Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

An employee was hired by a company and, as a condition of employment, signed an agreement requiring all employment-related claims to be resolved through arbitration governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The agreement specified that the employer would pay all arbitration costs except for certain fees. After the employee reported alleged workplace harassment and was subsequently terminated, he sued the employer in California Superior Court for retaliation and other violations. The employer moved to compel arbitration, which the court granted, and arbitration commenced. After about a year, the arbitrator issued invoices for fees, which the employer failed to pay within 30 days of receipt, as required by California Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.98. The employee then sought to withdraw from arbitration and proceed in court, arguing the employer’s late payment constituted a material breach under section 1281.98.The Superior Court denied the employee’s motion, reasoning that the arbitrator had set a new due date for payment and the employer paid within 30 days of that date. The California Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the statutory 30-day deadline applied from the original invoice date and that the employer’s late payment resulted in a material breach, allowing the employee to withdraw from arbitration. The Court of Appeal also held that section 1281.98 was not preempted by the FAA.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case to determine whether section 1281.98 is preempted by the FAA. The court held that section 1281.98 is not preempted, but clarified that the statute does not abrogate longstanding contract principles allowing relief from forfeiture for non-willful, non-grossly negligent, or non-fraudulent breaches. The court reversed the Court of Appeal’s order lifting the stay and remanded for the trial court to determine whether the employer’s late payment was excusable and whether the employee suffered compensable harm. View "Hohenshelt v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

A religious association that supports abortion as part of its core beliefs challenged Idaho’s laws criminalizing abortion. The association, which operates a telehealth abortion clinic in New Mexico, claimed to have members in Idaho who would be affected by the abortion bans. However, it did not have any patients in Idaho, no clinic or doctors licensed to practice in Idaho, and could not identify any Idaho citizen who had sought or would imminently seek an abortion through the organization. The association argued that Idaho’s laws harmed its members and frustrated its mission, and that it had diverted resources to open its New Mexico clinic in response to abortion bans in Idaho and other states.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that the association lacked both associational and organizational standing. The court also addressed the merits of the association’s constitutional claims and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal on the grounds of lack of Article III standing. The appellate court held that the association failed to show associational standing because it did not identify any specific member who had suffered or would imminently suffer an injury due to Idaho’s abortion laws. The court also found no organizational standing, as the association’s diversion of resources and alleged frustration of its mission were insufficient to establish standing under recent Supreme Court precedent. The Ninth Circuit did not reach the merits of the constitutional claims. The court remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the complaint could be saved by amendment, noting that dismissals for lack of jurisdiction should generally be without prejudice. View "THE SATANIC TEMPLE V. LABRADOR" on Justia Law

A man was involuntarily committed to the custody of Idaho’s Department of Health and Welfare under a state statute governing civil mental health commitments. After his commitment, hospital staff requested police assistance to transport him to another facility. When officers arrived, the man was cooperative and followed all instructions. Before placing him in the patrol car, an officer conducted a search for weapons. During this search, the officer felt an item in the man’s pocket that he suspected was drug-related, not a weapon. The officer reached into the pocket and found a small bag containing methamphetamine, leading to a felony drug possession charge.The Fifth Judicial District Court of Idaho reviewed the man’s motion to suppress the methamphetamine evidence, arguing that the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court found that the man was cooperative, showed no signs of being armed or dangerous, and that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to believe he was carrying a weapon. The court concluded that the search was not justified under any recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement and granted the motion to suppress. The State’s subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho considered whether the warrantless search of a person in civil protective custody under Idaho Code section 66-329 was permissible under the Fourth Amendment. The court held that the State failed to show the search fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement or was otherwise reasonable. The court clarified that the “community caretaking” function is not a standalone exception to the warrant requirement and that neither the search incident to arrest nor the special needs exception applied here. The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court’s order suppressing the evidence. View "State v. Adams" on Justia Law

Over a ten-day period in April 2020, a series of armed robberies targeted MetroPCS stores in the Miami area. The perpetrator, later identified as Francisco Louis, used a consistent method and attire, including a black Mercedes with a distinctive dent. After a police chase, Louis was apprehended, and evidence linking him to the robberies was recovered from his car, satchel, and residence. He was charged with six counts of Hobbs Act robbery.After his arrest, Louis spent several months in state custody before being transferred to federal custody in January 2021. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted four government-requested continuances for his arraignment and indictment, citing COVID-19 pandemic restrictions. Louis was indicted in April 2021, and his trial was initially set for August 2021. However, Louis, through counsel, requested three additional continuances to prepare for trial, resulting in the trial beginning in March 2022. He was convicted on all counts and sentenced to 218 months in prison.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Louis argued violations of both the Speedy Trial Act and the Sixth Amendment’s speedy trial guarantee, as well as challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, jury instructions, and certain evidentiary rulings. The Eleventh Circuit held that Louis had waived his statutory Speedy Trial Act claim by failing to file a valid motion to dismiss before trial. Regarding the Sixth Amendment claim, the court found that although the delay was presumptively prejudicial, the reasons for delay were attributable to the pandemic and Louis’s own requests, and he failed to show actual prejudice. The court also rejected his other challenges and affirmed the conviction and sentence. View "USA v. Louis" on Justia Law

Three residents and taxpayers of a Minnesota school district challenged a provision in the collective bargaining agreement between the district and its teachers’ union. The agreement allowed teachers to take up to 100 days per year of paid leave to work for the union, with the union reimbursing the district for the cost of substitute teachers but not for the full salaries and benefits of the teachers on leave. The residents objected to the alleged political and campaign activities conducted by teachers during this leave and filed suit, claiming violations of the First Amendment, the Minnesota Constitution, and state labor law.Previously, the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota dismissed the case, finding that the residents lacked Article III standing. On an earlier appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the residents had adequately alleged municipal taxpayer standing at the motion to dismiss stage and remanded the case. On remand, the district court again granted summary judgment for lack of standing, concluding that the residents had not shown a sufficient injury in fact. The residents appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and held that two of the residents, as current municipal taxpayers, had Article III standing because they demonstrated that district funds were expended solely due to the challenged union leave policy. The court found that the expenditure of funds, even if partially reimbursed, constituted a direct injury to municipal taxpayers. The court also held that the intermingling of local, state, and federal funds in the district’s general fund did not defeat standing. The judgment of the district court was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Huizenga v. ISD No. 11" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted in 2012 of assaulting the mother of his child, which constituted a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence under New York law. Several years later, he was arrested in New York City for possessing a firearm, specifically a .380 caliber pistol, after having been previously convicted of that domestic violence misdemeanor. He pleaded guilty to one count of possessing a firearm after a domestic violence conviction, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). At sentencing, the district court considered his criminal history, including a 2013 state drug conviction, and imposed a forty-eight-month prison term and three years of supervised release.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York determined that the 2013 state drug conviction did not qualify as a “controlled substance offense” under the federal Sentencing Guidelines, resulting in a lower base offense level for sentencing. Both the defendant and the government appealed: the defendant challenged the constitutionality of § 922(g)(9) under the Second Amendment and the reasonableness of his sentence, while the government contested the district court’s interpretation of the drug conviction under the Guidelines.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that § 922(g)(9) is constitutional, both facially and as applied to the defendant, because it is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of disarming individuals deemed dangerous, such as those convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors. The court also found that the defendant’s sentencing challenges were moot, as he had completed his prison term and there was no indication the district court would reduce his supervised release. Additionally, the court agreed with the government’s concession that its cross-appeal was foreclosed by recent precedent. The court dismissed the appeal in part as moot and otherwise affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Simmons" on Justia Law

In 1973, Fred Krug committed murder and other violent crimes while on parole, leading to his conviction and a life sentence plus additional consecutive terms. Over the years, Krug accumulated numerous disciplinary infractions in prison but had maintained a largely clean record since 2003, aside from a single incident in 2017. He was denied parole in 1994, 1995, 2012, and 2016. In 2022, at age 75, Krug became eligible for parole again. A two-member panel of the New Jersey State Parole Board denied his application in 2023, citing both old and new information, including his criminal history and institutional behavior, and set his next eligibility for thirty-six months later.Krug appealed the denial to the full Parole Board, arguing that the panel violated the 1979 Parole Act by failing to present new evidence since his last denial, as that Act required only “new information” to be considered at subsequent hearings. The full Board affirmed the denial, explaining that a 1997 amendment had removed the new-information limitation, allowing consideration of the entire record at each hearing. Krug then appealed to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, which upheld the Board’s decision, relying on its earlier ruling in Trantino v. State Parole Board (Trantino V) that the 1997 amendment was a procedural change and did not violate ex post facto protections.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and held that constitutional ex post facto prohibitions bar only punishment beyond what was contemplated at the time the crime was committed. Since the law in effect when Krug committed his offenses (the Parole Act of 1948) permitted the Board to consider all available information, the retroactive application of the 1997 amendment did not increase his punishment. The Court therefore rejected Krug’s ex post facto challenge and affirmed the lower court’s judgment as modified. View "Krug v. New Jersey State Parole Board" on Justia Law

A man in Michigan was found by sheriff’s deputies shooting a rifle in his backyard while intoxicated and under the influence of marijuana. Upon investigation, deputies discovered multiple firearms, three pipe bombs, and a large amount of ammunition in his home. The man admitted to regularly using marijuana and building the pipe bombs himself. He was convicted under state law for possessing a firearm while intoxicated and later pleaded guilty in federal court to possessing unregistered firearms (the pipe bombs).The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, following the Sentencing Guidelines, determined that the defendant was a “prohibited person” under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) due to his unlawful drug use and firearm possession. This resulted in a higher base offense level and a sentencing range of 46 to 57 months; the court imposed a 52-month sentence. The defendant objected, arguing that applying § 922(g)(3) to him violated the Second Amendment, but the district court rejected this argument, finding that he posed a threat to the public.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed whether § 922(g)(3) could constitutionally be applied to the defendant. The court held that, under its precedent and Supreme Court guidance, Congress may disarm groups it deems dangerous, provided individuals have an opportunity to show they are not actually dangerous. The court found that the defendant’s conduct—firing a rifle while drunk and high in a residential area—demonstrated he was dangerous. Therefore, the application of § 922(g)(3) to him was constitutional, and the district court’s sentence was affirmed. View "United States v. VanOchten" on Justia Law

Raul Guzman was living in a camper trailer parked on property in Albuquerque, New Mexico, where the City had declared two buildings substandard and posted notices prohibiting anyone from residing in the structures or on the property. Despite these warnings, Guzman stayed in the trailer with the property owner’s permission. In September 2022, city code enforcement officers, accompanied by police, inspected the property. Upon finding Guzman in the trailer, officers entered, detained him, and discovered a firearm inside.A grand jury indicted Guzman for being a felon in possession of a firearm. He moved to suppress the evidence, arguing he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the trailer because he had the owner’s permission to stay there and the posted notices did not specifically mention the trailer. The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico held an evidentiary hearing and denied the motion. The court found that, although Guzman may have had a subjective expectation of privacy, this expectation was not objectively reasonable because the posted notices made clear that residing on the property was unlawful. The court also found, in the alternative, that exceptions to the warrant requirement would have justified the officers’ actions. Guzman subsequently pleaded guilty but reserved the right to appeal the suppression ruling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Tenth Circuit held that Guzman lacked Fourth Amendment standing to challenge the search because he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the trailer. The court reasoned that, given the explicit posted notices prohibiting residence on the property and Guzman’s admission that he read them, society would not recognize his expectation of privacy as reasonable. The court therefore affirmed the denial of the suppression motion. View "United States v. Guzman" on Justia Law

A property owner challenged the tax assessment of its facility in Salisbury, Vermont, for the 2023-2024 tax year. After a grievance hearing attended by both the property owner and its attorney, the town listers denied the grievance and mailed the decision by certified mail to the property owner’s address of record. The property owner received the notice twelve days before the deadline to appeal but did not forward it to its attorney until after the appeal period had expired. The attorney then filed an appeal to the Board of Civil Authority (BCA), which was rejected as untimely.The property owner appealed to the Vermont Superior Court, Addison Unit, Civil Division, arguing that the town violated its procedural due process rights by failing to send notice of the listers’ decision to both the property owner and its attorney. The Superior Court allowed the property owner to amend its complaint and ultimately granted summary judgment in its favor, relying on Perry v. Department of Employment & Training, which required notice to both a claimant and their attorney in the context of unemployment benefits. The court ordered the BCA to hear the untimely appeal.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that, in the context of property tax grievances, procedural due process does not require notice to be mailed to both the taxpayer and the taxpayer’s counsel. The Court distinguished Perry as limited to unemployment-benefit proceedings and found that the statutory scheme for property tax appeals only requires notice to the taxpayer. Because the property owner received actual notice and had sufficient time to appeal, the Court concluded that due process was satisfied. The Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court’s decision and instructed that summary judgment be entered for the Town of Salisbury. View "Salisbury AD 1, LLC v. Town of Salisbury" on Justia Law