Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Ralph Burnell petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Bibb Circuit Court to vacate its 2011 order that denied his motion to dismiss claims Plaintiff Christi Burry Kelley filed against him. In 2007 while she was an inmate at the Bibb County jail, Plaintiff slipped in the shower and was injured. Petitioner was the warden of the jail at the time. Plaintiff sued the warden, the jail, the sheriff's department, and the sheriff, alleging negligence and wantonness. Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing among other things that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to hear the claims against them under state immunity. The trial court dismissed as to the County, the jail and the sheriff's department and sheriff, but denied the motion as to Defendant. Defendant argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that he was entitled to State immunity because he was being sued for money damages for actions that arose out of his performance of his duties as a deputy sheriff. Finding that Defendant established a clear legal right to the dismissal of Plaintiff's claims against him, the Supreme Court issued the writ.

The Montgomery County Board of Education (the Board), several of its members, and a teacher in the school system petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to vacated its order that denied their motion for summary judgment. Third-grade student "S.K." went to the restroom with two friends. Her teacher did not accompany them. S.K. claims that when she attempted to leave the restroom stall, the door jammed. She tried to climb over the door to get out of the stall but slipped and fell, cutting her face on a metal hanger on the back of the door. S.K. (by and through her mother Tetrina Capehart) sued the Board, its members individually and in their official capacities, and the teacher asserting negligence and wantonness claims, and sought compensatory and punitive damages. The Board and teacher argued that there were no genuine issues of fact, and that S.K. was contributorily negligent from "playing" in the restroom. The circuit court denied the Board's motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the Board demonstrated that under the state constitution, it had absolute immunity from suit for claims asserted against it. The Court granted the Board's petition and issued the writ to direct the circuit court to rule in the Board's favor.

Randy Fielding petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Walker Circuit Court to vacate its order denying his motion for summary judgment and to enter a summary judgment based on his claim to State immunity. In November 2004, Debra Jackson and Jerry Jackson sued Fielding, individually and in his capacity as a deputy sheriff, after he entered their property and shot their dog while on duty. The complaint alleged claims of negligence, wantonness, the tort of outrage, intentional infliction of emotional distress, trespass to person, and trespass on property. The Jacksons sought "compensatory, actual, incidental, and punitive damages, plus attorney fees." Fielding moved for summary judgment, arguing that because he was acting within the line and scope of his employment as a sheriff's deputy at the time of the incident, he was entitled to State immunity from the Jacksons' suit. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded Fielding established a clear legal right to a writ of mandamus. Therefore, the Court granted his petition and issue the writ.

The Supreme Court addressed the validity of a circuit court order that granted Pamela and Robert Washington a new trial. In an earlier action, the Supreme Court issued a writ of mandamus on petition of John Limerick, which directed the trial court to vacate its order that granted the Washngtons' motion for a new trial. The Court issued the writ on the basis that the Washington's motion was entered after the 90-day period referred to in Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P., thus depriving the trial court of jurisdiction in the case. While the Supreme Court was considering the validity of the trial court's new-trial order in that earlier case, the Washingtons filed a motion for relief from judgment in the present case which related back to their motion in the earlier action. On January 7, 2011, upon release of our opinion in Limerick, the trial court entered an order vacating its order granting a new trial in accordance with our instructions but simultaneously setting the Washingtons' pending Rule 60(b) motion for a hearing. Approximately six months later, on July 1, 2011, the trial court once again ordered a new trial, purportedly based this time on Rule 60(b). Subsequently, Limerick petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its second new-trial order. Once again, the Supreme Court granted the petition and issued the writ.

The State of Alabama petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Court of Criminal Appeals to vacate its order that granted a mandamus petition filed by Jeremy B. Jones, and that directed Mobile Circuit Judge Charles Graddick to recuse himself from presiding over Jones's postconviction proceedings. In October 2005, Judge Graddick presided over a trial in which Jones was convicted on four counts of capital murder and was sentenced to death. The jury was sequestered throughout the trial, which lasted several days. After his conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal, Jones filed a petition for postconviction relief. In that petition Jones alleged that juror "T.E." was unfit to serve on the jury on account of alcohol dependence and that T.E. had failed to answer truthfully certain questions on voir dire regarding his alcohol dependence. According to Jones, posttrial interviews revealed: (1) that T.E. had told Judge Graddick during Jones's trial that he was an alcoholic; (2) that T.E. had received permission from Judge Graddick to drink alcohol during sequestration; and (3) that Judge Graddick did not inform Jones's counsel that T.E. had requested such permission and that Judge Graddick had granted it. Jones's petition alleged juror misconduct, as well as juror incompetence. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that because Judge Graddick would not be a material witness in Jones's postconviction proceedings, no "reasonable person knowing everything that the judge knows would have a 'reasonable basis for questioning the judge's impartiality.'" Thus, the Court held Judge Graddick did not exceed his discretion in denying Jones's motion for his recusal, and the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in holding that he did. The Court granted the State's petition for mandamus.

The University of South Alabama Medical Center and the University of South Alabama Children's and Women's Hospital appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Mobile County. The County filed a complaint seeking a judgment to interpret Act 83-501. In its complaint, the County asserted that the Act was indefinite and unclear as to which hospitals qualify for reimbursements and the amount of those reimbursements. The County named several hospitals as defendants, including the University of Southern Alabama Children's and Women's Hospital. The Hospitals answered the complaint asserting that the Act is not indefinite, and that Mobile County previously provided reimbursement for providing indigent care and that it could continue to do so "based on established procedures and precedence and the plain meaning of the Act." In its review, the Supreme Court concluded that there was no justiciable controversy; Mobile County only sought an advisory opinion in its declaratory-judgment complaint. The trial court therefore lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over this action. The Court vacated the trial court's order and dismissed the case.

The issue before the Supreme Court pertained to the admissibility into evidence a child witness's prior inconsistent out-of-court statements. The Court granted certiorari to address this as an issue of first impression: whether a part of the Child Physical and Sexual Abuse Victim Protection Act conflicted with the Alabama Rules of Evidence. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that an "inherent tension" existed between the Act and the Rules of Evidence insofar as it permitted a prior inconsistent out-of-court statement of a child witness to be considered substantive evidence of asserted facts when the rules considered those statements as hearsay. "M.L.H." was adjudicated a youthful offender based on the trial court's finding that he was guilty of first-degree sodomy, and he was sentenced accordingly. M.L.H. appealed, and the Court of Criminal Appeals determined that M.L.H.'s prior out-of-court statements, although admissible as substantive evidence under the Act, were inadmissible as substantive evidence under the rules of evidence. The court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. The State appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Criminal Appeals, finding no conflict between the Act and the rules of evidence. The case was remanded for reassessment of the substantive admissibility of M.L.H.'s prior inconsistent out-of-court statements.

Defendant Brandon Mitchell was convicted on four counts of capital murder for killing three people during the course of a robbery at a hotel. The jury recommended that Defendant be sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parol on each conviction. After considering Defendant's presentence report and holding a sentencing hearing, the trial court overrode the jury's recommendation and sentenced Defendant to death. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. Defendant petitioned the Supreme COurt for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the appellate court, asserting seventeen separate grounds for review. The Court granted the writ in May 2011, and issued the writ to examine the sole question on whether the trial court complied with Ala. Code 1975 section 13A-5-47(d) and (e). Upon receiving the record, the Court determined the writ was "improvidently issued" and quashed it. The Court found that the trial court fully complied with Alabama Code.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, Southern Division sent a certified question to the Supreme Court. While the Court initially accepted the certified question; however upon review, the Court declined to answer it. The Court noted that the certified question was framed in the abstract, with no reference to any specific language in the title-insurance policy at the heart of the case (i.e., as an evidentiary issue with broad application). "The parties, in their briefs to this Court, do not address the construction of the policy at issue and instead refer this Court to various authorities discussing how valuation may be determined in various title-insurance contexts. Additionally, it is not apparent from the materials before us that the district court has had the opportunity to address whether the specific language of the policy would control the determination of the value of the property. Therefore, we see no grounds under Rule 18 [of the Rules of Alabama Civil Procedure] that will allow this Court to answer the question."

Students and former students of the University of Alabama, Auburn University, and the University of Alabama at Birmingham, filed three separate class-action lawsuits in the Jefferson Circuit Court challenging the legality of so-called "dining-dollars" programs implemented by the universities and pursuant to which all undergraduate students were required to pay a mandatory dining fee each semester, which was then credited back to the students in the form of "dining dollars" that could be spent only at on-campus dining outlets controlled exclusively by the food-service vendors for the universities - Aramark Educational Services, Inc., at UA; Compass Group, USA, Inc. (Chartwells) at Auburn; and Sodexo, Inc., at UAB. The trial court dismissed the three actions, and the students appealed. The Supreme Court consolidated the appeals for the purpose of writing one opinion and affirmed all three. The students sued the boards of trustees governing the universities and the food-service vendors, alleging that the dining-dollars programs violated: (1) state antitrust laws; (2) the Alabama Constitution inasmuch as it forbids the State from having an interest in a private enterprise; (3) the rule in 16-1-32(d) barring universities from charging excessive transaction fees to merchants that accept university-issued debit cards; and (4) the common-law prohibition on conversion. Because the boards of trustees are entitled to state immunity pursuant to section 14 of the Alabama Constitution, all claims against them were properly dismissed. The university administrators and foodservice vendors were entitled to immunity on the asserted antitrust claims as well, albeit state-action immunity as opposed to state immunity. Moreover, because the students lacked standing to pursue a cause of action for a violation of 16-1-32(d), and because the students did not and could not allege the necessary elements of a conversion claim, the trial court also properly dismissed the students' other claims.