Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

A journalist sought access to meetings of the Tennessee Judicial Advisory Commission, which advises the Tennessee Supreme Court on rules of practice and procedure. The Commission’s meetings had been open to the public until 2018, when they were closed following a disruption by a member of the public. The journalist argued that closing these meetings violated his First Amendment rights by denying him access to government proceedings.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee initially granted the journalist a preliminary injunction, allowing public access to the meetings. However, after discovery, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, the Director of the Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts, and dissolved the injunction. The journalist appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the First Amendment does not provide a general right of access to government information or proceedings. It explained that the “experience-and-logic” test, derived from Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California for Riverside County, applies only to adjudicatory proceedings, such as criminal trials or formal administrative hearings. The court found that the Commission’s meetings are purely advisory and not adjudicatory in nature, as they do not involve adversarial proceedings or have binding legal effect. Therefore, the experience-and-logic test was inapplicable, and the journalist’s First Amendment claim failed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant. View "McCaleb v. Long" on Justia Law

A woman experiencing a mental health crisis called 911 and requested that police come to her home to shoot her. Three officers responded and found her holding a bat and a pickaxe. The officers maintained a distance of about fifteen feet and attempted to de-escalate the situation, with one officer assuring her that she would not be harmed. After several minutes, and following an interaction with the woman’s mother, one officer tased her, and another officer shot her multiple times as she moved in the direction of the officers. The woman survived but suffered severe injuries.The plaintiff, acting on the woman’s behalf, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee against the two officers and the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and also brought a negligence claim against the municipality. The officers moved to dismiss the complaint on qualified immunity grounds, and the municipality sought judgment on the pleadings. The district court granted the officers’ motion to dismiss the excessive force claims and the municipality’s motion on the negligence claim, but initially denied the municipality’s motion as to the § 1983 claim. Later, the district court granted the municipality’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on the § 1983 claim as well.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the complaint plausibly alleged that both officers violated the woman’s clearly established Fourth Amendment rights by tasing and shooting her under the circumstances described. The court also held that the district court erred in dismissing the municipal liability claim. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the claims against the officers, vacated the judgment for the municipality, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Chrestman v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County" on Justia Law

A man was arrested by city police officers in Rainsville, Alabama, after exhibiting erratic behavior and resisting arrest. The Chief of Police directed Officer White to transport the arrestee to the county jail in Fort Payne, which had better medical facilities. Upon arrival at the county jail, jailers became frustrated with the arrestee during booking and began to beat him. Officer White witnessed the beating from a few feet away but did not attempt to intervene or protest. The beating continued for several minutes after White left the room, resulting in significant injuries to the arrestee. The jailers involved were later criminally prosecuted and convicted for their conduct.The arrestee filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officer White and others, alleging, among other claims, that White’s failure to intervene violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama granted summary judgment to the officers on the false arrest claim but denied summary judgment to White on the failure to intervene claim, rejecting his qualified immunity defense. White appealed the denial of qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that, under clearly established law as of March 2020, an arresting officer who delivers a helpless arrestee to jailers and witnesses those jailers immediately begin to beat the arrestee in his presence violates the Fourth Amendment if he remains silent and leaves the scene while the assault is ongoing. The court further held that the duty to intervene is not discharged by a phone call to a supervisor who is not in a position to stop the assault. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment to Officer White on the failure to intervene claim. View "Nute v. White" on Justia Law

Two nonprofit organizations and an individual challenged two provisions of Arizona’s 2023 Election Procedures Manual (EPM). The first provision, known as the Speech Provision, purported to summarize Arizona’s voter intimidation laws and included examples of prohibited conduct, such as using offensive language or engaging in behavior that could be seen as intimidating or harassing voters. The second, the Canvass Provision, described the Secretary of State’s duty to certify statewide election results by a statutory deadline, specifying that if a county failed to submit its official results on time, the Secretary must proceed without including that county’s votes.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, alleging that the Speech Provision violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by chilling protected political speech, and that the Canvass Provision unconstitutionally burdened the right to vote by threatening disenfranchisement if a county missed the certification deadline. The district court found that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge both provisions, denied a request to stay the case under Pullman abstention, and granted a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of both the Speech and Canvass Provisions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction as to the Speech Provision, holding that the plaintiffs had standing because they intended to engage in political speech arguably covered by the provision and faced a credible risk of enforcement. The court found a likelihood of success on the merits, as the state did not contest the district court’s conclusion that the Speech Provision likely violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s finding of standing regarding the Canvass Provision, concluding that plaintiffs had not shown a substantial risk that any county would fail to certify its results and thus vacated the injunction as to that provision. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "AMERICAN ENCORE V. FONTES" on Justia Law

A group of proponents filed an initiative petition seeking to repeal the existing constitutional provision governing Oklahoma’s primary elections and replace it with a new system. The proposed amendment would establish an “open primary” for certain state and federal offices, where all candidates appear on the same ballot regardless of party, and any qualified voter may vote for any candidate. The two candidates with the most votes would advance to the general election, regardless of party affiliation or endorsement. The ballot would display each candidate’s party registration or independent status, with a disclaimer clarifying that such registration does not imply party nomination or endorsement. The measure would not affect elections for presidential electors, municipal, judicial, or school board offices.After the petition was filed with the Secretary of State, the Oklahoma Republican Party and another petitioner protested its legal sufficiency before the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma. They argued that the initiative was facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment, claiming it infringed on the right of political association and failed strict scrutiny. They also asserted that the gist and ballot title were misleading, particularly in their use of the term “open primary” and in the explanation of changes to general elections.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the petition. Applying its standard of review, the court found no clear or manifest facial constitutional infirmity, holding that the proposed system did not impose a severe burden on associational rights under relevant U.S. Supreme Court precedents. The court determined that the gist was not misleading, as it adequately described the practical effect of the measure. The challenge to the ballot title was deemed premature, as statutory procedure requires such review after the signature-gathering phase. The court held that the initiative petition was legally sufficient for circulation and signature gathering. View "IN RE INITIATIVE PETITION NO. 448, STATE QUESTION NO. 836: THE OKLAHOMA REPUBLICAN PARTY v. SETTER" on Justia Law

The case concerns the conviction of a man for the malice murder of his wife, who was found beaten and stabbed to death in their Georgia home. The victim’s mother and son, after being unable to reach her, traveled from Chicago to Georgia and, with police assistance, eventually discovered her body concealed under a pile of clothes. The investigation revealed a history of controlling and violent behavior by the defendant toward the victim, evidence of his flight from Georgia to Chicago in the victim’s car, and his subsequent armed standoff with police in Chicago, during which he threatened suicide and possessed knives matching those found at the crime scene.A Henry County grand jury indicted the defendant for malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault. After a jury trial in the Superior Court of Henry County, he was found guilty on all counts and sentenced to life without parole. The defendant filed a motion for new trial, which was denied after an evidentiary hearing. He then appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia.The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the convictions and sentence. The court held that trial counsel was not constitutionally ineffective for failing to request a specific jury instruction on impeachment by bias, as the instructions given sufficiently covered the concept. The court also found no plain error in the admission of certain forensic testimony and reports, concluding that any potential Confrontation Clause violation did not affect the outcome given the overwhelming evidence of guilt. The admission of evidence regarding knives found in the defendant’s possession was deemed intrinsic to the case and not unfairly prejudicial. Finally, the court rejected the claim of cumulative error, finding no denial of a fundamentally fair trial. View "FELTON v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

In this case, Utah voters passed Proposition 4 in 2018, a citizen initiative designed to reform the state’s redistricting process and address partisan gerrymandering. Before the next redistricting cycle, the Utah Legislature repealed Proposition 4 and replaced it with Senate Bill 200 (S.B. 200), which eliminated the key reforms established by the initiative. Several organizations and individuals challenged this legislative action, arguing that the repeal violated Utahns’ constitutional right to alter or reform their government through the initiative process.The Third District Court initially dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim that the Legislature’s repeal of Proposition 4 was unconstitutional. On interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court of Utah held that the people’s right to reform their government via initiative is constitutionally protected and remanded the case for further proceedings. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, finding that S.B. 200 unconstitutionally impaired the reforms enacted by Proposition 4 and was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. The court declared Proposition 4 to be the law, enjoined the use of the 2021 Congressional Map enacted under S.B. 200, and established a remedial process for creating a compliant map. The Legislature’s request to stay the injunction on the 2021 map during the remedial process and any appeals was denied by the district court.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed the Legislature’s emergency petition for extraordinary relief, which challenged only the district court’s denial of the stay. The Supreme Court held that the Legislature had not shown the district court abused its discretion in denying the stay, as their arguments focused on the remedial process rather than the legal standard for granting a stay. The petition for extraordinary relief was therefore denied. View "State Legislature v. League of Women Voters" on Justia Law

A man was shot and killed outside a convenience store in Wilmington, Delaware. Surveillance footage captured the masked shooter’s movements before and after the incident, and police identified several witnesses, including Darnella Spady, who was present at the scene. During a police interview, Spady identified the shooter as “Gunner,” later determined to be Kevin Berry, and described her interactions with him. However, at trial, Spady was uncooperative, claimed memory loss due to drug use, and stated she could not recall the shooting or her prior statement to police. The prosecution sought to admit Spady’s out-of-court statement as substantive evidence under 11 Del. C. § 3507.The Superior Court of the State of Delaware conducted a bench trial after Berry waived his right to a jury. The court admitted Spady’s prior statement over Berry’s objection, finding that the State had established the necessary foundation under Section 3507 and that the statement was voluntary. The court found Berry guilty of first-degree murder and related weapons charges, and sentenced him to life plus ten years. Berry appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting Spady’s statement and urging the Delaware Supreme Court to overturn its recent precedent in McCrary v. State, which clarified the foundational requirements for admitting such statements.The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court’s decision. The Court held that there was no urgent reason or clear error warranting a departure from McCrary v. State, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Spady’s statement. The Court concluded that the State’s questioning satisfied the statutory requirements, and Berry’s confrontation rights were not violated. The convictions were affirmed. View "Berry v. State" on Justia Law

A car leasing company leased a vehicle to an individual who defaulted on payments soon after the lease began. Despite having the right to repossess the car, the company did not do so. Two years later, the lessee was stopped by police in Butler, New Jersey, for driving with a suspended license, suspended registration, and no insurance. The police seized the car and had it towed by a contractor, Malanga’s Automotive. The lessee was informed of the tow but did not retrieve the vehicle. The towing company did not notify the leasing company that it possessed the car until nearly a year later, at which point it demanded payment of towing and storage fees before releasing the vehicle.The leasing company filed suit in the Superior Court of New Jersey against the towing company, later adding the Borough of Butler as a defendant and asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the Fourth Amendment, and the Fifth Amendment. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, which granted summary judgment to Butler on all claims. The District Court found that the company had a property interest in the vehicle but concluded that Butler’s policies provided sufficient notice and opportunity to be heard, and that the seizure and retention of the vehicle were reasonable and did not constitute a taking.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that Butler’s policies violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause because they failed to require prompt notice to all holders of property rights in seized vehicles and did not provide an opportunity for a hearing to challenge the lawfulness of the tow or the fees. The court reversed and remanded the due process claim. However, it affirmed the District Court’s judgment on the Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims, finding no unreasonable seizure or unconstitutional taking. View "Honda Lease Trust v. Malanga's Automotive" on Justia Law

In 1922, the Territory of Hawai‘i issued a Land Patent for a 3.99-acre property to a trustee for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, with a deed restriction requiring the property to be used “for Church purposes only.” If used otherwise, the property would revert to the Territory. Over the years, the property changed hands several times, with each transaction referencing the original deed restriction. The current owners, Hilo Bay Marina, LLC and Keaukaha Ministry LLC, are not religious institutions and sought to have the restriction removed, arguing it was void under Hawai‘i Revised Statutes § 515-6(b), and violated both the Hawai‘i and Federal Establishment Clauses.The Circuit Court of the Third Circuit granted summary judgment for the State of Hawai‘i and its Board of Land and Natural Resources, finding that the deed restriction was a permissible form of early use-zoning, did not violate the cited laws, and was covered by the statutory exemption for religious use. The court also concluded that the restriction did not violate either the Hawai‘i or Federal Establishment Clauses, applying both the Lemon test and the more recent “historical practices and understandings” standard from Kennedy v. Bremerton School District.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i reviewed the case de novo. The court found that the record did not support the lower court’s conclusion that the deed restriction was an early form of use-zoning. It held that the State’s enforcement of the restriction violated the Hawai‘i Establishment Clause, as it required the State to actively police religious use and entangled the government with religious affairs. The court reversed the Circuit Court’s judgment for the State, vacated its ruling on the Federal Establishment Clause, and held that summary judgment should be entered for the plaintiffs. View "Hilo Bay Marina, LLC v. State" on Justia Law