Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Trevon Bey was convicted by a jury of possession of a firearm by a felon and carrying a loaded firearm in public. The trial court dismissed a prior strike conviction and sentenced Bey to three years for each count, to be served concurrently. Bey appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly revoked his self-representation status, that his conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon violated his Second Amendment rights, and that California's concealed carry laws were unconstitutional under a recent Supreme Court decision.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County initially allowed Bey to represent himself but later revoked this status due to his disruptive behavior and failure to follow court rules. Bey repeatedly challenged the court's authority, disrespected the court, and disrupted proceedings, despite multiple warnings. The court appointed standby counsel to represent him, citing his inability to adhere to courtroom protocol.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Bey's self-representation status due to his continuous disruptive conduct. The court also found that Bey's conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon did not violate his Second Amendment rights, referencing recent Supreme Court decisions that upheld prohibitions on firearm possession by felons. Additionally, the court rejected Bey's challenge to California's concealed carry laws, noting that the unconstitutional "good cause" requirement was severable from the rest of the licensing scheme.The Court of Appeal agreed with both parties that the sentence for carrying a loaded firearm in public should be stayed under Penal Code section 654, as it was based on the same act as the possession charge. The court modified the judgment to stay the sentence on count 2 and affirmed the judgment as modified. View "People v. Bey" on Justia Law

The case involves the defendant, who was charged with 46 sex crimes against the same person over an eight-year period. The counts in the indictment were identical and did not specify the incidents they were based on. During the first trial, the state did not link any specific incidents to the counts, and the jury found the defendant not guilty of 40 counts and guilty of six. The defendant appealed, arguing an evidentiary error, and the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case.On remand, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, claiming that retrying him on the six counts of conviction would violate his constitutional rights against double jeopardy. The trial court denied the motion, and the case proceeded to a second jury trial, where the defendant was again convicted of the six counts. The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the Court of Appeals had erred in resolving the case on preservation grounds. The Supreme Court concluded that the defendant had consistently raised the same double jeopardy argument throughout the case: that due to the lack of specificity in the indictment and the first trial, it was impossible to determine the factual basis for any count, and there was a risk that he would be convicted based on incidents of which he had already been acquitted. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings to address the merits of the double jeopardy issue. View "State v. Dodge" on Justia Law

Dario Giambro was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The conviction stemmed from evidence found by police officers who forcibly entered his home in Hebron, Maine, without a warrant. The officers entered the home based on information from Giambro's son, Antonio, who reported that his mother, Arline, had died and was not in the house. Giambro argued that the warrantless entry violated his Fourth Amendment rights and that the evidence should be suppressed. He also challenged the charge on Second Amendment grounds.The United States District Court for the District of Maine denied Giambro's motion to suppress, ruling that the entry fell within the emergency aid exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. The court found that the officers had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that Arline might be in need of immediate aid, despite Antonio's report that she had died and was not in the house. The court also denied Giambro's motion to dismiss the charge on Second Amendment grounds.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and disagreed with the district court's application of the emergency aid exception. The appellate court held that the officers did not have an objectively reasonable basis to believe that Arline was alive and in need of immediate aid, given that Antonio had been in the house that morning and reported that she was not there. The court emphasized that the officers should have spoken to Antonio and Giambro, who were available for questioning, before forcibly entering the home. Consequently, the First Circuit reversed the district court's denial of the motion to suppress, vacated Giambro's conviction and sentence, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court did not address the Second Amendment claim due to its ruling on the Fourth Amendment issue. View "United States v. Giambro" on Justia Law

Marcus Todd, a state employee in Minnesota, alleged that a union violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by deducting union dues from his paycheck without his consent. Todd joined the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees in 2014 and authorized dues deductions. In 2018, a new authorization card was allegedly signed electronically with Todd's name, which he claims was forged. After the Supreme Court's decision in Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, Todd attempted to resign from the union and stop dues deductions, but the union continued until May 2021, citing an annual opt-out period.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota dismissed Todd's federal claims, stating that he voluntarily agreed to the dues deductions before Janus and was contractually bound to the opt-out period. The court also found that the union did not act under color of state law regarding the alleged forgery and dismissed Todd's claims for prospective relief as moot. The court declined to exercise jurisdiction over Todd's state law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Todd's claims failed due to the lack of state action, as the union's actions were based on private agreements, not state statutes. The court referenced Hoekman v. Education Minnesota and Burns v. School Service Employees Union Local 284, which established that private agreements for dues deductions do not constitute state action. The court also found that the alleged forgery did not establish state action, as it was a private misuse of state law. Consequently, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Todd v. AFSCME" on Justia Law

David Shanton, Sr. was involved in two armed bank robberies in Hagerstown, Maryland, shortly after completing a 20-year sentence for a previous bank robbery. During the first robbery, Shanton threatened to kill anyone who called the police and pointed a shotgun at a deputy sheriff while fleeing with nearly $34,000. He was apprehended during the second attempted robbery. Shanton was indicted and convicted on multiple counts, including armed bank robbery, discharging and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, and possessing a firearm as a felon.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland sentenced Shanton to 188 months for each armed bank robbery and firearm possession conviction, to be served concurrently, plus consecutive terms for the firearm offenses, totaling 608 months. Shanton's sentence was enhanced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) due to his prior convictions, including Maryland robbery. Shanton did not initially object to the enhancement. On direct appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed his convictions and sentence.Shanton later filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, challenging the constitutionality of his ACCA-enhanced sentences based on the Supreme Court's decision in Samuel Johnson v. United States, which invalidated the ACCA's residual clause. The district court allowed Shanton to supplement his motion, arguing that his Maryland robbery convictions no longer qualified as violent felonies under ACCA's elements clause. The district court rejected this argument, relying on Fourth Circuit precedent, and denied the motion but issued a certificate of appealability.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that Maryland robbery qualifies as a violent felony under ACCA's elements clause, consistent with prior Fourth Circuit decisions and the Supreme Court's ruling in Stokeling v. United States. The court concluded that Maryland robbery involves the use of force against a person, meeting the ACCA's definition of a violent felony. View "United States v. Shanton" on Justia Law

During Winter Storm Uri in February 2021, Black Hills Colorado Electric LLC incurred extraordinary natural gas costs to ensure continuous electric service to its customers. Holcim U.S. Inc., a large retail electric customer, argued that the Colorado Public Utilities Commission (PUC) set an unjust and unreasonable charge for electricity over a five-day period, disproportionately allocating utility costs to Holcim. Holcim also claimed that the PUC's charge constituted a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment.The District Court for the City and County of Denver upheld the PUC's decision, finding that the rate was just and reasonable and did not violate Holcim's constitutional rights. The court noted that the PUC's rate structure was based on total customer usage forecasts and was applied uniformly to all customers.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that the PUC's rate was just and reasonable, as it accurately reflected the cost of service, distributed costs among customers fairly, and maintained the utility's financial integrity. The court also found that Holcim's actual electricity usage during the storm did not impact the costs incurred by Black Hills, which were based on forecasted needs.Additionally, the court rejected Holcim's constitutional claims. It concluded that Holcim did not adequately develop its takings claim and that the PUC's decision did not violate Holcim's due process rights, as the PUC provided a fair hearing, considered competent evidence, and made its determination based on evidence rather than arbitrarily. View "Holcim U.S. Inc. v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Taegan Ray Contreras was charged with possessing a firearm as a felon, violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that the statute violated the Second Amendment both facially and as applied to him. The district court denied the motion, and Contreras was convicted and sentenced. He appealed, raising the same constitutional challenges.The District Court for the Western District of Texas initially sentenced Contreras to 24 months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release for being a user in possession of a firearm. While on supervised release, detectives found Contreras in possession of a firearm and marijuana. He was arrested and indicted for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Contreras moved to dismiss the indictment, but the district court denied the motion, finding § 922(g)(1) constitutional. Contreras entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. He was sentenced to 21 months’ imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and forfeiture of the firearm.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reiterated that § 922(g)(1) is facially constitutional and concluded that it is constitutional as applied to Contreras. The court found that the Second Amendment extends to convicted felons but upheld the statute, noting historical traditions of disarming felons and those under the influence of substances. The court held that § 922(g)(1) is consistent with historical regulations and principles, affirming Contreras' conviction. View "United States v. Contreras" on Justia Law

Jose Gomez Quiroz was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) for making a false statement while purchasing a firearm, as he allegedly denied being under indictment for a felony. He was also charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(n) for receiving a firearm while under indictment. A jury found him guilty on both counts. However, on the same day, the Supreme Court decided New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen. Quiroz then moved to dismiss the indictment, and the district court granted the motion, ruling that § 922(n) is facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. Consequently, the court also dismissed the § 922(a)(6) charge, stating that the false statement was immaterial.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas initially denied Quiroz's motion to dismiss the indictment. After the jury's guilty verdict, the district court reconsidered its decision in light of the Bruen ruling and dismissed the indictment, declaring § 922(n) unconstitutional and the false statement under § 922(a)(6) immaterial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that § 922(n) is consistent with the nation's historical tradition of firearms regulation. The court noted that historically, individuals indicted for serious crimes were often detained pretrial, which effectively disarmed them. The court held that § 922(n) imposes a comparable burden on the right to armed self-defense as historical pretrial detention practices. Consequently, the court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case, reinstating the charges under both § 922(n) and § 922(a)(6). View "United States v. Quiroz" on Justia Law

Paul Curry, Jr. pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The presentence report (PSR) classified him as an armed career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), due to four prior Texas burglary convictions. Consequently, the district court sentenced him to 262 months of imprisonment, within the guidelines range of 210 to 262 months. Curry did not object to the PSR at the district court level.Curry appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, arguing for the first time that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional and that the district court erred in sentencing him as an armed career criminal. He contended that § 922(g)(1) exceeds Congress's power under the Commerce Clause and violates the Second Amendment. Additionally, he argued that the district court should have submitted the question of whether his prior crimes occurred on separate occasions to a jury, and that it erred by relying solely on the PSR for the ACCA enhancement.The Fifth Circuit reviewed Curry's constitutional challenges for plain error, as they were not raised in the district court. The court found that Curry's arguments regarding the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) were foreclosed by precedent. The court also held that Curry's facial challenge to § 922(g)(1) under the Second Amendment failed, as the statute was not unconstitutional in all its applications.Regarding the ACCA enhancement, the Fifth Circuit determined that the district court clearly erred by not submitting the separate-occasions inquiry to a jury, as required by the Supreme Court's decision in Erlinger v. United States. However, the court concluded that Curry failed to demonstrate that this error affected his substantial rights, given the substantial gaps in time and different victims involved in his prior convictions. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Curry" on Justia Law

Justin and Jared Brackett own and operate two restaurants in Harwich, Massachusetts: Ember Pizza, Inc. and The Port Restaurant and Bar, Inc. Both establishments held liquor and entertainment licenses issued by the town. Allegedly, they violated Harwich's noise ordinance and Massachusetts COVID-19 restrictions, leading to suspensions and restrictions on their permits. In response, they sued Harwich, several town officials, and other individuals in federal district court, asserting various federal and state claims.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts largely granted the defendants' dispositive motions, rejecting all of Ember and The Port's claims. The court also denied their request for leave to amend their complaint, finding that an amendment would be futile. Ember and The Port then appealed the district court's decisions.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's rulings. The appellate court held that Ember and The Port failed to state a plausible claim for relief under federal law, including their First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and procedural due process claims. The court also found that the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act claims and common law claims, including civil conspiracy and defamation, were inadequately pleaded. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request for leave to amend the complaint, as the proposed amendments would not have cured the deficiencies in the original complaint. View "3137, LLC v. Town of Harwich" on Justia Law