Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 2011, Winston Sylvester Oliver II and his co-defendant, Warren Brown, were convicted of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, attempted Hobbs Act robbery, and use of a firearm during these crimes. Oliver's firearm convictions were later vacated, necessitating resentencing for the remaining convictions. At his resentencing, Oliver argued that his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were violated when the court allowed Brown to invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination due to his pending appeal. Oliver also contended that his sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia initially sentenced Oliver to 630 months in prison. After his firearm convictions were vacated, the court resentenced him to 610 months. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit vacated his remaining firearm conviction and remanded for resentencing. At the second resentencing, Oliver's motion to recuse the entire bench of the Eastern District of Virginia was denied. The district court allowed Brown to invoke his Fifth Amendment right, excluded unauthenticated letters allegedly written by Brown, and calculated Oliver's Guidelines range, ultimately sentencing him to 480 months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Brown to invoke his Fifth Amendment right, as his testimony could have had adverse consequences due to his pending appeal. The court also found that the district court did not err in applying sentencing enhancements for Oliver's leadership role, obstruction of justice, and firearm discharge. The court concluded that the 480-month sentence was substantively reasonable, considering Oliver's extensive criminal history and the impact on the victims. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Oliver" on Justia Law

A journalist, Simon Ateba, sought preferred access to the White House Press Area through a special press credential known as a "hard pass." The White House issues hard passes only to reporters accredited by either the Supreme Court Press Gallery or a congressional press gallery. Ateba applied for membership in the Senate Daily Press Gallery as a prerequisite to securing a hard pass, but his application was still under consideration. In the meantime, he accessed the Press Area with a daily pass, which required him to wait for an escort. Ateba argued that the White House Hard Pass Policy violated the First Amendment because it burdened his access and conditioned fuller access on accreditation by the Senate Daily Press Gallery, which he claimed exercised unbridled discretion.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment in favor of the White House. The court concluded that while Ateba had suffered a cognizable First Amendment injury, the White House acted reasonably under the First Amendment by outsourcing part of its press-credentialing process. The district court also ruled that the Senate Daily Press Gallery did not impermissibly exercise discretion in deciding who could become a member and that extraordinary procedural protections were not constitutionally required.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that the White House Hard Pass Policy was both reasonable and viewpoint neutral. It found that the policy's reliance on external credentialing bodies was reasonable given the White House's lack of its own vetting system. The court also determined that the Senate Daily Press Gallery's membership criteria, including the "of repute" standard, did not confer unbridled discretion because it was guided by concrete rules. Additionally, the court held that the First Amendment did not require the gallery to set a deadline for processing membership applications. View "Ateba v. Leavitt" on Justia Law

The case involves the detention and removal of Venezuelan nationals believed to be members of Tren de Aragua (TdA), a group designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the State Department. The President issued a proclamation under the Alien Enemies Act (AEA) to detain and remove these individuals. Five detainees and a putative class sought injunctive and declaratory relief against their removal under the Proclamation, initially seeking relief in habeas but later dismissing those claims.The District Court for the District of Columbia issued two temporary restraining orders (TROs) preventing the removal of the named plaintiffs and a provisionally certified class of noncitizens subject to the Proclamation. The court extended the TROs for an additional 14 days. The D.C. Circuit denied the Government’s emergency motion to stay the orders, leading the Government to seek vacatur from the Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of the United States construed the TROs as appealable injunctions and granted the Government's application to vacate the orders. The Court held that challenges to removal under the AEA must be brought in habeas corpus, as the claims necessarily imply the invalidity of the detainees' confinement and removal. The Court also determined that venue for such habeas petitions lies in the district of confinement, which in this case is Texas, making the District of Columbia an improper venue. The detainees are entitled to notice and an opportunity to seek habeas relief in the proper venue before removal. The application to vacate the District Court's orders was granted, and the TROs were vacated. View "Trump v. J. G. G." on Justia Law

Barron Brantley was charged with multiple serious offenses, including malice murder and rape, in connection with the sexual assault and murder of Alexis Janaé Crawford. While awaiting trial, Brantley made several incriminating phone calls from jail, which were recorded and monitored by the Fulton County Sheriff’s Office. The District Attorney’s Office reviewed these calls and intended to use three of them at trial. Brantley filed a motion to exclude these calls, arguing that their use violated his constitutional rights to privacy and equal protection, and that the calls contained inadmissible evidence.The trial court granted Brantley’s motion, ruling that the District Attorney’s access to the recorded calls violated Brantley’s privacy rights under both the state and federal constitutions, and his equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The State appealed this decision, citing OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (4) as the basis for its appeal.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and reversed the trial court’s decision. The court held that Brantley had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his recorded jail calls, as established by precedent, and thus, the District Attorney’s access to these calls did not violate his privacy rights. Additionally, the court found that Brantley, as an incarcerated individual, was not similarly situated to nonincarcerated individuals, and the State had a rational basis for treating him differently, thereby not violating his equal protection rights. The case was remanded for the trial court to consider other grounds for excluding portions of the calls if Brantley still asserted them. View "THE STATE v. BRANTLEY" on Justia Law

Emiliano Gomez was found guilty by the trial court of multiple offenses, including stalking, criminal threats, and possession of a firearm and ammunition as a felon. The police found a flare gun in Gomez's possession, and based on an officer's testimony, the trial court convicted him of possessing a firearm as a felon under Penal Code section 29800, subdivision (a)(1). Gomez appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for possession of a firearm as a felon and that the statutes prohibiting felons from possessing firearms and ammunition violate the Second Amendment.The trial court found Gomez guilty on all counts except for possession of body armor. The court also found special allegations and aggravating factors true, sentencing Gomez to an aggregate term of four years in state prison. Gomez contended that the evidence was insufficient to prove the flare gun was a firearm designed to be used as a weapon, as required by section 16520, subdivision (a).The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case and held that the prosecution needed to prove the flare gun was designed to be used as a weapon. The court found the evidence insufficient to support such a finding and vacated the conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon. The court also rejected Gomez's Second Amendment challenge to the statutory prohibitions on possession of firearms and ammunition by felons, citing the reasoning in People v. Anderson. The judgment was reversed, the conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon was vacated, and the case was remanded for resentencing. View "People v. Gomez" on Justia Law

Dwayne Robinson was convicted by a jury for unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon. The district court imposed the Armed Career Criminal Act’s (ACCA) minimum punishment, finding that Robinson had three prior qualifying offenses committed on different occasions. Robinson appealed, raising four claims: a Sixth Amendment violation due to the district court responding to a jury note without his counsel’s input, the court’s failure to grant a mistrial after detectives implied he had shot at someone, incorrect jury instructions regarding gun ownership and possession, and the district court’s application of the ACCA without a jury determination on whether his prior offenses occurred on different occasions.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville initially reviewed the case. Robinson did not properly object to the court’s response to the jury note, the failure to grant a mistrial, or the jury instructions, leading to a review for plain error. The district court found Robinson’s three prior offenses occurred on different occasions, thus applying the ACCA’s mandatory minimum sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Robinson’s failure to object to the jury note response, mistrial denial, and jury instructions meant these issues were reviewed for plain error. The court found no obvious mistakes in these areas. Regarding the ACCA application, the court acknowledged intervening Supreme Court precedent requiring a jury to determine if prior offenses occurred on different occasions. However, the court found this error harmless because the record clearly showed Robinson’s offenses were separated by many years. Thus, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Clarios, LLC (Clarios) purchased an industrial site in 2006, for which the seller had executed a remediation plan under the Industrial Site Recovery Act (ISRA) and placed funds in trust for future remediation. In 2007, Clarios ceased operations and sought a Remediation in Progress Waiver (RIP Waiver) from the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), which was granted with the condition that the DEP reserved the right to enforce ISRA obligations in the future. Clarios sold the site in 2011, and the new owner, DeNovo, assumed remediation responsibilities. By 2021, the remediation trust was depleted, and the site was out of compliance. In April 2022, the DEP rescinded Clarios’s RIP Waiver due to non-compliance and depletion of funds.Clarios requested an adjudicatory hearing, arguing that the rescission without notice or a hearing violated its due process rights. The DEP denied the request, stating that rescission did not entitle Clarios to a hearing under the relevant regulations. Clarios appealed, and the Appellate Division ruled in favor of the DEP, holding that Clarios did not have a protected property interest in the RIP Waiver. The court found that Clarios’s expectation of continued suspension of remediation obligations was not based on any statutory or regulatory provisions but rather on a unilateral expectation.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision. The Court held that the DEP’s initial grant of the RIP Waiver did not create a property interest in the continued suspension of Clarios’s remediation obligations. The Court found that neither the controlling statutes and regulations nor a mutually explicit understanding between the parties provided an entitlement to the indefinite continuance of the waiver. The governing laws and agency materials anticipated the DEP’s ability to enforce remediation obligations in the future, and thus, rescission of the RIP Waiver without a hearing did not violate Clarios’s due process rights. View "In re Appeal of the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection's September 6, 2022 Denial of Request for Adjudicatory Hearing" on Justia Law

A Texas county judge, Brian Umphress, challenged the State Commission on Judicial Conduct's application of Canon 4A(1) of the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct, which requires judges to conduct their extra-judicial activities in a manner that does not call into question their impartiality. Umphress, who refuses to perform same-sex marriages for religious reasons while continuing to perform opposite-sex marriages, argued that applying the Canon to his refusal is unconstitutional. This challenge arose after a similar situation involving Justice of the Peace Dianne Hensley, who was publicly warned by the Commission for her refusal to perform same-sex weddings.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas dismissed Umphress's case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that he lacked standing and that his claims were not ripe. The court also noted that even if it had jurisdiction, it would have abstained under the Pullman doctrine, which allows federal courts to defer to state courts on issues of unclear state law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and found that Umphress had standing and that his claims were ripe for review. The court held that Umphress had demonstrated an imminent injury in fact, as his intended conduct was arguably proscribed by Canon 4A(1) and there was a substantial threat of future enforcement by the Commission. The court also determined that the case was not moot despite the Commission's rescission of its warning against Hensley, as the Commission had not disavowed future enforcement against Umphress.The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal and declined to abstain under Pullman, noting that state court litigation was unlikely to resolve the crucial threshold question of Texas law. Instead, the court certified the question to the Supreme Court of Texas, asking whether Canon 4A(1) prohibits judges from publicly refusing to perform same-sex weddings for moral or religious reasons while continuing to perform opposite-sex weddings. View "Umphress v. Hall" on Justia Law

Jacob Doe, a student at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC-CH), was found responsible for two allegations of sexual misconduct and subsequently expelled from the university system. Doe sued the university and several employees, claiming violations of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, Title IX, and various state laws. The district court largely denied the defendants' motions to dismiss, allowing Doe’s federal and most state law claims to proceed.The defendants appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The appellate court found that the district court erred in rejecting the defendants' claims of sovereign and qualified immunity. The court held that the UNC institutions were entitled to sovereign immunity, reversing the district court’s decision to allow Doe’s claims against them. Additionally, the court determined that the individual university employees were entitled to qualified immunity regarding Doe’s due process claims for damages, as the right to cross-examination in university disciplinary proceedings was not clearly established at the time.However, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s decision to allow Doe to seek prospective injunctive relief for the alleged due process violations. The court recognized that Doe had adequately alleged a liberty interest due to the permanent expulsion and the ongoing harm from the erroneous disciplinary record. The court declined to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss Doe’s Title IX claim against UNC-CH, dismissing that portion of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.In conclusion, the Fourth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and dismissed in part the district court’s rulings, allowing Doe’s claims for prospective injunctive relief to proceed while dismissing his claims for damages against the UNC institutions and individual employees. View "Doe v. The University of North Carolina System" on Justia Law

A retired teacher, Patsy Talley, received overpayments in her retirement benefits from the North Carolina Teachers’ and State Employees’ Retirement System (TSERS) for over eight years, totaling $86,173.93. When the overpayment was discovered, TSERS began reducing her monthly benefits to recoup the overpaid amount. Talley did not dispute the overpayment but argued that the recoupment process violated her due process rights because she was not provided a hearing before the reductions began.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina dismissed all of Talley’s claims. The court held that her official capacity claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment, her substantive due process claim failed because she received adequate post-deprivation process, and her equal protection claim did not allege a fundamental right or suspect class. The court also dismissed her individual capacity procedural due process claim, finding the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. Additionally, the court denied Talley’s motion to amend her complaint to add new plaintiffs, citing procedural deficiencies and lack of good cause.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court agreed that the Eleventh Amendment barred the official capacity claims and that the individual capacity claims were barred by qualified immunity. The court found that Talley failed to state a substantive due process claim because she received adequate post-deprivation process and that her equal protection claim did not meet the rational basis review. The court also upheld the denial of her motion to amend the complaint, finding no abuse of discretion by the district court. View "Talley v. Folwell" on Justia Law