Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

A public benefit corporation, Lawyers for Fair Reciprocal Admissions (LFRA), challenged local rules of federal district courts in the Ninth Circuit. These rules require attorneys seeking general admission to be members in good standing of the bar of the state where the district court is located. LFRA argued that these rules prevent its members, who are barred in states outside the Ninth Circuit and do not wish to join another state bar, from seeking general admission to these federal district courts.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona dismissed LFRA’s amended complaint with prejudice. The court found that LFRA had standing to bring claims on behalf of its members, except for the Sixth Amendment claim, which lacked standing. The court dismissed the remaining claims for failure to state a claim, concluding that the Admission Rules did not violate constitutional, statutory, or procedural grounds as alleged by LFRA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal with prejudice. The Ninth Circuit held that the Admission Rules are constitutional and do not violate separation of powers, federalism principles, the Privileges and Immunities Clauses, the Equal Protection Clause, the First Amendment, the Full Faith and Credit Act, the Rules Enabling Act, or procedural due process. The court also found that Rules 1 and 83 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not create a private right of action. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the amended complaint without leave to amend, as the complaint could not be saved by amendment. The court also upheld the denial of LFRA’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as procedurally premature. View "Lawyers for Fair Reciprocal Admissions v. United States" on Justia Law

In 1996, Roderick Rankin was sentenced to death for the murders of Zena Reynolds, Ernestine Halford, and Nathaniel Halford. Rankin filed a federal habeas petition, arguing that he was intellectually disabled at the time of the murders, his trial counsel was ineffective for not investigating and presenting evidence that his brother Rodney committed the murders, his trial counsel had conflicts of interest, the penalty-phase jury instructions violated Supreme Court precedents, and his trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to these instructions. The district court denied habeas relief without an evidentiary hearing.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas denied Rankin's habeas petition, finding that he had not exhausted all state court claims and stayed the proceedings to allow him to pursue relief in state court. Rankin's subsequent state court attempts were unsuccessful, and he returned to federal court with an amended habeas petition. The district court denied relief, noting that Rankin had not provided clear and convincing evidence to contradict the state court's determination that he was not intellectually disabled and that his other claims failed on the merits.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the Arkansas Supreme Court's rejection of Rankin's intellectual disability claim was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The court also found that Rankin's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and jury instruction errors were procedurally defaulted and without merit. The court concluded that Rankin was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claims. View "Rankin v. Payne" on Justia Law

The defendant, Rolando Joel De Leon De Paz, pleaded guilty to illegally reentering the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. De Leon had been removed from the U.S. five times previously, with his first removal in 2002 following a conviction for the sale and delivery of methamphetamine. Subsequent removals occurred in 2008, 2013, 2016, and 2022, each following separate convictions for illegal reentry. Despite escalating sentences for each conviction, De Leon reentered the U.S. again and was arrested in January 2023. He was indicted for illegal reentry and pleaded guilty after the district court denied his motion to dismiss the indictment on equal protection grounds.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin calculated a sentencing Guidelines range of 21 to 27 months but imposed an above-Guidelines sentence of 48 months. The court justified the sentence by emphasizing De Leon's repeated illegal reentries and the failure of previous escalating punishments to deter him. The court also noted De Leon's struggle with alcohol, which contributed to his criminal behavior, although this was not the main reason for the above-Guidelines sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the district court acted within its discretion in imposing the 48-month sentence, finding that the justifications provided were consistent with the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. The court noted that De Leon's repeated offenses and the ineffectiveness of prior sentences warranted the above-Guidelines sentence. Additionally, the appellate court rejected De Leon's argument that the district court improperly relied on his alcohol dependence and found no abuse of discretion in the sentencing decision. The court also affirmed the district court's denial of De Leon's motion to dismiss the indictment, citing recent precedent. View "United States v De Leon De Paz" on Justia Law

The plaintiff in error, Gregory Johnson, challenged his summary conviction of three counts of criminal contempt for repeatedly interrupting and directing racial slurs and other profanities at the court during his habeas corpus trial. He claimed that the trial court deprived him of his right to due process by not postponing the contempt proceeding and by not ordering it to be held before a different judge.The trial court, acting in the capacity of a trial court for the habeas proceeding, conducted the first day of the trial on April 4, 2023, and resumed on May 4, 2023. The plaintiff, appearing virtually, refused to comply with the court's instructions, used racial slurs, and swore at the court. The court warned the plaintiff multiple times before finding him in contempt. The court then appointed counsel for the plaintiff, allowed a private consultation, and provided an opportunity for both the plaintiff and his counsel to speak before sentencing.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the trial court's summary contempt proceeding substantially complied with the requirements of Practice Book § 1-16, which ensures fairness in the adjudication of summary criminal contempt. The court concluded that the plaintiff's behavior obstructed the orderly administration of justice, justifying the trial court's decision not to defer the proceeding under Practice Book § 1-17. The court also determined that the trial judge did not become personally embroiled in the controversy, as the judge maintained a calm demeanor and provided the plaintiff with multiple warnings and opportunities to explain his behavior.The court rejected the plaintiff's claim that his medical issues and alleged incompetency warranted deferral of the contempt proceeding. The trial court had observed the plaintiff's behavior and found him competent, and his counsel did not request a competency evaluation. The Connecticut Supreme Court dismissed the writ of error, upholding the trial court's findings and sentencing. View "Johnson v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Seven District of Columbia citizen-voters filed a complaint challenging the constitutionality of the Local Resident Voting Rights Amendment Act of 2022, which allows noncitizens to vote in municipal elections. The plaintiffs argued that this law dilutes their votes, discriminates against U.S. citizens, and violates the constitutional right to citizen self-government. The District of Columbia Board of Elections, responsible for implementing the law, was named as the defendant.The case was initially brought in D.C. Superior Court, but the Board removed it to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The Board then moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing and failed to state a claim. The district court agreed with the Board, holding that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate any individual disadvantage and thus lacked standing. The court dismissed the complaint, characterizing the plaintiffs' grievances as generalized and insufficient to confer standing.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the plaintiffs had standing to sue because they alleged a concrete and particularized injury: the dilution of their votes due to the expansion of the electorate to include noncitizens. The court distinguished this case from others where plaintiffs failed to show individualized harm. The court found that the plaintiffs' claims were specific to their voting power in D.C. local elections and not merely a generalized grievance. Consequently, the court reversed the district court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Board's cross-appeal was dismissed as moot. View "Hall v. District of Columbia Board of Elections" on Justia Law

Bobby Ray Osborne entered a conditional guilty plea to first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia, receiving a five-year prison sentence. The case arose when officers, acting on a tip about a stolen trailer, visited Osborne's property. Osborne consented to a search, during which he was found with a baggie containing a brown substance believed to be heroin and a large amount of cash. The officers did not find the stolen trailer but obtained a search warrant for Osborne's residence, yielding additional evidence.The Estill Circuit Court denied Osborne's motion to suppress the heroin and cash, finding that he voluntarily consented to the search. Osborne's subsequent motions to reconsider were also denied. He then entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the suppression ruling. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case to clarify the distinction between a consensual encounter and an investigative detention under the Fourth Amendment. The court affirmed the lower courts' rulings, holding that Osborne voluntarily consented to the search. The court found that the officers' actions did not convert the consensual encounter into an investigative detention. The court also upheld the application of the plain view doctrine, determining that the incriminating nature of the baggie was immediately apparent once Osborne removed it from his pocket. The court concluded that the trial court's findings were supported by substantial evidence and that additional findings were unnecessary. View "Osborne v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Earl K. Johnson was convicted by a jury in Logan Circuit Court on four counts of complicity to traffic in methamphetamine, one count of engaging in organized crime, and one count of complicity to murder. The jury found him to be a persistent felony offender and recommended a life sentence, which the court imposed. Johnson appealed, arguing several trial errors, including a violation of his right to confrontation when a key witness, Pam Wetton, testified remotely due to health concerns.The Logan Circuit Court allowed Pam to testify via Zoom based on a letter from a physician’s assistant stating that travel would be difficult for her. Johnson objected, arguing that this violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. The trial court overruled his objection, and Pam testified remotely. Johnson was convicted on all counts and sentenced to life in prison.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and found that allowing Pam to testify remotely violated Johnson’s right to confrontation. The court held that the Commonwealth failed to establish that remote testimony was necessary to further an important public policy and that the reliability of the testimony was assured. The court concluded that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt regarding the complicity to traffic convictions, as Pam’s testimony was crucial to those charges. Therefore, the court reversed Johnson’s convictions and sentences for complicity to traffic in methamphetamine.However, the court affirmed Johnson’s convictions and sentences for engaging in organized crime and complicity to murder. The court found that Pam’s testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt for these charges due to the overwhelming evidence of Johnson’s guilt presented by other witnesses. The court also addressed and dismissed Johnson’s other claims of trial errors, including improper admission of other crimes and bad acts, hearsay statements, and the denial of a mistrial. View "Johnson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Patrick Scullark, Jr. was charged with possession of a controlled substance after police officers found methamphetamine in his fanny pack during a search incident to his arrest on unrelated charges. Scullark attempted to pass the fanny pack to another person before being handcuffed. He argued that the search violated his constitutional rights because he could no longer access the fanny pack at the time it was searched.The Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County denied Scullark’s motion to suppress the evidence, finding the search valid as a search incident to arrest. Scullark entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling. The Iowa Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s decision, agreeing with Scullark that the search did not satisfy the search incident to arrest (SITA) exception because he could not access the fanny pack at the time it was searched.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and vacated the court of appeals decision, affirming the district court’s order. The court held that the search of the fanny pack was valid under both the United States Constitution and the Iowa Constitution. The court concluded that because the fanny pack was worn around Scullark’s waist at the time of his arrest, it was considered part of his person. Therefore, the search was justified as a search of his person incident to a lawful arrest, requiring no additional justification. The court emphasized that the SITA exception allows for a full search of the arrestee’s person and items immediately associated with the person. View "State v. Scullark" on Justia Law

Gage Peters was convicted of criminal sexual abuse in Illinois in 2013, which required him to register as a sex offender for ten years. He moved to Indiana in 2016 and registered as required. In 2021, Peters vacationed in Florida, where he signed a form agreeing to lifetime registration as a sex offender. After returning to Illinois and then moving back to Indiana in 2022, the Hamilton County Sheriff’s Department informed him that he must register as a lifetime sex offender due to Florida's laws.The Hamilton Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the State, finding that Peters was required to register for life in Indiana because of his obligation in Florida. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, interpreting the relevant statute to require registration in Indiana for individuals with out-of-state registration obligations, regardless of the source of those obligations.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the statute applies to individuals with out-of-state registration obligations, regardless of the source. However, the court found that Peters is not currently required to register in Florida because his registration obligations there lapsed when he moved out of the state. Consequently, the court concluded that Peters does not need to register as a sex offender in Indiana. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for entry of summary judgment in favor of Peters. View "Peters v. Quakenbush" on Justia Law

Four individuals aged 18 to 20 sought to purchase handguns but were prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(1), which restricts the commercial sale of handguns to those under 21. They filed a lawsuit against the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), claiming that the statute violated their Second Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The court applied the text, history, and tradition test from New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, determining that the Second Amendment protections apply to 18- to 20-year-olds and that the right to purchase a gun falls within the Amendment’s plain text. The court found that the government failed to demonstrate a historical tradition of firearm regulation supporting the constitutionality of § 922(b)(1).The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that § 922(b)(1) does not violate the Second Amendment. The court reasoned that historical traditions, including the common law infancy doctrine, supported restrictions on the sale of firearms to individuals under 21. The court found that both the infancy doctrine and § 922(b)(1) imposed similar burdens on minors' ability to purchase firearms and were motivated by concerns about the judgment and maturity of individuals under 21. The court concluded that § 922(b)(1) is consistent with the nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation and is therefore constitutional. The case was remanded with instructions to dismiss it. View "McCoy v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives" on Justia Law