Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Victory Insurance Company, a Montana property and casualty insurer, issued workers’ compensation policies to several businesses in 2019. Later that year, Victory entered into an agreement with Clear Spring Property and Casualty Company to reinsure and then purchase Victory’s book of business, including the relevant policies. Victory notified its insureds by phone and sent a single email on December 31, 2019, stating that their policies would be “upgraded” to Clear Spring policies effective January 1, 2020. All policies were rewritten under Clear Spring as of that date.The Montana Commissioner of Securities & Insurance (CSI) initiated an enforcement action in December 2022, alleging that Victory had illegally cancelled its policies and could be fined up to $2.7 million. After discovery, both parties moved for summary judgment before a CSI Hearing Examiner. The Hearing Examiner found that Victory committed 165 violations of Montana’s insurance code and recommended summary judgment for the CSI. The CSI adopted this recommendation, imposing a $250,000 fine with $150,000 suspended, payable only if further violations occurred within a year. Victory sought judicial review in the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, which affirmed the CSI’s decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case, applying the same standards as the district court. The Court held that the Hearing Examiner properly granted summary judgment because Victory’s actions constituted cancellations under the insurance code, regardless of whether they could also be considered assignments. The Court also held that Victory’s due process rights were not violated during the fine imposition process, that the statutory delegation of fine authority to the CSI was constitutional, and that Victory was not entitled to a jury trial because there were no material factual disputes. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order. View "Victory Insurance v. State" on Justia Law

After Missouri voters approved a constitutional amendment in November 2024 protecting the right to make decisions about reproductive healthcare, Planned Parenthood filed a lawsuit in the Circuit Court of Jackson County. The organization sought a declaration that various state abortion laws and regulations were unconstitutional under the new amendment and requested a preliminary injunction to prevent their enforcement while the case was pending. The circuit court initially granted a preliminary injunction enjoining several abortion-related statutes and regulations, and later expanded the injunction to include additional licensing requirements after a motion for reconsideration.The State of Missouri challenged the preliminary injunction, arguing that the circuit court applied the wrong legal standard. The Supreme Court of Missouri issued a peremptory writ directing the circuit court to vacate its orders and reconsider the injunction under a more rigorous standard, requiring a threshold finding that the party seeking the injunction is likely to prevail on the merits. The circuit court complied, reevaluated the request, and again issued a preliminary injunction enjoining the same statutes and regulations. The State then appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Missouri, raising multiple points of error and seeking a stay and expedited review.The Supreme Court of Missouri determined that it lacked exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the appeal because the circuit court had not yet ruled on the constitutional validity of the challenged statutes. The Court explained that its exclusive jurisdiction is only invoked when a claim that a statute is unconstitutional has been properly raised, preserved, and ruled upon in the lower court. Since the appeal concerned only the issuance of a preliminary injunction and not a final determination on the statutes’ validity, the Supreme Court of Missouri transferred the case to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, for further proceedings. View "Comprehensive Health of Planned Parenthood Great Plains v. State" on Justia Law

A group of professional auctioneers in Tennessee, including both licensed and unlicensed individuals, challenged a state law requiring auctioneers to obtain a license before conducting extended-time online auctions. The law, originally enacted in 1967 and updated in 2019 to address online auction formats, exempts certain types of online sales, such as fixed-price listings and timed listings that do not extend based on bidding activity. The plaintiffs, who conduct extended-time online auctions, argued that the licensing requirement infringed on their First Amendment rights by restricting their ability to communicate with potential buyers and craft narratives about auction items.Previously, one of the plaintiffs, McLemore, filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, challenging the law under both the First Amendment and the Dormant Commerce Clause. The district court granted summary judgment on the Dormant Commerce Clause claim but did not address the First Amendment issue. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated that decision for lack of standing and remanded with instructions to dismiss. Subsequently, McLemore and additional plaintiffs filed a new lawsuit, focusing on the First Amendment claim. The district court dismissed the case, holding that the law regulated professional conduct rather than speech and applied rational basis review, relying on the Sixth Circuit’s prior decision in Liberty Coins, LLC v. Goodman.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that Tennessee’s licensing requirement for auctioneers regulates economic activity and professional conduct, not speech, and that any burden on speech is incidental. The court applied rational basis review and concluded that the law is rationally related to the state’s legitimate interest in preventing fraud and incompetence in auctioneering. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "McLemore v. Gumucio" on Justia Law

A group of foster children in Oregon, through their representatives, brought a class action lawsuit against the Oregon Department of Human Services (ODHS) and state officials, alleging violations of their substantive due process rights due to serious abuses experienced while in ODHS’s legal custody. The plaintiffs sought relief on behalf of all children for whom ODHS had or would have legal responsibility, including those in ODHS’s legal custody but physically placed with their parents, either because they had not been removed from their homes or because they were on a temporary “Trial Home Visit” after removal.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon certified a general class that included all children in ODHS’s legal or physical custody. After extensive litigation, the parties reached a settlement agreement, but disagreed on whether the term “Child in Care” in the agreement included children in ODHS’s legal custody who were physically with their parents (the “Disputed Children”). The district court concluded that these children were not covered by the settlement, reasoning that children living with their biological parents did not have substantive due process rights to be free from serious abuses while in ODHS’s legal custody.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s interpretation of the settlement agreement and the scope of substantive due process protections. The Ninth Circuit held that the Disputed Children—those in ODHS’s legal custody but physically with their parents—are entitled to substantive due process protections. The court found that once the state assumes legal custody, it has an affirmative duty to provide reasonable safety and minimally adequate care, regardless of the child’s physical placement. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. View "WYATT B. V. KOTEK" on Justia Law

The petitioner was convicted by an Arizona jury of child molestation after he helped bathe young girls who were in his and his wife’s care through the foster system. The relevant Arizona statute defined child molestation as any direct or indirect touching of a child’s private parts, and, at the time, allowed a defendant to raise an affirmative defense by proving he was not motivated by sexual interest. The petitioner admitted to the touching but argued he lacked sexual motivation.After his first trial ended in a mistrial, the Arizona Supreme Court decided State v. Holle, which held that sexual motivation was not an element of the crime and that the lack of sexual interest was an affirmative defense the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence. At the petitioner’s second trial, the court instructed the jury accordingly, and he was convicted on some counts. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on Holle, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied review. The United States Supreme Court also denied certiorari. The petitioner then sought federal habeas relief in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, arguing that the statutory scheme unconstitutionally shifted the burden of disproving an essential element of the crime to him. The district court denied relief, finding the state courts’ application of federal law was not objectively unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. It held that Arizona’s statutory scheme violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by shifting to the defendant the burden of disproving sexual motivation, which is the critical fact distinguishing criminal from innocent conduct. The court concluded that the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision upholding the conviction was an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. The Ninth Circuit ordered the district court to grant the writ of habeas corpus. View "BIEGANSKI V. SHINN" on Justia Law

Police responded to reports of gunfire at a rowhouse in Southeast Washington, D.C., where they found spent shell casings but no suspects. Reviewing footage from a recently installed pole-mounted surveillance camera, officers observed a man firing a gun from the rear of the residence and later identified him as Demetrius Green. A search warrant executed that day at the residence uncovered large quantities of narcotics, digital scales, and a firearm. Green attempted to flee but was apprehended inside. Evidence linking Green to the residence included identification cards, personal items, and data from his cellphone, which contained a photograph of a bag of powder on a scale and a text message referencing drug sales.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied Green’s motion to suppress the pole-camera footage, finding he lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area surveilled. The court also admitted the challenged exhibits from Green’s cellphone, determining they were relevant to show knowledge and intent, and that any risk of unfair prejudice could be mitigated by a limiting instruction. At trial, Green was convicted by a jury on four counts related to drug and firearm offenses. He was sentenced to 84 months’ imprisonment and appealed his convictions.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the convictions. The court held that the use of the pole camera did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment because the area surveilled was exposed to public view and the surveillance was brief. The court also found the evidence sufficient to establish Green’s constructive possession of the drugs, given his connection to the residence and the items found. Finally, the court concluded that the challenged exhibits were properly admitted, and even if their admission was erroneous, any error was harmless. View "USA v. Green" on Justia Law

Police in Cheyenne, Wyoming, responded to a call about an unconscious man in a vehicle and arrested Derek Ascherin after finding drug paraphernalia and nearly 24 grams of suspected fentanyl pills. During the investigation, law enforcement suspected that Traquevis Dewayne Hardy was supplying fentanyl to Ascherin. Officers obtained a warrant to search Hardy’s Facebook messages, which revealed communications about fentanyl transactions. Hardy was later arrested in April 2023 with nine fentanyl pills in his possession.A grand jury in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming indicted Hardy for conspiracy to distribute at least 40 grams of fentanyl between July and December 2022. After a three-day trial, a jury found Hardy guilty. At sentencing, the district court attributed 1,773 grams of fentanyl to Hardy, relying in part on statements from a confidential source, and sentenced him to 168 months in prison. Hardy objected to the drug quantity calculation, arguing it was based on unreliable hearsay, but the district court overruled his objection. Hardy appealed his conviction and sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed three issues: whether Hardy’s absence from an in-chambers evidentiary ruling violated due process, whether the district court erred in admitting evidence of his later possession of fentanyl under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), and whether the sentencing court erred in relying on uncorroborated hearsay to determine drug quantity. The Tenth Circuit held that Hardy’s absence from the in-chambers conference did not violate due process and that any error in admitting the Rule 404(b) evidence did not affect the verdict. However, the court found clear error in the sentencing court’s reliance on uncorroborated hearsay for drug quantity. The Tenth Circuit affirmed Hardy’s conviction, vacated his sentence, and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Hardy" on Justia Law

Arkansas enacted a law in 2021 that prohibits healthcare professionals from providing or referring minors for gender transition procedures, which include certain medical and surgical interventions intended to alter a minor’s physical characteristics to those of a different sex. Four minors, their parents, and two healthcare professionals challenged the law, arguing it violated their constitutional rights. The law was passed over the governor’s veto and defined violations as unprofessional conduct subject to disciplinary action.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas initially granted a preliminary injunction, and a panel of the Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding a likelihood of success on the Equal Protection claim. After a bench trial, the district court permanently enjoined enforcement of the law, holding that it violated the Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the First Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the law does not classify based on sex or transgender status, but rather on age and medical procedure, and is therefore subject to rational basis review. The court found that the state’s interest in protecting the health and safety of minors provided a rational basis for the law. The court also concluded that there is no deeply rooted constitutional right for parents to obtain gender transition procedures for their children over a state prohibition. Regarding the First Amendment, the court determined that the law’s restriction on referrals regulates professional conduct with only incidental effects on speech and survives intermediate scrutiny. The permanent injunction was reversed and the case remanded. View "Brandt v. Griffin" on Justia Law

Two limited liability companies, majority-owned by California residents, applied for provisional licenses to operate marijuana dispensaries in New York under the state’s Adult Use application program. New York law gives “Extra Priority” to applicants who meet three criteria: (a) membership in a community disproportionately impacted by cannabis prohibition, (b) income below 80% of the county median, and (c) a conviction for a marijuana-related offense under New York law (or a close relative with such a conviction). The plaintiffs met the first two criteria but had marijuana convictions under California, not New York, law, making them ineligible for Extra Priority. They alleged that this licensing scheme discriminates against out-of-state applicants in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York denied the plaintiffs’ request for preliminary relief, holding that the dormant Commerce Clause does not apply to markets that Congress has criminalized, such as marijuana. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the state’s prioritization scheme was protectionist and that they had standing to challenge both the December Pool (in which they applied) and the November Pool (which was processed first and favored prior CAURD applicants, mostly New Yorkers).The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the plaintiffs have standing to challenge the December Pool’s Extra Priority regime and the November Pool’s precedence, but not the CAURD program. The court found the dormant Commerce Clause applies to New York’s marijuana licensing, as Congress has not clearly authorized state protectionism in this area. The court held that New York’s prioritization of applicants with New York marijuana convictions is a protectionist measure that violates the dormant Commerce Clause. The district court’s denial of preliminary relief was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Variscite NY Four, LLC v. New York State Cannabis Control Board" on Justia Law

The case concerns the fatal stabbing of Jason Cason, Jr. on November 10, 2022. Cason lived with Gary Mack, who testified that on the day of the incident, George Sharrod Johns, a friend and frequent visitor, entered Cason’s bedroom. Mack heard Cason plead, “[D]on’t hit me no more,” and soon after, saw Johns leave the apartment alone. Mack discovered Cason unresponsive and covered in blood, then saw Johns attempt to re-enter the apartment before leaving the area. Police later found bloodstains in Johns’s apartment matching Cason’s DNA. Forensic evidence established that Cason suffered 27 stab wounds, including defensive injuries, and died rapidly from chest wounds.A Fulton County grand jury indicted Johns for malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault. After a jury trial in December 2023, Johns was convicted on all counts. The trial court sentenced him to life in prison for malice murder, merging or vacating the other counts. Johns filed a motion for new trial, which was denied by the Superior Court of Fulton County in September 2024. He then appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed Johns’s claims that the evidence was insufficient, that the trial court erred in admitting certain autopsy photographs, and that his Confrontation Clause rights were violated by the testimony of a medical examiner who did not perform the autopsy. The court held that the evidence was constitutionally sufficient to support the conviction, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the autopsy photographs, and there was no Confrontation Clause violation because the testifying expert provided an independent opinion rather than relaying another’s findings. The court affirmed Johns’s convictions and sentence. View "JOHNS v. THE STATE" on Justia Law