Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In the early morning hours of September 17, 2024, police responded to a report that a man had drawn a knife and approached a woman in her vehicle at a Fargo gas station. Surveillance video captured the incident, and Shawn King was apprehended near the scene. He was charged with terrorizing, carrying a concealed weapon, and possession of drug paraphernalia, though the drug paraphernalia charge was dismissed before trial. At trial, the victim testified that King approached her on a bicycle, threw it down, brandished a knife, and advanced toward her in an angry manner, causing her to fear for her safety. The jury viewed the surveillance footage and heard testimony from three officers. Ultimately, the jury found King guilty of terrorizing but acquitted him of carrying a concealed weapon.Following the jury’s verdict, the District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, entered judgment and sentenced King to five years, with four years to be served and one year suspended during two years of supervised probation. King appealed, arguing that the terrorizing statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad as applied to his conduct, and that the combination of the terrorizing and concealed weapon statutes violated his right to lawfully carry a weapon. He did not raise these constitutional arguments in the district court.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed King’s claims for obvious error, as they were not preserved below. The court held that King failed to demonstrate any clear or obvious deviation from current law regarding the constitutionality of the statutes as applied to him. The court found that the terrorizing statute incorporates both subjective and objective standards, and that King’s overbreadth and Second Amendment arguments did not establish plain error. The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "State v. King" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was convicted by a jury of multiple sexual offenses, including rape, against his young daughter. The central issue on appeal relates to the jury selection process, specifically whether the defendant’s trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to challenge a particular juror, referred to as Juror McCarthy, for cause. During voir dire, Juror McCarthy expressed some initial uncertainty about his ability to be impartial in a case involving a child witness and indicated discomfort with the presumption of innocence, but also participated in group responses affirming his willingness to be fair and follow the law.After conviction, the defendant appealed to the Twelfth District Court of Appeals, arguing that his counsel’s failure to challenge Juror McCarthy deprived him of a fair trial. The appellate court reviewed the voir dire transcript and concluded that Juror McCarthy’s statements reflected an internal struggle common to many jurors faced with difficult subject matter, rather than actual bias against the defendant. The court also noted that Juror McCarthy, through group responses and direct questioning, indicated he could be fair and impartial. The appellate court therefore rejected the ineffective assistance claim and affirmed the convictions.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case, focusing on whether a reviewing court may consider group answers during voir dire when determining actual juror bias, and whether a juror who expresses partiality can be rehabilitated through such group responses. The court held that, in assessing actual bias, the entire voir dire record—including group answers—must be considered. The court found that the defendant failed to demonstrate that Juror McCarthy was actually biased, and thus did not establish ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the judgment of the Twelfth District Court of Appeals. View "State v. Rogers" on Justia Law

During the 2023–2024 academic year, students at a private university in Massachusetts engaged in a series of pro-Palestinian protests following violence in the Middle East. The protests included rallies, walkouts, chalk messages, and an encampment near the campus Hillel center. Some Jewish and Israeli students reported feeling unsafe or unwelcome, and a few specific incidents were alleged, such as being blocked from campus areas or subjected to hostile remarks. The university responded by revising protest policies, suspending student groups, and eventually clearing the encampment, but did not discipline all protestors or end the demonstrations immediately.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed the plaintiffs’ suit, which alleged violations of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, the Ku Klux Klan Act, and state law, for failure to state a claim. The court found that the plaintiffs had not plausibly alleged actionable harassment or that the university was deliberately indifferent to any such harassment. The court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The First Circuit held that most of the protestors’ conduct constituted protected speech under the First Amendment and did not amount to actionable harassment under Title VI. The court further found that the university was not deliberately indifferent, as it took a series of escalating actions in response to the protests. The court also concluded that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the Ku Klux Klan Act because they did not plausibly allege a conspiracy with the purpose of depriving Jewish or Israeli students of their rights. The dismissal of the state-law claims was affirmed, and the court found no abuse of discretion in denying further leave to amend the complaint. View "StandWithUs Center for Legal Justice v. MIT" on Justia Law

Several healthcare employees in Colorado, including those at the University of Colorado Hospital Authority and South Denver Cardiology Associates, were terminated after refusing to comply with their employers’ COVID-19 vaccination mandates. These mandates, implemented in 2021, required employees to either be vaccinated or obtain a medical or religious exemption. The plaintiffs declined vaccination and did not seek exemptions, resulting in their dismissal.Following their terminations, the plaintiffs filed separate lawsuits in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, asserting nearly identical claims. They alleged violations of statutory, constitutional, and contractual rights, including claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, state-law breach of contract and tort claims, and an implied private right of action under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. The defendants moved to dismiss on grounds such as sovereign immunity, qualified immunity, and failure to state a claim. The district courts dismissed all claims, finding that the plaintiffs had not adequately pled any viable legal theory. The courts also denied the plaintiffs’ requests to amend their complaints after judgment was entered.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the dismissals de novo. The court held that none of the statutes cited by the plaintiffs—including the Emergency Use Authorization statute, the PREP Act, and 10 U.S.C. § 980—unambiguously conferred individual rights enforceable under § 1983. The court also found that the constitutional claims, including those based on due process and equal protection, were not adequately pled and that the breach of contract claim was waived for lack of argument. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district courts’ judgments, holding that the plaintiffs failed to state any claim upon which relief could be granted and that the lower courts did not abuse their discretion in denying leave to amend. View "Timken v. South Denver Cardiology Associates" on Justia Law

A nineteen-year-old man was convicted for his involvement in two murders in Wyoming. He was sentenced in 2006 to three consecutive terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, following a jury trial in which he was acquitted of one count of first-degree murder but convicted of conspiracy to commit murder and first-degree murder for the other offenses. The crimes involved the killing of a roommate and a sixteen-year-old, with the defendant playing a significant role in both. At sentencing, the jury declined to impose the death penalty and instead issued mandatory life without parole sentences, as required by Wyoming law at the time.After his direct appeal was denied by the Wyoming Supreme Court, the defendant filed a motion in 2024 to correct his sentences, arguing that mandatory life without parole for “emerging adults” (those aged eighteen to twenty-one) is unconstitutional under both the Wyoming and United States Constitutions. He claimed that new scientific evidence and evolving legal standards, particularly those established in Miller v. Alabama and related U.S. Supreme Court cases, should extend protections against mandatory life without parole to offenders in his age group. The District Court of Campbell County denied his motion, finding that the relevant constitutional protections and precedents did not apply to adults over eighteen.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the Wyoming Constitution does not provide broader categorical protections for “emerging adults” than the Eighth Amendment. It concluded that the state’s constitutional provisions on cruel or unusual punishment and on the penal code’s humane principles do not prohibit mandatory life without parole sentences for offenders over eighteen. The court also found no violation of equal protection or entitlement to a new sentencing hearing. The holding clarified that, while Wyoming’s constitution is distinct from the federal constitution, it does not require categorical relief for emerging adults sentenced to life without parole. View "Hicks v. The State of Wyoming" on Justia Law

The case concerns a shooting that occurred on March 15, 2022, in Griffin, Georgia, resulting in the death of Wildarius Draggs and the assault of Rayshon Goodrum. Surveillance footage showed that Draggs and Goodrum were sitting on a porch when a car containing Isaac Reid, Kinesa Harvey, DeQuivon McMullin, and Cameron Barkley drove by. Later, Reid, McMullin, and Barkley exited the car, walked behind a nearby house, and shortly thereafter, shots were fired at Draggs and Goodrum. Barkley, a co-defendant, testified that Reid fired the shots, motivated by the belief that a rival gang member was present. Physical evidence included shell casings at the scene and a photograph of a gold gun allegedly used in the shooting. Draggs died from his injuries, and Goodrum survived.The Superior Court of Spalding County conducted a joint trial for Reid, Harvey, and McMullin. The jury acquitted Harvey of all charges, found Reid guilty of malice murder and other offenses (but not guilty on one gang-related count), and found McMullin guilty of aggravated battery and felony murder predicated on that battery. Reid was sentenced to life without parole plus consecutive sentences for aggravated assault and a gang violation. Reid filed a motion for new trial, which was denied. He then appealed.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case after it was transferred from the Court of Appeals. The Court held that the evidence was sufficient under federal due process standards to support Reid’s convictions, finding that the jury could reasonably conclude Reid was the shooter based on the surveillance footage, testimony, and corroborating evidence. The Court also found that the statutory requirement for corroboration of accomplice testimony was met. The denial of Reid’s motion for new trial was affirmed, and his convictions were upheld. View "REID v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

The case concerns the fatal shooting of Michael Riley in his home on June 30, 2013. Police investigation revealed that Riley’s wife, Antoinette Riley, and her daughter, Katrina Ledford, were involved in a plot to kill Riley, with Tarell Momon, who was incarcerated and romantically involved with Ledford, allegedly orchestrating the murder. Cell phone records showed extensive communication between Momon, Ledford, and Antoinette, as well as with two other individuals, Terrance Griswould and Travis Berrian, who were implicated as co-conspirators. The evidence included text messages indicating planning and coordination of the murder, and testimony about Momon’s gang affiliation and prison conduct.A Bulloch County grand jury indicted Momon, Griswould, Ledford, and Antoinette Riley for malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Ledford and Antoinette pleaded guilty, while Momon and Griswould were tried together. The jury found Momon guilty of murder but acquitted him of the firearm charge; Griswould was acquitted on all counts. Momon was sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole. He filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court after several amendments and delays.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed Momon’s appeal, in which he argued that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to make certain evidentiary objections and that the cumulative effect of these alleged errors denied him a fair trial. The court held that Momon failed to demonstrate either deficient performance by his counsel or resulting prejudice under the standard set by Strickland v. Washington. The court found that the challenged evidence was either admissible, cumulative, or not prejudicial, and that counsel’s decisions were within the bounds of reasonable trial strategy. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed. View "MOMON v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

A man with a prior felony conviction used another person’s identity to purchase a firearm and later used fraudulent identification to obtain a U.S. passport, which he used for international travel. He was indicted and ultimately pleaded guilty to making a false statement during a firearms transaction, making a false statement in a passport application, and aggravated identity theft. As part of his plea agreement, he waived his right to appeal his sentence if it was within or below the guideline range calculated by the court.After entering his plea but before sentencing, the defendant requested a psychological evaluation under 18 U.S.C. § 4241 to determine his mental competency, specifically asking that the examiner’s report be filed with the court. The evaluation was conducted by a Bureau of Prisons examiner, who informed the defendant that the results would be shared with the court. The report was included in the presentence report. At sentencing in the United States District Court for the District of Montana, the defendant objected to the use of the evaluation, arguing it violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The district court overruled his objections, including those to a sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice and to certain supervised release conditions, and imposed a sentence within the guideline range.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the defendant argued that the district court’s consideration of his psychological evaluation at sentencing violated his Fifth Amendment rights. The Ninth Circuit held that the Supreme Court’s decision in Estelle v. Smith does not extend to voluntary psychological evaluations requested by the defendant and that the district court did not violate his right against self-incrimination. The court also held that the defendant’s waiver of appeal barred his remaining challenges to the sentence. The sentence was affirmed. View "USA V. DAVIS" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, who worked for a bank that operated a branch inside a public high school, was terminated from her employment after she publicly criticized the local school district’s mask mandate on social media and at school events. The bank’s operation at the school was part of a partnership in which the bank provided funds and services to the school district. The plaintiff’s children attended schools in the district, and she was active in school-related activities. After a series of confrontations and a critical Facebook post about a school board member, the school superintendent communicated with the bank’s branch manager, expressing disapproval of the plaintiff’s conduct and requesting that she be barred from school property. The bank subsequently suspended and then fired the plaintiff, citing her conduct and the school’s ban.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota granted summary judgment to all defendants, finding that the plaintiff’s First Amendment rights were not violated and that there was insufficient evidence of a conspiracy or tortious interference. The court applied the Pickering balancing test, treating the plaintiff as a government contractor, and found no actionable retaliation. It also found no evidence of a meeting of the minds between the bank and the school district, and held that the superintendent and other officials were entitled to qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part. The court held that the plaintiff was not a government employee or contractor for First Amendment purposes and was entitled to ordinary citizen protections. It found that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to decide whether the superintendent, the bank, and the branch manager retaliated against the plaintiff for protected speech, and whether the superintendent tortiously interfered with her employment. However, the court affirmed summary judgment for the school board chair and the school district, finding insufficient evidence of their direct involvement or policy liability. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "McNeally v. HomeTown Bank" on Justia Law

Officers investigating a drug trafficking ring observed Devin Long engaging in several suspected drug transactions, including controlled buys involving other individuals. Surveillance revealed Long’s repeated visits to known stash houses and his own registered residence, where officers witnessed activity consistent with drug dealing. Based on these observations and information from a confidential source, officers obtained a warrant to search Long’s home. The search uncovered illegal drugs, firearms, and related paraphernalia, leading to Long’s indictment on federal drug and firearm charges.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio reviewed Long’s motion to suppress the evidence seized from his home, which argued that the affidavit supporting the search warrant failed to establish a sufficient nexus between his alleged criminal activity and the residence. The district court denied the motion, finding that the affidavit provided probable cause for the search. Long subsequently pleaded guilty to four charges but preserved his right to appeal the suppression ruling.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit considered whether the search warrant for Long’s home was supported by probable cause. Applying a deferential standard to the issuing magistrate judge’s determination, the Sixth Circuit held that the affidavit established both that Long’s home was his residence and that he was engaged in ongoing drug trafficking. The court further found that even a single drug transaction observed outside Long’s home provided an independent basis for probable cause. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of Long’s motion to suppress, concluding that the warrant was properly issued under the Fourth Amendment. View "United States v. Long" on Justia Law