Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Christopher Adams faced multiple counts of battery for allegedly assaulting two men and his girlfriend, Stephanie Lang, outside a bar. Lang initially identified Adams as the attacker but later claimed she did not remember the incident during a preliminary hearing. Due to her inconsistent statements, the State charged Lang with perjury and interference with law enforcement and warned her of additional perjury charges if she testified similarly at Adams' trial. Lang invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, citing the risk of incrimination in her pending perjury case and potential new perjury charges.The Ellis District Court ruled that Lang could invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege despite the State offering her use and derivative use immunity, which would make her trial testimony and any evidence derived from it inadmissible in her pending perjury case. The court found that the immunity did not protect her from a new perjury charge. A majority panel of the Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the immunity was insufficient to protect Lang's Fifth Amendment rights due to the imminent risk of a perjury charge. Chief Judge Karen Arnold-Burger dissented, arguing that the threat of a future perjury charge cannot be the basis for invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the decisions of the lower courts. The court held that Lang's Fifth Amendment privilege was extinguished by the State's grant of use and derivative use immunity, which is coextensive with the Fifth Amendment protection. The court further held that the risk of a future perjury charge is not a valid basis for invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege. The case was remanded to the district court with directions to compel Lang's testimony under the State's grant of immunity. View "State v. Adams " on Justia Law

Gregory W. Pheasant was charged with driving an off-road vehicle on public lands at night without a taillight, violating 43 C.F.R. § 8341.1(f)(5). This regulation was issued by the Secretary of the Interior under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA). Pheasant allegedly refused to stop for Bureau of Land Management rangers, made obscene gestures, and sped away before being apprehended. He was indicted on three counts, including the taillight violation.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada dismissed the taillight count, ruling that section 303(a) of the FLPMA was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. The court held that the statute gave the Secretary of the Interior too much authority without sufficient guidance or restraint, violating Article I of the Constitution, which vests all legislative powers in Congress.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court's dismissal, holding that section 303(a) of the FLPMA satisfies the "intelligible principle" test established by the Supreme Court. The Ninth Circuit found that the FLPMA provides clear guidance by requiring the Secretary to manage public lands under principles of multiple use and sustained yield, ensuring the land's value is realized sustainably. The court concluded that these constraints are sufficient to meet constitutional requirements, and thus, section 303(a) does not constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "USA V. PHEASANT" on Justia Law

A transgender woman, Darlene Griffith, filed a civil rights lawsuit regarding her pretrial confinement at the El Paso County Jail in Colorado. She alleged that the jail's policies, which assigned housing based on genitalia and denied her access to female clothing and products, violated her constitutional rights and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. The district court dismissed her complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), leading to this appeal.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado dismissed Ms. Griffith’s complaint, concluding that she failed to state a plausible claim for relief. The court applied rational-basis review to her Equal Protection claim, finding that transgender individuals are not a protected class under existing precedent. The court also dismissed her ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as she did not properly name the county as a defendant according to state law requirements.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that remand was required for some of Ms. Griffith’s claims. The court reversed and remanded for further proceedings on her Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim against Sheriff Elder in his official capacity, her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment cross-gender search claims against Sheriff Elder in his official capacity, and her Fourth Amendment abusive search claim against Deputy Mustapick. The court vacated the district court’s order dismissing Ms. Griffith’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims under Rule 12(b)(6) because those claims were dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), and that ruling was unchallenged on appeal. The court otherwise affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the remaining claims. View "Griffith v. El Paso County, Colorado" on Justia Law

The case involves parents (the "Parents") of a student at Baird Middle School in Ludlow, Massachusetts, who challenged the school's protocol regarding the use of a student's requested name and gender pronouns without notifying the parents unless the student consents. The Parents argued that this practice interfered with their parental rights under the U.S. Constitution. The school, represented by the Ludlow School Committee and various school officials, defended the protocol as necessary to ensure a safe and inclusive environment for students.In the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, the Parents' complaint was dismissed. The court held that the Parents failed to state a plausible claim that the school's protocol violated their fundamental right to direct the upbringing of their child. Specifically, the court found that the Parents did not adequately allege that the school's actions constituted medical treatment or that the conduct was so egregious as to shock the conscience, which is required to establish a substantive due process violation.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the protocol is a form of legislative conduct, not executive conduct, and thus did not require the shock-the-conscience test. The court determined that the Parents had identified a fundamental right but failed to plausibly allege that the school's conduct restricted that right. The court found that the school's actions, including the use of the student's chosen name and pronouns, did not constitute medical treatment and that the protocol did not restrict the Parents' rights to direct their child's upbringing.The First Circuit held that the protocol was rationally related to the legitimate state interest of creating a safe and inclusive educational environment for students. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Parents' complaint. View "Foote v. Ludlow School Committee" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to the constitutionality of the Ethics Commission Reform Act of 2022, which established the New York State Commission on Ethics and Lobbying in Government. The plaintiff, Andrew M. Cuomo, argued that the Act unconstitutionally vests executive power in the Commission without sufficient oversight by the Governor, violating the separation of powers doctrine. The Act was designed to address issues of public trust in government by creating an independent body to enforce ethics and lobbying laws, particularly to mitigate the risk of self-regulation by the Executive Branch.In the lower courts, the Supreme Court of Albany County declared the investigation and enforcement provisions of the Act unconstitutional and enjoined proceedings against Cuomo. The Appellate Division stayed the order pending appeal but ultimately affirmed the Supreme Court's decision, concluding that the Act violated the separation of powers by expanding legislative power at the expense of the Executive Branch. The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and concluded that the Act does not unconstitutionally encroach upon the powers of the Executive Branch. The court held that the Act is not unconstitutional in every conceivable application, emphasizing the flexible nature of the separation of powers doctrine in New York. The court noted that the Governor does not have exclusive powers of appointment and removal under the state constitution and that the Act's structure is consistent with the state's constitutional tradition. The court also found that the Act addresses a paramount state interest in maintaining public trust in government by ensuring impartial enforcement of ethics laws. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division's order, with costs, and declared the Act constitutional. View "Cuomo v New York State Commn. on Ethics & Lobbying in Govt." on Justia Law

Two defendants, Antonio Lemus and Carlos Daniel Canario-Vilomar, were convicted of cocaine-related charges under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA). Lemus was apprehended on December 30, 2021, when U.S. Coast Guard officers intercepted a vessel north of Panama, found cocaine, and determined the vessel was without nationality after Colombia could not confirm its registration. Canario-Vilomar was arrested on December 6, 2021, when a similar vessel was intercepted north of Colombia, and the Dominican Republic could not confirm its registration. Both defendants were charged with conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine on a vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction.In the Southern District of Florida, Lemus pled guilty to both counts and was sentenced to 87 months in prison. In the Middle District of Florida, Canario-Vilomar pled guilty to conspiracy, and his motion to dismiss the indictment was denied. He was sentenced to 120 months in prison. Both defendants appealed, arguing that the MDLEA exceeded Congress's authority under the Felonies Clause of the Constitution and that their vessels were not stateless under international law. Canario-Vilomar also argued that his offense occurred in an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which he claimed was beyond Congress's regulatory authority.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Congress's authority under the Felonies Clause is not limited by international law, affirming that the MDLEA's definition of a "vessel without nationality" and the inclusion of the EEZ within the "high seas" were constitutional. The court also rejected Canario-Vilomar's due process argument, citing precedent that the MDLEA does not require a nexus to the United States for jurisdiction. Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions of both defendants. View "USA v. Canario-Vilomar" on Justia Law

Terry Griffin was convicted of malice murder and other crimes related to the shooting death of her boyfriend, Wesley Hudson, in their shared apartment. Griffin was present at the scene and arrested immediately. During the trial, her counsel initially pursued a self-defense strategy but later shifted to arguing for a lesser charge of voluntary manslaughter after Griffin decided not to testify. The jury found Griffin guilty on all counts, including malice murder and felony murder.Griffin filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that her trial counsel violated her Sixth Amendment rights by abandoning her self-defense claim in favor of voluntary manslaughter without her consent, citing McCoy v. Louisiana. The trial court denied her motion, concluding that Griffin had not shown an "intransigent and unambiguous objection" to her counsel's strategy shift and that her counsel did not concede her guilt to the charges.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that Griffin's claim under McCoy failed because she did not make a clear and persistent objection to her counsel's strategy, as required by McCoy. The court noted that Griffin's plea of "not guilty" and her counsel's initial self-defense argument did not amount to the type of "vociferous insistence" and "adamant objection" seen in McCoy. Therefore, the court concluded that Griffin's Sixth Amendment rights were not violated, and her conviction was upheld. View "GRIFFIN v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

Roderick Watkins was convicted of malice murder and other crimes related to the March 14, 2012, shooting death of Ashley Clark and her unborn child. Watkins and Clark were in a romantic relationship that deteriorated over time, with Clark documenting physical, verbal, and emotional abuse in her diary. Clark became pregnant in late 2011, and despite Watkins's insistence on an abortion, she decided to keep the baby. On March 13, 2012, Clark wrote in her diary that Watkins planned to cause her to have a miscarriage. The next night, Watkins shot Clark, resulting in her death and the death of her unborn child.A Fulton County grand jury indicted Watkins on multiple charges, including murder and possession of cocaine. A jury found him guilty on all counts, and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison for murder and feticide, among other sentences for related charges. Watkins moved for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court. He then appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and addressed several claims by Watkins. The court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Clark's diary entries under Rule 807, as they bore equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness and were material and probative. The court also found no plain error in the admission of Watkins's pre-arrest silence or failure to come forward. However, the court concluded that the admission of testimony by a Georgia Bureau of Investigation analyst, who relayed the findings of a non-testifying analyst, violated the Confrontation Clause under Smith v. Arizona. Consequently, the court reversed Watkins's convictions for possession of cocaine and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony predicated on possession of cocaine. The court affirmed the remaining convictions. View "Watkins v. State" on Justia Law

A woman who had been in a long-term romantic relationship with a child's legal mother sought joint legal custody and parenting time under Georgia's Equitable Caregiver Statute, OCGA § 19-7-3.1, after the couple broke up. The statute allows a non-parent to seek custody or visitation rights if they have undertaken a parental role and developed a bonded and dependent relationship with the child, supported by a parent. The child's mother challenged the constitutionality of the statute and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's order.The Superior Court granted the woman's request for equitable caregiver status, finding that she had established a bonded and dependent relationship with the child and that the child would suffer long-term emotional harm without continued contact. The court awarded joint legal custody and parenting time to the woman, despite the mother's objections.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and raised concerns about the constitutionality of the Equitable Caregiver Statute, particularly regarding the fundamental right of parents to the care, custody, and control of their children. The court noted that any waiver of this constitutional right must be knowing and voluntary, and that conduct prior to the statute's effective date could not constitute such a waiver. The court concluded that the statute does not authorize trial courts to confer equitable caregiver status based on conduct by the legal parent that took place before the statute's effective date.The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the trial court's order, holding that the Equitable Caregiver Statute does not apply to parental conduct occurring before its effective date. The court did not resolve the constitutional questions but based its decision on statutory construction and the doctrine of constitutional avoidance. View "DIAS v. BOONE" on Justia Law

Michael Lovelace was charged with multiple felonies, including rape and aggravated kidnapping, along with special sentencing enhancements and aggravating factors under California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(c). Lovelace challenged the constitutionality of the rule 4.421(c) residual clause, which allows for consideration of any other factors that reasonably relate to the defendant or the circumstances under which the crime was committed. He argued that this clause violated the separation of powers and due process principles.The trial court denied Lovelace's motion to set aside the information, leading him to seek interlocutory review by petition for a writ of prohibition. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four, issued an order to show cause and held oral arguments. Following the Supreme Court's decision in People v. Lynch, which provided guidance on the interpretation and application of Senate Bill 567 amendments to section 1170, subdivision (b)(2), the court took supplemental briefing.The Court of Appeal granted writ relief, holding that the rule 4.421(c) residual clause is unconstitutionally vague and exceeds the Judicial Council’s delegated authority to adopt rules promoting uniformity in sentencing. The court found that the clause grants prosecutors and juries open-ended power to define sentencing criteria on an ad hoc basis, violating the separation of powers clause of the California Constitution. The court directed the trial court to vacate its order denying Lovelace's section 995 motion and to enter a new order sustaining the motion to the extent it seeks to invalidate the residual clause. The court prohibited the trial court from allowing a jury to consider any findings based on the rule 4.421(c) residual clause. View "Lovelace v. Superior Court" on Justia Law