Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Two University of Washington professors, who serve as moderators for a faculty email listserv, were investigated by the Washington State Executive Ethics Board after forwarding emails that allegedly contained political discussion and requests for fundraising. The Board reviewed several months of their emails during its investigations. One professor was ultimately fined $750 for improper use of state resources, while the other was not disciplined. The professors, on behalf of themselves and a proposed class of listserv subscribers, filed suit challenging the Board’s investigatory policies and practices, alleging that these chill their First Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington dismissed the professors’ complaint as unripe under Article III, finding that they had not sufficiently alleged that the Board’s policies chilled their speech. The district court also concluded that the professors’ emails, as public employees, were public records and thus not protected by a First Amendment privacy interest. Additionally, the court found the claims prudentially unripe because the Board’s investigations were ongoing.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the professors’ claims are ripe under both constitutional and prudential ripeness doctrines. The court found that the professors had sufficiently alleged a credible threat of future enforcement and chilling of speech, given their ongoing roles and the Board’s history of enforcement. The court also determined that the issues presented are fit for judicial decision and that withholding review would impose substantial hardship on the professors. The panel remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the professors’ First Amendment claims against the Board’s investigatory policies and practices are ripe for adjudication. View "FLAXMAN V. FERGUSON" on Justia Law

A certified nurse midwife in Nebraska sought to provide home birth services but was prevented from doing so by state law. The Nebraska Certified Nurse Midwifery Practice Act requires midwives to work under a supervising physician through a practice agreement and prohibits them from attending home births outside authorized medical facilities. The midwife alleged that these restrictions forced her to turn away women seeking home births and sued state officials, claiming the law violated her constitutional rights and the rights of her prospective patients.The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska dismissed the midwife’s claims. The court found that she failed to state a claim for violation of her own rights under the Due Process Clause and lacked standing to assert claims on behalf of her prospective patients. The district court concluded that the statutory requirements were rationally related to legitimate state interests in health and safety and that the midwife did not have a sufficiently close relationship with prospective patients nor could she show that those patients were hindered from bringing their own suits.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The appellate court held that the Nebraska law regulating midwifery is subject to rational basis review and that the legislature could rationally believe the restrictions serve legitimate interests in public health and safety. The court also held that the midwife lacked third-party standing to assert the rights of prospective patients because she did not have a close relationship with them and they were not hindered from bringing their own claims. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, upholding the dismissal of all claims. View "Swanson v. Hilgers" on Justia Law

Marcus D. Evans, an inmate at the Varner Supermax Unit in Arkansas, was placed in full restraints to attend a prison program. After returning to his cell, officers removed his hand restraints but refused to remove his leg restraints, despite his repeated requests. Evans remained in leg restraints for approximately 15 hours, during which he experienced pain, had difficulty sleeping, and was forced to cut off his clothing to shower. Medical records indicated he reported significant pain but showed no serious physical injury. Evans alleged that the officers’ refusal to remove the restraints was intentional and stemmed from prior altercations and threats.Evans filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, asserting an excessive force claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the officers. The officers moved for summary judgment, arguing qualified immunity. A magistrate judge recommended granting summary judgment, finding that while a jury could find a constitutional violation, the right was not clearly established. The district court declined to adopt this recommendation, holding that existing precedent clearly established that prolonged restraints without penological justification could constitute excessive force, and denied qualified immunity.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the denial of qualified immunity de novo. The court held that the officers’ refusal to remove the leg restraints constituted a use of force, and that Evans’s pain and discomfort, even absent serious injury, were sufficient to support an excessive force claim. The court further found that existing case law clearly established that subjecting an inmate to prolonged restraints without penological justification could violate the Eighth Amendment. Therefore, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to the officers. View "Evans v. Smith" on Justia Law

Judge Pauline Newman, a sitting judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, was investigated by a Special Committee of her circuit under the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980. The investigation was initiated after the Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit raised concerns about Judge Newman’s ability to manage her workload due to alleged health and age-related impairments. The Special Committee requested that Judge Newman undergo medical examinations and provide medical records, which she refused, arguing the requests and investigation were unlawful. As a result, the Federal Circuit’s Judicial Council suspended Judge Newman from receiving new case assignments for one year, with the suspension subsequently renewed.Judge Newman filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, challenging her suspension on statutory and constitutional grounds. She argued that the Judicial Council exceeded its statutory authority, violated her due process rights by not transferring the matter to another circuit, and that the Act’s case-suspension provision was unconstitutional both facially and as applied. The district court dismissed her statutory and as-applied constitutional claims for lack of jurisdiction, relying on circuit precedent, and rejected her facial constitutional challenge on the merits.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that, under binding precedent from McBryde v. Committee to Review Circuit Council Conduct & Disability Orders of the Judicial Conference of the United States, it lacked jurisdiction to review Judge Newman’s statutory and as-applied constitutional claims. The court further held that Judge Newman’s facial constitutional challenge to the Act’s case-suspension provision failed because the provision has many constitutional applications. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Newman v. Moore" on Justia Law

Following the 2012 mass shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School, Connecticut enacted legislation restricting the acquisition and possession of certain “assault weapons” and “large capacity magazines.” The laws were later expanded to include additional firearms. Individuals and organizations who wished to acquire and possess weapons restricted by these statutes, including AR-platform rifles and magazines holding more than ten rounds, challenged the laws. They argued that the restrictions violated their rights under the Second Amendment.In the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, the plaintiffs in both cases sought preliminary injunctions to prevent enforcement of the statutes. The district court denied the motions, finding that the plaintiffs had not shown a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits of their Second Amendment claims. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the regulated weapons and magazines were commonly used for self-defense, and, alternatively, that the state’s restrictions were consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of regulating unusually dangerous weapons. The plaintiffs appealed these rulings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of the preliminary injunctions. Applying the framework established by the Supreme Court in District of Columbia v. Heller and New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, the Second Circuit assumed, without deciding, that the plaintiffs’ proposed conduct was presumptively protected by the Second Amendment. The court concluded, however, that Connecticut’s laws are consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of regulating unusually dangerous weapons, as they impose targeted restrictions while preserving numerous alternatives for lawful self-defense. The court also found that the plaintiffs had not shown that the balance of equities and public interest favored an injunction. Accordingly, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of preliminary injunctive relief in both cases. View "Nat'l Ass'n for Gun Rights v. Lamont" on Justia Law

Ernest Clark, while on probation for a Louisiana felony conviction of aggravated assault with a firearm, was found in possession of a firearm. He was indicted for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits felons from possessing firearms. Clark moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to him under the Second Amendment, violated the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee, and exceeded Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause. The district court denied his motion. Clark then pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement, which included a waiver of most appellate rights except for a direct appeal of the district court’s order denying his motion to dismiss under the Second Amendment, as interpreted in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi sentenced Clark to 64 months in prison and three years of supervised release. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Clark raised several claims, but acknowledged that most were foreclosed or waived by his plea agreement, except for his as-applied Second Amendment challenge and his Fifth Amendment equal protection claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that disarming individuals convicted of violent felonies, such as aggravated assault with a firearm, and those found in possession of a firearm while on probation, is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court relied on its own recent precedents to conclude that Clark’s as-applied Second Amendment challenge failed. The court also found that Clark’s equal protection claim was waived by his plea agreement. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of conviction. View "USA v. Clark" on Justia Law

The case concerns the fatal shooting of Angel Rodriguez outside his home. Surveillance footage showed a silver Cadillac SUV near the scene, and eyewitnesses described the shooter as matching the build of Xavier Acosta. Acosta was identified as a suspect after a domestic violence incident involving his spouse, Rebecca. During the investigation, Acosta’s mother-in-law reported that Acosta confessed to killing Rodriguez out of love for Rebecca, who was Rodriguez’s ex-boyfriend. Police seized two cell phones belonging to Acosta and, after obtaining a search warrant, extracted their contents, which included a photograph of Rodriguez’s house taken minutes before the shooting. DNA evidence also linked Acosta to a Cadillac similar to the one seen in the surveillance footage.The Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, presided over Acosta’s trial. Acosta moved to suppress evidence obtained from his cell phones, arguing the warrant was overbroad and unsupported by probable cause, but the court denied the motion. The court also admitted certain letters between Acosta and his wife and evidence of a prior domestic violence incident. The jury found Acosta guilty of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon, and he was sentenced accordingly.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case. It held that the warrant authorizing the search of Acosta’s cell phones was constitutionally deficient because it lacked specific facts establishing probable cause that evidence of the murder would be found on the phones. The court found that the district court erred in denying the motion to suppress this evidence and that the good-faith exception did not apply. However, the court concluded that the error was harmless due to overwhelming other evidence of guilt. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the judgment of conviction. View "Acosta v. State" on Justia Law

Greg Wright was recorded on video robbing a gas station convenience store at gunpoint. The cashier, who was present during the incident, testified that Wright showed no signs of intoxication—he did not smell of alcohol, slur his words, or appear confused. The robbery was carried out efficiently, with Wright taking money, a lighter, and his own dollar before leaving. Police arrested Wright the next day and found a loaded pistol in his car. At trial, Wright represented himself and argued that he was too intoxicated to form the intent to rob, but the evidence from both the cashier and the surveillance video contradicted this claim.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County presided over the trial. The jury convicted Wright of robbery, possession of a firearm by a felon, and unlawful possession of ammunition, and found true the firearm use and prior conviction allegations. The trial court sentenced Wright to 36 years and four months to life, including enhancements for firearm use and prior convictions. Wright challenged the jury instructions regarding intoxication, the prosecutor’s closing argument, and the imposition of multiple punishments for related offenses, as well as the process for determining aggravating sentencing factors.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court erred by using the term “specific intent” in the intoxication defense instruction, but found the error harmless given the overwhelming evidence that Wright was not impaired. The court also found any assumed prosecutorial error and cumulative error to be harmless. However, the appellate court agreed that sentencing errors occurred: multiple punishments for the firearm and ammunition offenses violated Penal Code section 654, and Wright was denied his right to a jury trial on aggravating sentencing factors as required by Erlinger v. United States. The convictions were affirmed, but the case was remanded for full resentencing. View "People v. Wright" on Justia Law

A group of researchers at the University of California received multi-year federal research grants from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the National Science Foundation (NSF), and the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH). In April 2025, the EPA and NEH sent form letters to these researchers, terminating their grants. The letters cited changes in agency priorities and referenced the implementation of several Executive Orders issued in early 2025, which directed agencies to eliminate funding for projects related to diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI), environmental justice, and similar initiatives. The researchers alleged that these terminations were not based on individualized assessments but were instead the result of broad policy changes.The researchers filed a class action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, challenging the mass termination of grants on constitutional and statutory grounds, including violations of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the First and Fifth Amendments, and separation of powers. The district court provisionally certified two classes: one for those who received form termination letters without specific explanations, and another for those whose grants were terminated due to the DEI-related Executive Orders. The district court granted a preliminary injunction, ordering the agencies to reinstate the terminated grants, finding that the terminations were likely arbitrary and capricious and, for the DEI class, likely violated the First Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the government’s motion for a partial stay of the injunction. The court denied the motion, holding that the government had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits regarding jurisdiction, standing, or the substantive claims. The court found that the agencies’ actions were likely arbitrary and capricious under the APA and likely constituted viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment. The court also concluded that the balance of harms and public interest did not favor a stay. View "THAKUR V. TRUMP" on Justia Law

A prospective candidate for the 2025 New York City mayoral election, who had not been affiliated with any political party since 2006, sought to run as the nominee of an independent body named the “Independence Party.” New York election law prohibits both political parties and independent bodies from using certain words, including “Independence” and “Independent,” in their names. The candidate argued that these naming restrictions, as applied to him, violated his First Amendment rights to free speech and association.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York reviewed the candidate’s request for a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of the naming restrictions. The district court found that the candidate had standing to sue but denied the injunction. The court concluded that the naming provisions did not impose a severe burden on the candidate’s First Amendment rights, as they did not prevent him from communicating his political message or engaging in petitioning activity. Applying the Anderson-Burdick balancing test, the court determined that the restrictions were reasonable, nondiscriminatory, and justified by the state’s interest in preventing voter confusion.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Second Circuit held that the naming restrictions apply to independent bodies, that the candidate had standing, and that the state officials were not entitled to sovereign immunity. The court further held that the naming provisions did not impose a severe burden on the candidate’s First Amendment rights and were reasonable and viewpoint-neutral regulations justified by the state’s interest in avoiding voter confusion. The denial of the preliminary injunction was affirmed. View "Walden v. Kosinski" on Justia Law