Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Earl K. Johnson was convicted by a jury in Logan Circuit Court on four counts of complicity to traffic in methamphetamine, one count of engaging in organized crime, and one count of complicity to murder. The jury found him to be a persistent felony offender and recommended a life sentence, which the court imposed. Johnson appealed, arguing several trial errors, including a violation of his right to confrontation when a key witness, Pam Wetton, testified remotely due to health concerns.The Logan Circuit Court allowed Pam to testify via Zoom based on a letter from a physician’s assistant stating that travel would be difficult for her. Johnson objected, arguing that this violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. The trial court overruled his objection, and Pam testified remotely. Johnson was convicted on all counts and sentenced to life in prison.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and found that allowing Pam to testify remotely violated Johnson’s right to confrontation. The court held that the Commonwealth failed to establish that remote testimony was necessary to further an important public policy and that the reliability of the testimony was assured. The court concluded that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt regarding the complicity to traffic convictions, as Pam’s testimony was crucial to those charges. Therefore, the court reversed Johnson’s convictions and sentences for complicity to traffic in methamphetamine.However, the court affirmed Johnson’s convictions and sentences for engaging in organized crime and complicity to murder. The court found that Pam’s testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt for these charges due to the overwhelming evidence of Johnson’s guilt presented by other witnesses. The court also addressed and dismissed Johnson’s other claims of trial errors, including improper admission of other crimes and bad acts, hearsay statements, and the denial of a mistrial. View "Johnson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Patrick Scullark, Jr. was charged with possession of a controlled substance after police officers found methamphetamine in his fanny pack during a search incident to his arrest on unrelated charges. Scullark attempted to pass the fanny pack to another person before being handcuffed. He argued that the search violated his constitutional rights because he could no longer access the fanny pack at the time it was searched.The Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County denied Scullark’s motion to suppress the evidence, finding the search valid as a search incident to arrest. Scullark entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling. The Iowa Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s decision, agreeing with Scullark that the search did not satisfy the search incident to arrest (SITA) exception because he could not access the fanny pack at the time it was searched.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and vacated the court of appeals decision, affirming the district court’s order. The court held that the search of the fanny pack was valid under both the United States Constitution and the Iowa Constitution. The court concluded that because the fanny pack was worn around Scullark’s waist at the time of his arrest, it was considered part of his person. Therefore, the search was justified as a search of his person incident to a lawful arrest, requiring no additional justification. The court emphasized that the SITA exception allows for a full search of the arrestee’s person and items immediately associated with the person. View "State v. Scullark" on Justia Law

Gage Peters was convicted of criminal sexual abuse in Illinois in 2013, which required him to register as a sex offender for ten years. He moved to Indiana in 2016 and registered as required. In 2021, Peters vacationed in Florida, where he signed a form agreeing to lifetime registration as a sex offender. After returning to Illinois and then moving back to Indiana in 2022, the Hamilton County Sheriff’s Department informed him that he must register as a lifetime sex offender due to Florida's laws.The Hamilton Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the State, finding that Peters was required to register for life in Indiana because of his obligation in Florida. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, interpreting the relevant statute to require registration in Indiana for individuals with out-of-state registration obligations, regardless of the source of those obligations.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the statute applies to individuals with out-of-state registration obligations, regardless of the source. However, the court found that Peters is not currently required to register in Florida because his registration obligations there lapsed when he moved out of the state. Consequently, the court concluded that Peters does not need to register as a sex offender in Indiana. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for entry of summary judgment in favor of Peters. View "Peters v. Quakenbush" on Justia Law

Four individuals aged 18 to 20 sought to purchase handguns but were prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(1), which restricts the commercial sale of handguns to those under 21. They filed a lawsuit against the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), claiming that the statute violated their Second Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The court applied the text, history, and tradition test from New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, determining that the Second Amendment protections apply to 18- to 20-year-olds and that the right to purchase a gun falls within the Amendment’s plain text. The court found that the government failed to demonstrate a historical tradition of firearm regulation supporting the constitutionality of § 922(b)(1).The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that § 922(b)(1) does not violate the Second Amendment. The court reasoned that historical traditions, including the common law infancy doctrine, supported restrictions on the sale of firearms to individuals under 21. The court found that both the infancy doctrine and § 922(b)(1) imposed similar burdens on minors' ability to purchase firearms and were motivated by concerns about the judgment and maturity of individuals under 21. The court concluded that § 922(b)(1) is consistent with the nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation and is therefore constitutional. The case was remanded with instructions to dismiss it. View "McCoy v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives" on Justia Law

In 2023, Tennessee enacted Senate Bill 1 (SB1), which prohibits healthcare providers from prescribing, administering, or dispensing puberty blockers or hormones to minors for the purpose of enabling them to identify with a gender different from their biological sex or to treat discomfort from such discordance. However, SB1 allows these treatments for minors with congenital defects, precocious puberty, disease, or physical injury. Three transgender minors, their parents, and a doctor challenged SB1 under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.The District Court partially enjoined SB1, finding that transgender individuals constitute a quasi-suspect class, that SB1 discriminates based on sex and transgender status, and that it was unlikely to survive intermediate scrutiny. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that SB1 did not trigger heightened scrutiny and satisfied rational basis review. The court found that SB1 did not classify based on sex or transgender status and that Tennessee had provided considerable evidence regarding the risks associated with the banned treatments.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that SB1 is not subject to heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause and satisfies rational basis review. The Court determined that SB1 does not classify on any bases that warrant heightened review, such as sex or transgender status. Instead, it classifies based on age and medical use, which are subject to rational basis review. The Court found that Tennessee had a rational basis for enacting SB1, citing concerns about the risks and unknown long-term effects of the treatments, the maturity of minors, and the availability of less invasive approaches. The judgment of the Sixth Circuit was affirmed. View "United States v. Skrmetti" on Justia Law

In this case, inmate Kyle Richards alleged that Thomas Perttu, a prison employee, sexually harassed him and other inmates. Richards also claimed that Perttu destroyed his grievance documents and retaliated against him for attempting to file them. Richards sued Perttu under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for violating his constitutional rights, including his First Amendment right to file grievances. Perttu moved for summary judgment, arguing that Richards had failed to exhaust available grievance procedures as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA).The Magistrate Judge found a genuine issue of fact regarding whether Richards was excused from exhausting his claims due to Perttu's interference and held an evidentiary hearing. The Magistrate Judge concluded that Richards's witnesses lacked credibility and recommended dismissal without prejudice for failure to exhaust. The District Court adopted this recommendation. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the Seventh Amendment requires a jury trial when the resolution of the exhaustion issue under the PLRA would also resolve a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the merits of the plaintiff's substantive case.The Supreme Court of the United States held that parties are entitled to a jury trial on PLRA exhaustion when that issue is intertwined with the merits of a claim that requires a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment. The Court reasoned that the usual practice under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is that factual disputes regarding legal claims go to the jury. The PLRA is silent on whether judges or juries should resolve exhaustion disputes, and this silence indicates that the usual practice should be followed. The Court affirmed the judgment of the Sixth Circuit. View "Perttu v. Richards" on Justia Law

Rubin Delphonso Holman was convicted of robbery, assault with intent to rob (AWIR), and simple assault. The incident occurred on a Metro train where Holman and his friend, Mr. Black, engaged in inappropriate behavior towards Domini Dotson. After Dotson moved to another train car and reported the incident, Holman followed her, threatened her, and attempted to take her phone. When Dotson resisted, Holman assaulted her, and during the altercation, he took her phone. Holman later threw the phone onto the Metro tracks when approached by police.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia convicted Holman of the charges. Holman appealed, arguing that his convictions for simple assault and AWIR should merge with his robbery conviction under the Double Jeopardy Clause. He also contended that there was insufficient evidence to support his robbery conviction.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court agreed with Holman that his convictions for simple assault and AWIR should merge with his robbery conviction, as robbery requires proof of assault, and thus, the lesser offenses are included within the greater offense of robbery. The court also found that there was sufficient evidence to support Holman’s robbery conviction, as a reasonable jury could infer that Holman intended to permanently deprive Dotson of her phone.The Court of Appeals reversed Holman’s convictions for simple assault and AWIR, affirmed his robbery conviction, and remanded the case for entry of a new judgment and commitment order reflecting only the robbery conviction. The court noted that resentencing was unnecessary as the trial court had imposed concurrent sentences. View "Holman v. United States" on Justia Law

Eric Coomer, Ph.D., the former Director of Product Strategy and Safety at Dominion Voting Systems, Inc., filed a defamation lawsuit against several defendants, including Make Your Life Epic, LLC, Reopen America, LLC, and Clayton Thomas Clark. Joseph Oltmann, a nonparty to the lawsuit, was subpoenaed to testify and produce documents. Oltmann initially appeared for his deposition but left without authorization and later boasted about his actions on his podcast, disparaging the magistrate judge and suggesting violence.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado held Oltmann in civil contempt for failing to comply with the subpoena and court orders. The court imposed a $1,000 per day fine until Oltmann complied and ordered him to pay attorney’s fees and costs. Oltmann appealed the Contempt Order, arguing that he properly invoked the newsperson’s privilege and that his due process rights were violated because the district court did not hold a hearing before issuing the Contempt Order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s Contempt Order. The appellate court held that Oltmann waived his arguments by not raising them specifically in his objections to the magistrate judge’s recommendations. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the Contempt Order without a second hearing, as the material facts were undisputed. The appellate court further imposed sanctions on Oltmann, ordering him to pay Coomer’s reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees and costs associated with the appeal, and remanded the case to the district court to determine the amount. View "Coomer v. Make Your Life Epic" on Justia Law

Clifford Bain was seriously injured when a bus owned and operated by the City of Cheyenne collided with him while he was riding his motorcycle. Bain filed a complaint against the bus driver and the City under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act (WGCA). The bus driver and the City admitted liability but claimed immunity from any liability exceeding $250,000 under the WGCA. Bain then filed a motion for partial summary judgment, arguing that the limitation in § 1-39-118(a)(i) of the WGCA was unconstitutional under Article 10, § 4(a) of the Wyoming Constitution. The district court denied Bain’s motion, declaring the statute constitutional. Bain subsequently filed a petition for writ of review with the Wyoming Supreme Court.The district court denied Bain’s motion for partial summary judgment, holding that § 1-39-118(a)(i) of the WGCA is not a limitation on damages but rather a limitation on the waiver of immunity. Bain then filed a petition for writ of review, which the Wyoming Supreme Court granted.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Court held that § 1-39-118(a)(i) is a limitation on the waiver of immunity under the WGCA and not a limitation on damages, thus it does not violate Article 10, § 4(a) of the Wyoming Constitution. The Court emphasized that the statute limits the legal responsibility or obligation of governmental entities and is consistent with the legislative intent to balance the equities between injured persons and taxpayers. The Court concluded that Bain did not meet his burden of proving the statute unconstitutional. View "Bain v. City of Cheyenne" on Justia Law

Elfido Gonzalez Castillo, a native and citizen of Mexico, illegally entered the United States in 1981 and became a lawful permanent resident in 1989. In 2009, he applied for naturalization but failed to disclose a recent indictment for sexually abusing his niece. He became a naturalized citizen in October 2009 and pleaded guilty to the offense two months later. In 2019, the government sought to revoke his citizenship, and in 2022, a court ordered its cancellation due to his fraudulent procurement. Subsequently, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) for a crime of child abuse.An immigration judge ordered Gonzalez's removal, and the Board of Immigration Appeals upheld this decision. Gonzalez sought review in the Third Circuit, which transferred the case to the Sixth Circuit, determining that venue lay elsewhere.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that Gonzalez was not deportable under the child-abuse provision because he was a naturalized citizen at the time of his conviction. The court relied on the precedent set by the Supreme Court in Costello v. INS, which held that deportation provisions do not apply to individuals who were citizens at the time of their conviction. The court noted that the statutory language and the rule of lenity supported this interpretation. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit granted Gonzalez's petition for review, vacated the order of removal, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Gonzalez Castillo v. Bondi" on Justia Law