Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

A philosophy lecturer at a public university in New Jersey had his contract non-renewed after his private, off-campus comments and writings about race, politics, and immigration became public. These included controversial essays and recorded conversations, which were later featured in a New York Times article. The university received some complaints from students, faculty, and outside parties, and several faculty groups issued public statements condemning the lecturer’s views. The university placed him on paid leave, conducted an investigation into his outside activities and class attendance, and ultimately decided not to renew his contract, citing both the content of his speech and alleged policy violations.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey granted summary judgment in favor of the university, holding that the lecturer’s speech was not protected by the First Amendment. The court found that the university’s interest in mitigating disruption outweighed the lecturer’s interest in expressing his views. The District Court did not address whether the speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the non-renewal, whether the same action would have occurred absent the speech, or whether university officials were entitled to qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the District Court’s judgment. The Third Circuit held that the lecturer’s off-campus, extramural speech on matters of public concern was protected by the First Amendment, and that the university had not demonstrated sufficient disruption to outweigh the lecturer’s interest in his speech under the Pickering balancing test. The court found the evidence of disruption minimal and insufficient to justify the adverse employment action. The judgment was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Jason Jorjani v. New Jersey Institute of Technology" on Justia Law

Two police officers responded to a domestic battery call at a residential home. While one officer spoke with a woman at the door, the other saw a person flee over a backyard wall into a neighboring yard. Instead of immediately pursuing, the officer returned to his car, called for backup, and drove to establish a perimeter. Eighteen minutes later, a K-9 unit arrived and began searching within the perimeter. The K-9 alerted toward the plaintiffs’ backyard, which was locked and posted with a “Beware of Dog” sign. Without a warrant or consent, officers entered the backyard. The plaintiffs’ three dogs were roused, and two of them attacked the police K-9. One officer shot and killed the two dogs. The suspect was never found.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada granted summary judgment to the officers and the City of North Las Vegas, finding the officers’ entry justified under the “hot pursuit” exception to the warrant requirement and the use of force against the dogs reasonable. The court also granted summary judgment to the City on the plaintiffs’ Monell claims, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim after dismissing the federal claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the “hot pursuit” exception did not apply because the officers lost track of the suspect for eighteen minutes, breaking the continuity required for exigent circumstances. Therefore, the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity for the warrantless search. However, the court affirmed qualified immunity for the officer’s use of force against the dogs, finding no clearly established law prohibiting his actions in the spontaneous circumstances. The court also affirmed summary judgment for the City on the Monell claims, finding insufficient evidence of a policy or deliberate indifference. The case was remanded for further proceedings. The disposition was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "JONES V. CITY OF NORTH LAS VEGAS" on Justia Law

Philip Myers, a native and citizen of Liberia, was adopted by a U.S. citizen and entered the United States as a child. He later sustained several criminal convictions, including for aggravated felonies. In 2021, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him. Myers claimed derivative citizenship through his adoptive mother, who had become a naturalized U.S. citizen, and also alleged that he had been abused by her. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) had previously denied his derivative citizenship application, finding insufficient evidence that he was in his adoptive mother’s legal and physical custody at the relevant time. During removal proceedings, Myers, sometimes represented by counsel and sometimes pro se, was found competent to proceed without safeguards. He applied for various forms of relief, including asylum and protection under the Convention Against Torture, but these were denied.The Immigration Judge ordered Myers removed to Liberia. Myers appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), arguing that the competency determination was flawed and that he should have been found incompetent to proceed pro se. The BIA found no clear error in the Immigration Judge’s competency finding and dismissed the appeal. Myers then moved to reopen the proceedings, citing a pending motion with USCIS regarding derivative citizenship, alleged errors in the competency determination, a new asylum claim based on his sexual orientation, and a pending T-visa application as a victim of sex trafficking. The BIA denied the motion to reopen, and Myers was removed to Liberia.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s denial of the motion to reopen for abuse of discretion and found none. The court also rejected Myers’s constitutional challenge to the statutory requirements for derivative citizenship and found no genuine issue of material fact regarding his nationality claim. The petition for review was denied. View "Myers v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A masked assailant entered a jewelry store in Delaware, assaulted the owner with a gun and hammer, smashed display cases, and stole jewelry before fleeing. The owner, Chang Yen Suh, suffered significant injuries requiring hospitalization and months of rehabilitation. Calvin Ushery was indicted for multiple offenses, including first-degree robbery, first-degree assault of a person over 62, possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony, and other related charges. After a mistrial in the first jury trial, a second jury trial resulted in Ushery’s conviction on three counts. The State dismissed several other charges, and Ushery was sentenced as a habitual offender to substantial prison terms.The Superior Court of the State of Delaware presided over both trials and sentencing. Ushery appealed, arguing that the trial court failed to properly admonish the jury against pre-deliberation discussions and exposure to extrajudicial information, and that the court erred by not investigating or excusing an alternate juror who submitted a note raising questions about the evidence and his own hearing difficulties. Ushery claimed these failures violated his constitutional right to a fair trial by an impartial jury and requested the adoption of a presumption of juror misconduct when admonishments are lacking.The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reviewed the case for plain error, as Ushery’s claims were not raised at trial. The Court held that, although daily admonishments are recommended, the instructions given were sufficient and did not constitute plain error. The Court also found no evidence of juror misconduct or bias, and that the trial court acted within its discretion regarding the alternate juror. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment of conviction. View "Ushery v. State" on Justia Law

In 2019, a well-known advice columnist publicly accused a sitting U.S. president of sexually assaulting her in a department store in 1996. The president, while in office, responded with public statements denying the allegations, asserting he did not know the accuser, and claiming she fabricated the story for personal and political gain. The accuser then filed a defamation lawsuit in New York state court, alleging that these statements were false and damaged her reputation. The case was removed to federal court after the Department of Justice certified that the president acted within the scope of his office, but the DOJ later withdrew this certification. During the litigation, the accuser also brought a separate lawsuit under a new state law allowing survivors of sexual assault to sue regardless of the statute of limitations, which resulted in a jury finding that the president had sexually abused and defamed her after leaving office.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted partial summary judgment for the accuser in the original defamation case, relying on issue preclusion from the verdict in the later case. The trial was limited to damages, and the jury awarded the accuser $83.3 million in compensatory and punitive damages. The president moved for a new trial or remittitur, arguing, among other things, that he was entitled to presidential immunity, that the damages were excessive, and that the jury instructions were erroneous. The district court denied these motions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the president had waived any claim to absolute presidential immunity by failing to timely assert it, and that the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Trump v. United States did not alter this conclusion. The court also found no error in the district court’s application of issue preclusion, evidentiary rulings, or jury instructions, and concluded that the damages awarded were reasonable and not excessive. The judgment in favor of the accuser was affirmed in full. View "Carroll v. Trump" on Justia Law

A company had been diverting large amounts of water from streams in East Maui for over twenty years under a series of annually renewed, so-called “temporary” permits issued by the state’s Board of Land and Natural Resources (BLNR). Each year, the company applied to renew these permits, which allowed it to use state land and divert millions of gallons of water daily. In 2020, before BLNR voted to renew the permits for 2021, an environmental group timely requested a contested case hearing, arguing that new evidence and changed circumstances warranted further scrutiny. BLNR denied this request and proceeded to renew the permits, adding some new conditions.The environmental group appealed to the Environmental Court of the First Circuit, challenging both the denial of a contested case hearing and the permit renewals. The Environmental Court found that the group had a constitutionally protected right to a clean and healthful environment, as defined by state law, and that due process required a contested case hearing before the permits were renewed. The court vacated the permits but stayed its order to avoid disruption, temporarily modifying the permits to reduce the allowable water diversion. The court also awarded attorney fees and costs to the group.On appeal, the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) held that the group’s protected interest was defined by some, but not all, relevant environmental laws, and that due process did not require a contested case hearing in this instance. The ICA further found that the Environmental Court lacked jurisdiction over the permit renewals and erred in modifying the permits and awarding attorney fees.The Supreme Court of Hawaiʻi reversed the ICA in relevant part. It held that the group’s constitutional right was defined by all cited environmental laws, including those governing coastal zone management. The court concluded that due process required a contested case hearing before the permits were renewed, and that the Environmental Court had jurisdiction to review both the denial of the hearing and the permit renewals. The Supreme Court also affirmed the Environmental Court’s authority to temporarily modify the permits and to award attorney fees and costs to the environmental group. View "Sierra Club v. Board of Land and Natural Resources" on Justia Law

The petitioner was convicted in 2003 after pleading no contest to several counts of lewd and lascivious acts with minors and one count of nonforcible oral copulation with a minor. The plea agreement amended one charge from forcible to nonforcible oral copulation, and the factual basis for the plea referenced police reports describing acts involving force. In 2005, mental health professionals evaluated the petitioner and, relying in part on a probation report, certified him as a mentally disordered offender (MDO) under California law, finding he had committed a qualifying offense involving force or violence. The Board of Parole Hearings affirmed this certification, and the petitioner did not seek review in the superior court at that time. He has remained in state custody under annual recommitment orders since then.Years later, the petitioner challenged his original MDO certification in the Fresno County Superior Court through a habeas corpus petition, arguing that his conviction did not qualify as a predicate offense for MDO commitment because he did not admit to using force or violence, and that reliance on hearsay in the probation report violated his constitutional rights. The superior court denied the petition, finding the probation report admissible and sufficient to establish use of force, and concluded the petitioner’s offense qualified under the statutory “catchall” provision for nonenumerated crimes involving force or violence.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It held that a habeas corpus petition is an appropriate means to challenge an initial MDO certification based on the nature of the underlying offense, even many years after the initial commitment. The court further held that the evidentiary rule announced in People v. Stevens, which restricts the use of expert testimony to prove qualifying offenses, does not apply retroactively. The court found sufficient evidence supported the original certification under the law in effect at the time and rejected claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The petition for writ of habeas corpus was denied. View "In re Grinder" on Justia Law

The defendant pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm after a felony conviction, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The presentence investigation report determined that the defendant’s offense level was increased due to two prior Louisiana felony convictions: aggravated battery and distribution of cocaine. The report also applied enhancements for a stolen firearm and use of the firearm in connection with another felony. The defendant objected to these enhancements and the classification of his prior aggravated battery conviction as a “crime of violence.” The district court overruled the objections, adopted the report’s findings, and sentenced the defendant to 120 months in prison, the statutory maximum.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the defendant argued that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, relying on New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, and that the district court erred in treating his prior aggravated battery conviction as a crime of violence for sentencing purposes. The defendant had not raised these arguments in the district court, so the Fifth Circuit reviewed for plain error.The Fifth Circuit held that, under existing precedent, a conviction under § 922(g)(1) does not constitute plain error, and there has been no development in the law to suggest otherwise. Regarding the sentencing enhancement, the court found that the defendant failed to show a “realistic probability” that Louisiana courts would uphold an aggravated battery conviction based on reckless or negligent conduct, as required to demonstrate clear or obvious error under the categorical approach. The court concluded that neither the conviction nor the sentence was reversible under plain error review and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "USA v. Sereal" on Justia Law

A company sought approval to construct electricity transmission lines in Pennsylvania as part of a larger project selected through a federally supervised regional planning process. The project was designed to alleviate regional congestion on the electricity grid, which would lower wholesale electricity costs in certain states but increase costs for some Pennsylvania consumers. The regional transmission organization (PJM), acting under Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) rules, selected the project using a benefit-cost methodology approved by FERC.The Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (PUC) reviewed the company’s applications for siting and eminent domain authority. After an evidentiary hearing, an administrative law judge recommended denial, finding that the project was no longer needed due to decreased congestion and that the benefit-cost analysis used by PJM was deficient under Pennsylvania law. The PUC adopted this recommendation, denied the applications, and rescinded the company’s provisional certificate of public convenience. The company appealed to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, which affirmed the PUC’s decision. The company then pursued federal constitutional claims in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, reserving those issues in state court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the PUC’s order was preempted under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution because it posed an obstacle to federal objectives established by Congress and implemented by FERC—specifically, the regional planning and congestion-reduction process. The court found that the PUC’s independent “need” determination, which second-guessed PJM’s FERC-approved methodology, impermissibly conflicted with federal law. The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment for the company and did not reach the dormant Commerce Clause issues. View "Transource Pennsylvania LLC v. DeFrank" on Justia Law

Two former Army members, Aaron Wilson and Sean Dillon, were convicted by court-martial for sex crimes committed during their active-duty service. Both had been medically retired from the Army due to disabilities—Wilson in 2012 and Dillon in 2015. After their retirements, each was charged and convicted by court-martial for offenses that occurred while they were on active duty. Both challenged the court-martial’s jurisdiction, arguing that as medically retired servicemembers, they were no longer part of the “land and naval Forces” under the Constitution and thus could not be subjected to military jurisdiction.Wilson and Dillon appealed their convictions through the military justice system. The United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed both convictions, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces denied discretionary review. After exhausting military appeals, both petitioners filed for habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, arguing that the statutory grant of military jurisdiction over medically retired personnel exceeded Congress’s constitutional authority. The district court denied both petitions, holding that military retirees maintain a formal relationship with the armed forces and remain subject to recall, distinguishing them from separated servicemembers.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of habeas relief de novo. The Tenth Circuit held that medically retired servicemembers retain military status because they hold rank, receive pay, may wear the uniform, and are subject to recall. Therefore, they are part of the “land and naval Forces” under Article I, Section 8, Clause 14 of the Constitution. The court concluded that Congress’s statutory grant of court-martial jurisdiction over such retirees is constitutional and affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas relief. View "Wilson v. Curtis" on Justia Law