Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

A New York State Police trooper stopped Daniel Delgado for erratic driving and discovered that his license was suspended. During an inventory search of his vehicle, the trooper found a loaded “ghost gun” and ammunition, which Delgado admitted belonged to him. Delgado had several prior convictions, including a felony conviction for attempted second-degree murder in Florida, where he had shot a man in the back. Delgado was indicted for possessing ammunition after a felony conviction, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and pleaded guilty without a plea agreement.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied Delgado’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea and to dismiss the indictment, finding that § 922(g)(1) did not violate the Second Amendment. At sentencing, the court determined that Delgado’s prior Florida conviction for attempted second-degree murder was a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a), resulting in a higher base offense level. Delgado was sentenced to thirty months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release. He timely appealed, challenging both the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) and the classification of his prior conviction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It held that Delgado’s constitutional challenge to § 922(g)(1) was foreclosed by its recent decision in Zherka v. Bondi, which reaffirmed the statute’s constitutionality after New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen. The court also held that Florida’s offense of attempted second-degree murder is categorically a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines, as it requires an intentional act imminently dangerous to another and demonstrating a depraved mind. The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Delgado" on Justia Law

A man was stopped by police in Lawton, Oklahoma, for a traffic violation. During the stop, officers smelled marijuana and, after searching his car, found a loaded revolver and various marijuana products. The man did not have a medical marijuana card and was arrested on state charges for marijuana possession, paraphernalia, and a traffic offense. Subsequently, a federal grand jury indicted him for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), which prohibits firearm possession by anyone who is an unlawful user of or addicted to a controlled substance.The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment. The district court found that the Second Amendment’s text covered the defendant’s conduct and held that applying § 922(g)(3) to non-intoxicated marijuana users was inconsistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court reasoned that historical regulations only permitted disarming those who had acted dangerously in the past, not those merely believed to pose a risk of future danger. The government appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. After the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Rahimi clarified the methodology for Second Amendment challenges, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the historical tradition supports disarming individuals believed to pose a risk of future danger, not just those who have acted dangerously before. However, the appellate court found that the government must show that non-intoxicated marijuana users pose such a risk. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether the government can meet this burden. View "United States v. Harrison" on Justia Law

A Pennsylvania resident, along with several organizations, challenged the state’s requirement that mail-in ballots be discarded if the return envelope is missing a handwritten date or contains an incorrect date. The plaintiffs argued that this “date requirement” led to thousands of otherwise valid ballots being rejected in recent elections, often without notice to the affected voters or an opportunity to cure the error. The date field on the return envelope does not determine whether a ballot is timely or whether the voter is eligible, and the state’s election system already records the actual receipt date of each ballot.The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania reviewed the case after extensive discovery. Only two county election boards defended the date requirement, while most did not. The District Court found that the date requirement was not justified by the state’s interests in election efficiency, solemnity, or fraud prevention. The court noted that the requirement imposed a minimal but real burden on voters, as it led to the rejection of thousands of ballots, and that the state had not shown the requirement meaningfully advanced its asserted interests. The court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs and enjoined enforcement of the date requirement, but did not prohibit the inclusion of a date field on return envelopes.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The Third Circuit held that, under the Anderson-Burdick framework, the date requirement imposed a minimal burden on the right to vote, but that burden was not justified by the state’s interests. The court found no meaningful connection between the date requirement and election administration, solemnity, or fraud prevention, and concluded that discarding ballots for minor date errors was unconstitutional. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed. View "Eakin v. Adams County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

Oregon enacted a law requiring prescription drug manufacturers to report detailed information about certain drugs, including pricing, costs, and factors contributing to price increases, to the state’s Department of Consumer and Business Services. The law also directs the agency to post most of this information online, but prohibits public disclosure of information designated as a trade secret unless the agency determines that disclosure is in the public interest. Since the law’s enactment, manufacturers have claimed thousands of trade secrets, but the agency has not publicly disclosed any such information.A trade association representing pharmaceutical manufacturers sued the director of the Oregon agency in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon, raising several facial constitutional challenges. The district court granted summary judgment for the association on two claims: that the reporting requirement violated the First Amendment by compelling speech, and that any use of the public-interest exception to disclose trade secrets would constitute an uncompensated taking under the Fifth Amendment. The court declared the entire reporting requirement unconstitutional and held that any disclosure of trade secrets under the public-interest exception would violate the Takings Clause unless just compensation was provided.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It reversed the district court’s summary judgment for the association on both the First and Fifth Amendment claims. The Ninth Circuit held that the reporting requirement compels commercial speech and survives intermediate scrutiny under the First Amendment, as it directly advances substantial state interests in transparency and market efficiency and is not more extensive than necessary. On the takings claim, the court found the association’s challenge justiciable but concluded that, under the Penn Central regulatory takings framework, none of the factors supported a facial claim that every disclosure under the public-interest exception would constitute a taking. The court remanded with instructions to enter summary judgment for the state on these claims. View "Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America v. Stolfi" on Justia Law

Three former members of a religious organization alleged that the organization intentionally misrepresented its history and the use of member tithing payments. They claimed that, had they known the true facts, they would not have joined or contributed financially. The plaintiffs asserted two main theories under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO): first, that the organization’s leaders made fraudulent statements about the group’s history and beliefs that they did not sincerely hold; and second, that the organization misrepresented how tithing funds would be used, including using them for commercial purposes contrary to representations.The United States District Court for the District of Utah initially dismissed the complaint, finding that the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses and the church autonomy doctrine barred adjudication of claims requiring inquiry into the truth or falsity of religious beliefs. After amendments to the complaint, the district court allowed a RICO claim based on the tithing theory to proceed, viewing it as a secular dispute. However, after further amendments and additional plaintiffs, the district court ultimately dismissed all claims, holding that the church autonomy doctrine barred claims based on religious misrepresentations and that the plaintiffs failed to adequately plead reliance or a pattern of predicate acts for the tithing-based RICO claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. It held that the church autonomy doctrine bars civil RICO claims premised on alleged misrepresentations about religious history or doctrine, as such claims would require courts to adjudicate ecclesiastical questions. Regarding the tithing theory, the court held that the plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege a causal link between the organization’s statements about tithing and their own financial contributions, as required for a civil RICO claim. The court therefore affirmed the dismissal of all claims. View "Gaddy v. Corp. of the President of the Church of Jesus" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of two counts of unlawful sexual contact and one count of unlawful sexual touching involving his niece by marriage, who was a minor at the time. The incidents occurred in 2020 at the defendant’s home in West Gardiner, Maine, when the victim was left alone with him during family gatherings. The victim later disclosed the abuse in a forensic interview at a Children’s Advocacy Center (CAC), which was video recorded. The State charged the defendant in March 2022, and after a grand jury indictment, the case proceeded to trial. The defendant was subject to bail conditions restricting contact with minors.Prior to trial in the Kennebec County Unified Criminal Docket, the defendant moved for a bill of particulars and later asserted his right to a speedy trial, which he temporarily waived to obtain out-of-state records. He renewed his speedy trial demand, but delays occurred due to both his requests for specific trial dates and court scheduling constraints. The trial court denied his motion to dismiss for a speedy trial violation, finding that the delays were attributable to both parties and that the prejudice suffered was insufficient to warrant dismissal. The court also admitted the CAC video under 16 M.R.S. § 358, over the defendant’s objections based on confrontation and due process rights, and after editing out most references to uncharged conduct. The jury found the defendant guilty of the counts related to West Gardiner and not guilty of those related to Augusta.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the denial of the speedy trial motion, the admission of the CAC video, and the applicability of section 358. The Court held that there was no violation of the defendant’s speedy trial rights under either the Maine or United States Constitutions, that the admission of the CAC video did not violate the Maine Confrontation Clause or Due Process Clause, and that the amended version of section 358 applied to the case. The judgment of conviction was affirmed. View "State of Maine v. Engroff" on Justia Law

In 2023, the Maine Legislature enacted the Paid Family and Medical Leave (PFML) program, requiring employers to remit quarterly premiums into a state fund beginning January 1, 2025. The program allows covered individuals to take up to twelve weeks of leave for qualifying reasons, with benefits paid from the fund. Employers may apply to substitute an approved private plan that provides substantially equivalent benefits, which exempts them from further premium payments. The Maine Department of Labor adopted rules implementing the PFML program, including a provision that all employers must pay nonrefundable premiums for the first quarter of 2025, even if they later obtain approval for a private plan. Employers could begin applying for private plan approval after April 1, 2025, due to the time needed for insurers to develop compliant policies.The Maine State Chamber of Commerce and Bath Iron Works challenged the Department’s rule requiring nonrefundable premiums, arguing it conflicted with the PFML Act and constituted an unconstitutional taking under both the Maine and U.S. Constitutions. The Kennebec County Superior Court accepted a consented-to motion to report three legal questions to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court: whether the rule conflicted with the Act or was arbitrary and capricious, and whether it constituted a taking under state or federal law.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court accepted the report and held that the Department’s rules do not conflict with the PFML Act and are not arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise unlawful. The Court found that the statute unambiguously requires employers to remit premiums until a private plan is approved, and the rules reasonably implement the legislative intent. Additionally, the Court determined that the obligation to pay premiums does not constitute a cognizable taking of private property under either the Maine or U.S. Constitution. The Court answered all three reported questions in the negative and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Maine State Chamber of Commerce v. Department of Labor" on Justia Law

Police officers in Washington, D.C., approached a car that was illegally parked and had windows tinted beyond legal limits. When the officers tapped on the window, the driver, Ronnard Williams, lowered it only slightly, making it difficult for the officers to see inside. The officers then ordered Williams to lower the windows further. After he complied, the officers saw a firearm at the feet of a backseat passenger. The officers opened the door, seized the gun, and arrested Williams and the passenger. A subsequent search revealed another gun, marijuana, and cash. Williams, a convicted felon, was indicted for unlawful possession of a firearm.In the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Williams moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the order to lower the windows constituted an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied the motion, and a jury convicted Williams. He was sentenced to three years and five months in prison, with credit for time served.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed whether the police order to lower the windows during a lawful traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment. The court held that, under Pennsylvania v. Mimms, police may order a driver to exit a vehicle during a lawful stop due to officer safety concerns, and that the same reasoning applies to ordering a driver to lower tinted windows. The court found that the minimal intrusion of lowering a window is outweighed by the government’s legitimate interest in officer safety. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of the suppression motion and upheld Williams’s conviction. View "USA v. Williams" on Justia Law

A high school social studies teacher with a history of disciplinary issues was terminated after posting inflammatory messages on her Facebook account, which was followed primarily by former students. The posts, made during nationwide protests following the killing of George Floyd, included comments and memes that were perceived as racially insensitive and vulgar. Although the teacher had set her account to private and did not accept friend requests from current students, the posts quickly circulated within the school community, prompting complaints from students, parents, staff, and widespread media attention. The school district cited her prior suspensions for similar conduct, the disruption caused by her posts, and her failure to appreciate the impact of her comments as reasons for her dismissal.After her termination, the teacher requested a review hearing before the Illinois State Board of Education, where she argued that her Facebook posts were protected by the First Amendment. The hearing officer applied the Pickering balancing test and found that her dismissal did not violate her constitutional rights. Subsequently, the teacher filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, against the school district and associated individuals under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a First Amendment violation. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding that she was collaterally estopped from bringing her claim and, alternatively, that her claim failed on the merits.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Seventh Circuit held that the teacher failed to present sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to find in her favor on her First Amendment claim. Applying the Pickering balancing test, the court concluded that the school district’s interest in addressing actual and potential disruption outweighed the teacher’s interest in free expression, and her posts were not entitled to First Amendment protection. View "Hedgepeth v Britton" on Justia Law

The case concerns a former CEO of a Texas credit union who was removed from his position after the credit union was placed into conservatorship by state authorities, with the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) appointed as conservator. The NCUA terminated the CEO, seized property, and allegedly withheld post-termination benefits. The CEO initially sued in Texas state court for those benefits. Before the credit union responded to that suit, the NCUA initiated an administrative enforcement action against him. In response, the CEO filed a federal lawsuit challenging the NCUA’s authority and the constitutionality of the administrative proceedings, raising claims about the removal protections for the administrative law judge, the lack of a jury trial, due process, and the non-delegation doctrine.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed the federal suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that 12 U.S.C. § 1786(k)(1) explicitly precludes district court jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin or otherwise affect NCUA enforcement proceedings. The district court reasoned that the statutory language was clear and that any challenge to the administrative process must proceed through the statutory review scheme, which provides for review in the courts of appeals after the agency action is final.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that § 1786(k)(1) explicitly precludes district court jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin or otherwise affect NCUA enforcement actions, relying on its recent decision in Burgess v. Whang and Supreme Court precedent interpreting similar statutory language. The court rejected the argument that Congress must specifically reference 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to preclude federal question jurisdiction. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Moats v. Natl Crdt Un Admin Bd" on Justia Law