human sexuality” had a discernible core of meaning, so the law was not unconstitutionally vague.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Seventh Circuit held that the teacher had not demonstrated that the statute prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech or is impermissibly vague. The court concluded that any ambiguity at the margins does not render the statute facially invalid and emphasized that challenges to specific applications of the law could be brought in the future if necessary. View "Smiley v. Jenner" on Justia Law

A fifteen-year-old was involved in a physical altercation with a thirteen-year-old after getting off a school bus, during which he struck the younger student and kicked him once. Tragically, the victim died from his injuries. The defendant was subsequently indicted and convicted in the Superior Court of Cherokee County for felony murder, aggravated assault, and aggravated battery. He received a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Georgia, and his federal habeas petition was denied, with the denial affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.Years later, the defendant filed a motion to correct a void sentence, arguing that his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment because a life sentence was grossly disproportionate to an unintentional killing committed by a juvenile during a fistfight. The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that the sentence was within the statutory range and thus not void, and concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the claim. The court also suggested the case did not meet the rare threshold for an Eighth Amendment disproportionality challenge but ultimately dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and held that a proportionality challenge under the Eighth Amendment is a cognizable void sentence claim that may be raised at any time, not just within the statutory time frame for sentence modification. The Court determined that the trial court erred in dismissing the motion for lack of jurisdiction, vacated the dismissal order, and remanded the case for the trial court to consider the merits of the Eighth Amendment claim. View "MILLER v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

A federal inmate brought an action for damages against several officials at a federal prison, claiming they provided delayed or inadequate medical treatment and used excessive force against him during his incarceration. His allegations included delayed dental care, insufficient response to rectal bleeding, denial of participation in a mental health class, and the use of restraints and physical force during an incident involving his cellmate. He asserted that these actions violated his constitutional rights under the Eighth, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments.The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia dismissed his complaint, holding that a damages remedy under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics was not available for his claims. The court reasoned that his claims, both for inadequate medical care and excessive force, presented new contexts beyond those recognized in previous Supreme Court cases and that special factors counseled against extending a judicially implied damages remedy. The inmate appealed from the district court’s judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the inmate’s inadequate medical treatment claims presented a new context distinct from Carlson v. Green, as the facts involved less severe circumstances and implicated broader, systemic prison management issues rather than deliberate malfeasance. The court further found that special factors, including Congress’s silence and provision of alternative remedies, counseled against extending Bivens. Regarding the excessive force claims, the Fourth Circuit found that the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Goldey v. Fields expressly foreclosed recognizing a Bivens remedy in this context. Thus, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal, holding that a Bivens remedy was unavailable for the plaintiff’s claims. View "Spivey v. Breckon" on Justia Law

Two defendants were implicated in the 1985 kidnapping, rape, and murder of a woman in California. Evidence showed that they were previously involved in a string of armed robberies and planned to escape law enforcement by stealing a vehicle from a shopping center parking lot. They kidnapped the victim, drove her hundreds of miles, sexually assaulted her, and killed her before disposing of her body in a canal. Forensic evidence, including eyewitness testimony and DNA analysis, linked both men to the crimes. Both were arrested years later after advances in DNA technology allowed for retesting of biological evidence.The Sacramento County Superior Court tried the defendants together with separate juries. Each was found guilty of murder, rape, and kidnapping, with special circumstances for kidnapping-murder, robbery-murder, and rape-murder. One defendant was also convicted of sodomy with a sodomy-murder special circumstance. Both were sentenced to death after separate penalty phase trials. The court also imposed various prison terms and restitution fines, staying the execution of the prison sentences.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case on automatic appeal. It affirmed the convictions of both defendants and the death sentence for one. However, it reversed the death sentence for the second defendant, finding that subsequent changes in the law—specifically regarding the competency of defendants with mental illness to represent themselves—required reversal of his sentence, including the death judgment. The court also vacated any balance of restitution fines for both defendants, pursuant to recent statutory amendments. The case was remanded for further proceedings as to the sentencing of the second defendant. View "P. v. Bertsch" on Justia Law

After being found not guilty of a crime by reason of insanity, C.F. was admitted to a state hospital, where he was treated with antipsychotic medication under a court order. When the Department of State Hospitals sought to renew the order authorizing involuntary medication, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing. C.F.’s counsel did not request a court reporter, though one could have been provided at no cost by simply submitting a form. Consequently, no verbatim record of the hearing was made, and C.F. did not attend, with his counsel waiving his appearance.The Superior Court of Napa County heard from the Department’s expert witness and found, by clear and convincing evidence, that C.F. lacked capacity to refuse treatment, granting the renewal for up to one year. C.F. appealed, arguing that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his lawyer did not secure a record of the hearing. When C.F. later applied for a settled statement to reconstruct the hearing for appellate review, the trial court denied the request, finding he had waived his right to a record by not requesting a reporter.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Five, found that C.F.’s counsel’s failure to request a reporter constituted deficient performance, with no tactical explanation and resulting prejudice. The absence of a hearing record rendered meaningful appellate review impossible, amounting to a denial of due process and effective assistance of counsel. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded for a new hearing, noting that if the Department seeks to renew the order after its expiration, the new hearing may be combined with any future renewal petition. View "People v. C.F." on Justia Law

Nathaniel Martin was a passenger in a vehicle stopped by a United States Forest Service law enforcement officer in the Monongahela National Forest after the vehicle was found illegally parked on a single-lane bridge. The officer, Joshua Radford, initially cited the parking violation as the reason for the stop. However, as soon as the stop began, Radford immediately shifted focus, asking about firearms in the vehicle and then further questioning both the driver and Martin regarding other possible contraband. Firearms were discovered, and Martin was eventually arrested after a check revealed prior felony convictions. Notably, the officer did not issue a citation for the parking offense, and the initial minutes of the stop were not captured on bodycam video.After more than two years, Martin was charged in the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia with being a felon in possession of a firearm. He moved to suppress the evidence and his statements, arguing that the stop violated his Fourth Amendment rights because the officer had abandoned the original purpose of the stop. The district court denied the motion to suppress, finding that the officer’s actions remained within the permissible scope of the stop and did not unlawfully extend it. Martin then entered a guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the officer’s immediate pivot from addressing the parking violation to investigating potential criminal activity was not reasonably related in scope to the original justification for the stop. The court distinguished this situation from prior precedent by noting the absence of circumstances suggesting officer safety concerns. The court reversed the district court’s denial of the suppression motion and vacated Martin’s guilty plea. View "US v. Martin" on Justia Law