Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Cornelius Burgess, the former CEO of Herring Bank, was the subject of a Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) enforcement action that began with an investigation in 2010 and formal proceedings in 2014. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) recommended in 2017 that Burgess be removed from his position, barred from the banking industry, and fined $200,000. The FDIC Board adopted this recommendation, but the enforcement order was stayed pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Lucia v. SEC, which addressed the constitutionality of ALJ appointments. After Lucia, the case was remanded for a new hearing before a properly appointed ALJ, who again recommended the same sanctions in 2022. Before the FDIC Board could issue its final order, Burgess filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, seeking to enjoin the Board from issuing its decision on constitutional grounds.The district court found it had jurisdiction to hear Burgess’s claims despite 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(1), which generally precludes such jurisdiction. The court denied injunctive relief on Burgess’s claims regarding unconstitutional removal protections for the Board and ALJs, finding he had not shown harm from those provisions. However, it granted an injunction based on his Seventh Amendment claim, concluding he was likely to succeed on the merits and that the other factors for injunctive relief were met. The FDIC appealed the injunction, and Burgess cross-appealed the denial of relief on his removal claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(1) explicitly strips district courts of subject matter jurisdiction to enjoin or otherwise affect the issuance or enforcement of FDIC orders, including on constitutional grounds. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of injunctive relief and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, declining to reach the merits of Burgess’s constitutional claims. View "Burgess v. Whang" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, an Illinois prisoner, was involved in a physical altercation with several correctional officers at Stateville Correctional Center. Following the incident, he was transferred to Pontiac Correctional Center, where he received medical treatment. He was issued a disciplinary ticket for a major infraction, which led to an adjustment committee hearing at Pontiac. At the hearing, he was allowed to present his side but was not permitted to call witnesses or view video evidence. The committee recommended several disciplinary measures, including three months of solitary confinement in conditions the plaintiff later described as appalling, with unsanitary and unsafe features.The plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, alleging that the disciplinary committee members and the warden violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights by imposing solitary confinement without sufficient procedural protections. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff had not established a protected liberty interest, had not shown inadequate procedures, and that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding that three months in segregation, even with harsh conditions, did not amount to a deprivation of a liberty interest protected by due process.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit disagreed with the district court’s conclusion regarding the liberty interest, holding that the plaintiff’s evidence of three months in unusually harsh and unsanitary solitary confinement raised a genuine issue of material fact about deprivation of a protected liberty interest. However, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment for the defendants, holding that they were entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established at the time of the plaintiff’s confinement. The court clarified that, going forward, short terms of solitary confinement combined with comparably harsh conditions will suffice to show a protected liberty interest requiring procedural protections. View "Jackson v. Anastacio" on Justia Law

Two individuals alleged that the Arizona Department of Revenue, through its Unclaimed Property Act (UPA), unlawfully took possession of checks owed to them by various businesses. Under the UPA, property presumed abandoned is transferred from the holder to the state, which then lists it on a public website but does not provide direct notice to the apparent owners. The plaintiffs claimed that this process constituted an unlawful taking without just compensation and a deprivation of property without due process, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona dismissed the case. It found that the defendants were protected by sovereign immunity and that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for relief, both for retrospective and prospective relief. The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the plaintiffs had Article III standing because they alleged a concrete injury: the state’s possession of their property without consent. The court also determined that sovereign immunity did not bar the claims, as the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and alleged unconstitutional conduct. On the merits, the Ninth Circuit held that the takings claim failed as a matter of law because property held in trust by the state is not considered “taken.” However, the court found that the plaintiffs stated a viable due process claim, as they plausibly alleged a property interest and that Arizona’s notice procedures were constitutionally inadequate under circuit precedent. The court affirmed the dismissal of the takings claim, reversed the dismissal of the due process claim, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "GARZA V. WOODS" on Justia Law

A woman who had been living with a couple in Tennessee returned to their home to collect her belongings after being told she could no longer stay there. A dispute arose over the ownership of a car parked at the residence. The woman alleged that one of the residents, Matthew Howell, pointed a gun at her and refused to let her retrieve the car. She called 911, reporting the incident and stating that Howell was intoxicated and had threatened her. When police arrived, they spoke with the woman, who reiterated her allegations. Officers knocked on the door, and upon Howell opening it, they detected the smell of marijuana. The officers entered the home, arrested Howell for aggravated assault and resisting a frisk, and temporarily handcuffed his girlfriend, Alisha Brown, while conducting a protective sweep. The officers also allowed the woman to access the disputed car.Howell was indicted by a Tennessee grand jury for aggravated assault and resisting arrest. At trial, the jury convicted him of reckless aggravated assault, but the conviction was later amended to simple assault and ultimately reversed on double jeopardy grounds by an appellate court. Meanwhile, Howell and Brown filed a civil suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, alleging Fourth Amendment violations and state tort claims against the officers and the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the federal claims and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the state claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity on all federal claims. It found that the officers’ warrantless entry was not clearly established as unconstitutional under existing precedent, that probable cause supported Howell’s arrest, and that Brown’s temporary detention did not violate clearly established law. The court also found no clearly established law prohibiting the officers’ actions regarding the disputed car and rejected the malicious prosecution claim. The court affirmed summary judgment for the officers and municipality. View "Howell v. McCormick" on Justia Law

A group of bar owners and employees in North Carolina challenged a series of executive orders issued by the Governor during the COVID-19 pandemic. These orders required bars to remain closed for over 400 days, while allowing other businesses, including restaurants, breweries, and wineries, to reopen under certain restrictions. The plaintiffs argued that this differential treatment lacked a meaningful public health justification and violated their constitutional and statutory rights. They also sought records supporting the Governor’s decisions and claimed entitlement to compensation under the Emergency Management Act.In the Superior Court, Wake County, the trial judge denied the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction and granted the Governor’s motion to dismiss, finding that the executive orders were reasonable and based on scientific data. The trial court also dismissed the statutory claims, concluding that the Emergency Management Act did not provide compensation for mere restrictions on business operations and that the Public Records Act claim was moot because the requested records had been produced. The North Carolina Court of Appeals determined that the trial court had effectively granted summary judgment and vacated that order on the constitutional claims, remanding for further proceedings. The Court of Appeals applied rational basis review to the Fruits of Labor claim and strict scrutiny to the Equal Protection claim, finding the Governor’s actions unjustified under both standards. It affirmed dismissal of the statutory claims.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case. It held that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the Fruits of Labor claim and that the proper legal standard, as clarified in Ace Speedway, is not rational basis but a fact-intensive inquiry into whether the government’s action was reasonably necessary to promote a public good. The Court modified and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ remand for further proceedings on this claim, allowing additional discovery. However, it reversed the Court of Appeals’ application of strict scrutiny to the Equal Protection claim, holding that rational basis review applies to economic regulations not involving a suspect class or fundamental right. The Court affirmed dismissal of the statutory claims, finding no entitlement to compensation under the Emergency Management Act and no jurisdiction for the Public Records Act claim due to failure to complete required mediation. View "Bar and Tavern Ass'n v. Stein" on Justia Law

Police officers in Charlotte, North Carolina, received a tip from a confidential informant that a man matching the defendant’s description was riding a bicycle and carrying an illegal firearm. Officers located the defendant, who took a shortcut on a dirt path marked “No Trespassing.” After stopping him, officers asked for his identification, which he provided, and requested that he step off his bicycle and remove his backpack. The officers conducted a pat-down with the defendant’s permission. When asked for consent to search his backpack, the defendant initially agreed, then declined several times, expressing fear. Eventually, after further questioning, the defendant agreed to open his backpack, revealing a handgun. The defendant was arrested, and additional contraband was found.The Superior Court, Mecklenburg County, denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence, finding that the officers had returned his identification and that he freely consented to the search. The court also found that the officers had reasonable suspicion and probable cause for the stop. The defendant entered an Alford plea to the charges and was sentenced to prison. The North Carolina Court of Appeals vacated the conviction, holding that the trial court’s finding that the officers returned the identification was not supported by competent evidence, and that the defendant’s consent to the search was not voluntary under the totality of the circumstances.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case. It held that competent evidence supported the trial court’s finding that the officers returned the defendant’s identification. The court further held that, under the totality of the circumstances, the defendant voluntarily consented to the search of his backpack. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, reinstating the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress. View "State v. Wright" on Justia Law

A group of bar owners and operators in North Carolina challenged a series of executive orders issued by the Governor in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. These orders initially required bars to close statewide, then imposed restrictions that effectively prevented them from operating, such as prohibiting onsite consumption of alcohol and limiting service to outdoor areas only. Some bars could not reopen at all due to lack of outdoor space, while others found the restrictions made operation unprofitable. The restrictions lasted for approximately nine months, during which time the plaintiffs allege they were forced to remain closed or operate at a loss.After the Governor allowed bars to fully reopen, the plaintiffs filed suit in Superior Court, Carteret County, alleging that the executive orders violated their fundamental rights to earn a living under the North Carolina Constitution. They sought damages and other relief. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that sovereign immunity barred the claims. The trial court denied the motion in part, allowing the constitutional claims to proceed. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the plaintiffs had stated colorable constitutional claims and that sovereign immunity did not bar their action.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case. It held that, under established precedent, plaintiffs may bring direct constitutional claims against the state when they allege a violation of their rights and lack an adequate alternative remedy. The Court concluded that the plaintiffs’ complaint sufficiently alleged facts that, if proven, could support violations of their rights to earn a living under the Fruits of Their Own Labor Clause and the Law of the Land Clause. The Court also clarified that plaintiffs are not required to plead that they seek the least intrusive remedy at this stage. The decision of the Court of Appeals was modified and affirmed. View "Howell v. Cooper" on Justia Law

Philip Morris USA, Inc., a Virginia-based corporation doing business in North Carolina, was assessed additional franchise taxes by the North Carolina Department of Revenue for tax years 2012–2014. The Department determined that Philip Morris had improperly deducted certain debts from its capital base, as the debtor corporations were not subject to North Carolina’s franchise tax, contrary to the requirements of the relevant statute. After exhausting administrative remedies, Philip Morris petitioned the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) for a contested case hearing, arguing that the statute, as applied to it, violated the dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.An administrative law judge (ALJ) at the OAH rejected the Department’s argument that the OAH lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Philip Morris’s constitutional claim and granted summary judgment in favor of Philip Morris, finding the statute unconstitutional as applied. The Department sought judicial review, and the case was assigned to the North Carolina Business Court. The Business Court reversed the ALJ’s decision, holding that the OAH lacked subject matter jurisdiction over as-applied constitutional challenges to tax statutes, reasoning that such challenges must be heard by the judiciary, not administrative agencies, and that the relevant statutes did not confer such jurisdiction on the OAH.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the Business Court’s decision de novo. The Court held that N.C.G.S. § 105-241.17 does not grant the OAH subject matter jurisdiction over as-applied constitutional challenges to tax statutes. The Court reasoned that the power to rule on the constitutionality of statutes is reserved for the judiciary, and the statute’s language and legislative intent did not clearly confer such authority on the OAH. The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the Business Court’s order reversing the OAH’s decision and remanding the case for dismissal. View "Dep't of Revenue v. Philip Morris USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Melvin Bilbro was charged after killing Shanna Daniels in her North Saint Paul apartment and setting the apartment on fire. Evidence at trial established that Bilbro and Daniels had a significant romantic and sexual relationship, as shown by their frequent text messages, terms of endearment, and testimony from acquaintances. On the night of the murder, Daniels was found dead with multiple stab wounds, and the fire in her apartment was determined to be intentionally set. Investigators found blood evidence linking Bilbro to the scene, and Daniels’s dog was discovered in Bilbro’s apartment. Bilbro denied involvement and claimed he was not in a relationship with Daniels.The State charged Bilbro with first-degree domestic-abuse murder, second-degree intentional murder, and first-degree arson. Bilbro waived his right to a jury trial on guilt but reserved the right to a jury for any facts supporting an aggravated sentence. The trial proceeded in Ramsey County District Court as a bench trial. The State presented evidence of Bilbro’s prior acts of domestic abuse against a former girlfriend, A.B., including physical assaults and an attempted murder for which Bilbro had previously been convicted. The district court found Bilbro guilty on all counts and sentenced him to life in prison for first-degree domestic-abuse murder and a consecutive 57-month sentence for arson, finding that the arson was committed to conceal the murder.On direct appeal, Bilbro argued that the evidence was insufficient to prove a significant romantic relationship with Daniels or a past pattern of domestic abuse, and that his Sixth Amendment right to a jury was violated when the court, rather than a jury, found facts authorizing the consecutive arson sentence under Minn. Stat. § 609.035. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the murder conviction and that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury under Blakely v. Washington does not apply to the threshold question of whether a sentence may be imposed for an offense under Minn. Stat. § 609.035. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Ramsey County v. Bilbro" on Justia Law

Jeffery Krueger died following a traffic stop in Oklahoma initiated by Wagoner County Sheriff’s Office deputies. The stop began when deputies suspected Mr. Krueger of minor traffic violations and possible intoxication. After Mr. Krueger stopped his car in a turn lane, deputies forcibly removed him from his vehicle, allegedly pulling him by his hair, slamming his head on the pavement, and repeatedly using tasers as they attempted to handcuff him. Additional law enforcement officers arrived and, according to the plaintiffs, either participated directly or failed to intervene as Mr. Krueger, now handcuffed and prone, was further restrained with leg shackles and a hobble tie. Mr. Krueger stopped breathing at the scene and was later pronounced dead at a hospital.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma reviewed the case after the plaintiffs, Mr. Krueger’s parents and estate representatives, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force and failure to intervene in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The defendants, including deputies and police officers, moved for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity. The district court denied summary judgment for most defendants, finding that, when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, there were sufficient grounds to show clearly established constitutional violations. The court found material disputes regarding the amount and duration of force used, including the number of taser applications and the nature of the prone restraint.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. The Tenth Circuit held that a reasonable jury could find the defendants used excessive force both in the initial removal and restraint of Mr. Krueger and in the prolonged prone restraint after he was subdued. The court also held that the failure to intervene in the use of excessive force was clearly established as a constitutional violation. The district court’s orders denying summary judgment were affirmed. View "Krueger v. Phillips" on Justia Law